Problems of Rationality
Davidson (Donald)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
Text Colour-ConventionsDisclaimerPapers in this BookBooks / Papers Citing this Book


Back Cover Blurb

  1. Problems of Rationality is the eagerly awaited fourth volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings.
  2. From the 1960s until his death in August 2003 Davidson was perhaps the most influential figure in English-language philosophy, and his work has had a profound effect upon the discipline. His unified theory of the interpretation of thought, meaning, and action holds that rationality is a necessary condition for both mind and interpretation.
  3. Davidson here develops this theory to illuminate value judgements and how we understand them; to investigate what the conditions are for attributing mental states to an object or creature; and to grapple with the problems presented by thoughts and actions which seem to be irrational.
  4. Anyone working on knowledge, mind, and language will find these essays essential reading.
Book Comment
  • OUP Oxford (25 Mar. 2004)
  • Volume IV of Davidson's Collected Works


"Cavell (Marcia) - Introduction: Davidson - Problems of Rationality"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Introduction


"Davidson (Donald) - The Problem of Objectivity"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 1


"Davidson (Donald) - Expressing Evaluations"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 2


"Davidson (Donald) - The Objectivity of Values"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 3


"Davidson (Donald) - Objectivity and Practical Reason"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Appendix to Chapter 3

Paper Comment


"Davidson (Donald) - The Interpersonal Comparison of Values"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 4


"Davidson (Donald) - Turing's Test"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 5


"Davidson (Donald) - Representation and Interpretation"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 6


"Davidson (Donald) - Problems in the Explanation of Action"

Source: Pettit, Sylvan & Norman - Metaphysics & Morality - Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This paper tries to answer several objections that have been made to my causal theory of action. The claim that if one person kills another by shooting him, the shooting and the killing are one and the same event is defended. Hume's contention that a desire or pro-attitude is always involved in the causality1 and explanation of an action is upheld against criticism. It is argued that reason explanations of actions cannot be backed by strict laws, but that this does not show that reasons (beliefs and desires) are causally ineffectual.

Paper Comment

Also appears in "Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality", Chapter 7.


"Davidson (Donald) - Could There Be a Science of Rationality?"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 8


"Davidson (Donald) - What Thought Requires"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 9


"Davidson (Donald) - A Unified Theory of Thought, Meaning, and Action"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 10


"Davidson (Donald) - Paradoxes of Irrationality"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 11


"Davidson (Donald) - Incoherence and Irrationality"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 12


"Davidson (Donald) - Deception and Division"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 13


"Davidson (Donald) - Who Is Fooled?"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Chapter 14


"Davidson (Donald) & LePore (Ernie) - An Interview with Donald Davidson"

Source: Davidson (Donald) - Problems of Rationality, Appendix


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2025
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)


© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Dec 2025. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page