<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death (Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_6334.htm">The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Martin (L. Michael).htm">Martin (L. Michael)</a> & <A HREF = "../../../Authors/A/Author_Augustine (Keith).htm">Augustine (Keith)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_6334.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_6334.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B6334_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B6334_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Because every single one of us will die, most of us would like to know what  if anything  awaits us afterward, not to mention the fate of lost loved ones. Given the nearly universal vested interest we personally have in deciding this question in favor of an <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>2</SUP>, it is no surprise that the vast majority of books on the topic affirm the reality of <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>3</SUP> without a backward glance. But the evidence of our senses and the ever-gaining strength of scientific evidence strongly suggest otherwise. </li><li>In <em>The Myth of an <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>4</SUP></em>: The Case against <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Life after Death</A><SUP>5</SUP>, Michael Martin and Keith Augustine collect a series of contributions that redress this imbalance in the literature by providing a strong, comprehensive, and up-to-date casebook of the chief arguments against an <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>6</SUP> all in one place. </li><li>Divided into four separate sections, <ol type="i"><li>This essay collection opens the volume with a broad overview of the issues, as contributors consider the strongest available evidence as to whether or not we survive death  in particular the biological basis of all mental states and their grounding in brain activity that ceases to function at death. </li><li>Next contributors consider a host of conceptual and empirical difficulties that confront the various ways of "surviving" death  from bodiless minds to bodily resurrection to any form of posthumous survival. </li><li>Then essayists turn to internal inconsistencies between traditional theological conceptions of an <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>7</SUP>  Heaven, Hell, karmic rebirth  and widely held ethical principles central to the belief systems undergirding those notions. </li><li>In the final section, authors offer critical evaluations of the main types of evidence for an <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>8</SUP>. </ol></li><li>Fully interdisciplinary, <em>The Myth of an <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>9</SUP>: The Case against <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Life after Death</A><SUP>10</SUP></em> brings together a variety of fields of research to make that case, including cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, personal identity, philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, psychical research, and anomalistic psychology.</li><li> As the definitive casebook of arguments against <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>11</SUP>, this collection is required reading for any instructor, researcher, and student in philosophy, religious studies, and theology. It is sure to raise provocative issues new to readers, regardless of background, from those who believe fervently in the reality of an <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>12</SUP> to those who do not or are undecided on the matter.</li></ol> </FONT><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> (<a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6334.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_B6334_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B6334_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <a name="W2499W"></a><A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/AUGTMO" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>, numbering mine. <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>Rowman & Littlefield, 16/03/2015</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20796.htm">Stewart-Williams (Steve) - On the Origin of Afterlife Beliefs by Means of Memetic Selection</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Foreward<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20796_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20796_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Somewhere in the mists of the past, we somehow picked up the idea of an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>2</SUP> from our culture. So, where did this idea come from in the first place? </li><li>The problem is not that there aren t any plausible theories to explain it; the problem is that there are too many. <ol type="i"><li>Some claim that the belief in an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>3</SUP> is wishful thinking; </li><li>Others that it s a way of encouraging socially desirable behavior; and </li><li>Others still that it represents ancient people s best effort to explain strange phenomena such as dreams. </ol></li><li>More recently, it has been suggested that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>4</SUP> beliefs are the handiwork of evolution by natural selection, or by-products of various evolved psychological capacities. </li><li>According to one approach, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>5</SUP> beliefs are products of natural selection, but not natural selection operating on genes or any other biological entities. Instead, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>6</SUP> beliefs are products of natural selection operating among ideas or memes. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>A Plethora of Theories <ol type="i"><li>Wishful Thinking</li><li>Social Glue</li><li>Social Control</li><li>Primitive Science </ol></li><li>Evolving an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>7</SUP> <ol type="i"><li>A Spandrel in the Works</li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>8</SUP> Beliefs as Selfish Memes </ol></li><li>Why Go There? </li></ol> </FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20796_9">Comments</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20796_9"></A></u> <ol type="1"><li><b>Introduction</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>Story of Granny packing her cases the day before her death having just been told by her dead parents it was time to go. </li><li>Do such-like stories add up to a  reasonable case for <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>10</SUP>? They can all be picked apart and given a non-supernaturalist explanation. </li><li>If you didn t already have the concept of an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>11</SUP>, a supernaturalist explanation wouldn t occur to you and  it s time to go wouldn t be equated with dying (except coincidentally). So, where do such ideas come from? </li></ul></li><li><b>A Plethora of Theories</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>There are just too many explanations  as give in the ToC. So, how to choose between them? </li><li>Stewart-Williams would prefer not to, but to come up with an over-arching explanation. This is the memetic explanation of religious beliefs. </li><li>The plan of the paper is to whiz through the  theories and then outline the memetic approach. </li><li>We re referred to "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6400.htm">Stewart-Williams (Steve) - Darwin, God and the Meaning of Life: How Evolutionary Theory Undermines Everything You Thought You Knew</A>" for a fuller exposition.</li><li>The theories examined:- <ol type="i"><li><b>Wishful Thinking</b>: <ul type="square"><li>Stewart-Williams thinks there s more than a grain of truth in this. Not only  inter alia  does it help us to overcome the belief that a finite life has no meaning, it helps us to comfort others. But  in general  we don t invent our own account of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>12</SUP>, or of religion generally, but adopt one that s current in our culture. How did these arise in the first place?</li><li>However, it s an incomplete explanation for two reasons:- <ol type="a"><li>Belief in an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>13</SUP> doesn t always provide much comfort  we still fear death  so maybe it s like an addiction that  once acquired  provides little comfort in itself, but its withdrawal gives a lot of <em>discomfort</em>. </li><li>Lots of the beliefs about the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>14</SUP>  Hell for instance  are anything but comforting. On account of this  damnable doctrine (Stewart-Williams describes it as  a good candidate for the most unpleasant idea devised by human minds ) Darwin wrote that he could hardly see why anyone could wish Christianity true. Rather than providing comfort, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>15</SUP> beliefs provide fears that people would not otherwise have. </ol></li></ul></li><li><b>Social Glue</b>: <ul type="square"><li>Has the advantage that it explains both the positive and negative elements of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>16</SUP> beliefs  encouraging socially beneficial and discouraging socially harmful practices respectively. </li><li>Two objections:- <ol type="a"><li>Not all religions are socially cohesive, or at least they have not always been in practice. </li><li>While  once created  religious systems may be socially cohesive, how did they arise in the first place? </ol> </li></ul></li><li><b>Social Control</b>: <ul type="square"><li>Religious systems in general  and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>17</SUP> beliefs in particular  function for the benefit of their promoters. Parents control children, husbands wives, masters slaves, upper lower classes, rulers subjects, priests & </li><li>Many doubtless really do believe  examples of drowning  walkers on water  but sincere believers may be perpetuating beliefs invented by unscrupulous manipulators. </li><li>Objection: Religious systems are often  grass roots liberation phenomena. </li></ul> </li><li><b>Primitive Science</b>: <ul type="square"><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20796_18">Edward Taylor</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20796_18"></A>, and the suggestion that religious beliefs arose as an honest attempt to explain anomalous life-experiences in the pre-scientific age. <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20796_19">Dreaming</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20796_19"></A> experiences  eg. of leaving the body, or meeting the dead  may have given rise to beliefs in souls and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>20</SUP>. </li><li>Two objections:- <ol type="a"><li>If knowledge is the only goal, why are people so reluctant to give up their <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>21</SUP> beliefs in the face of scientific evidence?</li><li>If religious ideas are to explain human experience, why are they often so disconnected from it? </ol> </li></ul> </ol> </li></ul> </li><li><b>Evolving an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>22</SUP></b> <ol type="i"><li><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>23</SUP> beliefs as adaptations?</b> <ul type="disc"><li>The least plausible application of Darwinism to religious belief is the most obvious  that religious beliefs (in an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife)</A><SUP>24</SUP> supply a survival advantage. </li><li>So, they provide believers with confidence and purpose, or lower anxiety and improve health, or bind groups together. </li><li>The objections are:- <ol type="a"><li>The variety of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>25</SUP> beliefs  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_69.htm">disembodied existence</A><SUP>26</SUP>, bodily resurrection, reincarnation  how can they all be the result of the same adaptation? </li><li>Choice of belief is determined by where people grew up  which suggests culture rather than biology.</li><li>Millions make their way through life without religious beliefs. </ol></li><li>This makes such beliefs poor candidates for being adaptations. Real psychological adaptations  emotions, for instance  are universal, and you can t be talked out of them. </li><li>There might be an evolved tendency to conform oneself to the beliefs of one s community, but this is not specific to religious beliefs (and religious belief-acquisition might be a special case). </li></ul></li><li><b>A Spandrel in the Works</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>Rather that being a direct product of evolution, religious beliefs piggy-back on those habits of mind that are. The preferred candidate is the Theory of Mind, leading to the use of separate vocabularies for mental and physical phenomena. </li><li>This results in the thought that minds  not being obviously spatially extended  are distinct from bodies. </li><li>While not <em>forcing</em> the idea that minds might be separable from the body, and so might survive bodily death, it makes the notion come naturally. </li><li>So  Stewart-Williams claims  a by-product of the Theory of Mind is our proneness to believe  falsely  that the mind/soul is distinct from the activity of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20796_27">brain</A></U><SUB>27</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20796_27"></A>, separable from the body and capable of a variety of post-mortem adventures. </li><li>Stewart-Williams is a  big fan of the by-product approach, but now considers a third Darwinian alternative. </li></ul></li><li><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>28</SUP> Beliefs as Selfish Memes</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>Stewart-Williams thinks memetics by far the most exciting recent explanation of religious belief. Brief discussion of what <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20796_29">memes are</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20796_29"></A>. The important point from the author s perspective is that there doesn t need to be  though there often is  anything  true or useful or pleasurable about successful memes  the important factor is just that they are  catchy . All they need are the attributes  whatever these might be  that keep them in circulation in the culture. </li><li>Rather than displacing the other explanations, memetics provides the overarching theory that draws together the elements of truth in the other theories.</li><li>The  selection pressures include:- <ol type="a"><li>Comfort,</li><li>Social cohesion, </li><li>Behaviour manipulation, and</li><li>Explanation. </ol> </li><li>These pressures may conflict  cultural evolution is much like biological evolution in this regard  and so  for instance  the more successful memes (that are in fact false) should not be too readily falsifiable. The  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death </A><SUP>30</SUP> meme fits perfectly  it provides comfort, and there s nothing obvious in the ordinary run of things to explicitly contradict it, and it even makes sense of some anomalous experiences. </li><li>Stewart-Williams doesn t agree that the memetic approach is in conflict with the spandrel approach. He thinks the most successful memes are themselves by-products of evolved psychological tendencies of thought. The spandrel approach describes the environment in which all memes  including religious ones  must adapt. </li><li>We are now treated to a  just so story about the evolution of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>31</SUP> beliefs. <ol type="a"><li><b>Comfort</b>: Our large brains and intelligence were presumably selected for for the sensible reasons rehearsed. An unintended consequence of this development was that  uniquely amongst the animals  human beings developed the understanding that each individual is one day going to die. This in turn developed a psychological selection pressure for beliefs that allayed concerns about death. The evidence of costly burials going back to Palaeolithic times shows that such beliefs may be tens of thousands of years old. </li><li><b>Social Cohesion</b>: with the rise of agriculture, group-size increased so as to exceed the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20796_32">Dunbar number</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20796_32"></A> (150) and cultural institutions are required to maintain group cohesiveness artificially, and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>33</SUP> beliefs  and religious beliefs generally  are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20796_34">suitable</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20796_34"></A> & already had a foot in the door. </ol></li><li>Stewart-Williams notes that memes compete against one another, and compares the rather shadowy and bleak <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>35</SUP> of Hades and Sheol with the results of a fully-developed post-Arms-Race  Heaven & Hell . </li><li>Also, memes don t need to be advantageous to the believer, only to themselves. Why do people  contrary to what is actually found  believe that losing their <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife-beliefs</A><SUP>36</SUP> would be terrible? Stewart-Williams answer is that the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>37</SUP> memes have themselves evolved to include the content that their abandonment would be terrible, hence resulting in their perpetuation. He admits this is pure speculation  which I agree  but suggests this is a fruitful area of new ideas about the origins and persistence of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>38</SUP> beliefs  which I doubt. </li></ul> </ol></li><li><b>Why Go There?</b> <ul type="disc"><li>Why bother to dislodge people s comforting illusions about an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>39</SUP>? Why promote the view that death is the end? Stewart-Williams thinks there s truth in the usual suggestion that facing the fact that our time is finite makes us focus on it better, but prefers the following four reasons for arguing that death really is the end:- <ol type="i"><li>Because it s true. </li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>40</SUP> beliefs are not always comforting, but cause grief and distress. </li><li>Getting rid of superstition allows us to get a more accurate view of the  sometimes starkly  beautiful world. </li><li>The importance of grieving a real loss (not just a  moving house ). </ol> </li><li>Even if <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>41</SUP> beliefs are comforting, they aren t hugely so. It s not as though you can tell by looking at how the berieved are coping whether they are atheists or not. </li><li>The reason for this is that even those who profess belief can t really walk the walk. </li></ul> </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20796.htm">Stewart-Williams (Steve) - On the Origin of Afterlife Beliefs by Means of Memetic Selection</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20796_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20796_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/STEOTO-2" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>, numbering mine. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20796_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20796_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>My first thought is that this paper ought to be an afterword rather than a foreword. </li><li>The reason being that the presumption of this paper is that any belief in an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</a> is unsupported, and that the burden is to explain how such false beliefs arose, give that they are false. </li><li>But, it is the burden of the book as a whole to argue that belief in an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</a> is indeed unsupported; so, this paper is somewhat cart before horse. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P20796_18"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20796_18"><B>Footnote 18</B></A></U>: I m not clear who this is. No reference is given. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20796_19"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20796_19"><B>Footnote 19</B></A></U>: This is the only example given, and is a bit feeble  though dreams have had important religious significance from shamanism onwards. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20796_27"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20796_27"><B>Footnote 27</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The central role of the brain in thought is a relatively recent discovery, though maybe known to Descartes if not to Aristotle.</li><li>Though maybe Descartes had a lesser role for the brain, as the immaterial mind was the thinking thing - though if needed to be connected to the brain (via the pineal gland) to get sensations in and motor commands out. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P20796_29"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20796_29"><B>Footnote 29</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>See <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meme" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </li><li>I have the following books that discuss memes in the context of religion:- <ul type="square"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_904.htm">Blackmore (Susan) - The Meme Machine</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5050.htm">Collins (Francis) - The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1610.htm">Dawkins (Richard) - The God Delusion</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4904.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2074.htm">McGrath (Alister) - Dawkins' God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life</A>". </li></ul> </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20796_32"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20796_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: See <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunbar%27s_number" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20796_34"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20796_34"><B>Footnote 34</B></A></U>: This section seems a bit feeble, and doesn t follow up the four-fold map onto  selection pressures that I d expected. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20797.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: Preface</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Preface<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20657.htm">Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Chapter 1<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20657_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20657_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="i">The Introduction provides a general overview of the issues discussed in <em>The Myth of an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>2</SUP></em> in more detail in the individual selections, structured according to the four parts of the volume, plus preceding introductory and subsequent concluding comments. </ol></FONT><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Preliminary Considerations </li><li>Empirical Arguments for Annihilation </li><li>Conceptual and Empirical Difficulties for Survival </li><li>Problematic Models of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Afterlife</A><SUP>3</SUP> </li><li>Dubious Evidence for Survival </li><li>The Importance of Empirical Consideration </li><li>Alternative Paranormal Explanations of the Survival Evidence</li><li>Concluding Remarks</li></ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20657.htm">Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: Introduction</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20657_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20657_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/AUGI-4" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20658.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: Part 1 - Empirical Arguments for Annihilation: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Introduction to Part 1<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20662.htm">McCormick (Matt) - Dead as a Doornail: Souls, Brains, and Survival</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 2<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20662_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20662_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">There is a strong probabilistic case that human cognitive abilities, memories, personalities, thoughts, emotions, conscious awareness, and self-awareness are dependent upon the brain to occur/exist and thus cannot survive the death of the brain. This paper a broad overview of the general lines of evidence that even the highest mental functions are produced by brain activity, evidence that does not sit well with the notion of any sort of soul or ethereal double that can function completely independently of the brain. Yet this notion is presupposed by all versions of the survival hypothesis that do not depend exclusively upon miraculous bodily resurrection. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20662.htm">McCormick (Matt) - Dead as a Doornail: Souls, Brains, and Survival</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20662_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20662_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/MCCDAA-2" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20663.htm">Mercer (Jean) - Explaining Personality: Soul Theory versus Behavior Genetics</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 3<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20663_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20663_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper explores the causes of the unique individual patterns of reaction we call personality and compares the view that these are determined by the individual s soul with the view that biological factors are responsible for personality characteristics. The paper discusses current evidence for genetic influences on temperament, psychopathology, and intelligence and examines complexities such as the influence of environment and epigenetic factors. It concludes that in all likelihood our unique personality traits are determined by biological factors alone, without any need to appeal to a nonmaterial or ethereal element. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20663.htm">Mercer (Jean) - Explaining Personality: Soul Theory versus Behavior Genetics</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20663_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20663_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/MEREPS" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20664.htm">Weisman (David) - Dissolution into Death: The Mind s Last Symptoms Indicate Annihilation</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 4<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20664_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20664_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper looks at progressive neurological diseases showing brain decline correlated with the decline of consciousness, as well as the content of consciousness. For instance, a young man s healthy and fully functional brain generated an intelligent and lovely self, but then an aggressive brain tumor grew deep within his brain. As the tumor grew, it rendered brain tissue dysfunction and direct effects followed. From focal destruction of brain tissue, an aphasia first results. What follows is the dissolution of a functional brain, a mind, a person, and what some call a soul. From more widespread destruction of brain tissue, more functions erode until a minimally conscious state results. Intact and functional brain tissue is required to produce one s consciousness and personality. When these brain tissues become dysfunctional and die, everything taken as the soul appears to die with them. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20664.htm">Weisman (David) - Dissolution into Death: The Mind s Last Symptoms Indicate Annihilation</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20664_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20664_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/WEIDID-5" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20665.htm">Gennaro (Rocco) & Fishman (Yonatan I.) - The Argument from Brain Damage Vindicated</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 5<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20665_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20665_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">It has long been known that brain damage has important negative effects on one s mental life and even eliminates one s ability to have certain conscious experiences. It thus stands to reason that when all of one s brain activity ceases upon death, consciousness is no longer possible and so neither is an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>2</SUP>. It seems clear that human consciousness is dependent upon functioning brains. This essay reviews some of the overall neurological evidence from brain damage studies and concludes that our argument from brain damage has been vindicated by such overwhelming evidence. It also puts forth a more mature philosophical rationale against an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>3</SUP> and counters several replies to the argument. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20665.htm">Gennaro (Rocco) & Fishman (Yonatan I.) - The Argument from Brain Damage Vindicated</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20665_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20665_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/GENTAF" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20666.htm">Piccinini (Gualtiero) & Bahar (Sonya) - No Mental Life after Brain Death: The Argument from the Neural Localization of Mental Functions</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 6<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20666_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20666_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper samples the large body of neuroscientific evidence suggesting that each mental function takes place within specific neural structures. For instance, vision appears to occur in the visual cortex, motor control in the motor cortex, spatial memory in the hippocampus, and cognitive control in the prefrontal cortex. Evidence comes from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, neurochemistry, brain stimulation, neuroimaging, lesion studies, and behavioral genetics. If mental functions take place within neural structures, mental functions cannot survive <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1028.htm">brain death</A><SUP>2</SUP>. Therefore, there is no mental life after <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1028.htm">brain death</A><SUP>3</SUP>. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20666.htm">Piccinini (Gualtiero) & Bahar (Sonya) - No Mental Life after Brain Death: The Argument from the Neural Localization of Mental Functions</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20666_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20666_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/PICNML" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20667.htm">Alvarez (Carlos J.) - The Neural Substrate of Emotions and Emotional Processing</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 7<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20667_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20667_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Until recently emotion and emotional processing have been largely neglected by experimental psychology and neuroscience more generally. This paper reviews the substantial psychological and neuroscientific evidence that each emotion is localized in specific neural structures, and thus that it is not necessary to invoke souls or spirits to explain emotions or emotional processing often held to be distinctive of a soul. In addition, the paper aims to demonstrate the adaptive and biological value of emotion for humans and other animals. It closes by focusing on recent research on neural processing of emotions and emotional words. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20667.htm">Alvarez (Carlos J.) - The Neural Substrate of Emotions and Emotional Processing</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20667_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20667_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/LVATNS" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20668.htm">Hines (Terence) - Brain, Language, and Survival after Death</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 8<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20668_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20668_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper reviews the neuroanatomical bases of language processing in the brain. It argues that the highly detailed anatomical structures that process different aspects of language render any extracorporeal mind superfluous. Though conceivable, the reality of a mind that can exist independently of the brain would make redundant the neural architecture and complex processing mechanisms necessary for the production and understanding of language. Since these structures and mechanisms are manifestly not redundant, how could normal language function be preserved after their destruction by death, allowing the dead to understand or produce language? </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20668.htm">Hines (Terence) - Brain, Language, and Survival after Death</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20668_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20668_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/HINBLA" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20669.htm">Horder (Jamie) - The Brain that Doesn t Know Itself: Persons Oblivious to their Neurological Deficits</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 9<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20669_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20669_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper surveys the neuroscientific evidence that brain lesions and drug intoxication can not only disrupt mental functions like perception and motor control, but can also remove one s very awareness that these functions are impaired or altered. Such deficits imply that consciousness of one s mental faculties, no less than the faculties themselves, is a product of particular neural structures. But this is inconsistent with any view  such as the dualistic interactionism of John Eccles  that holds that the conscious self interacts with and uses the brain rather than being constituted by it. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20669.htm">Horder (Jamie) - The Brain that Doesn t Know Itself: Persons Oblivious to their Neurological Deficits</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20669_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20669_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/HORTBT" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20670.htm">Augustine (Keith) & Fishman (Yonatan I.) - The Dualist s Dilemma: The High Cost of Reconciling Neuroscience with a Soul</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 1, Chapter 10<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20670_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20670_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Tight correlations between mental states and brain states have been observed time and again within <ol type="i"><li>the ethology of biologically ingrained animal behaviors, </li><li>the comparative psychology of animal minds, </li><li>the evolutionary psychology of mental adaptations, </li><li>the behavioral genetics of inherited mental traits, </li><li>the developmental psychology of the maturing mind, </li><li>the psychopharmacology of mind-altering substances, and </li><li>cognitive neuroscience more generally. </ol></li><li>They imply that our mental lives are only made possible because of brain activity  that having a functioning brain is a necessary condition for having conscious experiences. </li><li>This dependence thesis yields predictions that have been spectacularly confirmed by the evidence, whereas its antithesis has been massively disconfirmed  at least so long as it is not formulated so vaguely as to yield no specific empirical consequences at all. </li><li>Dualists are thus forced to make a difficult choice: either <ol type="i"><li>retain a belief in personal survival at the expense of ignoring or dismissing the implications of our best evidence, or </li><li>accept those implications at the expense of acknowledging that the prospects for personal survival are extremely dim.</ol> </li></ol> </FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction: A Probabilistic Argument</li><li>Scientific Reasoning I: Mill's Methods and Modern Epidemiological <BR>Principles <ul type="disc"><li>When Correlation Indicates <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>2</SUP></li></ul></li><li>Scientific Reasoning II: Inference to the Best Explanation, Testability, and Predictive Success <ul type="disc"><li>Parsimony: Tempering Explanations to Minimize False Beliefs</li><li>Plausibility: Harmonizing Explanations with Background Knowledge</li><li>Testability & Confirmation: Checking Hypotheses Against the Data <ul type="square"><li>Confirmation of the Dependence Thesis from Failed Attempts to Falsify It</li><li>Confirmation of the Dependence Thesis from the Falsification of its Rival </li></ul></li><li>Scope: Bringing Disparate Facts Together</li><li>Fertility: Generating New Lines of Research</li><li>Overview <ul type="square"><li>Table 10.1: Evaluation of the dependence and independence theses according to inference to the best explanation </li></ul></li></ul></li><li>Scientific Reasoning III: Bayesian and Information-Theoretic Approaches <ul type="disc"><li>Bayesian Probability</li><li>Bayesian Confirmation Theory</li><li>A Bayesian Approach to the Dependence and Independence Theses</li><li>The Probabilistic Price of Ad Hoc Accommodation: Simplicity vs. Goodness of Fit <ul type="square"><li>Simplicity Reflected in the Likelihood</li><li>Simplicity Reflected in the Prior Probability</li></ul></li><li>Prediction vs. Accommodation</li><li>Bayesian Analysis of the Dependence and Independence Theses</li></ul></li><li>The Dualist's Dilemma: Reject Science, or Reject Personal Survival? <ul type="disc"><li>What's Left for a Soul to Do? </li></ul></li><li>Conclusion </li></ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20670.htm">Augustine (Keith) & Fishman (Yonatan I.) - The Dualist s Dilemma: The High Cost of Reconciling Neuroscience with a Soul</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20670_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20670_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/AUGTDD" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>, numbering mine. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20659.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: Part 2 - Conceptual & Empirical Difficulties For Survival: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Introduction to Part 2<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20671.htm">Bradley (Raymond D.) - Why Survival is Metaphysically Impossible</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 11<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20671_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20671_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Human bodies have a totally different mode of existence from those collections of mental properties (intelligence, will power, consciousness, etc.) that we call minds. They belong to the ontological category of physical substances or entities, whereas mental properties belong to the ontological category of properties or attributes, and as such can exist only so long as their physical bearers exist. Mental properties  emerge (in a sense that makes emergence ubiquitous throughout the natural world) when the constituent parts of a biological organism  especially its brain are configured in certain sorts of ways. A view of reality that is both conceptually coherent and scientifically comprehensive makes the very idea of surviving one s bodily death literally absurd.</ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20671.htm">Bradley (Raymond D.) - Why Survival is Metaphysically Impossible</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20671_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20671_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/BRAWSI" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20672.htm">Drange (Theodore M.) - Conceptual Problems Confronting a Totally Disembodied Afterlife</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 12<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20672_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20672_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper presents and defends an argument for the conclusion that a personal <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>2</SUP> in the absence of any sort of body at all is not conceptually possible. The main idea behind the argument is that there would be no way for the identities of people in a bodiless state to be established, either by others or by themselves. The argument raises a significant challenge to explaining just how someone in a totally <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_69.htm">disembodied</A><SUP>3</SUP> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>4</SUP> could ever be identified  a challenge that has yet to be met. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20672.htm">Drange (Theodore M.) - Conceptual Problems Confronting a Totally Disembodied Afterlife</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20672_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20672_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/DRACPC" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20673.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - What Could Pair a Nonphysical Soul to a Physical Body?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 13<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20673_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20673_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper argues that since nonphysical souls lack a position in space, they cannot have the pairing relations that would allow them to interact with physical bodies. For example, if two rifles (A and B) are fired at the same time, and consequently Andy and Buddy are killed, we can only say that rifle A killed Andy while rifle B killed Buddy, rather than the other way around, if there are appropriate spatial relations (such as distance and orientation) that pair Andy s death to A s firing, and Buddy s death to B s firing. But no such pairing relations are available to nonphysical minds that lack spatial positions altogether. And attributing spatial location to nonphysical souls raises more problems than it solves, such as how to find particular souls at particular locations, how souls taken to be geometric points in space could retain enough structure to have sufficient causal powers to influence bodies, and why spatial entities more robust than points shouldn t simply be conceived of as exotic physical entities like astral bodies. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20673.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - What Could Pair a Nonphysical Soul to a Physical Body?</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20673_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20673_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMWCP" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20674.htm">Wilson (David L.) - Nonphysical Souls Would Violate Physical Laws</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 14<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20674_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20674_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper argues that nonphysical souls would violate fundamental physical laws if they were able to influence brain events. Though we have no idea how nonphysical souls might operate, we know quite a bit about how brains work, so we can consider each of the ways that an external force could interrupt brain processes enough to control one s body. It concludes that there is no way that a nonphysical soul could interact with the brain  neither by introducing new energy into the physical world, nor by borrowing existing energy from it  without apparently violating one or more basic laws of physics, such as the law of conservation of energy. And despite widespread appeals to quantum mechanics to give interactionism an air of scientific respectability, the essential randomness of quantum processes prohibits the distinctly nonrandom influence that a nonphysical soul must have on brain events in order to control the body, and quantum mechanical uncertainty is not great enough to allow neurons to fire action potentials. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20674.htm">Wilson (David L.) - Nonphysical Souls Would Violate Physical Laws</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20674_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20674_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/WILNSW" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20675.htm">Papineau (David) - There is No Trace of Any Soul Linked to the Body</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 15<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20675_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20675_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper argues that all apparently special forces characteristically reduce to a few fundamental physical forces which conserve energy and operate throughout nature. Consequently, there are probably no special mental forces originating from souls and acting upon bodies and brains in addition to the basic, energy-conserving physical forces. Moreover, physiological and biochemical research have failed to uncover any evidence of forces over and above the basic physical forces acting on living bodies. It is as if all organic processes can be fully accounted for in terms of normal physical forces  that is, as if there are no souls or ethereal doubles interacting with living bodies. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20675.htm">Papineau (David) - There is No Trace of Any Soul Linked to the Body</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20675_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20675_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/PAPTIN" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20676.htm">Angel (Leonard) - Since Physical Formulas are Not Violated, No Soul Controls the Body</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 16<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20676_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20676_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper provides evidence from the history of the natural sciences in philosophy (particularly mathematical physics, chemistry, and biology) that a  piloting soul would have to make physical changes in human beings violating well-established physical laws. But, among other things, it has been discovered that there can be no such changes, and thus that there is no piloting soul.</ol></FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20676.htm">Angel (Leonard) - Since Physical Formulas are Not Violated, No Soul Controls the Body</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20676_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20676_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/ANGSPF" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20677.htm">Blackmore (Susan) - The Implausibility of Astral Bodies and Astral Worlds</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 17<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20677_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20677_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Astral body views posit that an exotic double with a definite location in space  an astral or ethereal body  leaves the normal biological body during out-of-body experiences or after death. In this paper the severe difficulties confronting such a view are reviewed, difficulties concerning not only the nature of the double which travels, but the nature of the world in which it travels. Three exhaustive possibilities are considered: that a physical double travels in the physical world; that a nonphysical double travels in the physical world; and that a nonphysical double travels in a nonphysical (but objective) world. Careful analysis shows that none of these possibilities can adequately resolve the problems that they generate. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20677.htm">Blackmore (Susan) - The Implausibility of Astral Bodies and Astral Worlds</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20677_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20677_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/BLATIO-19" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20678.htm">Drange (Theodore M.) - The Pluralizability Objection to a New-Body Afterlife</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 18<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20678_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20678_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper presents and defends that an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>2</SUP> in which a person receives a new body after his or her old body is destroyed (as it is on some notions of bodily resurrection) is conceptually impossible. The main idea behind this argument is that such an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>3</SUP> would conceptually require that a person be a kind of thing that could be rendered plural. But since persons are not that type of thing, such an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>4</SUP> is not conceptually possible. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20678.htm">Drange (Theodore M.) - The Pluralizability Objection to a New-Body Afterlife</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20678_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20678_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/DRATPO-11" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19915.htm">Olson (Eric) - Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 19, 2015: 409-423<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Author s <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This paper  written for non-specialist readers  asks whether <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>2</SUP> is in any sense possible given the apparent fact that after we die our remains decay to the point where only randomly scattered atoms remain. </li><li>The paper argues that this is possible only if our remains are not in fact dispersed in this way, and discusses how that might be the case.</li></ol> </FONT><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Life After Death</A><SUP>3</SUP></li><li>Total Destruction</li><li>The Soul</li><li>Body-Snatching</li><li>Radical Resurrection</li><li>Irreversibility</li><li>Atomic Reassembly</li><li>The Transporter</li><li>Duplicates and Originals</li><li>Survival and Causal Connections</li></ol> </FONT><BR><u>References</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7296.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Death and the Afterlife</A>", 2005.</li><li>Hick, J. <em>Philosophy of Religion</em>, 1990. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", 2010. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1143.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Evolution of the Soul</A>", 1997.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>", 1992. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4094.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Metaphysics</A>", 2002.</li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_4">Zimmerman</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_4"></A>, D. The compatibility of materialism and survival: The  falling elevator model. <em>Faith and Philosophy</em>, 16, pp. 194-212, 1999. </li></ul> </FONT><BR><u>Comments</u> <ol type="1"><li>As Olson says in his Abstract, this paper is for non-specialist readers.</li><li>It is basically a re-working of parts of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", without the difficult  but important  sections on Immanent <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_5">Causation</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_5"></A>. We are referred to this paper, and to Dean Zimmerman s original  falling elevator paper for a continuation of this discussion. </li><li>As I ve written extensive <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1134.htm">Notes</A><SUP>6</SUP> on Olson s paper above there s no point repeating them here. I just note the correspondences and any change of emphasis, or anything new that struck me. The comments below are indexed to the Sections of this paper. </li><li><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Life After Death</A><SUP>7</SUP></b>: <ul type="disc"><li>The question is not so much whether there <u>is</u> an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>8</SUP>, but whether there <u>could be</u> (for beings such as us). </li><li>Just how would our <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">post-mortem survival</A><SUP>9</SUP> be accomplished? We need an explanation. </li><li>Otherwise, it might be something that even God couldn t <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_10">accomplish</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_10"></A>. </li><li>Olson effectively defines <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_67.htm">death</A><SUP>11</SUP> as  an event in which one s biological functions cease and cannot be restarted by any possible medical intervention (eg. after incineration). </li><li>He ignores trivial cases such as <ol type="i"><li>Freezing and subsequent repair and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_12">resuscitation</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_12"></A>. </li><li>Living on in the memories of others. </ol></li><li>The interesting cases are:- <ol type="i"><li> The life of the world to come , whether this be in heaven, hell or more generally in some time or place somehow <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_13">removed</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_13"></A> from the one we currently inhabit, or </li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_95.htm">Reincarnation</A><SUP>14</SUP>. </ol></li><li>Olson will not focus on reincarnation, as he doesn t consider it a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_15">majority</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_15"></A> view, and he thinks it has  special problems to be addressed later. </li><li>Instead, he considers just what it would take for us to exist post-mortem in the next world conscious and with <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_16">memories</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_16"></A> of our past life in this world. </li></ul> </li><li><b>Total Destruction</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson rehearses what this means  the scattering of your atoms at random across the void  and contrasts the situation where some recognisable ruins remain  so that you might be reconstructed  with a sandcastle washed away by the tide. </li><li>Olson can think of two reasons why  despite appearances  you might persist though totally destroyed <ol type="i"><li>One  <em>preservation</em>  is that the total destruction of death is largely an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_17">illusion</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_17"></A>. </li><li>The other is <em>radical resurrection</em>, whereby God restores us to being despite our total destruction. </ol> </li></ul></li><li><b>The Soul</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>According to this view, an immaterial part of us  the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_100.htm">soul</A><SUP>18</SUP>  survives death and <ol type="i"><li>Either finds its way (somehow) to the next world, where it may  but need not  acquire a new body, </li><li>Or attaches itself to a newly conceived <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">foetus</A><SUP>19</SUP>  the only possibility for <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_95.htm">reincarnation</A><SUP>20</SUP>, thinks Olson. </ol></li><li>The soul must be a very special part of you, because the mere fact that a part of you  a carbon atom (say)  survives your death doesn t mean that <u>you</u> do! The soul must enable you to be conscious and remember your past life. </li><li>The usual claim by those who hold this view is that it s your soul that experiences and does these things pre-mortem, with the body its tool for action. </li><li>This view has been endorsed by great thinkers of the past  and is accepted by the vast bulk of religious people today. "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1143.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Evolution of the Soul</A>" (1997) is a contemporary defense of this  the <em>Platonic Model</em> of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>21</SUP>.</li><li>There s disagreement amongst philosophers as to whether the <em>Platonic Model</em> is even possible, but even if it is, it s very unlikely to be <u>actual</u> because:- <ol type="i"><li>On the  soul view a sharp blow to the head ought to leave the soul fully conscious, albeit disconnected from its body, but this isn t what we find. So, if a minor brain assault leads to unconsciousness, how could you remain conscious if your brain was totally destroyed? We re referred to "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4094.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Metaphysics</A>", pp. <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_22">196-8</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_22"></A>. </li><li>Every mental phenomenon we know of varies with the state of one s brain. Even where the connections aren t known, we know there must be some. These facts suggest that mental goings-on are physical processes in the brain rather than events in the soul. So, it looks like there is no immaterial soul; and that even if there is, it has nothing to do with our mental abilities, and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_23">so</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_23"></A> of no more post-mortem interest than our carbon atoms. </ol></li><li>For these and other reasons, most contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists regard this model as a lost cause. While we might hope the experts are wrong, it s unwise to bet against the settled scientific consensus. </li></ul></li><li><b>Body-Snatching</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>See section 3 of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>"  this account is much the same. </li><li>The advantage is that no immaterial soul is required  though this advantage is (for atheists) outweighed by the need for a supernatural being (on the  soul view we might be naturally immortal). </li><li>While it appears to show that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>24</SUP> is indeed <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_25">possible</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_25"></A>, but Olson thinks the main objections are theological. The objections are the same as previously given. </li></ul></li><li><b>Radical Resurrection</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>So, rejecting souls and body snatching  how else might we survive death? </li><li>Olson rehearses the  Colossus of Rhodes example introduced in Section 2 of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>". As the Colossus has been totally destroyed (rather than broken into pieces that might be rediscovered and reassembled) no amount of ingenuity can do more than create an exact replica.</li><li>While God might create a perfect replica from the very atoms that made up the Colossus, even he cannot recreate the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_26">original</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_26"></A>. </li></ul></li><li><b>Irreversibility</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a recapitulation of the rest of Section 2 of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>". </li><li>Olson s objection  the  irreversibility principle  is effectively an intuition that others might not share. </li><li>He says that it d be open to debate if your organic parts still existed and could be reassembled and repaired, but this isn t the case envisaged. </li></ul></li><li><b>Atomic Reassembly</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>For all that, some people don t share Olson s intuition and claim that a person could be restored after total destruction. Olson cites:- <ol type="i"><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Hick (John).htm">John Hick</A> - <em>Philosophy of Religion</em> 4th Ed. 1990, pp. <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_27">122-4</A></U><SUB>27</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_27"></A>, and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7296.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Death and the Afterlife</A>". </ol></li><li>Just what is wrong with the <em>reassembly model</em>, in which God gathers our atoms and reassembles them as a watchmaker the scattered parts of a disassembled watch?</li><li>Olson considers the following difficulties:- <ol type="i"><li>A continuous space-time path is required from this world to the next, as for the body-snatching case. </li><li>Even atoms aren t indestructible, so <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>28</SUP> could be prevented by atomic destruction that even God couldn t repair. </li><li>Our atoms enter the food chain and will eventually form part of other people. <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_29">This</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_29"></A> becomes a greater problem as (geological) time goes by. </li><li>Given <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_30">metabolism</A></U><SUB>30</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_30"></A>, there s no such collection as  your original atoms . </li><li>Having the same atoms is not necessary for persistence even in this world  Olson imagines that sometime in the remote future some other person might possess the same atoms in the same configuration as you  yet not be you  as (apart from for an instant) that person s career would bear no similarity to yours. </ol> </li><li>How does this compare with the watch-repair? Well, the disassembled watch hasn t been totally destroyed. Its parts remain  otherwise there would be no difference between reassembling a watch and manufacturing a new one from new materials. </li><li>Your atoms are not like the gears of a watch, but like the grains of sand making up a sandcastle. There s no natural or <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_31">salient</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_31"></A> way of putting them back together. </li></ul></li><li><b>The Transporter</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>So, as the particular atoms we re made up of is irrelevant, cannot God just take any appropriate atoms and arrange them as you are now: would that person be you?</li><li>This resembles <em>Star Trek</em> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_46.htm">teletransportation</A><SUP>32</SUP>. As Olson describes it, the process involves scanning and dispersing the local body  thus totally destroying it  and sending information to the destination, where new atoms are configured as were the originals. </li><li>Olson isn t claiming this is how God gets us to the next world  but it shows that  if teletransportation is possible  he could do so: indeed, he could  note the configuration of your atoms at the  appropriate moment of your life without disturbing you at all, and recreate you at Judgement Day. Does the <em>Star Trek</em> model of radical resurrection work? </li></ul></li><li><b>Duplicates and Originals</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>While the <em>Star Trek</em> model solves many of the problems associated with the <em>reassembly</em> model, it has many new problems of its own. <ol type="i"><li>The first is the problem of duplication. <ul type="square"><li>If it becomes possible to exactly duplicate a Rembrandt, the original is still the version that should be displayed as the genuine article, even if there s no aesthetic difference between it and the copy.</li><li>Olson applies this model  rather obscurely  to the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_33">Colossus</A></U><SUB>33</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_33"></A>. What would you do differently to send a copy than to transport the original? And how would you <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_34">know</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_34"></A> which was which?</li><li>Some processes  like tossing a coin  have chance outcomes (so we might toss a coin to determine which is the original), but this doesn t help in this case  if we repeat the process we might end up with <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_35">two</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_35"></A>  originals , which is impossible. </li><li>So, if the <em>Star Trek</em> model is correct when applied to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>36</SUP>, there s no difference between you being recreated and a duplicate being created, and having <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>37</SUP> ceases to be a fundamental question of human <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_38">existence</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_38"></A>. </li></ul></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_39">second</A></U><SUB>39</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_39"></A> problem is the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_40">case</A></U><SUB>40</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_40"></A> where the scan does not disperse the original, but just grabs the information. <ul type="square"> <li>The scanned individual would be universally considered to remain self-identical, with the teletransportee a duplicate. </li><li>But, the previously considered logic of the teletransporter as a means of transport would imply that this man is also the original, and the logic of identity implies a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_41">contradiction</A></U><SUB>41</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_41"></A>.</li><li>So, it looks like we have a situation whereby whether the original is or isn t destroyed affects whether the teletransportee is or isn t identical to the original, which Olson takes to be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_42">absurd</A></U><SUB>42</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_42"></A>. </li></ul> </ol></li><li>So, for these and other (unspecified) reasons, teletransportation only leads to a duplicate being transported. </li><li>So, why do viewers of <em>Star Trek</em> not share this intuition? Olson s answer is that <em>Star Trek</em> is a work of fiction, and that we suspend disbelief and go along with the plot unless it s so absurd that we lose patience. But teletransportation isn t obviously absurd. Olson imagines that most people would go along with the notion of Captain Kirk discovering the largest prime number, despite there being a mathematical proof that this is impossible. So, the fact that audiences go along with fictions is no guide to their <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_43">possibility</A></U><SUB>43</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_43"></A>. </li></ul></li><li><b>Survival and Causal <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_44">Connections</A></U><SUB>44</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_44"></A></b>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson draws things together, and gives the reason why radical resurrection and teletransportation don t work. While the individual would think of themselves as the prior person, they would be wrong. </li><li>The reason is the wrong sort of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19915_45">causation</A></U><SUB>45</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19915_45"></A>. To continue to exist, an individual has to at least partly cause itself to continue existing; all the work cannot be done by an external agency. </li><li>The bottom line is that if the devastation of the grave isn t an illusion, we re doomed. We must hope we re souls or our bodies are snatched away. </li><li>See the footnote for the details. </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>See <A HREF = "https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.281145!/file/LADDG.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </li><li>Printout filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5972.htm">Olson (Eric) - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson)</A>". </li></ul></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19915.htm">Olson (Eric) - Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Repeated by the Editors at <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSLAD" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I find it irritating that Olson always cites this old paper by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A> (which I ve not got, and can t get hold of) rather than & </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", </li><li>& which appeared in the same collection as "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_5"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: Though Olson does mention this briefly in Section 10. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_10"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_10"><B>Footnote 10</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>There have been disputes about this. Most people (on reflection) think there are some things that even God cannot do. </li><li>Olson gives two examples:- <ol type="i"><li>God can t make it the case that there s a greatest prime number. </li><li>God can t make it the case that he himself never existed (if he did exist). </li></ol> </li><li>Others (eg. Descartes) have claimed that God is sovereign even over the laws of logic and mathematics, though it s difficult to see how this can be so without changing the subject in these cases (or at all, in Olson s second example).</li><li>Yet others have claimed that the things God cannot do aren t proper tasks, or he s be able to do them. </li><li>See:- <ul type="square"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16620.htm">Kenny (Anthony) - The Definition of Omnipotence</A>", and </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16613.htm">Nash (Donald H.) - Omnipotence</A>". </li></ul> </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_12"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_12"><B>Footnote 12</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>As I ve noted elsewhere, the resurrection of Jesus  while requiring a miracle  isn t the same order of miracle as after total bodily destruction. </li><li>So, Olson isn t concerned with the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_939.htm">Transhumanists</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_13"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_13"><B>Footnote 13</B></A></U>: Christian materialist and maybe some Biblical literalists seem to agree, but most Christians probably consider heaven and hell to be  along with God  outside of space and time altogether. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_15"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_15"><B>Footnote 15</B></A></U>: Maybe not, but there are a lot of Buddhist and Hindus who believe in reincarnation. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_16"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_16"><B>Footnote 16</B></A></U>: Olson allows for the case of a reincarnated infant remembering her past life  but  while so-called evidences of memories of past lives are often used to support claims for reincarnation  this isn t supposed to be the normal case. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_17"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_17"><B>Footnote 17</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>From a physicalist perspective, this might be Chisholm s view in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1790.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'</A>". </li><li>But, as we shall see, the prime candidate for death being illusory as our total destruction is the Soul View (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_908.htm">Click here for Note</A>) of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what we are</a>. This is dealt with in the next Section.</li><li>The other candidate is Van Inwagen s  body snatching view, dealt with in Section 4. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_22"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_22"><B>Footnote 22</B></A></U>: We re referred to the 2nd edition, 2002. I have the 3rd edition, 2008, and the pagination seems to differ. I ll chase this up eventually. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_23"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_23"><B>Footnote 23</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is all very quick, though I can t see anything obvious against the first point. </li><li>Maybe, like the (supposed) luz bone, the soul might be a bare particular  it is often taken to be  simple  without parts  so, God might then provide stored memories in the next life to whatever the mental processor is.</li><li>But it s a rather different role for the soul under this approach than has been traditionally conceived, where it was the  thinking thing . </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_25"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_25"><B>Footnote 25</B></A></U>: This was the intention of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>" - the suggestion was to show logical possibility, not to demonstrate how it s done. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_26"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_26"><B>Footnote 26</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson will go on to explain why this is so in the next Section. </li><li>Note also that this has nothing to do with the logic of identity not allowing duplicates to be self-identical, as there is only one thing existent at a time. So, this objection isn t rescued by four-dimensionalism. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_27"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_27"><B>Footnote 27</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t have this book, but & </li><li>Why  given that he s citing Hick  doesn t Olson cite "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4048.htm">Hick (John) - Death and Eternal Life</A>"? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_29"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_29"><B>Footnote 29</B></A></U>: Considered as the  cannibalism objection in medieval times. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_30"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_30"><B>Footnote 30</B></A></U>: This is  as always  important. We are organisms (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_113.htm">Click here for Note</A>) not  bodies (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_18.htm">Click here for Note</A>). <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_31"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_31"><B>Footnote 31</B></A></U>: This is the key point  they could make anything you like that s made of the same raw materials. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_33"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_33"><B>Footnote 33</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>He d have been better sticking to the Rembrandt, because in that case there is a fact of the matter about which is the original. </li><li>In the case of the Colossus, this is not the case  as Olson has already demonstrated that it cannot be resurrected. </li><li>But  for the sake of the argument  it is supposed that is has been. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_34"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_34"><B>Footnote 34</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson stresses this epistemological factor. </li><li>You just can t tell by checking which is which, as they are qualitatively identical. </li><li>The same is approximately true of manufactured goods, but you get round it practically speaking by tracking space-time paths, but with serial numbers applied post-manufacture to resolve cases of dispute. </li><li>Olson s point here is how could a recipient tell whether it s the original or a copy that s been teletransported?  and it s true that he wouldn t be able to tell in the case of dishonesty. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_35"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_35"><B>Footnote 35</B></A></U>: This duplication objection is defeated by perdurantist (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">Click here for Note</A>) considerations. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_38"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_38"><B>Footnote 38</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>All this treats human beings as in the same category as artefacts.</li><li>No doubt <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> would try to bring the FPP (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">Click here for Note</A>) into this, with good cause. </li><li>She would claim that there s a fact of the matter whether your FPP gets carried forward, and I d agree, though not for her reason (she effectively thinks that FPPs are substances in their own right).</li><li>If my FPP is carried forward via teletransportation or any other method, I have what I want out of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</a>  whether or not I ve strictly-speaking survived. </li><li>My view is that this survival would be identity-preserving (relying on perdurantism if necessary).</li><li>But, I don t think that teletransportation would preserve my FPP. The lights would turn off for me and turn on for someone else who would have my memories and character. <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_38.htm">Click here for Note</A>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_39"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_39"><B>Footnote 39</B></A></U>: This looks rather like the first problem to me. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_40"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_40"><B>Footnote 40</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is <A HREF = "../../../Authors/P/Author_Parfit (Derek).htm">Derek Parfit</A> s <em>branch-line</em> case. </li><li>It has already been considered in the account of teletransportation to the next life  but the difference is that in that case, the pre- and post-mortem individuals are (naturally) not both around at the same time, so the logical pressure to treat them as distinct individuals is not there. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_41"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_41"><B>Footnote 41</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>As noted above, perdurantism  which treats individuals as space-time worms  would not flag a contradiction here.</li><li>Olson, however, always rules this out of court. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_42"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_42"><B>Footnote 42</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is in violation of the  only x and y principle, beloved of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">David Wiggins</A>, originally invoked in response to Closest Continuer theories of personal identity (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_41.htm">Click here for Note</A>). </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_43"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_43"><B>Footnote 43</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I like this explanation: effectively it argues against Descartes s  conceivability implies possibility argument for the real distinction between mind and matter.</li><li>But, anyone who knew Euclid s proof (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclid%27s_theorem" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>) would not be taken in by any plot that suggested the greatest prime had been found; as Olson says, they would lose patience.</li><li>But, I ve found that even when the issues are explained, people still insist that if the technology could be got to work, you would be transported because you d think you had been, and that s enough. </li><li>Maybe this is symptomatic of people being impatient of  proofs , or (say) of adopting something like the approach in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2281.htm">Moore (G.E.) - Proof of an External World</A>" - if you can see two hands before you, that defeats any convoluted theory that says they don t exist.</li><li>But, as noted, the above  proof that teletransportation cannot be identity-preserving depends on an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">endurantist</a> account of persistence, so the intuitions of the many may be correct after all. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_44"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_44"><B>Footnote 44</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The draft version is entitled  Immanent <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</a> , and the text differs somewhat. In brief:- <ol type="i"><li>Accepting all the criticisms of the various models, why can t we move something from A to B by simply building something exactly similar at B?</li><li>This is a  hard metaphysical question to which Olson wishes he knew the answer. But part of the answer has to do with causal connections. </li><li>In the usual case, the mental and physical states of a continuant are caused <em>directly</em> by prior states, but in the case of the teletransportee, the causal connection with the pre-transported person is <em>tenuous</em> - because (says Olson) the teletransportee s existence depends wholly on the workings of the machine. </li><li>Olson notes that the difference in the atoms that make up the individuals is not the key issue  it s just a consequence of the process. </li><li>Similarly, the 21st century Colossus isn t identical to the ancient one because the latter isn t causally responsible for the existence of the former. </li><li>An individual  eg. you  only continues to exist if it causes itself to continue existing. </li><li>External factors can assist your continued existence, and some will be essential, but they can t do the whole job. </li><li>The  work doesn t need to be conscious or effortful  stones maintain themselves in existence with no thought or effort at all. </li><li>Philosophically, the required process is called <em>immanent <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</a></em>. Take beliefs: my continuing to hold a particular belief is immanently caused; if I persuade you to adopt this belief, your believing is not immanently caused. If I lose this belief and you then persuade me, then while my later belief is caused by my earlier one, it is not immanently caused as the causal chain passes entirely outside of me. </li><li>So, for Olson, the reason the <em>Star Trek</em> model doesn t work is that you don t immanently cause yourself to  exist again  all the work is done by God. </li><li>Indeed, the principle of immanent <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</a> explains why nothing that has been totally destroyed can ever exist again, as all the work has to be done by an external agency  be it a construction company, a teletransportation machine, or God. </li><li>We re referred to <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A> s  falling elevator model for a  challenge to the claim, and to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>" for further discussion of immanent <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</a>. </li><li>So, Olson says that if we want <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</a>, we have to hope that the devastation of the grave is an illusion and that we are either immaterial souls or we re snatched bodily away. </li></ol></li><li>The difference from the published version is basically a bit of truncation  there s no example of immanent <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</a>  and the avoidance of the forbidding terminology of <em>immanent</em> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P19915_45"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19915_45"><B>Footnote 45</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>We re referred  as in the draft  to Zimmerman for  an important challenge . </li><li>It s irritating that an inaccessible paper is referenced while a later and accessible paper  "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>"  that appears in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5722.htm">Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?</A>" along with "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>" is available. </li><li>Maybe this is consistent with not wanting to advertise on behalf of the opposition.</li><li>Also, I don t think Zimmerman s paper is a  challenge but an acceptance of the  immanent <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation </a> principle and an attempt to show how God might enable it to take effect. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20660.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: Part 3 - Problematic Models Of The Afterlife: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Introduction to Part 3<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20679.htm">Martin (L. Michael) - Problems with Heaven</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 3, Chapter 20<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20679_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20679_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Belief in Heaven is an essential part of the great monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Famous theologians have written about it, and ordinary theists hope to go there after death. However, the concept of Heaven is neither clear nor unproblematic. There are three serious problems with the notion of Heaven. First, the concept of Heaven lacks coherence. Second, it is doubtful that theists can reconcile the heavenly character of Heaven with standard defenses against the argument from evil, such as the free will defense. Finally, Heaven is unfair and thus in conflict with the goodness of God. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20679.htm">Martin (L. Michael) - Problems with Heaven</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20679_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20679_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/MARPWH" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20680.htm">Bradley (Raymond D.) - Can God Condemn One to an Afterlife in Hell?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 3, Chapter 21<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20680_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20680_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper argues that God is not logically able to condemn a person to Hell by considering what is entailed by accepting the best argument to the contrary, the so-called free will defense expounded by Christian apologists Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig. It argues that the free will defense is logically fallacious, involves a philosophical fiction, and is based on a fraudulent account of Scripture, concluding that the problem of postmortem evil puts would-be believers in a logical and moral straightjacket from which there is no escape without heresy or contradiction. </ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20274.htm">Lewis (David), Kitcher (Philip) - Divine Evil</A>".</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20680.htm">Bradley (Raymond D.) - Can God Condemn One to an Afterlife in Hell?</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20680_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20680_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/BRACGC" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20681.htm">Smythe (Ingrid Hansen) - Objections to Karma and Rebirth: An Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 3, Chapter 22<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20681_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20681_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper presents moral and epistemological objections to the twin theories of karma and rebirth. It not only considers whether there is any evidence that a principle of karmic rebirth actually operates, but asks whether a karmic principle could provide us with a solid moral education, a comprehensive explanation of evil, or a sufficient reason to do good to others. More fundamentally, how would the law of karma evaluate us, and who or what would be doing the evaluating? It also takes stock of the broader social ramifications of accepting the doctrine, such as whether its widespread acceptance has promoted or hindered societal well-being. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20681.htm">Smythe (Ingrid Hansen) - Objections to Karma and Rebirth: An Introduction</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20681_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20681_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/SMYOTK" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20661.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: Part 4 - Dubious Evidence for Survival: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Introduction to Part 4<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20682.htm">Lange (Rense) & Houran (James) - Giving Up the Ghost to Psychology</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 23<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20682_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20682_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper explores why people report haunting and poltergeist outbreaks, which have been traditionally interpreted as direct and dramatic evidence of spirits. Deliberate deceit and psychopathology can explain some cases, but a more complex process is often at work. Synthesizing qualitative and quantitative research, we conclude that most reports do not offer evidence of survival, but rather represent the predictable human tendency to interpret ambiguous psychological and physical phenomena as paranormal due to contextual factors that influence normal processes underlying imagination, cognition, and personality. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20682.htm">Lange (Rense) & Houran (James) - Giving Up the Ghost to Psychology</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20682_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20682_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/LANGUT" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20683.htm">Blackmore (Susan) - Out-of-Body Experiences are not Evidence for Survival</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 24<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20683_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20683_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper reviews the evidence that something leaves the body during out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and thus could potentially survive death. First, during OBEs people can purportedly see things at a distance without using the recognized senses. Second, some claim that the double or astral body can be detected. Finally, there is evidence from OBEs occurring near death. This paper evaluates each in turn. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20683.htm">Blackmore (Susan) - Out-of-Body Experiences are not Evidence for Survival</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20683_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20683_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/BLAOEA" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20684.htm">Augustine (Keith) - Near-Death Experiences are Hallucinations</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 25<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20684_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20684_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Reports of near-death experiences (NDEs) with suggestive or manifestly hallucinatory features strongly imply that NDEs are not glimpses of an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>2</SUP>, but rather internally generated fantasies. Such features include discrepancies between what is seen in the seemingly physical environment of  out-of-body NDEs and what is actually happening in the physical world at the time, bodily sensations felt after near-death experiencers (NDErs) have ostensibly departed the physical world altogether and entered a transcendental realm, encounters with living persons and fictional characters while NDErs are ostensibly in a transcendental realm, hallucinatory imagery in NDEs, medical influences on the experience itself, the ubiquitous influence of culture and personal expectation on the content (not merely the description) of NDEs, and the failure of  prophetic NDEs to accurately forecast future events, among other things. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20684.htm">Augustine (Keith) - Near-Death Experiences are Hallucinations</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20684_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20684_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/AUGNEA-2" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20685.htm">Ransom (Champe) - A Critique of Ian Stevenson s Rebirth Research</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 26<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20685_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20685_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This abbreviated critique notes several weaknesses in Ian Stevenson s reincarnation research based on an examination of the cases at the University of Virginia s then Division of Parapsychology. The analysis raises issues about the use of leading questions, the inadequate depth of the investigations, the substantial allowance left for memory distortions and embellishment in the case reports, and the likelihood of contamination by normal sources in the vast majority of cases due to communication between the families of the deceased and the families of the  reborn long before any investigation ensued. In addition, the weaknesses of the cases are somewhat obscured by Stevenson discussing them in a general way in a separate part of the report or book rather than in the actual presentation of the case itself. The critique concludes that both the behavioral and informational features of the  rebirth data are weak. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20685.htm">Ransom (Champe) - A Critique of Ian Stevenson s Rebirth Research</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20685_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20685_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/RANACO-4" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20686.htm">Angel (Leonard) - Is There Adequate Empirical Evidence for Reincarnation? An Analysis of Ian Stevenson s Work</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 27<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20686_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20686_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This article reviews the research of  top rebirth scientist Ian Stevenson on spontaneous past-life memory cases, focusing on three key problems with Stevenson s work. <ol type="i"><li>First, his research of entirely anecdotal case reports contains a number of errors and omissions. </li><li>Second, like other reincarnation researchers, Stevenson has done no controlled experimental work on such cases; yet only such research could ever resolve whether the correspondences found between a child s statements and a deceased person s life exceed what we might find by chance. </li><li>Finally, the best reincarnation research should at least meet the standards met by typical empirical research, but Stevenson s methodology does not even meet the standards expected of third- or fourth-year college students. </ol></li></ol></FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20686.htm">Angel (Leonard) - Is There Adequate Empirical Evidence for Reincarnation? An Analysis of Ian Stevenson s Work</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20686_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20686_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/ANGITA-2" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20687.htm">Larsen (Claus Flodin) - Conjecturing Up Spirits in the Improvisations of Mediums</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 28<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20687_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20687_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper provides an analysis of the  Arizona experiments conducted by experimental mediumship researcher Gary E. Schwartz, a psychology professor at the University of Arizona, in 1999. During the experiments, a number of  psychics were tested for their ability to communicate with the dead, and afterward Schwartz concluded that his results produced strong scientific support for the existence of an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>2</SUP>. This paper critically evaluates Schwartz s arguments for this claim. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20687.htm">Larsen (Claus Flodin) - Conjecturing Up Spirits in the Improvisations of Mediums</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20687_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20687_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/LARCUS" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20688.htm">Battista (Christian), Gauvrit (Nicolas) & LeBel (Etienne) - Madness in the Method: Fatal Flaws in Recent Mediumship Experiments</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 29<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20688_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20688_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper reviews one of the most methodologically rigorous studies of mediumship conducted to date. On the surface, the statistical procedures used by Julie Beischel and Gary E. Schwartz in the study seem to support the existence of anomalous information reception (AIR), but in fact have been misapplied. Other methodological flaws are fatal, including unaccounted for researcher degrees of freedom, which completely calls into question Beischel and Schwartz s conclusion regarding AIR. We conclude by proposing an experimental design more appropriate for the small sample sizes typically used in experimental mediumship research. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20688.htm">Battista (Christian), Gauvrit (Nicolas) & LeBel (Etienne) - Madness in the Method: Fatal Flaws in Recent Mediumship Experiments</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20688_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20688_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/BATMIT" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20689.htm">Lester (David) - Is There Life After Death? A Review of the Supporting Evidence</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 30<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Editors <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20689_1">Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20689_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper reviews recent empirical research into the possibility of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>2</SUP>. First, it focuses on inconsistencies in accounts of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>3</SUP> from different sources of supposed evidence for survival. Next, it reviews problematic aspects of survival research on apparitions, near-death experiences, and reincarnation claims, among other things. Finally, it examines whether any recent near-death research has addressed previous methodological criticisms, concluding that such research has not in fact advanced. </ol> </FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20689.htm">Lester (David) - Is There Life After Death? A Review of the Supporting Evidence</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20689_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20689_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Taken from <A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/rec/LESITL" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T05:14" pubdate>02/08/2018 05:14:52</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>