The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice
Carruthers (Peter)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Cover Blurb

  1. Do animals have moral rights? In contrast to the philosophical gurus of the animal rights1 movement, whose opinion has held moral sway in recent years, Peter Carruthers here claims that they do not. The Animals Issue provides an admirably clear discussion of the role theoretical considerations have to play in determining our moral judgement. Carruthers explores a variety of moral theories, exposing the weaknesses of those that would accord rights to animals, and concluding that contractualism (in the tradition of Kant and Rawls) offers the most acceptable framework. From such a perspective animals lack direct moral significance. This need not entail of course that there are no moral constraints on our treatment of them.
  2. This provocative but judiciously argued book is for all those interested in animal rights2, whatever their initial standpoint. It will also serve as a lively introduction to ethics, demonstrating why theoretical issues in ethics actually matter.
  3. ‘A highly intelligent and philosophically probing discussion of our obligations to other animal species.’
    Stephen Darwall, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
  4. ‘Those interested in the issue of animal rights3 should read this book. Carruthers lays out the philosophical issues involved in the use of animals in medical research with clarity and sincerity. Anyone who cares about the trade-off between acquiring human knowledge to help cure disease and the use of animal for those purposes will enjoy new perspectives on the issue as a result of Carruthers’ fascinating arguments.’
    Michael S. Gazzaniga, Dartmouth Medical School

Contents
    "Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice - Preface"
  1. "Carruthers (Peter) - Moral Argument and Moral Theory"
  2. "Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Contractualism"
  3. "Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Animal Suffering"
  4. "Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and the Harm of Killing"
  5. "Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Animals"
  6. "Carruthers (Peter) - Animals and Rational Agency"
  7. "Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Character"
  8. Animals and Conscious Experience
    (not available: contains errors; for my current views,
  9. "Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice - Conclusion"
    Notes
    Index

BOOK COMMENT:
  • Cambridge University Press (24 Sept. 1992)
  • For the Electronic text, see Link



"Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice - Preface"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Preface


Full Text1
  1. The animal rights2 movement has gained considerable momentum in recent years, fuelled, in part, by the theoretical arguments of moral philosophers. Indeed, it is striking that almost all of the books and articles recently published on this issue have argued in favour of the moral standing of animals. This is not because the consensus amongst moral philosophers as a whole is that animals have rights. It is rather because, for one reason or another, most of those who take the opposite view have chosen to remain silent. This book is written in an attempt to redress the balance.
  2. My view is that the case for the moral standing of animals is weak, and that the contrary case is, by contrast, very powerful. In fact, I regard the present popular concern with animal rights3 in our culture as a reflection of moral decadence. Just4 as Nero fiddled while Rome burned, many in the West agonise over the fate of seal pups and cormorants while human beings elsewhere starve or are enslaved. This reaction is, to a degree, understandable. For animal sufferers are always blameless, and the steps necessary to improve their situation are generally plain. Our response to human suffering, in contrast, is often complicated by the suspicion that the victims, or their political representatives, are at least partially responsible for their fate, and by knowledge of the fearsome complexity of the economic and social problems involved in such issues as famine relief. Whatever may have been true of Nero, our species of decadence may consist in a weakness for easy options, rather than in any failure of moral sensitivity.
  3. The recent explosion of interest in animal rights5 has had a variety of sources, no doubt, besides moral paralysis in face of the enormity of the world’s human problems.
    1. One such source may be the increasing urbanisation of Western culture, that has dramatically diminished the extent of personal working contact with animals. The sentimentality that many people feel for their pets has thus come to spread itself over the whole animal domain.
    2. But another source has undoubtedly been intellectual. The philosophical gurus of the animal rights6 movement have managed to seize the moral high ground, charging those who oppose them with inconsistency or morally arbitrary speciesism.
    The main purpose of this book is to show that these charges can be rebutted. Besides exposing the implausibility of those theories that would grant rights7 to animals, I shall defend a theoretical framework that accords full moral standing to all human beings, while non-arbitrarily withholding such standing from animals.
  4. In attacking those who attribute moral standing to animals, however, I am not opposing those who are animal lovers, as I explain in the opening chapter. Indeed, I count myself as belonging to the latter group. But it is one thing to love animals for8 their grace, beauty, and marvellous variety, and quite another to believe that they make any direct moral claims9 upon us. Nor should I be seen as placing myself in opposition to recent ecology movements. But my view is that rare species of animal and rain-forests are worth preserving for their importance to us, not because they have moral significance, or moral rights, in their own10 right. Far from being strengthened, the ecology movement is only weakened by association with such extreme and indefensible views.
  5. This book is aimed primarily at non-philosophers, in the sense that I try to take nothing for granted, and lay out my material as clearly and explicitly as I can. All I assume is that my readers are prepared to think while they read, and that they can follow the course of a rational argument. This does not mean, however, that I talk down to my audience. I do not write from any position of specialised knowledge or superior wisdom, but only as one who has tried to think honestly and openly about the issues. In any case, I belong to that breed of contemporary philosopher who holds that the life-blood of philosophy is accessibility. Where philosophy retreats into technicality it withers and dies, and where it takes refuge in obscurity it only forms a rallying point for those who care nothing for truth.
  6. Although human beings are, strictly speaking, a species of animal, for reasons of simplicity I shall use the term ‘animal’, throughout, in such a way as to contrast with ‘human being’. So when I raise the question whether any animals have rights, what I am asking, in fact, is whether any non-human animals have rights. …


COMMENT: See Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice - Preface")

Footnote 1: Truncated.

Footnote 4:
  • I don’t accept the analogy, or the example.
  • It’s not as though helping human beings and helping animals are mutually exclusive.
  • Also, there are (I imagine) arguments in favour of seal culls from within an animal welfarist (or at least consequentialist) perspective.
  • But, seal pups are not the critical case. The “fiddling” is taking action on this issue when billions of chickens live lives of terror and misery.
Footnote 7: I agree they don’t have rights, but we have duties not to treat them any worse than is strictly necessary for our legitimate aims.

Footnote 8: While OK as far as it goes, this just treats animals as objects, rather than as ends in themselves.

Footnote 9:
  • I don’t see why a contractarian framework can’t be made to work, even though animals can’t sign up.
  • They don’t deserve a free lunch, but in return for their performing whatever role they are bred to play in our affairs, they receive good care and support insofar as this is practical for “their humans”.
Footnote 10:
  • How can this be right? While human beings have tried to control and enslave nature, and have been mostly successful, the negative consequences of this approach are now apparent.
  • When the last tiger becomes extinct, this isn’t just bad for us, nor even for the tigers. Arguing for this intuition is difficult, however, as the arguments tend to be instrumentalist, with talk of food chains and the like – or even “grace and beauty” (though such aesthetic considerations are important – and beyond the sensibilities of particular societies; just because we disapprove of Roman religion doesn’t mean we can without loss destroy their temples).
  • We need to think of ourselves as part of nature and not its master – which we are not, except when things go well. In reality, we live a very precarious existence – something mostly lost on academics with tenure.



"Carruthers (Peter) - Moral Argument and Moral Theory"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Chapter 1


Author’s Introduction
  1. The task of this book is to consider whether animals have moral standing - that is, whether they have rights that we may infringe by killing them or causing them suffering, or whether there is some other way in which we have direct moral duties towards them.
  2. In this first chapter I shall lay the foundation for what follows, discussing the role of theoretical considerations within morality and the methods that may be appropriate in resolving moral disputes. I shall also argue against some kinds of moral theory that they are too implausible to be taken seriously.

Author’s Summary (Conclusion)
  1. I have argued that both strong subjectivism and strong objectivism are unacceptable as accounts of morality - moral judgements are neither direct expressions of attitude or feeling, nor descriptive of values that exist independent of the human mind and human systems of classification.
  2. But both weak subjectivism and weak objectivism are left in play - it may be that moral disagreements express, at bottom, commitment to different basic principles, or it may be that they result from the complexities inherent in a common system of concepts.
  3. But either way, fully justifying a moral belief must involve showing how it may be integrated into a moral theory whose governing conception and basic normative principles are each acceptable after rational reflection.


COMMENT: See Link.



"Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Contractualism"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Chapter 2


Author’s Introduction
  1. In this chapter I shall examine two theories (or classes of theory) that stand some chance of proving acceptable, both in respect of the explanations provided by their governing conceptions of the source of moral notions and moral motivation, and in respect of their basic normative output.
  2. The theories are, namely, utilitarianism1 and contractualism.

Author’s Summary (Conclusion)
  1. I have developed versions of both utilitarianism and contractualism that can claim not only to present a satisfying explanation of the origins of morality and of moral motivation, but also to accommodate a good deal, at least, of common-sense moral judgement.
  2. My own view is that contractualism is, under reflective equilibrium, by far the more plausible moral theory. But both are sufficiently powerful that we shall need to consider the consequences of each of them for our treatment of animals. It will be a further test of the adequacy of our two candidate theories that they should entail acceptable consequences2 on such matters.


COMMENT: See Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Contractualism")

Footnote 1: This is a rather primitive and implausible version of consequentialism.

Footnote 2:
  • Of course, people will differ as to whether these consequences are or are not acceptable.
  • They will also differ on whether – if in fact the consequences are indeed “unacceptable” to some or many – whether people should still be encouraged to accept them (and whether they morally ought to do so).
  • The fact that I like steak – and being told I can’t have it is “unacceptable” to me – isn’t really an “unacceptable consequence” of a theory that says I can’t.



"Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Animal Suffering"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Chapter 3


Author’s Introduction
  1. In this chapter I shall begin considering what a utilitarian should say about the moral standing of animals.
  2. I shall confine my attention to the question of the moral standing of animal experience (particularly pleasure and pain), reserving to "Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and the Harm of Killing" (Chapter 4) discussion of utilitarian approaches to the value of animal life.

Author’s Summary (Conclusion)
  1. There is an argument for saying that speciesism is just1 as morally objectionable as racism or sexism. This argument would, if accepted, have important implications for our practices that cause suffering to animals, such as hunting and factory farming, since there are good reasons for believing that higher vertebrates, at least, have interests.
  2. But in fact the argument presupposes that the moral stand-point may be equated with that of an impartial sympathetic observer, which is the governing conception of utilitarianism. Moreover, the fact that utilitarianism has such a consequence renders it reflectively unstable, since the conclusion is at odds with apparently fundamental2 features of our moral thought. Even an appeal to the distinction between higher and lower pleasures cannot really help.
  3. The utilitarian approach to animal suffering is therefore inadequate, and should be rejected.


COMMENT: See Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Animal Suffering")

Footnote 1: Well, it might be the same sort of lazy and unjustified prejudice – of the same sort as racism and sexism – while not being “just as morally objectionable”.

Footnote 2: The same could have been said of racism and sexism when they were first raised as moral issues.



"Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and the Harm of Killing"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Chapter 4


Author’s Introduction
  1. In this chapter I shall conclude my discussion of the implications of utilitarianism for the question of the moral standing of animals, by considering what a utilitarian should say about the value of animal life.

Author’s Summary (Conclusion)
  1. Death is a harm to the one who dies only1 in so far as it prevents future worthwhile existence. Yet our reason for fearing death is that continued life will be presupposed by almost all of our desires.
  2. From a utilitarian perspective there is essentially the same direct moral objection to killing an animal as there is to killing a human - namely, that the death prevents future enjoyments, and that not being killed is a necessary condition for the future desires of the creature to be satisfied.
  3. From the same perspective there is no2 reason to count the life of an animal as less valuable than the life of a rational agent.
  4. I have argued that these consequences are too extreme3 to be believed.


COMMENT: See Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and the Harm of Killing")

Footnote 1:
  • The process of dying, and the fear of that process, is also a harm.
  • Do people really fear “being dead”. Do they also consider their lives so much fun that it’s this that keeps them struggling to stay alive against almost any odds?
  • Human beings struggle to stay alive for the same reason animals do – because species without this drive wouldn’t have been selected for. It has – in general – nothing to do with reasons or projects. I doubt most people near the end of their lives have much of either, yet they still want to live – or at least don’t want to die.
Footnote 2: There is, if value is a non-binary property based on actual qualities – but it would – if accepted – lead to the “unacceptable” consequence that some human lives are more valuable than others – which they are, of course, though few in academia dare say so.

Footnote 3: Two issues, I think:
  1. Being on the lookout for a “reductio” is a sensible stance in philosophy – the question is always knowing when you have found one.
  2. Consequences may be correctly argued, but impractical to implement. Societies have the moralities they can afford. But it can be laziness and moral turpitude that fails to note when the possibility of affording moral change has arisen (eg. sourcing tasty protein in ways that don’t involve the ruthless exploitation of sentient beings).



"Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Animals"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Chapter 5


Author’s Introduction
  1. In this chapter I shall consider what a contractualist should say about the moral standing of animals.
  2. Throughout, I shall make the simplifying assumption that no animals should be counted as rational agents, in the sense that is central to contractualism. The extent to which this assumption is true will be examined in "Carruthers (Peter) - Animals and Rational Agency" (the chapter that follows).

Author’s Summary (Conclusion)
  1. No1 version of contractualism will accord moral standing to animals. There may, nevertheless, be indirect duties towards animals, owed out of respect for the legitimate concerns of animal lovers2. But the protection thus extended to animals is unlikely to be very great. Nor can this approach explain the common-sense intuition that unmotivated cruelty to an animal is directly3 wrong.
  2. Contractualists also face the challenge of extending direct moral rights to those human beings who are not rational agents.
  3. While the first two avenues discussed, through which contractualists might hope to grant such rights, were seen to fail, two others - a slippery slope argument, and an argument from social stability - proved successful4.


COMMENT: See Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Animals")

Footnote 1: Presumably because animals cannot sign. But there could be a one-sided contract.

Footnote 2: This – while OK as far as it goes – does nothing to respect animals in themselves.

Footnote 3: I agree. What has Carruthers to say in response to this?

Footnote 4: I bet. Philosophical ethics just seems to be a way of intellectualising one’s prejudices.



"Carruthers (Peter) - Animals and Rational Agency"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Chapter 6


Author’s Introduction
  1. In this chapter I shall consider how much truth there is in the simplifying assumption made throughout Chapter 5 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Animals") - namely, that no animals are rational agents in the sense that would be necessary to ensure that they have moral standing within contractualism.

Author’s Summary (Conclusion)
  1. Many animals may be said to have beliefs and desires. Some animals (particularly apes) may be said to have second-order beliefs and desires.
  2. But:-
    1. no animals possess the other qualities necessary for rational agency. Specifically, no animals appear capable of long-term planning, or of representing to themselves different possible futures. And
    2. no1 animals appear capable of conceptualising (let alone acting under) general socially agreed rules.
  3. I therefore conclude that the simplifying assumption made in Chapter 5 is correct. No animals count as rational agents, in the sense necessary to secure them direct rights under contractualism2.


COMMENT: See Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Carruthers (Peter) - Animals and Rational Agency")

Footnote 1: No doubt both these claims are subject to dispute, and to the claim that this is just bar-raising in order to restrict the moral community to human beings.

Footnote 2: Why does contractualism require both sides to be rational agents?



"Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Character"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Chapter 7


Author’s Introduction
  1. In this chapter I shall confront the problem left over from Chapter 5 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Animals"), arguing that there is a way in which contractualism can accommodate duties towards animals that is independent of the question of offence caused to animal lovers.
  2. I shall then investigate just how extensive these duties may be, on the resulting account.

Author’s Summary (Conclusion)
  1. Contractualism withholds direct moral rights from animals, while at the same time granting them to all human beings. Yet contractualism can explain our common-sense belief that animals should not be caused to suffer for trivial reasons, since causing such suffering is expressive of a cruel character.
  2. This position is sufficiently plausible1 to be acceptable under reflective equilibrium. But the constraints thus justified are minimal. Contractualism certainly provides no support for those who would wish to extend still further the moral protection already available to animals.


COMMENT: See Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Character")

Footnote 1:
  • Bah! This just highlights the difference between consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethics.
  • The primary reason it’s wicked to cause gratuitous suffering to an animal is that it’s bad for the animal to be so treated, not that “causing such suffering is expressive of a cruel character”.
  • While it certainly is, so is the torturing of something falsely believed to be sentient. The proposed principle doesn’t distinguish the cases.
  • Also, as another objection, compare the actions of Nazis or slave-owners who didn’t consider the recipients of their brutalities as human, or as those they were “contracted” to protect.



"Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice - Conclusion"

Source: Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, Chapter 8


Full Text
  1. It is time to pull together the threads of my argument, and to briefly set out my conclusions. In doing this I shall by-pass the position defended in Chapter 8, that the mental states of animals are non-conscious ones. For this is, at the moment, too highly speculative to serve as a secure1 basis for moral practice. The contents of that chapter may best be regarded as suggestions for further research.
  2. My main argument against the moral standing of animals is that some version of contractualism provides us with the most acceptable framework for moral theory, and that from such a perspective animals must fail to be accorded direct rights, through failing to qualify as rational agents. While contractualism allows that we do have duties towards animals, these only arise indirectly -
    1. on the one hand, out of respect for the feelings of animal lovers, and
    2. on the other hand, through the good or bad qualities of character that animals may evoke in us.
    Most importantly, this position is not undermined by failure to accord direct rights to those human beings who are not rational agents, since such rights are in fact granted through a version of slippery slope argument, as well as through an argument from social stability.
  3. There only appear to be two real competitors to the contractualist line on animals rehearsed above. The first is the rights-based approach of Tom Regan. But there is no way in which this can achieve reflective equilibrium, largely because of its failure to provide an adequate governing conception of the sources of morality and moral motivation. We can set Regan a dilemma, indeed.
    1. The most natural reading of his work involves him in a commitment to moral intuitionism, maintaining that moral values form part of the fabric of the world independent of our minds. While this provides us with a kind of governing conception, it is an unacceptable one, as we saw in Chapter 1 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Moral Argument and Moral Theory"). It makes a complete mystery, both of the subject matter of morality, and of our supposed knowledge of moral truths.
    2. On the other hand, it might be possible to read Regan more neutrally, supposing that his intention is merely to pull together our common-sense moral beliefs into a coherent set of principles. Taken like this, his work provides us with no governing conception at all. But this is both unacceptable in itself, and serves also to undermine many of Regan’s own arguments, in so far as they depend upon claims about moral relevance, as many of them do. For as we saw in Chapter 3 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Animal Suffering"), relevance is always relevant to some point of view, and on this reading of Regan the moral point of view would remain uncharacterised.
  4. The other main competitor to my contractualist account is the utilitarian approach defended by Peter Singer. There are a number of reasons for preferring contractualism to utilitarianism as a framework for moral theory, as we saw in Chapter 2 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Contractualism"). But the main argument against Singer is that, when properly worked out, utilitarianism entails a position on the animals issue that is far too extreme2 to be taken seriously. For it is obliged to count animal suffering and animal lives as equal3 in standing to our own, as we saw in Chapters 3 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and Animal Suffering") and 4 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Utilitarianism and the Harm of Killing"). Yet we find it intuitively abhorrent4 that the lives or sufferings of animals should be weighed against the lives or sufferings of human beings. Note that this argument against Singer is partially dependent upon the success of my attempt, in Chapters 5 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Animals") and 7 ("Carruthers (Peter) - Contractualism and Character"), to work out a plausible contractualist approach to the animals issue. For we can be more convincing in resisting the claim that theoretical considerations should be allowed to over-ride our common-sense beliefs, if we have some alternative approach to offer. The dependence is only partial, however. For the beliefs in question are so deeply embedded in our moral thinking that it might be more reasonable to do without any theory of morality at all, than to accept one that would accord animals equal5 moral standing with ourselves. (Compare the fact that it may, in the same way, be more reasonable for us to do without a theory of knowledge at all, than to accept one that would entail that we have no knowledge of the physical world.)
  5. The most important practical conclusion of this book is that there is no basis for extending moral protection to animals beyond that which is already provided. In particular, there are no good moral grounds for forbidding hunting, factory farming, or laboratory testing on animals. The argument for this conclusion may be summarised as follows.
    1. As claimed above, some version of contractualism provides us with the most acceptable framework for moral theory, and from such a perspective animals will be denied moral standing.
    2. There are then only two possible indirect reasons for outlawing the sorts of activities listed above.
    3. One pertains to the qualities of moral character revealed in their practitioners. But these may be insignificant, in the light of the ready psychological separability6 of attitudes to animal and to human suffering.
    4. The other turns on the likely offence caused to animal lovers. But this, too, fails, because of the moral costs that would accompany further extending and encouraging feelings of sympathy for animals. These feelings serve only to divert attention from the claims of those who do have moral standing, namely human beings. And no doubt in many instances they are, in any case, partly dependent upon a false belief in the equal moral standing of animals.
  6. This is not to say, of course, that there is anything wrong7 with admiring animals, or enjoying their company. Nor is it to deny that there are powerful moral reasons for wishing to preserve endangered species of animal, similar to, but considerably more powerful8 than, the reasons for preserving great works of art. But what it does mean, is that those who are committed to any9 aspect of the animal rights10 movement are thoroughly misguided.


COMMENT: See Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice - Conclusion")

Footnote 1: Footnote 2: Well, you should see the work by Gary Francione!.

Footnote 3: No – we aren’t obliged to think any such thing.

Footnote 4:
  • Do “we” indeed?
  • Probably we find it surprising, and on reflection false, but abhorrent?
  • A test case is that posed in the title of "Francione (Gary) - Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?".
  • Personally, I think this is just silly. There are lots of non-speciesist reasons for rescuing your child rather than your dog (given you can only rescue one). Just two:
    1. Your child is (or will normally become) more cognitively advanced, has a greater anticipation of the future and would have a greater expectation of your help.
    2. You have contracted to do all in your power to protect your child by bringing it into the world. It is expected of you and legally demanded of you. The same is not true of the dog – or not to the same degree.
Footnote 5: This is not what is claimed. Animals do not have “equal moral standing with ourselves”. They don’t – species by species – even have equal moral standing with one another.

Footnote 6:
  • Presumably he’s referring to people – like Adolf Hitler – whose fondness for non-human animals didn’t carry over to his conspecifics.
  • But, while fondness for animals doesn’t imply a good character, a fondness for torturing them certainly shows a bad one.
  • Not that our selfish concerns with our own characters is the most important point, which should be the well-being of other sentient creatures.
Footnote 7: That’s kind of him to allow this!

Footnote 8: Surely it depends on the species involved?

Footnote 9: If, by this, he means strictly those – like Francione – who imagine animals have rights, then he is correct. But if he includes the animal welfarist movement in this, he is seriously – and wickedly – in error.



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
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