<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Metaphysics, Spring 2014 (Funkhouser (Eric)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_6305.htm">Metaphysics, Spring 2014</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/F/Author_Funkhouser (Eric).htm">Funkhouser (Eric)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_6305.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_6305.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>This is a graduate + undergraduate course in Metaphysics. The topics <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B6305_1">covered</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B6305_1"></A> are  loosely speaking  the logic of identity, ontology, <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>2</SUP>, persistence, personal identity, <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP> and <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>4</SUP>. All are of interest to me in my thesis. I d thought  <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation </A><SUP>5</SUP> was not, but  remote <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation </A><SUP>6</SUP> is topical in discussions of resurrection, so I ve included it. </li><li>The course relies heavily on discussing papers from the book Kim, Jaegwon, Daniel Korman, and Ernest Sosa, eds. 2012. <em>Metaphysics: An Anthology, Second<BR>Edition</em>. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell). I don t have the book, but have all the papers relevant to this course as they are frequently anthologised, or are otherwise available on-line. </li><li>The course seems to have been fairly intensive  with three lectures a week for 4 months. About half the papers have a single lecture, with the rest having two. </li><li>There are two sets of questions, closely related to the actual papers. All but three of the papers have questions. </li><li>Funkhouser has provided useful summaries of each of the papers, bar one.</li><li>As the course was delivered in 1H14, it is useful to see which papers are still considered foundational in a metaphysics course. </li><li>The course web-page is here: <a name="W2307W"></a><A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaphysicsS14.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. </li></ul><BR><BR><u>Course Description </u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li> Metaphysics concerns itself with the most fundamental features of reality. In contrast with the physical sciences, it continues to rely (for better or worse) on a more a priori methodology. Here are some examples of metaphysical questions: <ul type="disc"><li>What things really exist? (The Ontological Question) Does God exist? Numbers? Propositions?</li><li>What is the basic ontological structure of our physical world?</li><li>What is the nature of space-time?</li><li>Do only particulars exist?</li><li>What is the nature of <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>7</SUP>?</li><li>What is required to have a free will, and are we free?</li><li>Can objects persist through change, and if so how?</li><li>What is it to be a person? What is required to maintain personal identity over time?</li><li>How are our minds related to our brains?</li><li>Is there a way the world really is, apart from how it is perceived and conceptualized? </li></ul></li><li>We will not tackle all of these questions. Instead, we will limit ourselves to the following topics: identity, existence, <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>8</SUP>, persistence through time, personal identity, properties, and <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>9</SUP>. There will be some additional readings and work for graduate students. </li></ol></FONT> <BR><u>Papers Addressed</u> <ul type="disc"><li>The course consists in a discussion of the following papers, with Funkhouser s brief analyses given as hand-outs, but commencing with a discussion of metaphysics. <BR><u><b>Introduction</b></u><ol type="1"><li>What is Metaphysics? <a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20387.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - What Is Metaphysics?</A>"</li></ol></li><li><u><b>Identity</b></u><ol type="1"><li><a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20409.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Locke, Essay, Book III, Chapter 3, 'Of General Terms'</A>"</li><li><a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1986.htm">Black (Max) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>"<BR><a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20388.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Black,  The Identity of Indiscernibles </A>"</li><li><a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_65.htm">Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity</A>"<BR><a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20385.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Adams, 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity'</A>"</li><li><a name="17"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1989.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity</A>"<BR><a name="18"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20389.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Kripke,  Identity and Necessity </A>"</li><li><a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>"<BR><a name="20"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20390.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Gibbard,  Contingent Identity </A>"</li></ol></li><li><u><b>Ontology</b></u><ol type="1"><li><a name="21"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1091.htm">Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is</A>"<BR><a name="22"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20391.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine,  On What There Is </A>"</li><li><a name="23"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20388.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Black,  The Identity of Indiscernibles </A>"<BR><a name="24"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20392.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Carnap,  Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology </A>"</li><li><a name="25"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20412.htm">Yablo (Stephen) - Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?</A>"</li><li><a name="26"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16647.htm">Schaffer (Jonathan) - On What Grounds What</A>"<BR><a name="27"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20393.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Schaffer,  On What Grounds What </A>"</li></ol></li><li><u><b><a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modality</A><SUP>10</SUP></b></u><ol type="1"><li><a name="28"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20410.htm">Plantinga (Alvin) - Modalities: Basic Concepts and Distinctions</A>"<BR><a name="29"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20394.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Plantinga,  Modalities: Basic Concepts and Distinctions </A>"</li><li><a name="30"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8010.htm">Lewis (David) - A Philosopher's Paradise</A>"<BR><a name="31"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20395.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  A Philosopher's Paradise </A>"</li><li><a name="32"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20411.htm">Fine (Kit) - Essence and Modality</A>"<BR><a name="33"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20396.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Fine,  Essence and Modality </A>"</li></ol></li><li><u><b>Persistence</b></u><ol type="1"><li><a name="34"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1778.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Identity Through Time</A>" and / or<BR><a name="35"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3397.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Identity Through Time</A>"<BR><a name="36"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20397.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Chisholm,  Identity through Time </A>"</li><li><a name="37"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1779.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis</A>"<BR><a name="38"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20398.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine,  Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis </A>"</li><li><a name="39"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1993.htm">Heller (Mark) - Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects</A>"<BR><a name="40"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20399.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Heller,  Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects </A>"</li></ol></li><li><u><b>Persons</b></u><ol type="1"><li><a name="41"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>"<BR><a name="42"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20400.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Shoemaker,  Persons and their Pasts </A>"</li><li><a name="43"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>"<BR><a name="44"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20401.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Williams, 'The Self and the Future'</A>"</li><li><a name="45"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_325.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity</A>"<BR><a name="46"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20402.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Parfit,  Personal Identity </A>"</li><li><a name="47"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>"<BR><a name="48"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20403.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  Survival and Identity </A>"</li><li><a name="49"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_560.htm">Olson (Eric) - An Argument for Animalism</A>"<BR><a name="50"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20404.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Olson,  An Argument for Animalism </A>"</li></ol></li><li><u><b>Properties</b></u><ol type="1"><li><a name="51"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2117.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Natural Kinds</A>"<BR><a name="52"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20405.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine,  Natural Kinds </A>"</li><li><a name="53"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1096.htm">Campbell (Keith) - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars</A>"<BR><a name="54"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20406.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Campbell,  The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars </A>"</li><li><a name="55"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1100.htm">Lewis (David) - New Work for a Theory of Universals</A>"<BR><a name="56"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20407.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  New Work for a Theory of Universals </A>"</li><li><a name="57"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1985.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals as Attributes</A>"<BR><a name="58"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20408.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Armstrong,  Universals as Attributes </A>"</li></ol></li><li><u><b><a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>11</SUP></b></u><ol type="1"><li><a name="59"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2783.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - On the Notion of Cause</A>"<BR><a name="60"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20414.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Russell,  On the Notion of Cause </A>"</li><li><a name="61"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_512.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Causes and Conditions</A>"<BR><a name="62"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20415.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Mackie,  Causes and Conditions </A>"</li><li><a name="63"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_151.htm">Davidson (Donald) - Causal Relations</A>"<BR><a name="64"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20416.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Davidson,  Causal Relations </A>"</li><li><a name="65"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1669.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Causality and Determination</A>"<BR><a name="66"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20417.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Anscombe,  Causality and Determination </A>"</li><li><a name="67"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_129.htm">Lewis (David) - Causation</A>"<BR><a name="68"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20418.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  Causation </A>"</li><li><a name="69"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1674.htm">Tooley (Michael) - Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism</A>" <BR><a name="70"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20419.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Tooley,  Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism </A>"</li><li><a name="71"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20423.htm">Hall (Ned) - Two Concepts of Causation</A>"<BR><a name="72"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20420.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Hall,  Two Concepts of Causation </A>" </li></ol></li></ul><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> (<a name="73"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6305.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_B6305_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B6305_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: This is my  take  the course description give a slight variant. <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Pseudo-Book to hold the Notes produced by Funkhouser on his Introduction to Metaphysics course of Spring 2014. </li><li>Filed in <a name="74"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5985.htm">Various - Papers on Logic & Metaphysics Boxes: Vol 2 (F-N)</A>". </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20386.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR>For want of anywhere else better, I ve placed here the full contents of Kim, Jaegwon, Daniel Korman, and Ernest Sosa, eds. 2012. <em>Metaphysics: An Anthology, Second Edition</em>. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell). It s not worth me buying this book, as I seem to have (almost) all the papers already, either in other anthologies, as photocopies, or electronically. <BR><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>Preface (Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, Daniel Z. Korman) </li><li><u><b>Part I: Ontology</b></u><ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1091.htm">Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1736.htm">Carnap (Rudolf) - Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_109.htm">Lewis (David) & Lewis (Stephanie) - Holes</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20421.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Beyond Being and Nonbeing</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20412.htm">Yablo (Stephen) - Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20425.htm">Thomasson (Amie L.) - Fictional Entities</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16647.htm">Schaffer (Jonathan) - On What Grounds What</A>" </li></ol></li><li><u><b>Part II: Identity</b></u><ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1986.htm">Black (Max) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_65.htm">Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1989.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_443.htm">Evans (Gareth) - Can There Be Vague Objects?</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3457.htm">Stalnaker (Robert) - Vague Identity</A>" </li></ol></li><li><u><b>Part III: <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modality</A><SUP>1</SUP></b></u><ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20410.htm">Plantinga (Alvin) - Modalities: Basic Concepts and Distinctions</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20424.htm">Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Actualism and Thisness</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8010.htm">Lewis (David) - A Philosopher's Paradise</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_508.htm">Stalnaker (Robert) - Possible Worlds</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7361.htm">Rosen (Gideon) - Modal Fictionalism</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20411.htm">Fine (Kit) - Essence and Modality</A>" </li></ol></li><li><u><b>Part IV: Properties</b></u><ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2117.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Natural Kinds</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_514.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Causality and Properties</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1096.htm">Campbell (Keith) - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1100.htm">Lewis (David) - New Work for a Theory of Universals</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1985.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals as Attributes</A>" </li></ol></li><li><u><b>Part V: <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>2</SUP></b></u><ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2783.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - On the Notion of Cause</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_512.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Causes and Conditions</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_151.htm">Davidson (Donald) - Causal Relations</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1669.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Causality and Determination</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_129.htm">Lewis (David) - Causation</A>"</li><li>"Causal Connections" (<A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Salmon (Wesley).htm">Wesley Salmon</A>).</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1674.htm">Tooley (Michael) - Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20423.htm">Hall (Ned) - Two Concepts of Causation</A>" </li></ol></li><li><u><b>Part VI: Persistence</b></u><ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1778.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Identity Through Time</A>" and / or<BR>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3397.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Identity Through Time</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1779.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2005.htm">Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - Parthood and Identity Across Time</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1993.htm">Heller (Mark) - Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects</A>", or, maybe & <BR>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3556.htm">Heller (Mark) - Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1781.htm">Lewis (David) - The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6036.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5125.htm">Sider (Ted) - All the World's a Stage</A>" </li></ol></li><li><u><b>Part VII: Persons</b></u><ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_325.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6197.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5194.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Ontological Status of Persons</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_560.htm">Olson (Eric) - An Argument for Animalism</A>" </li></ol></li><li><u><b>Part VIII: Objects</b></u><ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5620.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - When are Objects Parts?</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1239.htm">Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5159.htm">Sosa (Ernest) - Existential Relativity</A>"</li><li>"The Argument from Vagueness" (<A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Sider (Ted).htm">Ted Sider</A>). <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20386_3">Note</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20386_3"></A>. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3914.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism</A>"</li><li>"Against Revisionary Ontology" (<A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Hirsch (Eli).htm">Eli Hirsch</A>). <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20386_4">Note</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20386_4"></A>. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20422.htm">Korman (Daniel Z.) - Strange Kinds, Familiar Kinds, and the Charge of Arbitrariness</A>" </li></ol></li></ul></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>This, and the other papers in this series, filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5985.htm">Various - Papers on Logic & Metaphysics Boxes: Vol 2 (F-N)</A>".</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20386.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20386_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20386_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>For want of this paper, it may be worth substituting "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6290.htm">Varzi (Achille) - Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness</A>". </li><li>I suspect the paper is an extract from "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1339.htm">Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time</A>", and Varzi s paper will direct me to the right spot. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P20386_4"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20386_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>In the absence of this paper, how about a critique? </li><li>Ie. "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20431.htm">Howard-Snyder (Daniel) - The Argument from Charity Against Revisionary Ontology</A>". </li><li>Alternatively, more positively "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16643.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Ontology and Alternative Languages</A>"</li><li>Or, "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1374.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Dividing Reality</A>". </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20387.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - What Is Metaphysics?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_1">Outline</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>What is the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_2">subject</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_2"></A> matter of metaphysics? </li><li>What is the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_3">methodology</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_3"></A> for doing metaphysics? <ul type="disc"><li>Conceptual <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_4">Analysis</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_4"></A> and Conceptual <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_5">Connections</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_5"></A>; are useful because they:- <BR>1. Foster better understanding and communication.<BR>2. Provide a recipe for classifying objects or events.<BR>3. Change our perceptions and / or thoughts.<BR>4. Alter our practices.<BR>5. Inform our standards of evaluation for the appropriate kind.<BR>6. Reveal why the concept is thought to be important, valuable, etc.<BR>7. Are needed for official, practical, and oftentimes bureaucratic purposes.</li><li>Thought <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_6">Experiments</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_6"></A> and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_7">Intuitions</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_7"></A></li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_8">Arguments</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_8"></A></li></ul></li><li>Skepticism and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20387_9">disdain</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20387_9"></A> for metaphysics</li></ol></FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20387.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - What Is Metaphysics?</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Extracted by TT, with Notes. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Ontology, and  the nature of things at the most abstract level of investigation .</li><li>Distinguish metaphysics from epistemology. </li><li>For more in-depth discussions (I would say), see:-<BR>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3471.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Introduction: The Nature of Metaphysics</A>", and <BR>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4177.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - What Is Metaphysics?</A>". </li><li>From a theological perspective, see:-<BR>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8400.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Arguing for Atheism: Preface / Introduction</A>", and<BR>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19817.htm">Moreland (J.P.) & Craig (William Lane) - Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview: Metaphysics</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li><em>a priori</em>, but not just armchair speculation. </li><li>Evaluation subject to the standards of other domains. </li><li>Consistent with empirical discoveries. </li><li>Informed by the best science of the day. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_4"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Sometime stipulative, but often going beyond mere definition. </li><li>Determining necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept or membership of a kind. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_5"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>For example the connection between <em>free will</em> and <em>determinism</em>, after these concepts have been analysed. </li><li>While these connections have, historically, been determined <em>a priori</em>, latterly <em>experimental philosophers</em> have applied empirical methods. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_6"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Funkhouser will take talk of other  possible worlds as a figure of speech for how the universe could have been. </li><li>Simplifies things  as do  frictionless planes for physicists. </li><li>Close connection between a correct analysis and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</a>. </li><li>We are referred to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20426.htm">Brown (James Robert) & Fehige (Yiftach) - Thought Experiments</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_7"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_7"><B>Footnote 7</B></A></U>: Not discussed, though  intuition pumps were mentioned earlier (though not referred to Dennett). <a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_8"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: In evaluating an argument, either the logic may be wrong (an invalid argument), or one of the premises may be false (an unsound one). <a name="On-Page_Link_P20387_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20387_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Not really discussed, in the sense of defended against, but we are referred to Hume s famous  Commit it then to the flames dictum, and to the logical positivists, as exemplified by "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2.htm">Ayer (A.J.) - Language, Truth and Logic</A>". </li><li>However, two criticisms   meaninglessness pseudo-questions versus  meaningful but pointless, because unanswerable  are distinguished </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20409.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Locke, Essay, Book III, Chapter 3, 'Of General Terms'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> What is the difference between real essences and nominal essences? Present and explain Locke s argument, from our reading, against real essences. Then critically evaluate this argument. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>A printout of this chapter of Locke's <em>Essay</em> is filed along with Funkhouser's notes thereon. </li><li>For Locke's paper, see <A HREF = "http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/locke/locke1/Book3a.html#Chapter%20III" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (Defunct); </li><li>For Funkhouser's Notes, see <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaLocke.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20388.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Black,  The Identity of Indiscernibles </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1986.htm">Black (Max) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaBlack.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20385.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Adams, 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain what Adams means by  primitive <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">thisness </A><SUP>1</SUP>. What is a <em><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">thisness</A><SUP>2</SUP></em>? What does it mean for a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">thisness</A><SUP>3</SUP> to be <em>primitive</em>? Explain Adams argument for primitive <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">thisness</A><SUP>4</SUP> from the possibility of almost indiscernible spheres. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_65.htm">Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity</A>"; </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaAdams.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20389.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Kripke,  Identity and Necessity </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Kripke famously argued that the necessary truths do not always coincide with the a priori truths. Provide one of his examples of the necessary a posteriori. How does Kripke explain the <em>appearance</em> of contingency in your example? How would Locke either agree or disagree with Kripke when it comes to understanding this example? </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1989.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaKripke.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20390.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Gibbard,  Contingent Identity </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaGibbard.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20391.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine,  On What There Is </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> According to Quine, what determines our ontological commitments  i.e., what <em>really</em> exists, by our lights? In answering this question do not just use a slogan, but explain it. Then explain Carnap s reasons for thinking that such external questions are meaningless. Briefly explain how Quine and Carnap both agree and disagree over the ontological project. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1091.htm">Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaQuine01.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20392.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Carnap,  Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> According to Quine, what determines our ontological commitments  i.e., what <em>really</em> exists, by our lights? In answering this question do not just use a slogan, but explain it. Then explain Carnap s reasons for thinking that such external questions are meaningless. Briefly explain how Quine and Carnap both agree and disagree over the ontological project. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1736.htm">Carnap (Rudolf) - Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaCarnap.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20393.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Schaffer,  On What Grounds What </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain how Schaffer s understanding of the project of metaphysics in terms of <em>grounding</em> contrasts with, say, Quine s ontological project. Explain this notion of ground by showing how Schaffer thinks it could be used to distinguish mere aggregates from unified wholes. Then apply the concept to another topic of your choosing. Is it coherent? </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16647.htm">Schaffer (Jonathan) - On What Grounds What</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaSchaffer.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20394.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Plantinga,  Modalities: Basic Concepts and Distinctions </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain, in some detail, how Quine s mathematical cyclist argument, as discussed in our Plantinga article, is supposed to serve as an objection to <em>de re</em> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>1</SUP>. According to Plantinga, what is wrong with Quine s argument? Along the way, be sure to explain the concept of <em>de re</em> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>2</SUP>. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20410.htm">Plantinga (Alvin) - Modalities: Basic Concepts and Distinctions</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaPlantinga.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20395.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  A Philosopher's Paradise </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain how David Lewis uses his <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>1</SUP> realism to give reductive accounts of both <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>2</SUP> (e.g., singular causal claims, like  The spark caused the explosion ) and <em>de re</em> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>3</SUP> (e.g., Humphrey could have won the election). </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8010.htm">Lewis (David) - A Philosopher's Paradise</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaLewis.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20396.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Fine,  Essence and Modality </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain Fine s objection to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>1</SUP> accounts of essences. In particular, explain his objection involving Socrates and the singleton Socrates. Explain in some detail the relationship that Fine advances between essences and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>2</SUP> more generally. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20411.htm">Fine (Kit) - Essence and Modality</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaFine.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20397.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Chisholm,  Identity through Time </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1778.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Identity Through Time</A>", </li><li>Or, maybe, "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3397.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Identity Through Time</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaChisholm.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20398.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine,  Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> As Quine uses the terms in his  Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis , explain what is meant by river-stage, water-stage, river-kinship and water-kinship. How do rivers and waters relate to river-stages and water-stages? Explain Quine s answer to Heraclitus claim that we cannot step in the same river twice. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1779.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaQuine02.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20399.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Heller,  Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain how the 4-dimensionalist accounts for an object s persistence through time. Take a stand on the issue of 4-dimenionalism by critically evaluating both Heller s 5 premise argument for 4-dimensionalism and Van Inwagen s Descartes-Minus argument against it. (Don t provide the arguments in premise-conclusion form. Just launch into discussing and evaluating them.) </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1993.htm">Heller (Mark) - Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaHeller.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20400.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Shoemaker,  Persons and their Pasts </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain the difference between a quasi-memory and a genuine memory, as Shoemaker uses these terms. Describe a situation, discussed by Shoemaker, in which (apparently) distinct people quasi-remember the same experience  from the inside . What problem does this raise for a psychological theory of personal identity? How does Shoemaker address this problem? </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaShoemaker01.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20401.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Williams, 'The Self and the Future'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Bernard Williams provides two versions of a torture story. One version appears to support the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>1</SUP> theory whereas the other version appears to support the bodily continuity theory. Provide the version of the torture story that is supposed to support the bodily continuity theory. Present the story in the careful step-by-step manner employed by Williams. At what step in this story could the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>2</SUP> theorist reasonably object, and how so? </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaWilliams.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20402.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Parfit,  Personal Identity </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain Parfit s objection to Shoemaker's handling of fission cases. How does Parfit reconcile his commitment to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>1</SUP> and connectedness with his recognition of the difficulties presented by fission and duplication cases? Explain Parfit s positive theory and how it radically departs from earlier accounts of personal identity and survival. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_325.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaParfit.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20403.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  Survival and Identity </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> According to Lewis, what makes it the case that a person at t1 is the same person as a person at t2? (Apply both his account of personhood and his general account of persistence to this question.) Explain the sense in which Lewis largely endorses Parfit s account of personhood, though he does differ in arguing that identity is still <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>1</SUP> to survival (e.g., that the I-relation <em>is</em> the R-relation.) </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaLewis02.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20404.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Olson,  An Argument for Animalism </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> What is the thesis of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>1</SUP>, as understood by Olson? Provide his main argument for this thesis. What are some of the ways in which physicalist philosophers sympathetic to the psychological criterion often deny <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>2</SUP>? Where/how do they object to Olson s argument? </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_560.htm">Olson (Eric) - An Argument for Animalism</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/OlsonNotes.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20405.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine,  Natural Kinds </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain either Hempel s puzzle about non-black non-ravens or Goodman s grue puzzle, as presented by Quine. Explain how this puzzle raises a problem for simple accounts of kinds (e.g., set-theoretic). What modification of the simple theory of kinds does Quine endorse in order to resolve these problems? Explain the sense in which Quine privileges certain kinds, while nevertheless maintaining his Nominalism. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2117.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Natural Kinds</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaQuine03.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20406.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Campbell,  The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain the concrete/abstract and particular/universal distinctions, as made by Campbell. Then, with this distinction in mind, explain what a trope is supposed to be. How do tropes differ from the more traditional (abstract) <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP> and (concrete) particulars? How does the trope theorist understand what it is for distinct objects to be of the very same kind? Explain at least one supposed advantage that tropes have over <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">properties-as-universals</A><SUP>2</SUP>. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1096.htm">Campbell (Keith) - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaCampbell.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20407.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  New Work for a Theory of Universals </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain, on Lewis s special terminology, the distinction between properties and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>. Explain how <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP>, so understood, can contribute to solving either the grue or raven paradox. Also, apply the idea to reference  e.g., how can <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP> contribute to providing the meanings of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>4</SUP> terms? Ultimately, why does Lewis reject <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>5</SUP>, though? How, instead, does he account for the  one over many ? </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1100.htm">Lewis (David) - New Work for a Theory of Universals</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaLewis03.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20408.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Armstrong,  Universals as Attributes </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain the sense in which Armstrong s theory of properties is both <em>scientific</em> and <em>realistic</em> (i.e., his Scientific Realism). Explain why his conception of properties rules out both disjunctive and negative <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>. Also explain why he favors an ontology that rejects uninstantiated properties and a  Platonic Heaven . </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1985.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals as Attributes</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaArmstrong.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20414.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Russell,  On the Notion of Cause </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain how both Russell and Anscombe object to accounts of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>1</SUP> that take causes to be sufficient for their effects. When it comes to their own views on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>2</SUP>, however, they radically diverge. Explain the position each takes on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>3</SUP>. In particular, explain the way in which Anscombe departs from Hume when it comes to the epistemology of causal relations.</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2783.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - On the Notion of Cause</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/RussellNotes.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20415.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Mackie,  Causes and Conditions </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> What is an INUS condition? Explain Mackie s INUS theory of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>1</SUP> by applying it to a particular example in which it seems to correctly identify a cause. Next, describe a counterexample to this view  e.g., a case in which the INUS theory seems to misidentify or fail to identify a cause. Generally speaking, what is most problematic about Mackie s account? </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_512.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Causes and Conditions</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaMackie.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20416.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Davidson,  Causal Relations </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Davidson agrees with Hume and Mill that singular causal statements must be supported by a general law. Yet, he allows that it can be true that Smith s fall from the ladder caused his death even though there is no general law relating falls from ladders to deaths. Explain how Davidson reconciles these claims. Along the way explain the notion of  fragility as applied to events. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_151.htm">Davidson (Donald) - Causal Relations</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaDavidson.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20417.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Anscombe,  Causality and Determination </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain how both Russell and Anscombe object to accounts of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>1</SUP> that take causes to be sufficient for their effects. When it comes to their own views on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>2</SUP>, however, they radically diverge. Explain the position each takes on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>3</SUP>. In particular, explain the way in which Anscombe departs from Hume when it comes to the epistemology of causal relations.</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1669.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Causality and Determination</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaAnscombe.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20418.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  Causation </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Describe Lewis s counterfactual theory of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>1</SUP>. Discuss a normal case of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>2</SUP>, and explain Lewis s procedure for evaluating the relevant counterfactual. Next explain, by discussing a different example, how Lewis uses his counterfactual theory to handle cases of epiphenomenalism that, he thinks, pose problems for the regularity theorist. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_129.htm">Lewis (David) - Causation</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaLewis04.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20419.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Tooley,  Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Question</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"> Explain what it means to be a strong reductionist about causal relations. Tooley offers four arguments in favor of his realist account of causal relations. One of these is the argument from the possibility of indeterministic laws. Explain, by describing a specific example, how this argument is supposed to serve as an objection to the dominant reductionist view. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1674.htm">Tooley (Michael) - Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaTooley.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20420.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Hall,  Two Concepts of Causation </A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Notes on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20423.htm">Hall (Ned) - Two Concepts of Causation</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://comp.uark.edu/~efunkho/MetaHall.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. </li></ul></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T23:58" pubdate>02/08/2018 23:58:55</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>