<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Truth, Time and History: A Philosophical Enquiry (Botros (Sophie)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_6536.htm">Truth, Time and History: A Philosophical Enquiry</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Botros (Sophie).htm">Botros (Sophie)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_6536.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_6536.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><u>Bloomsbury Book Description</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li><em>Truth, Time and History</em> investigates the reality of the past by connecting arguments across areas which are conventionally discussed in isolation from each other.</li><li>Breaking the impasse within the narrower analytic debate between Dummett's semantic anti-realists and the truth value link realists as to whether the past exists independently of our methods of verification, the book argues, through an examination of the puzzles concerning identity over time, that only the present exists. Drawing on Lewis's analogy between times and possible worlds, and work by Collingwood and Oakeshott, and the continental philosopher, Barthes, the author advances a wholly novel proposal, as to how aspects of ersatz presentism may be combined with historical coherentism to uphold the legitimacy of discourse about the past.</li><li>In highlighting the role of historians in the creation and construction of temporality, <em>Truth, Time and History</em> offers a convincing philosophical argument for the inherence of an unreal past in the real present. </li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B6536_1">Contents</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B6536_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li><b>Truth</b><ol type="1"><li>The Realist/Anti-Realist Wars  3 <ol type="i"><li>Dummett s reconfiguration of the debate  4 </li><li>The realists play their trump card  19 </li><li>The realist appeal to memory  36 </ol></li><li>Projection, Analogy and Meaning  43 <ol type="i"><li>Projection: an <em>anti-realist</em> haunted realist strategy  44 </li><li>The truth-value link again  60 </ol> </li></ol></li><li><b>Time</b><ol start = "3" type="1"><li>Tense Theory  67 <ol type="i"><li>A continuity that tolerates discontinuity  68 </li><li>Presentist and non-presentist tensed solutions  79 </li><li>Truth-value link realists within the tensed-tenseless spectrum  88 </ol></li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B6536_2">Caught in a Timeless Leibnizian Net</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B6536_2"></A>  95 <ol type="i"><li>Property and essence  96 </li><li>Essence as dynamic  107 </ol></li><li>Presentism and <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modality</A><SUP>3</SUP>  121 <ol type="i"><li>The truth-maker lacks structure  124 </li><li>The truth-maker is  hypothetical  134 </li><li>Presentists, anti-realists: Russell s  five minute hypothesis  142 </ol></li></ol></li><li><b>History</b><ol start = "6" type="1"><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B6536_4">Collingwood and Oakeshott: Is History Possible</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B6536_4"></A>?  149 <ol type="i"><li>Collingwood:  history is the re-enactment of past thought  154 </li><li>Historical idealism: a revolutionary conception of evidence?  172 </li><li>Collingwood s  question and answer at Hadrian s Wall  181 </ol></li><li>A Realist Present and a Coherentist Past  191 <ol type="i"><li>Can historical texts really replace ersatz times as truth-makers?  193 </li><li>The history / fiction controversies  211<BR>Conclusion  229 </ol></li></ol>Notes  231 <BR>Bibliography  256 <BR>Index  265 </li></ol></FONT><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> (<a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6536.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: A Philosophical Enquiry</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_B6536_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B6536_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>General help from <BR>&rarr; <a name="3"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Black (Oliver).htm">Oliver Black</A>, who also reviewed Chapter 6<BR>&rarr; <a name="4"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Broome (John).htm">John Broome</A> <BR>&rarr; <a name="5"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/C/Author_Cartwright (Will).htm">Will Cartwright</A><BR>&rarr; <a name="6"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/E/Author_Evnine (Simon J.).htm">Simon J. Evnine</A><BR>&rarr; <a name="7"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">David Wiggins</A>, who also reviewed Chapter 4<BR>&rarr; <a name="8"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/J/Author_Johnson (Paul).htm">Paul Johnson</A>, who provided cross-disciplinary advice. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_B6536_2"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B6536_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>An earlier title was  <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_81.htm">Leibniz's Law</a> and the Paradox of Diachronic Identity , which I find to be clearer and more exciting. </li><li>Reviewed by <a name="9"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">David Wiggins</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_B6536_4"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B6536_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Reviewed by <a name="10"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Black (Oliver).htm">Oliver Black</A>. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Bloomsbury Academic, London, September 2017 </li><li>Gift from Sophie </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22604.htm">Botros (Sophie) - The Realist/Anti-Realist Wars</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Part I (Truth), Chapter 1<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Introduction  3 <li>Dummett s reconfiguration of the debate  4 <ol type="i"><li>Selective anti-realism: the importance of reduction  4 </li><li>Curbing heterogeneity  7 </li><li>Three moves towards semantic anti-realism  8 </li><li><em>Two</em> attempts to get realists off Dummett s metaphysical  hook  15 <ol type="a"><li>Wright, deflationism and superassertibility  15</li><li>Norris, projectivism and conceptually structured properties  17 </ol> </ol></li><li>The realists play their trump card  19 <ol type="i"><li>The circumvention of evidence: Present &rarr; Future  20 <ol type="a"><li>A past-tensed statement whose <em>future</em> utterance is made true by an event <em>now</em>  20</li><li>Anti-realists response: but  true means  verifiable now  21 </li><li>A standpoint outside time <em>versus</em> immurement in the present  22 </ol> </li><li>The circumvention of evidence: Past &rarr; Present  23 <ol type="a"><li>A past-tensed statement whose utterance <em>now</em> is made true by a <em>past</em> event  23 </li><li>The reinterpreted truth value link applied to the revised verification principle  24 </li><li>The collapse of  verifiable <em>now</em> into  verifiable <em>at that time</em>  24 </ol> </li><li>The circumvention of evidence: Future &rarr; Present  25 <ol type="a"><li>Anti-realists  don t assume that the verification principle must have retrospective reach!  25 </li><li>A future-tensed statement whose utterance <em>now</em> is made true by a <em>future</em> event  27 </li><li>Realists:  one cannot subscribe to a principle one says will not hold in a year s time!  27 </li><li>The threat to realism from fatalism defused  28 </li><li>Anti-realism:  but  true will not <em>mean</em> the same in a year s time  30 </li><li>Anti-realists:  we cannot <em>express</em> the meaning which we shall attach to  true in a year s time  32 </li><li>Past facts let in  by the back door  35 </ol> </ol></li><li>The realist appeal to memory  36 <ol type="i"><li>Models of memory: mental image and physical trace  36 </li><li>Memory not an atemporal yardstick  37 </li><li>Robert Southey s  The Battle of Blenheim  38 </ol> </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22804.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Projection, Analogy and Meaning</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Part I (Truth), Chapter 2<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Introduction  43 <li>Projection: an <em>anti-realist</em> haunted realist strategy  44 <ol type="i"><li>A preliminary appeal to  implicit , and  indirect , knowledge  44 </li><li>Difficulties in setting up the strategy  45 <ol type="a"><li>The shortfall between justification and truth: the slide to subjectivism  46 </li><li>The flawed parallel between present-tensed observation, and first-person sensation, statements  48 </ol> </li><li>Objections to the strategy once set up  49 <ol type="a"><li> Reference to the past has not been completely expunged  49 </li><li>McDowell s refutation   [It countenances] a leap beyond the bounds of awareness </li><li>The spurious appeal to  <em>same sort</em> : Wittgenstein again  51 </li><li>Why the truth value link fails to underwrite projection  54 </li><li>McDowell s revised realist proposal  56 </ol></li><li>The Wittgenstein background  58 </ol></li><li>The truth-value link again  60 <ol type="i"><li>Anti-realist emasculation of the truth value link  60 </li><li>Dummett: the truth value link realists cannot account for our  living <em>in time</em>  62 </ol> </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22805.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Tense Theory</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Part II (Time), Chapter 3<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Introduction  67 <li>A continuity that tolerates discontinuity  68 <ol type="i"><li>A spectrum of positions on time and change  68 <ol type="a"><li>Two intermediate positions:  simple temporal passage versus  alteration in properties  68 </ol> </li><li>Difficulties raised by the notion of  alteration in properties : eternalist solutions  71 <ol type="a"><li>The contradictory properties ascribed to distinct temporal parts  72 </li><li> But it must be the object itself which has the contradictory properties, otherwise it cannot lose or gain them  72 </li><li>Sider s <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">stage theory</A><SUP>1</SUP>: an attempt to meet the  proper subject condition  74 </li><li>Haslanger and the denial that persistence requires identity  76 </li><li>A <em>lacuna</em> in the eternalist account of the difficulty with change: Leibniz s Law introduced  77 </li><li>The problem of combining continuity and discontinuity again  78 </ol> </ol></li><li>Presentist and non-presentist tensed solutions  79 <ol type="i"><li>Presentism introduced  79 <ol type="a"><li>Presently existing  bearers contrasted with other notions of grounds, realist and verificationist  80 </li><li>Lucretius and the idea that a past-tensed property can shift from one bearer to another  81 </ol></li><li>Advantages of presentism  82 <ol type="a"><li>A present with remarkable temporal  depth  82 </li><li>Lucretius s  shifting bearer  83 </ol></li><li>Objections to presentism  85 </li><li>Non-presentist tensed theories: two proposals  85 <ol type="a"><li>Lowe: past and present as irreducibly <em>tensed</em> modes of existence  86 </ol> </ol> </li><li>Truth-value link realists within the tensed-tenseless spectrum  88 <ol type="i"><li>Truth value link presentism and presentism  88 </li><li>Truth value link realists and eternalism  89</li><li>Truth value link realism and non-presentist-tensed theory  91 </li><li>Dummett s charge regarding  living in time rejected  93 </ol> </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22806.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Caught in a Timeless Leibnizian Net</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Part II (Time), Chapter 4<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Introduction  95 <li>Property and essence  96 <ol type="i"><li> All an entity s properties are essential : the argument from everyday discourse  96 </li><li>All an entity s properties  flow from its essence: the argument from science  99 <ol type="a"><li>Fine, Gorman, Copi and a preliminary example from chemistry  99 </li><li>The scientific pessimism behind Locke s distinction between real and nominal essences  100 </li><li>Opposing the pessimism: for and against  101 </li><li>Why atomic number cannot explain all an entity s other properties: hydrogen, helium, iron  102 </li><li>Philosophical unclarity about atomic number, and the relation of essence to properties  104 </li><li>Leibniz s principle of the indiscernibility of identity affirmed  106 </ol> </ol></li><li>Essence as dynamic  107 <ol type="i"><li>First strategy: Leibniz s Law governs different notions of identity  107 <ol type="a"><li>Diachronic / synchronic identity  107 </li><li>Relative/absolute identity  108 </ol></li><li>Second strategy: Leibniz s Law is applied to persistence and survival conditions  109 <ol type="a"><li> Continuants as basic to immediate experience  110 </li><li>The  true claim that identity judgements must conform to Leibniz distinguished from the  false one that they must be <em>reached</em> via Leibniz  111 </li><li>Argument from  unworkability for the falsity of the last claim  112 </li><li>Why Leibniz s Principle of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_81.htm">Identity of Indiscernibles</A><SUP>1</SUP> cannot help  113 </li><li>But can our identity judgements conform to Leibniz if they are not reached via Leibniz?  113 </li><li>Objections to temporal parts theorists, Gabbay and Moravscik  115 </li><li>The paradox of change again  116 </ol></li><li>Implications for truth value link realism as a non-presentist tensed theory  119 </ol> </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22807.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Presentism and Modality</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Part II (Time), Chapter 5<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Introduction  121 <li>The truth-maker lacks structure  124 <ol type="i"><li>Haecceities and surrogates  124 </li><li>Ersatz times  126 <ol type="a"><li>The abstract/concrete distinction  128 </li><li> Everything is instantaneous  129 </li><li>The shifting truth maker  130 </li><li>The truth value link again: why presentism cannot rehabilitate it  131 </li><li>The ersatz series and the course of history  133 </ol> </ol></li><li>The truth-maker is  hypothetical  134 <ol type="i"><li>Categoricity is not a panacea for all the ills of dubious ontologies  134 </li><li>Prospects for micro physical reductions of dispositions  137 <ol type="a"><li>The trouble with dispositions is that they are Meinongian (Armstrong)  137 </li><li>For and against Armstrong s micro-physical reduction  137 </ol></li><li>Comparison of dispositional with past-tensed properties  138 <ol type="a"><li>Directedness, intentionality and indeterminacy  139 </li><li>Crisp: the distinction between dispositions and past-tensed properties  139 </ol> </ol></li><li>Presentists, anti-realists: Russell s  five minute hypothesis  142 </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22808.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Collingwood and Oakeshott: Is History Possible?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Part III (History), Chapter 6<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Introduction  149 <li>Collingwood:  history is the re-enactment of past thought  154 <ol type="i"><li>Transitoriness: a special problem for history among the social sciences  154 </li><li>The re-enactment of past thought: preliminary clarifications  157 </li><li>Contribution of the past act of thought to re-enactment  159 <ol type="a"><li>The machinery of  two orders  159 </li><li>The thought/feeling and action/movement distinctions  161 </li><li>Counting acts of thought by reference to their content  164 </li><li>Collingwood s appeal to common linguistic usage: the two orders again  168 </ol> </ol></li><li>Historical idealism: a revolutionary conception of evidence?  172 <ol type="i"><li>Three key features, and the notion of evidence that they give rise to  173 </li><li> Everything in the world is potential evidence for any subject whatever (Collingwood, 1953:280)</ol></li><li>Collingwood s  question and answer at Hadrian s Wall  181 </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22809.htm">Botros (Sophie) - A Realist Present and a Coherentist Past</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Part III (History), Chapter 7<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Introduction  191 <li>Can historical texts really replace ersatz times as truth-makers?  193 <ol type="i"><li>Are they sufficiently similar?  193 <ol type="a"><li>Absence of a  realist, reductive, truth-making structure  193</li><li>A literary precedent for transferring truth making to the historical text  195 </li><li>The realist backlash, and Lewis s competing view about fictional truth laid bare  196 </ol></li><li>Are historical texts sufficiently different from ersatz times?  199 <ol type="a"><li>Lewisian objections:  Completeness ,  Plenitude , etc.  199 </li><li> Radical presentist objections  202 </li><li>Texts, authored and unauthored; story prefixes, transparent and opaque  203 </ol></li><li>How historians arrange events in order of time  204 <ol type="a"><li>The myth of the  ideal chronicler  204 </li><li>Choosing a time frame to suit one s narrative: Thucydides Peloponnesian War  206 </li><li>The less than radical truth behind Williams claim that Thucydides invented linear time  207 </li><li>Methods of determining linear succession:  archaeological horizons  210 </ol></ol></li><li>The history / fiction controversies  211 <ol type="i"><li>Is history sufficiently like fiction to count as a narrative form?  211 <ol type="a"><li>Aristotle s Poetics and the tension between history s linearity and dramatic unity  212 </li><li>Periodisation and Mink s claim that  history has a beginning, a middle, and an end  214 </li><li>Barthes, Carlyle and the dramatic subversion of linear time  216 </ol></li><li>Is history sufficiently different from fiction not to be dismissed as a  sanctioned pretence ?  217 <ol type="a"><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</A><SUP>1</SUP> fictionalism: truth within the scope of a (silent) story prefix  218 </ol></li><li> Realism about the present, coherentism about the past : the remainder of our proposal explained and defended  223 <ol type="a"><li>Texts, theories: robust enough to be realist truth makers? <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</A><SUP>2</SUP> fictionalism again  223 </li><li>Texts, as actually existing abstract cultural creations, transferred to historical domain  224 </li><li>Rejection of a realist reduction that  goes all the way down and appeal to different levels of discourse  227 </ol> </ol></li><li>Conclusion  229 </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22810.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Bibliography</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR>Sophie has supplied an extensive bibliography. Not all of it is relevant to my needs. I ve decided to list those books and papers I ve either got, or ought to have. No doubt I ll miss some important works, particularly related to the  History aspect of the book, but life s too short for everything. Where I ve not got the book or paper, but have hopes of acquiring it, I ve cited the author. <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_445.htm">Armstrong (David) - Identity Through Time</A>", Armstrong </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22818.htm">Baldwin (Thomas) - Reviews: Sameness and Substance by David Wiggins; Objects and Identity by Harold Noonan</A>", Baldwin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22817.htm">Baldwin (Thomas) - Modal Fictionalism and the Imagination</A>", Baldwin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6473.htm">Bernecker (Sven) - Memory: A Philosophical Study</A>", Bernecker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5270.htm">Bigelow (John) - Presentism and Properties</A>", Bigelow</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Bilgrami (Akeel).htm">Akeel Bilgrami</A>, Dummett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20943.htm">Bourne (Craig) - A Theory of Presentism</A>", Bourne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6349.htm">Bourne (Craig) - A Future for Presentism</A>", Bourne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22819.htm">Braddon-Mitchell (David) - How Do We Know It Is Now Now?</A>", Braddon-Mitchell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22820.htm">Bricker (Phillip) - David Lewis: On the Plurality of Worlds</A>", Bricker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7435.htm">Brock (Stuart) - Modal Fictionalism: A Response to Rosen</A>", Brock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7386.htm">Brody (Baruch) - Natural Kinds and Real Essences</A>", Brody</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1386.htm">Brody (Baruch) - Identity and Essence</A>", Brody</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1679.htm">Carlyle (Thomas) - The French Revolution</A>", Carlyle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22811.htm">Choi (Sungho) & Fara (Michael) - Dispositions</A>", Choi+Fara</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3061.htm">Conrad (Joseph) - The Secret Agent</A>", Conrad</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21268.htm">Copi (Irving M.) - Essence and Accident</A>", Copi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22874.htm">Crisp (Thomas M.) - Presentism and The Grounding Objection</A>", Crisp</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2883.htm">Dummett (Michael) - The Reality of the Past</A>", Dummett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1995.htm">Dummett (Michael) - Realism</A>", Dummett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6553.htm">Dummett (Michael) - Truth and the Past</A>", Dummett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2875.htm">Everett (Daniel) - Don't Sleep There are Snakes: Life and Language in the Amazonian Jungle</A>", Everett</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/F/Author_Fine (Kit).htm">Kit Fine</A>, Senses of Essence</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4286.htm">Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter</A>", Fine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22879.htm">Forrest (Peter) - The Real but Dead past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell</A>", Forrest</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_389.htm">Van Fraassen (Bas) - The Scientific Image</A>", Van Fraassen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22880.htm">Frances (Bryan) - The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism</A>", Frances </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4312.htm">Gabbay (Dov M.) & Moravcsik (Julius) - Sameness and Individuation</A>", Gabbay</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/G/Author_Gallois (Andre).htm">Andre Gallois</A>, Can an Anti-realist live in the past?</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/G/Author_Geach (Peter).htm">Peter Geach</A>, Reference and Generality</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/G/Author_Gorman (Michael).htm">Michael Gorman</A>, The Essential and the Accidental</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1924.htm">Hale (Bob) - Realism and Its Opponents</A>", Hale</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4724.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time</A>", Haslanger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5114.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things</A>", Haslanger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4316.htm">Heller (Mark) - Things Change</A>", Heller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5836.htm">Hinchliff (Mark) - The Puzzle of Change</A>", Hinchliff</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22873.htm">Horgan (Terence) - The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism</A>", Horgan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22872.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Fiction and Metaphysics</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6552.htm">Ishiguro (Hide) - Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language</A>", Ishiguro</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/J/Author_Jackson (Frank).htm">Frank Jackson</A>, Perception</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_326.htm">Jeffrey (Richard) - The Logic of Decision</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22810_1">Jeffrey</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22810_1"></A></li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/J/Author_Johnston (Mark).htm">Mark Johnston</A>, Dispositional Theories of Value</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1419.htm">Jubien (Michael) - Contemporary Metaphysics</A>", Jubien</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21262.htm">Kaplan (David) - Demonstratives</A>", Kaplan</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/K/Author_Keller (Simon).htm">Simon Keller</A>, Presentism and Truth-Making</li><li>Richard L. Kirkham  What Dummett says about Truth & </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_123.htm">Lewis (David) - Truth in Fiction</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_637.htm">Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds</A>", Lewis</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Loux (Michael).htm">Michael Loux</A>, The Possible and the Actual</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2003.htm">Loux (Michael) - Realism and Anti-Realism</A>", Loux</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4175.htm">Loux (Michael) - The Challenge Of Anti-Realism</A>", Loux</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Lycan (William).htm">William Lycan</A>, The Trouble with Possible Worlds</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Martin (C.B.).htm">C.B. Martin</A>, Dispositions and Conditionals</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Martin (C.B.).htm">C.B. Martin</A>, Intentionality & </li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_McCullagh (C. Behan).htm">C. Behan McCullagh</A>, The Truth of History</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_McDowell (John).htm">John McDowell</A>, On  The Reality of the Past </li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_McDowell (John).htm">John McDowell</A>, Anti-realism and the Epistemology of Understanding</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_McGinn (Colin).htm">Colin McGinn</A>, Truth and Use</li><li>J. McKitrick, The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13102.htm">McTaggart (J. McT. E.) - The Unreality of Time</A>", McTaggart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1428.htm">Melia (Joseph) - Modality</A>", Melia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19869.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - In Defense of Dispositions</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1160.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22810_2">Mellor</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22810_2"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4327.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Persistence, Parts and Presentism</A>", Merricks</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Merricks (Trenton).htm">Trenton Merricks</A>, Truth and Ontology</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Miller (Alexander).htm">Alexander Miller</A>, Rule Following, & McDowell & Anti-realism</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Miller (Alexander).htm">Alexander Miller</A>, What is the Manifestation Argument?</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Miller (Alexander).htm">Alexander Miller</A>, What is the Acquisition Argument?</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Miller (Alexander).htm">Alexander Miller</A>, Realism and Anti-realism</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19950.htm">Miller (Alexander) - Realism</A>", Miller</li><li>Louis O. Mink, Philosophical Analysis and Historical Understanding</li><li>G. Molnar, Are Dispositions Reducible</li><li>Montidori+Morton, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</A><SUP>3</SUP> realism</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Mumford (Stephen).htm">Stephen Mumford</A>, Intentionality and the Physical</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Mumford (Stephen).htm">Stephen Mumford</A>, The Underground Argument</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9319.htm">Nelson (Jack) - Relative Identity</A>", Nelson</li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li><li></li></ul></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22810.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: Bibliography</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22810_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22810_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: I ve not bought this book, and probably won t as it s out of date and fairly expensive. <a name="On-Page_Link_P22810_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22810_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: Why not "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1420.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II</A>"? <BR><BR> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T23:57" pubdate>02/08/2018 23:57:45</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>