Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction
Graham (George)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Cover Blurb

  1. Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction is a lively and accessible introduction to one of philosophy's most active and important areas of research.
  2. In this second edition, George Graham maintains the strengths, structure, and overall features of the first, but expands its scope, deepens the detail, and reinforces the student oriented style and coverage. The book is aimed at readers with little or no background in philosophy and covers a broad range of issues. Included are such central topics as the mind/body problem, personal identity, consciousness, intentionality and freedom of the will, as well as others rarely included in elementary introductions such as 'after-death experience’, minds of animals and of God, folk psychology, mental illness, altruism, weakness of will, and happiness.
  3. The book begins with a crisp introduction to the nature of the philosophy of mind, and ends with a provocative discussion of the causal role of consciousness in depression and schizophrenia. It is supported by consideration of classical and contemporary figures ranging from St Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, and Hume to the Churchlands, Daniel Dennett, and John Searle.
  4. It is the ideal text for a first course in philosophy of mind.
  5. George Graham is Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy, and Professor of Psychology, at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He is co-editor (with William Bechtel) of A Companion to Cognitive Science (Blackwell Publishers, 1998), and (with N. Scott Arnold and Theodore M. Benditt) of Philosophy Then and Now (also published by Blackwell, 1998).
Contents
    Preface to the Second Edition – viii
    Acknowledgments – xi
  1. What is Philosophy of Mind? – 1
    1.1 Beginning Definitions, Elementary Ideas – 2
    1.2 Color in Black and White – 8
  2. Death and Identity – 16
    2.1 Christianity and the Problem of Survival – 17
    2.2 The After-Death Experience – 22
    2.3 Dissent from After Death – 27
    2.4 The Idea of ‘Personal Identity' – 30
    2.5 Glorifying the Afterlife1 – 35
    2.6 Solace and Annihilation – 36
  3. The Problem of Other Minds – 42
    3.1 The Loneliness of Skepticism – 43
    3.2 How Not to Solve the Problem of Other Minds – 45
    3.3 How to Solve the Problem of Other Minds – 54
    3.4 Other Minds and the Best Explanation Argument – 56
  4. Mind and Belief in Animals – 65
    4.1 The Mental Community – 65
    4.2 Optimism about Animal Belief – 67
    4.3 Pessimism about Animal Belief – 69
    4.4 The Challenge of Animal Belief – 76
    4.5 Horse and Chimp – 80
  5. Mind and Belief in Computers – 87
    5.1 Could a Computer Believe? – 87
    5.2 Functionalism and Intentionality – 89
    5.3 The Chinese Room Argument – 94
    5.4 The Counter-Argument from Possibility – 97
    5.5 The Counter Argument from Intentional Anti-Realism – 103
    5.6 Once More: Could a Computer Believe? – 107
  6. Mind and Belief in God – 111
    6.1 A Dilemma for St Thomas – 112
    6.2 Does God Possess Beliefs? – 115
    6.3 Suffering and Love – 119
    6.4 On Having it All – 122
  7. Rational Action – 125
    7.1 The Concept of ‘Rational Action' – 125
    7.2 Rationality versus Irrationality – 128
    7.3 Is Weakness of Will Unreasonable? – 130
    7.4 Is Unselfish Action Impossible? – 136
  8. Does Mind Depend Upon Brain? – 145
    8.1 Materialism – 145
    8.2 Is Materialism Correct? – 149
    8.3 Brentano's Thesis – 152
    8.4 Intentionality and Materialism – 155
    8.5 Supervenience2 and Melancholia or Why Did Robert Schumann Starve Himself to Death? – 162
    8.6 Explanation and Mind/Brain Supervenience3 – 168
  9. Inside Persons – 175
    9.1 A Question of Gender – 175
    9.2 What Is It Like to Be a Person? – 176
    9.3 Freedom and Explanation – 180
    9.4 The Dilemma of Free Will – 184
    9.5 Folk Psychology, Freedom, and Compatibilism – 187
    9.6 Happy Ending – 192
  10. Consciousness, Matter, and Morality – 200
    10.1 Consciousness Defined – 200
    10.2 Six Roles of Consciousness – 202
    10.3 Is Consciousness a Brain Process? – 204
    10.4 Consciousness and Animal Liberation – 211
    10.5 An Impossible Consciousness – 216
  11. Fear and Trembling – 227
    11.1 Consciousness Epiphenomenalism – 227
    11.2 The Master Argument for Consciousness Epiphenomenalism – 229
    11.3 Attacking the Master Argument – 231
    11.4 Defeating the Master Argument – 233
    11.5 The Intelligent Behavior Hypothesis – 235
    11.6 The Divided Labor Hypothesis – 240
    11.7 Criticism and Commitments – 244
    11.8 Final Feeling – 247
  12. Glossary – 252
  13. A Philosophy of Mind Bookshelf – 256
  14. Index – 262

BOOK COMMENT:

Wiley-Blackwell; 2nd Revised edition edition (14 Aug 1998)



"Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction - Preface"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Preface


Preface to the Second Edition
  1. For you will do me much greater good by putting an end to ignorance of my psyche than if you put an end to an affliction of my body.
    … Plato, Hippias Minor
  2. This is a book to begin with: to begin the philosophy of mind. It tries to make the main ideas of the subject available to readers with little or no previous exposure to philosophy. It is primarily intended for undergraduate students and the inquisitive general reader.
  3. The first edition appeared in 1993. This is the second edition. What changes have been made?
  4. The most visible change is that the book is longer. A chapter on epiphenomenalism about consciousness has been added. The discussions of personal identity, materialism, freedom of will, and conscious experience have been substantially revised. The chapter on computer belief and the mind of God has been split into two chapters. Both discussions have been expanded, the first with consideration of functionalism. Paragraphs prompted by philosophic interest in psychopathology, neuroscience, and cognitive science have found their way into different chapters. Sections of various chapters have been rewritten, either because they contained mistakes or because the quality or clarity of argumentation wanted improvement. In all, about a third of the book is new or different.
  5. The structure is the same. Each chapter addresses topics which are distinguishable from topics addressed in other chapters. So someone who is interested in whether persons can survive bodily death could read the second chapter without reading the first, whereas someone who is curious about freedom of will could turn immediately to the ninth chapter for a self-enclosed guide to the rudiments of that concept. While the chapters stand alone, however, the book can be read from front to back. When read in order a narrative unfolds (with some redundancies as seem unavoidable). A cautious and, no doubt, incautious train of my own thoughts, indeed, there is.
  6. The first chapter provides, to begin with, a working definition of philosophy of mind as well as representative discussion of a topic within the subject. This is the question of whether knowledge of conscious experience is essentially subjective or first-personal. The book is then divided into ten main chapters, each of which deals with a specific family of topics central to the subject. Both the choice of topics and their treatment is influenced by current philosophic research and activity. The current influence is perhaps most clearly shown in the organization of the second through sixth chapters, which directly mirrors contemporary concern with the attribution of mind to others: the disembodied1, other human beings, nonhuman animals+XX+, computers, and God. This is folIowed by discussions of rational action, materialism about Intentionality and supervenience2, freedom and personhood, and the issues and debates which these topics have inspired. The tenth chapter applies philosophy of mind to ethical debate over animal liberation. It employs theses about animal consciousness to support critical moves in the debate. It also addresses the question of whether conscious experience is a brain process. The eleventh and final chapter locates debate about the causal power of consciousness within the broad confines of contemporary psychopathology and neuroscience.
  7. Several important figures in past and present philosophy of mind are discussed, although this is not an intellectual history text. My own convictions and preferences are present, sometimes visibly in certain remarks, always invisibly in underlying editorial decisions, but this is not a personal philosophy of mind. I try to let positions and arguments speak for themselves. I also try to maintain contact with puzzlement and perplexity about the mind. The mind/body problem, for example, may be made genuinely interesting to novices when bound up with questions of survival of bodily death (as attempted in the second chapter) and of mental illness and suicidal depression (as attempted in the eighth). It is less interesting, perhaps even uninteresting, if people simply walk through the Philosopher's Museum of Mind/Body ‘Isms' (materialism, etc.) without the partner of perplexity.
  8. A long paragraph about footnotes, endnotes, citations, and reading lists: To offer a visually uncluttered text, there are no footnotes. When a particular reference is part of the narrative progression or development of an idea, I offer citation in the main text. Otherwise references are in endnotes. Endnotes, as the name suggests, are relegated to the backs of chapters, where they help the author to acknowledge sources and the curious reader to track down references and suggested readings. In this book they also function as notes. They add information to the text, which seems useful to a student, who otherwise may wonder why various authors or works are mentioned. Readers eager to read more philosophy of mind may consult ‘A philosophy of mind bookshelf' at the back of the book. By examining citations, endnotes, and the philosophy of mind bookshelf, students should find ample bibliographic orientation for term papers and other academic projects.
  9. Although the book is written in a non-technical style, I include a glossary.
    … George Graham University of Alabama at Birmingham



"Graham (George) - What is Philosophy of Mind?"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 1


Contents
  1. Beginning Definitions, Elementary Ideas – 2
  2. Color in Black and White – 8

Comments
  1. The first section discusses what philosophy is – focusing on its comprehensiveness (divided into breadth and depth) and systematicity – and its relation to the sciences (in particular – for philosophy of mind – psychology and neuroscience).
  2. The second section is a preview of Jackson’s knowledge argument. It’s simply introduced as a taster.
    The works cited include:- While I also have (at least) the following in addition:-



"Graham (George) - Death and Identity"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 2


Contents
  1. Christianity and the Problem of Survival – 17
  2. The After-Death Experience – 22
  3. Dissent from After Death – 27
  4. The Idea of ‘Personal Identity' – 30
  5. Glorifying the Afterlife1 – 35
  6. Solace and Annihilation – 36



"Graham (George) - The Problem of Other Minds"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 3


Contents
  1. The Loneliness of Skepticism – 43
  2. How Not to Solve the Problem of Other Minds – 45
  3. How to Solve the Problem of Other Minds – 54
  4. Other Minds and the Best Explanation Argument – 56

Comments
  1. The works cited include1:-

    • .
  2. While I also have (at least) the following in addition:-




In-Page Footnotes ("Graham (George) - The Problem of Other Minds")

Footnote 1: To be supplied!



"Graham (George) - Mind and Belief in Animals"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 4


Contents
  1. The Mental Community – 65
  2. Optimism about Animal Belief – 67
  3. Pessimism about Animal Belief – 69
  4. The Challenge of Animal Belief – 76
  5. Horse and Chimp – 80



"Graham (George) - Mind and Belief in Computers"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 5


Contents
  1. Could a Computer Believe? – 87
  2. Functionalism and Intentionality – 89
  3. The Chinese Room Argument – 94
  4. The Counter-Argument from Possibility – 97
  5. The Counter Argument from Intentional Anti-Realism – 103
  6. Once More: Could a Computer Believe? – 107



"Graham (George) - Mind and Belief in God"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 6


Contents
  1. A Dilemma for St Thomas – 112
  2. Does God Possess Beliefs? – 115
  3. Suffering and Love – 119
  4. On Having it All – 122



"Graham (George) - Rational Action"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 7


Contents
  1. The Concept of 'Rational Action' – 125
  2. Rationality versus Irrationality – 128
  3. Is Weakness of Will Unreasonable? – 130
  4. Is Unselfish Action Impossible? – 136



"Graham (George) - Does Mind Depend Upon Brain?"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 8


Contents
  1. Materialism – 145
  2. Is Materialism Correct? – 149
  3. Brentano's Thesis – 152
  4. Intentionality and Materialism – 155
  5. Supervenience1 and Melancholia or Why Did Robert Schumann Starve Himself to Death? – 162
  6. Explanation and Mind/Brain Supervenience2 – 168



"Graham (George) - Inside Persons"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 9


Contents
  1. A Question of Gender – 175
  2. What Is It Like to Be a Person? – 176
  3. Freedom and Explanation – 180
  4. The Dilemma of Free Will – 184
  5. Folk Psychology, Freedom, and Compatibilism – 187
  6. Happy Ending – 192



"Graham (George) - Consciousness, Matter, and Morality"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 10


Contents
  1. Consciousness Defined – 200
  2. Six Roles of Consciousness – 202
  3. Is Consciousness a Brain Process? – 204
  4. Consciousness and Animal Liberation – 211
  5. An Impossible Consciousness – 216



"Graham (George) - Fear and Trembling"

Source: Graham (George) - Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, Chapter 11


Contents
  1. Consciousness Epiphenomenalism – 227
  2. The Master Argument+XX+ for Consciousness Epiphenomenalism – 229
  3. Attacking the Master Argument+XX+ – 231
  4. Defeating the Master Argument+XX+ – 233
  5. The Intelligent Behavior Hypothesis – 235
  6. The Divided Labor Hypothesis – 240
  7. Criticism and Commitments – 244
  8. Final Feeling – 247



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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