Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation
Francione (Gary)
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Authors Citing this Book: Francione (Gary)


Amazon Book Description

  1. A prominent and respected philosopher of animal rights1 law and ethical theory, Gary L. Francione is known for his criticism of animal welfare laws and regulations, his abolitionist theory of animal rights2, and his promotion of veganism and nonviolence as the baseline principles of the abolitionist movement.
  2. In this collection, Francione advances the most radical theory of animal rights3 to date. Unlike Peter Singer, Francione maintains that we cannot morally justify using animals under any circumstances, and unlike Tom Regan, Francione's theory applies to all sentient beings, not only to those who have more sophisticated cognitive abilities.
  3. Gary L. Francione: was the first academic to teach animal rights4 theory in an American law school and has lectured on the topic throughout the United States, Canada, and Europe. He is Distinguished Professor of Law and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Scholar of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers University-Newark, and his books include Introduction to Animal Rights5 and Animals, Property, and the Law.

Amazon Customer Review
  1. This book is a collection of essays which argue the personhood of non-human animals. Gary L Francione has the amazing ability to shake us out of our ignorance and comfort zones, not with horror stories but with theories that make us examine our own humanity and moral values. He can really make us think outside the regurgitated untruths that we have all been hypnotised with.
  2. He exposes the harmful flaws of animal welfare reforms and shows that animal rights6 is about the abolition of animal use, exploitation and injustice NOT the regulation of animal treatment. The moral baseline of the animal rights7 movement is veganism. And veganism is, quite simply, nonviolence.
  3. This book is a must for all thinking people. It should be a compulsory read on all school curriculums.


Columbia University Press (22 Dec. 2009)

"Pynes (Christopher A.) - Review of Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation by Gary L. Francione"

Source: The Quarterly Review of Biology, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 2009), p. 283

Full Text
  1. The author is a radical, vegan activist and in this collection of seven previously published papers, "Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation", argues for the end of all animal uses by humans: the abolitionist thesis. He bases this on the philosophical claim that sentience alone is both necessary and sufficient to grant full moral status and legal rights to animals, which means, among other things, animals cannot properly be human property and an end to the domestic animal trade.
  2. Francione takes aim at seeming animal welfare allies Peter Singer and Tom Regan for arguing for a kind of animal welfare reform that the author claims just makes people feel better about animal uses, but does not actually achieve its proper aim of protecting animals and treating them as persons. Gary Francione on animals is like Christian Science founder Mrs. Eddy on drugs and alcohol: “its slightest use is abuse.” For this reason, he argues for a vegan lifestyle over trying to increase or improve regulation on animal uses; he claims the regulations do more harm than good for the animals involved, but more importantly the animals deserve not to be used at all.
  3. The author provides a clear and informative introduction to the collection, and given that the articles have not been altered in content from their original publication, there is a bit of repetition of the more common themes. But if a person is interested in the best defense for a vegan worldview and an end to all animal uses by humans, then Francione has the best arguments and they are worth knowing and understanding. The problem is that the best arguments for veganism and the end of animal uses are not the best arguments for how animals should be treated or used and, for this reason, Francione’s views, no matter how clearly they are expressed, will not appeal to many people whether vegetarian, omnivore, or pet owner. He is really preaching to Mrs. Eddy’s choir.

COMMENT: Review of "Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation"

"Steiner (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Foreward"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation

Full Text1
  1. Paradigm shifts in human thought always depend on iconoclasts who are not afraid to challenge conventional wisdom. Although our thinking in the past generation about the moral status of animals has advanced in certain respects, its fundamental presuppositions have suffered from a debilitating stagnation. In contemporary thought no individual has been doing more to challenge these presuppositions in a fruitful than Gary Francione.
  2. The past generation of thinking about animals has been dominated by the thought of Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Indeed, Singer's and Regan's work on animals has been so influential that few thinkers have been willing to question their basic assumptions. Singer takes a utilitarian approach derived from Bentham and Mill, while Regan takes a deontological approach inherited from Kant. Both seek to refine and improve the views of their historical forebears, and both have done a great deal to draw attention to the plight of animals. But as Francione has shown through his meticulous and critical examination of their work, neither Singer nor Regan has succeeded in overcoming the anthropocentric limitations of traditional Western philosophical thinking about the moreal status of animals. Nonetheless, Francione has succeeded in rethinking the tenets of utilitarianism and deontology so as to develop an entirely new approach that identifies sentience as the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of rights. Specifically, he argues that all sentient beings, those capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, have a fundamental interest in avoiding suffering and continuing to exist. We protect (at least in theory2) the right of all humans not to have to suffer the deprivation of their fundamental interests by being used as the resources of others. In other words, all humans have the right not to be treated as the property of others. Francione contends that there is no reason not to accord this right to nonhuman animals as well. Once we recognize this right, we must abolish our institutionalized exploitation of animals, which rests on their status as economic commodities.
  3. Francione has argued for this conclusion at length in numerous essays and in his books, Animals, Property, and the Law (1995) and "Francione (Gary) - Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?" (2000). Central to Francione's critique of Singer and Regan is his rejection of "similar-minds theory," the view that animals must be cognitively like3 human beings in order to possess inherent moral worth (see "Francione (Gary) - Taking Sentience Seriously" in this volume). The dominant assumption in the history of Western philosophy has been that only those beings capable of reason and language can have full4 moral worth. Thus animals would have to be rational and linguistic in the same sense as humans in order to merit moral respect and to have the right not to be mere resources. Like Bentham and Mill before him, Singer proceeds from the idea that sentience is the only capacity relevant to considerations of moral worth, and concludes that human beings enjoy certain moral prerogatives over animals on the ground that our superior cognitive capacities make it possible for the future to matter to us in ways that it cannot matter to animals5. Humans, like nonhumans, have an interest in how they are treated, but unlike animals, humans also have an interest in life per se. Thus Singer ultimately reinforces an anthropocentric hierarchy that subordinates6 animals to the interests of human beings and accordingly focuses on the treatment, not the use, of animals. Similarly, Regan argues that animals (at least mammals over one7 year of age and perhaps other animals as well) have inherent moral worth equal8 to that of humans but concludes that in unavoidable conflicts of interest between humans and animals, the interest of humans should prevail because our superior cognitive abilities give us greater opportunities for future satisfaction than animals can have. Francione challenges the basic assumptions behind these conclusions and rejects the idea that the inherent worth of human beings is any9 greater than that of animals (see "Francione (Gary) - Comparable Harm and Equal Inherent Value: The Problem of the Dog in the Lifeboat" in this volume).
  4. The crux of Francione's challenge to Singer and Regan is the proposition that any being that is sentient necessarily has an interest in life because sentience is a means to the end of continued existence, an idea expressed in a number10 of essays in this book. Once we acknowledge that a being has an interest in life, we must recognize that this being also has a right to life and the avoidance of suffering that is equal in principle to the right to life enjoyed by any other sentient being. We may not make quantitative or qualitative distinctions among sentient beings in regard to their right to life. If a being has a right to life, then that being also has a right not to be property. This right is basic in the sense that it gives rise to important subsidiary rights, such as the right not to be killed for food, experimented upon, or used for entertainment. As Francione argues in the essays in this volume, these rights are shared equally by human11 and nonhuman animals; they have a categorical force that forbids us to subordinate the interests and fortunes of animals to those of humans.
  5. A related aspect of Francione's iconoclasm is his absolute rejection of animal welfarism. In Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights12 Movement (1996) and in "Francione (Gary) - Reflections on 'Animals, Property, and the Law' and 'Rain Without Thunder'" in this volume, Francione distinguishes between animal welfarism and abolitionism. Welfarists take the view that using animals to satisfy human desires is acceptable, and they emphasize the need to treat animals well in the process of using them. Welfarists often argue that killing and eating animals is permissible as long as we raise them in comfortable and healthy circumstances. For example, we are entitled to kill and eat chickens as long as they are allowed free-range living conditions. Abolitionists, on the other hand, see any such uses of animals as a fundamental violation of their right not to be property, and they argue that all uses of animals to satisfy human desires must cease altogether. Francione argues that we have no moral justification for continuing to bring domestic animals into existence13 for human use. One focal point of his work has been his effort to demonstrate that there are now more animal welfare regulations in place than ever before, and yet there is more14 exploitation inflicted on more animals today than ever before. In effect, animal welfare regulation simply permits human beings to feel better about exploiting animals.
  6. Recognizing that abolition will not occur immediately, Francione focuses on the incremental eradication of the status of animals as property and on the importance of veganism15, the complete rejection of the use of animals for food or other purposes. As he describes it, veganism is the application of the principle of abolition to the life of the individual. For Francione, perhaps more than any other contemporary figure since Donald Watson, who founded the Vegan Society in Britain in 1944, veganism must be the guiding conviction in all discussion of animal ethics.
  7. I have often heard it said that the kind of radical change in the moral and legal status of animals envisioned by Francione will never take place. What Francione shows us, however, is that animals have the same right as human beings to live their lives, free from ownership and exploitation, quite apart from speculations about what may or may not come to pass. The fact that we humans tend to be comfortable with a regime of animal exploitation dating back thousands of years is not a justification for our continued subjugation of animals. It is an obstacle that we urgently need to overcome. To this end, what we need more than anything else is thinkers with the courage and the determination to break the images in the temple. Gary Francione is doing exactly that.
  8. Department of Philosophy, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, October 17, 2007

In-Page Footnotes ("Steiner (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Foreward")

Footnote 1: Foototes are my comments.

Footnote 2:
  • Indeed – but this has nothing to do with pseudo-slavery, but rather with wage-slavery (or other ways of earning a living).
  • There are no free lunches, unless you are a companion animal, for human beings or other animals. Most human beings spend most of their lives doing things they’d prefer not to. That’s life.
Footnote 3:
  • “Like”is a weasel word.
  • The contention isn’t really that their cognition be like ours in the sense of “similar” (any more than an alien’s cognition would need to be), but that it has a degree of sophistication.
Footnote 4:
  • Reason, yes; language, no.
  • Also, “full” is an all-or-nothing term. It implies equality, which cannot be the case for all sentient beings.
  • If your arguments imply otherwise, they have gone wrong.
Footnote 5:
  • Again, this is all-or-nothing. How do we know that no animals think of the future?
  • That said, anticipating the future, and making sacrifices to improve it, gives some sort of moral right not to have it cut short.
Footnote 6:
  • Well, this is just how it is – we just happen to be at the top of the food chain.
  • Animals subordinate one another and often treat one another (whether of the same species or others) horribly.
  • Now the fact that we human beings have to a degree escaped our evolutionary heritage gives us the opportunity to make things better for those that haven’t.
  • But – while we may have a duty to do this – nonhuman animals don’t have a right that we so do.
Footnote 7: Where does this come from?

Footnote 8: Tosh.

Footnote 9:
  • However much you sympathise with the general principle that all sentient beings have moral worth, and that the effect on their “senses” should be taken into account in our moral calculations, this “any” just opens up the position to ridicule.
  • Forget the dog and the child – what about the dog and the chimp, or other pairs of animals with different cognitive or sensory capacities?
  • It’s not even clear (to me) that all human beings have equal moral worth.
Footnote 10: Hopefully not, as the idea is muddled at best.

Footnote 13: Even, presumably, if their lives for them – irrespective of their value for human beings – has positive utility on the whole.

Footnote 14:
  • The point is not to count heads, but to compare cases.
  • There are more human beings, and technology has moved on. What would the situation be – given these changes – in the absence of the animal welfarist movement?
Footnote 15:
  • What’s wrong with eating eggs from your own hens?
  • They lead happy enough lives and die natural, if not happy, deaths.
  • Presumably the objection would be that for each hen there’s a cockerel that’s been liquidated?

"Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Introduction

  1. Introduction:
    1. In order to understand how we think about animals as a moral and a legal matter — both historically and at the present time — it is necessary to consider two different aspects of our relationship with other animals: our use of animals and our treatment of animals. These aspects are different because whether we use animals at all for a particular purpose is a different question from how we treat them pursuant to that purpose. For example, whether it is morally acceptable to kill and eat animals at all is a different question from how we treat the animals we eat and whether, for instance, we raise them in intensive "factory farms" or in "free-range" conditions, or how we slaughter them. Our use of animals is a separate matter from whether our treatment of them is "humane" or "cruel."
    2. Based on this distinction between use and treatment, we can identify four primary ways in which we have conceptualized our moral and legal obligations to nonhuman animals:
      • Before the nineteenth century, we generally regarded animals as things both in moral theory and under the law. According to this view, neither use nor treatment raised a moral or legal concern because animals simply did not matter at all.
      • The animal welfare position, which became popular in the nineteenth century and represents the prevailing contemporary paradigm, separates use and treatment and holds that it is acceptable to use animals for our purposes. We do, however, have a moral and legal obligation to treat them "humanely" and to avoid imposing "unnecessary" suffering on them. The primary focus of animal welfare is the regulation of animal treatment.
      • The animal rights2 position, which maintains that our use of animals cannot be justified, seeks to abolish ail animal use. The abolitionist position rejects regulation on theoretical grounds (even "humane" animal use cannot be justified morally) as well as practical grounds (regulation does not sufficiently protect animal interests and even facilitates the continued social acceptance of animal use).
      • The "new welfarist" position, of which there are multiple versions, is more or less critical of traditional welfarist regulation but continues to promote regulation as a means to achieve abolition or significantly reduce animal use and exploitation in the future. Most large animal advocacy organizations promote some version of the new welfarist position.
    3. At each stage, our views about supposed cognitive or spiritual differences between humans and nonhumans and the perceived moral significance of those differences have informed our views about the use and treatment of nonhumans.
    4. I will now briefly examine these four positions in very general terms and then describe the essays in this book, which discuss these topics in greater detail.
  2. Conclusion:
    1. The animal advocacy movement is really two vastly different movements. One sees our use of animals as central and seeks the abolition of animal exploitation through the progressive and deliberate eradication of the property status of animals. The other regards treatment as the primary concern and seeks better regulation of animal exploitation through measures that mainly make animal exploitation more efficient but do not effectively challenge property status. The essays in this book focus on the inherent tension between these two approaches, the failure of animal welfare laws to provide significant protection to animal interests, and the idea, present even in the writing of animal advocates Peter Singer and Tom Regan, that issues of use and treatment are properly informed by supposed differences between the minds of humans and those of nonhumans.
    2. It is my hope that these essays will help sharpen the meaning of the "animal rights3," which has come to be used to describe any normative position that vaguely concerns animals, and to make clear that the rights approach means abolishing the exploitation of animals and accepting the personhood of nonhuman animals. By "personhood of non-human animals," I do not mean that we are morally obligated to treat nonhumans as human persons. Humans have interests that nonhumans do not have, and vice versa. But just as we regard every human as having inherent value that precludes treating that human exclusively as a resource for others, so, too, do animals have inherent value that precludes our treating them as our property. It is my hope also that my views will inform the debate between the abolitionist and welfare approaches, a debate that is increasingly taking the center stage in our thinking about the moral and legal status of nonhuman animals.

In-Page Footnotes ("Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment")

Footnote 1:
  • This is basically the Introduction and the Conclusion.
  • The detailed elaboration of the “four positions” has been omitted, and
  • The abstracts of the seven papers have been removed to form abstracts for the papers themselves.

"Francione (Gary) - Animals - Property or Persons?"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Chapter 1

Author’s Abstract1
  1. This essay presents a version of the abolitionist theory of animal rights2 that I developed more fully in "Francione (Gary) - Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?".
  2. I argue that our moral thinking about animals is terribly confused and that a large part of the problem is our treatment of animals as property, which cannot be justified morally.
  3. I conclude that our acceptance of the right of nonhumans not to be treated as property requires that we abolish institutionalized animal exploitation and stop producing domestic nonhumans for human use.

In-Page Footnotes ("Francione (Gary) - Animals - Property or Persons?")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment".

"Francione (Gary) - Reflections on 'Animals, Property, and the Law' and 'Rain Without Thunder'"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Chapter 2

Author’s Abstract1
  1. In this essay I respond to various critics who argue that the property status of animals is not an insurmountable obstacle to improving animal welfare and that animal welfare regulation is an effective way of moving incrementally toward the recognition that nonhumans have more than extrinsic or conditional value.

Author’s Introduction2
  1. In my 1995 book, Animals, Property, and the Law, I argue that animal-welfare laws do not provide any significant protection to nonhuman animals because nonhumans are the property of humans3. Animals are things that we own and that have only extrinsic or conditional value as means to our ends. We may as a matter of personal choice attach a higher value to our companion animals, such as dogs and cats, but as far as the law is concerned, even these animals are nothing more than commodities. As a general matter, we do not regard animals as having any intrinsic value and we protect animal interests only to the extent that it benefits us to do so.
  2. We claim to take animal interests seriously from both a moral and legal perspective, which is why we have anti-cruelty and other animal-welfare laws in the first place. We purport to balance human and animal interests, but because animals are property, there can be no meaningful balance. Animal interests will almost always be regarded as less important than human interests, even when the human interest at stake is relatively trivial and the animal interest at stake is significant. The result of any supposed balancing of human and nonhuman interests required by animal-welfare laws is predetermined from the outset by the property status of the nonhuman as a "food animal," "experimental animal," "game animal," et cetera.
  3. Although we supposedly prohibit the infliction on animals of "unnecessary" suffering, we do not ask whether particular animal uses are necessary even though most of the suffering that we impose on animals cannot be characterized as necessary in any meaningful sense. Rather, we ask only whether particular treatment is necessary given uses that are per se not necessary. We look to the customs and practices of the various institutions of exploitation and we assume that those involved in the activity would not inflict more pain and suffering than required for the particular purpose because it would be irrational to do so, just as it would be for the owner of a car to dent her vehicle for no reason.
  4. For example, although it is not necessary for humans to eat meat or dairy products and these foods may well be detrimental to human health and the environment, we do not ask about the necessity per se of using animals for food. We ask only whether the pain and suffering imposed on animals used for food go beyond what is regarded as acceptable according to the customs and practices of animal agriculture. To the extent it is customary for farmers to castrate or brand farm animals, both very painful activities, we regard such actions as "necessary" because we assume that farmers would not mutilate animals for no reason.
  5. The result of this framework is that the level of care required by animal-welfare laws rarely rises above that which a rational property owner would provide in order to exploit the animal in an economically efficient way. Because animals are property, we consider as "humane" treatment that we would regard as torture if it were inflicted on humans.
  6. In my 1996 book Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights4 Movement I argue that there are important theoretical and practical differences between the animal-rights and animal-welfare positions and that welfarist regulation intended to make animal treatment more "humane" will, for the most part, do nothing but make animal exploitation more efficient. Welfarist regulation, I maintain, does not recognize or protect the inherent value of animals and will not lead in some incremental way to the abolition of animal exploitation. For example, the federal Humane Slaughter Act, which supposedly requires the "humane" slaughter of nonhumans for food purposes, prohibits suffering only to the extent that it ensures worker safety, reduces carcass damage, and provides other economic benefits for humans. It would, however, be an absurd use of the word to characterize any slaughterhouse as "humane."
  7. To the extent that animal advocates seek protection for animals that exceeds what is necessary to exploit them for a particular purpose, the property status of nonhumans and the political compromise that is required invariably result in regulations that do little — if anything — to affect adversely the interests of human property owners or to improve the treatment of nonhumans. The primary effect of these measures is to make the public feel better about animal exploitation, which actually may result in a net increase of animal suffering through increased use. A central thesis of Rain Without Thunder, as well as my later work, is that, if animal interests are to be morally significant, we must accord to nonhumans the basic right not to be treated as property, and this requires that we seek to abolish, and not merely to regulate, institutionalized animal exploitation.
  8. A number of my critics have argued that, although we do treat animals badly, there is nothing inherent in the property status of animals that would prevent us from changing the law to require that animals be accorded better treatment and so animal advocates ought to pursue incremental improvements in animal welfare. Although I maintain that we cannot justify the property status of nonhumans irrespective of how "humanely" we may treat them — just as we cannot justify human slavery even if it is "humane" — I certainly agree that we could treat animals better than we do and stated so explicitly in Animals, Property, and the Law5. The status of nonhumans as property, however, militates strongly against significant improvement in our treatment of animals, and animal welfare will do little more than make animal exploitation more economically efficient and socially acceptable.
  9. There can be no doubt that the animal-protection community in the United States — and, indeed, throughout the world — has in the years since I wrote these books achieved a greater degree of economic power and social prominence than at any point in history. Therefore, if my critics are correct, and the property status of nonhumans is not as significant an obstacle as I have claimed, it would seem that there should be some evidence of progress that does not fit the model that I have described. That is, there should be evidence of animal protection that goes beyond what is required for efficient exploitation, reflecting at least a nascent recognition of the inherent value of animals as opposed to their exclusively extrinsic value as property. Instead, the events of the past decade or so reinforce the view that the property status of nonhumans is a greater obstacle than my critics and the animal-protection movement have recognized or appreciated.
  10. Plan:
    • Part II of this article examines whether animal welfare in the United States has moved us closer to recognizing the inherent value of nonhumans and concludes that it has not. This is not a complete survey of federal and state law or of changes that have occurred through the voluntary action of animal users; rather, it focuses on those developments that animal advocates appear to regard as most significant.
    • Part III discusses some general reasons why the property paradigm militates against better treatment of nonhumans. These remarks are made primarily in the context of responding to criticisms of my views made by Cass Sunstein.
    • Part IV discusses the false dichotomy promoted by my critics that we must either pursue traditional welfarist regulation or sacrifice nonhumans to the "Utopian" goal of abolition that will not be achieved for many years, if ever.
    • Part V offers some observations on the field of "animal law" as it has emerged in the past decade.
    • Part VI addresses the view advanced by some in the legal community that we ought to treat certain animals, such as great apes, in a different manner based on their cognitive similarities to humans.

In-Page Footnotes ("Francione (Gary) - Reflections on 'Animals, Property, and the Law' and 'Rain Without Thunder'")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment".

Footnote 2:
  • Section I.
  • Most footnotes omitted.
Footnote 3:
  • Throughout this article, I use "nonhuman" and "animal" interchangeably, but it should not be forgotten that humans are animals as well. In addition, I use "animal who" rather than "animal that" to emphasize that nonhumans are not objects, as implied by our reference to them as "it."
Footnote 5: In the Introduction to Animals, Property, and the Law, I state:
    "I do not maintain that characterizing sentient beings as property necessarily means that those beings will be treated exactly the same as inanimate objects or that property can never have rights as a matter of formal jurisprudential theory. For example, although slaves were, for some purposes, considered 'persons' who technically held certain rights, those rights were not particularly effective in providing any real protection for slaves. We could decide to grant certain rights to animals while continuing to regard them as property. The problem is that as long as property is, as a matter of legal theory, regarded as that which cannot have interests or cannot have interests that transcend the rights of property owners to use their property, then there will probably always be a gap between what the law permits people to do with animals and what any acceptable moral theory and basic decency tell us is appropriate."

"Francione (Gary) - Taking Sentience Seriously"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Chapter 3

Author’s Abstract1
  1. In this essay, I discuss how our focus on whether animal minds are like ours — what I have called the 'similar-minds' approach to the human/nonhuman relationship — has led us to analyze inadequately the moral importance of animal suffering, despite our claim to take it seriously through the prohibition on inflicting "unnecessary" suffering and the requirement that we treat animals 'humanely.'

In-Page Footnotes ("Francione (Gary) - Taking Sentience Seriously")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment".

"Francione (Gary) - Equal Consideration and the Interest of Nonhuman Animals in Continued Existence: A Response to Professor Sunstein"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Chapter 4

Author’s Abstract1
  1. In this essay I reply to Professor Cass Sunstein who, in a lengthy review of my Introduction to Animal Rights2 in The New Republic, claims that I have failed to justify why we should not focus on better regulating our treatment of animals rather than abolishing animal use.

In-Page Footnotes ("Francione (Gary) - Equal Consideration and the Interest of Nonhuman Animals in Continued Existence: A Response to Professor Sunstein")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment".

"Francione (Gary) - The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research: Necessity and Justification"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Chapter 5

Author’s Abstract1
  1. In this essay I discuss how the discourse on the use of animals in biomedical research usually focuses on two issues.
    1. The first issue is empirical and asks whether the use of nonhumans in experiments is required in order to obtain data.
    2. The second issue is moral and asks whether the use of nonhumans can be defended as a matter of ethical theory.
  2. I argue that although the use of animals in research may involve a plausible necessity claim — indeed, our use of animals in this context is our only animal use that is not transparently frivolous — there is no moral justification for using nonhumans in situations in which we would not use humans. And with the exception of Peter Singer and a few other utilitarians, almost no one argues that it is ever permissible to use humans in this way.

In-Page Footnotes ("Francione (Gary) - The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research: Necessity and Justification")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment".

"Francione (Gary) - Ecofeminism and Animal Rights: A Review of 'Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment ofAnimals'"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Chapter 6

Author’s Abstract1
  1. In this essay I contend that when applied to nonhumans who are property, the feminist ethic of care does not provide protection that extends beyond rights.
  2. Rather, when so applied, it is a form of new welfarist theory, which, like Peter Singer's position, seeks to accord greater weight to the interests of nonhumans but still preserves the hierarchy of humans, who have rights protection that is denied to nonhumans.

In-Page Footnotes ("Francione (Gary) - Ecofeminism and Animal Rights: A Review of 'Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment ofAnimals'")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment".

"Francione (Gary) - Comparable Harm and Equal Inherent Value: The Problem of the Dog in the Lifeboat"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Chapter 7

Author’s Abstract1
  1. In this essay I discuss Tom Regan's view that harm is a qualitatively greater loss, and therefore a greater harm, for humans than for nonhumans and that when we must choose to save the life of a human or a nonhuman, we are morally obligated to save the life of the human. I discuss some of the problems that arise from Regan's analysis.
  2. I have, since writing this article in 1995, decided that Regan's theory of comparable harm is more problematic for Regan's theory than I thought initially. Accordingly, I have added some comments as a postscript to this essay that reflect my more recent views.

In-Page Footnotes ("Francione (Gary) - Comparable Harm and Equal Inherent Value: The Problem of the Dog in the Lifeboat")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Francione (Gary) - The Abolition of Animal Use Versus the Regulation of Animal Treatment".

"Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Reference Guide to Selected Topics"

Source: Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation, Appendix

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