<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity (Wiggins (David)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_6549.htm">Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">Wiggins (David)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_6549.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_6549.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><u>Cover Blurb</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This volume gathers twelve essays by David Wiggins in an area where his work has been particularly influential. Among the subjects treated are: <BR>&rarr; persistence of a substance through change, <BR>&rarr; the notion of a continuant, <BR>&rarr; the logic of identity, <BR>&rarr; the co-occupation of space by a continuant and its matter, <BR>&rarr; the relation of person to human organism, <BR>&rarr; the metaphysical idea of a person, <BR>&rarr; the status of artefacts, <BR>&rarr; the relation of the three-dimensional and four-dimensional conceptions of reality, and <BR>&rarr; the nomological underpinning of <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>1</SUP> classification. </li><li>From a much larger body of work the author has selected, edited or annotated, and variously shortened or extended eleven pieces. He has added an Introduction and one completely new essay, on the philosophy of biology and the role there of the idea of process. </li><li>The collection begins with <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B6549_2">an essay</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B6549_2"></A> postdating his <a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>" (2001), which amends and upstages his earlier presentation of his <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortalist</A><SUP>3</SUP> conception of identity. </li><li>In subsequent essays and the introduction Wiggins examines the contributions to these subjects made by Heraclitus, Aristotle, Leibniz, <a name="6"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/C/Author_Chisholm (Roderick).htm">Roderick Chisholm</A>, <a name="7"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/P/Author_Putnam (Hilary).htm">Hilary Putnam</A>, <a name="8"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Shoemaker (Sydney).htm">Sydney Shoemaker</A>, <a name="9"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/A/Author_Ayers (Michael R.).htm">Michael R. Ayers</A>, <a name="10"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/K/Author_Kripke (Saul).htm">Saul Kripke</A>, <a name="11"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/Q/Author_Quine (W.V.).htm">W.V. Quine</A>, <a name="12"></a><A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Lewis (David).htm">David Lewis</A>, Fei Xu, and others. </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Preface</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In response to my editor Peter Momtchiloff's suggestion that I make selections, subject by subject, from among the papers I have written over the last four and a half decades, I decided to begin with the topics of substance and identity. These are among my longest-standing interests in philosophy. Out of a much much larger number of pieces about these two subjects  one part of my contribution to the publishing mania that has afflicted our times  I have chosen barely one third. Some such as Chapters <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B6549_4">6</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B6549_4"></A> and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B6549_5">7</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B6549_5"></A> are given here in more or less their original state. That might have been a wise policy to follow everywhere. But where identity is concerned I still aspire to do more exact justice to the Aristotelian insight from which I once began. Fidelity to this aspiration has demanded a more energetic policy of local repair and improvement. All too often the essays repeat one another at certain points or redeploy some of the same well-worn examples. But, holding paramount the self-sufficiency and independent accessibility of each and every essay, I have been unable to do very much to reduce this overlap. To those who would have preferred a different policy I can only apologize. </li><li>At the end of the book there is a would-be complete bibliography of the writings that I published between 1964 and 2016. The simple effort of continuing this from an earlier bibliography that I take from <a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_38.htm">Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) - Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins</A>" (1996), has reinforced and renewed my gratitude to them  for this as for much else. (Any corrections or additions to the bibliography will be noted in subsequent collections.) Another debt is to [& snip & ]<BR>&rarr; Oxford, July 2015 </li></ol></FONT><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> (<a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6549.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_B6549_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B6549_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <a name="3"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22764.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity, Individuation, and Substance</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_B6549_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B6549_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22767.htm">Wiggins (David) - Heraclitus' Conception of Flux, Fire, and Material Persistence</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_B6549_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B6549_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22768.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate</A>".<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>OUP Oxford (10 Nov. 2016)</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22773.htm">Wiggins (David) - Activity, Process, Continuant, Substance, Organism</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22773_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22773_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>(This essay)<FONT COLOR = "800080"> is a response to <A HREF = "../../../Authors/D/Author_Dupre (John).htm">John Dupre</A>'s suggestion that an ontology of processes will provide a better framework for interpreting science than any ontology of substances. In response, after giving grounds to doubt that an ontology of pure processes can muster the resources to answer the individuative questions presented by the biological sciences themselves, I defend a plural ontology of process, activity, event <em>and</em> continuant. </FONT></li><li>We are referred to  <FONT COLOR = "800080">a manifesto entitled  A Process Ontology for Biology at <A HREF = "http://thebjps.typepad.com/my-blog/2014/08/a-process-ontology-for-biology-john-dupr%C3%A9.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A><FONT COLOR = "800080"> . </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally in Philosophy, vol. 91, 2016, pp. 269-80</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22773.htm">Wiggins (David) - Activity, Process, Continuant, Substance, Organism</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22773_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22773_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>".</li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Section 1</u> (Full text)<FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Forty-four years ago I published a short monograph called "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_53.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity</A>", henceforth ISTC, in which I contended that the identity between x and y  or the persistence of x in the shape of y  cannot in general be determined without reference to what x is and what y is, the fundamental thing-kind of each. I recently discovered that, in placing such emphasis on the question <em>x and y are the same what?</em>, I was repeating something I had said in an entry for <em>Analysis</em> Problem number 11 (1957). I did not win the competition, but it was a consolation (I now recall) that, in his report, Arthur Prior who was the judge made honourable mention of my deployment of that question. </li><li>In ISTC I contended also that a proper concern with that same question, so soon as it was married with a concern for the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_81.htm">indiscernibility of identicals</A><SUP>1</SUP>, logically excluded the very idea, which was championed at that time by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/G/Author_Geach (Peter).htm">Peter Geach</A>, of relative identity. The point of the <em>same what</em> question was not to make room for relative identity but to focus attention upon the question what thing or things  and what sort of things  were being inquired about. </li><li>Once ISTC was in print, I started putting one or two things right. From this process, once it was begun, arose "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_54.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance</A>", henceforth S&S, and later "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>", henceforth S&SR. </li><li>In the present collection the first essay summarizes, clarifies or extends S&SR. <ul type="disc"><li>A summary of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22763_2">this paper</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22763_2"></A> is given at Section 2 which ensues here. </li><li>Section 3 describes the contents of Chapters 2 to 12. </li><li>Sections 4 and 5 give explanations which are perfectly essential to the understanding of all the essays in this book. </li><li>Sections 6 to 8 treat less immediate matters which arise from recent controversy. </li></ul> </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Notes on Sections 2  8</u><ol type="1"><li><b>Section 2</b>  as noted above  purports to be a summary of Chapter 2 ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22764.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity, Individuation, and Substance</A>"), but I found it incomprehensible without reading that chapter. Anything I can make of it appears against that Chapter itself. </li><li>Similarly, the comments in <b>Section 3</b> are used for the introductions to Chapters 2  12. </li><li><b>Section 4</b>: </li><li><b>Section 5</b>: </li><li><b>Section 6</b>: </li><li><b>Section 7</b>: </li><li><b>Section 8</b>: </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22763_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22763_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Ie. a summary of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22764.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity, Individuation, and Substance</A>", itself a summary of S&SR!</li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22767.htm">Wiggins (David) - Heraclitus' Conception of Flux, Fire, and Material Persistence</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22767_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22767_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>(This essay, unrevised) <FONT COLOR = "800080">records some of the contributions made to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22767_2">our subject</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22767_2"></A> by Heraclitus. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally in Language and Logos: Essays for G.E.L. Owen, ed. Martha Nussbaum & M. Schofield, CUP, 1982</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22767.htm">Wiggins (David) - Heraclitus' Conception of Flux, Fire, and Material Persistence</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22767_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22767_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P22767_2"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22767_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Presumable the subject is  Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity . </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22764.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity, Individuation, and Substance</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Originally, European Journal of Philosophy, 20, 2012, pp. 1-25. </li><li>This version is much revised. </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22771.htm">Wiggins (David) - Mereological Essentialism and Chisholm on Parts, Wholes, and Primary Things</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22771_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22771_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>(This essay, now abbreviated and reorganized)<FONT COLOR = "800080"> is a critical exposition of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/C/Author_Chisholm (Roderick).htm">Roderick Chisholm</A>'s account of primary things, his mereological essentialism, and his defence of the principle that all the proper parts of a thing are essential to it. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally "Mereological Essentialism: Asymmetrical Essential Dependence and the Nature of Continuants" in Ernest Sosa (Ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M Chisholm, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (Amsterdam), 1979, pp. 297-315</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22771.htm">Wiggins (David) - Mereological Essentialism and Chisholm on Parts, Wholes, and Primary Things</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22771_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22771_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>".</li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_422.htm">Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Rea - Material Constitution - A Reader<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_1">Author s Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>(This paper) considers the possibility or impossibility of the co-occupation by distinct things of the same place at the same time. </li><li>It lays particular emphasis upon the distinction between a proper substance and an aggregation of material components. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Notes</U><ol type="1"><li><b>S</b> is the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_2">principle</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_2"></A> that  Two things cannot <em>completely</em> occupy the same place / volume / sub-volume at the same time . </li><li>Apparent exceptions that are fairly easy to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_3">explain</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_3"></A> include:- <ul type="disc"><li><em>Proper Parts</em>: My forearm only <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_4">partly</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_4"></A> occupies the volume occupied by my body. The apparent exception  doesn t count . </li><li><em>Sponges</em>: The point is to  mingle two things  in this case a sponge and a body of water  and then to recover them both afterwards. The things have to persist, or we can t say they are two <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_5">things</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_5"></A> in the same place at the same time. Wiggins also considers (nomologically counterfactual) mingling as the atomic and subatomic <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_6">level</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_6"></A>. This  doesn t count either. </li></ul></li><li>Wiggins thinks he can resolve but one of the  difficult questions arising from all this, but <b>S</b> is still inadequately formulated. </li><li><em>The  is of Constitution</em>: Wiggins considers a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_7">tree</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_7"></A> (T) and its constituent matter (W). T and W occupy the same place at the same time, but are non-identical  because of Leibniz s Law and the fact that they have different persistence conditions. <ul type="disc"><li>W survives T s decomposition into cellulose molecules, while T does not.</li><li>T survives the loss of some of the constituent cells of W, in the course of organic change, while W does not. </li></ul></li><li>Wiggins thinks it d be a  trick to define an aggregate W1 with <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_8">persistence</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_8"></A> conditions exactly the same as the tree s. A trick because all you ve done is define a tree. </li><li>Wiggins spells this out: we have  contrived an identity between stuff (W) and substance (T) by introducing a concept foreign to things falling under the  stuff category  namely organisation. </li><li>Wiggins has a footnote saying that more can be said about identity and the mereological treatment of aggregates  and refers us to "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_53.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity</A>", pp. 11-13, 67-8, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_9">72</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_9"></A>. </li><li>Wiggins has an excellent <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_10">footnote</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_10"></A> illustrating  for artefacts  the difference between the stuff and the artefact from which the stuff is made. He proves, by transitivity, that the artefact cannot be identical to its stuff  in this case sweater, wool and socks  since the sweater is not identical to the socks, neither can be identical to the wool from which  at different times  they were made. The stuff (wool) must pre-exist the fabrication of the artefact, but the artefact cannot pre-exist its fabrication. </li><li>However, he goes on to argue that none of this implies that T is something <em>over and above</em> W. His definition of <em>over and above</em> is open to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_11">objection</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_11"></A>, in that he wants it to mean merely that there are no (material) parts of T that are not in W, or as he says, W fully <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_12">exhausts</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_12"></A> the matter of T. </li><li>Wiggins s understanding of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_62.htm">constitution</A><SUP>13</SUP> includes:- <ul type="disc"><li>The  is of material constitution is not the  is of identity. </li><li> x is <em>constituted of</em> y is equivalent to:-<BR>&  x is <em>made of</em> y , or <BR>&  x <em>consists of</em> y , or <BR>&  x <em>is wholly composed of</em> y , or<BR>&  x <em>is merely</em> y , or<BR>&  x <em>merely consists of</em> y . </li></ul></li><li>Wiggins notes that if T = W is a consequence of <em>materialism</em>, then Wiggins is not a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_14">materialist</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_14"></A>, as he denies this equation. </li><li>Wiggins claims that his denial that T=W only puts an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_15">uninteresting</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_15"></A> obstacle in the way of reducing botany to organic chemistry. </li><li>Wiggins leaves T & W with the remark that what he s shown is similar to a philosophical commonplace of assigning objects to different <em>logical types</em>. He prefers his approach, however, because it makes a smaller claims (he says) for two reasons:- <ul type="disc"><li>1. It allows for a clear statement of the connection between objects and their constituting stuff, and </li><li>2. The Leibnizian principle for the predicative  is (as opposed to the constitutive  is ) is highly <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_16">intelligible</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_16"></A> <BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"> If and only if A is an f (or is phi) then A is identical with an f (or with one of the phi-things); and if and only if A is one of the f's (or phi-things) then it must share all its properties with that f (or phi-thing). </FONT></li></ul></li><li>There is more to be said on the topic of  ranges of significance  we re referred to Russell s simple or ramified Theory of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_17">Types</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_17"></A>. </li><li>The lesson from T & W is that we need to reformulate principle <b>S</b> as <b>S*</b>, namely <ul type="disc"><b>S*</b>: No two things of the same kind can occupy the same volume at exactly the same time</ul></li><li>Wiggins s gloss on <em>kind</em> is  & satisfy (the same) <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>18</SUP> or substance concept . </li><li>He thinks there are at least three reasons for thinking this a necessary truth:- <ul type="disc"><li>1. Space can be mapped only by its occupants. </li><li>2. </li><li>3. </li></ul></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20058.htm">Wiggins (David) & Woods (Michael J.) - Symposium: The Individuation of Things and Places</A>"</li><li>Wiggins closes with an application of principle S* to the problem of <em>Tib and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tibbles</A><SUP>19</SUP></em>. He attributes the puzzle to William of Sherwood, via <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P422_20">Geach</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P422_20"></A></li><li> & to be completed. </li></ol><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Originally published in The Philosophical Review 77, Issue 1, Jan. 1968, 90-95)</li><li>Annotated printout filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5977.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 19 (W)</A>",</li><li>Included in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6213.htm">Look (Brandon C.) - The Metaphysics of Material Beings: Constitution, Persistence, and Identity</A>". </li><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6549.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity</A>". </li><li>See <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/articles/Wiggins_same_place_time.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </li></ul></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_422.htm">Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P422_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>".</li><li>The version in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6549.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity</A>" includes a 3-page  Postscript and Commentary , from 2016. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_2"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: It is something of an open question whether <b>S</b> is a <em>physical</em> or <em>metaphysical</em> question. Wiggins subsequently considers counterfactual physical circumstances which would allow indefinitely fine commingling of two distinct things, but this still leaves him thinking there s a problem to solve. So, he thinks there s an a priori metaphysical issue at stake. <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: What s the compulsion to believe <b>S</b>? Worries often have to do with language (how would our counting work  or else various epistemological claims; these are Olson s worries about persons and animals occupying the same place at the same time), but the worries ought to run deeper than this. <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: The conundrums of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_871.htm">Dion</a> / Theon and Tib / <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tibbles</a> are relevant here. <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: Is there an issue caused by the supposed possibility of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_78.htm">intermittent existence</a>? <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_6"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: Something like the case of miscible fluids would only take us to the molecular level  but at least that s further than sponges. <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_7"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_7"><B>Footnote 7</B></A></U>: A change from  the statue and the clay (See Goliath and Lump1 in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>", etc.)  and better, since artefacts might be a special case where human concerns and arbitrariness muddy the waters. <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_8"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: I d thought of aggregates having less strict persistence conditions than those demanded by mereological essentialism  a heap that has lost a grain is still the same heap  but Wiggins picks up on this. That said, his  take is an extreme one for the sake of argument, but you could define persistence conditions for aggregates that didn t mirror those of organic objects, and that were, therefore, less contrived. <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I must read this book! </li><li>See my note above on this topic. </li><li>Presumably Wiggins has much more to say on the subject in two books yet to be written when this paper was published, namely:-<BR>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_54.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance</A>", and <BR>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P422_10"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_10"><B>Footnote 10</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>There are obvious connections to the <em>Ship of Thesesus</em> paradox (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_44.htm">Click here for Note</A>) here: we could repair the sweater over time, and save the replaced threads, and make socks out of them. </li><li>This is interesting  there s no temptation to paradox in this case (as socks can t be identical to a sweater)  but if we made the threads into another sweater, the paradox would return. </li><li>This, I think, shows that the stuff returns to the universal pool of stuff, and carries no memory of its previous form with it. </li><li>Yet we re still left with disassembled and reassembled watches, bicycles etc. Yet they aren t disassembled into stuff, but into parts, which retain part of the form of the artefact. </li><li>So, the question is whether the material that makes ships and sweaters are parts or stuff. It would seem that pieces of wool have no relevant form, while planks of wood do  or might. Some planks will be interchangeable, while others are specific to function. Watch and bicycle parts, however, are very specific to place and function. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_11"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_11"><B>Footnote 11</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I think the disagreement is only semantic. It s common sense that  the whole is more than the sum of its parts , but Wiggins doesn t want to deny this. He s simply speaking mereologically. </li><li>The parts of the whole either support one another (as in the proverb) or else have form or structure. </li><li>This structure may explain the suggestion that the heap of sand in my garden has different persistence conditions to a mere aggregate (which  one presumes  has mereologically essentialist persistence conditions  as does a set). </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_12"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_12"><B>Footnote 12</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m uncomfortable about this. If (counterfactually) we had immaterial souls, then we would  according to normal parlance  be something  over and above the matter that constitutes our bodies, yet the matter under consideration (that of our bodies) would be  exhausted  no more is needed. </li><li>Also, Wiggins takes it that T is  nothing over and above W if T is constituted of W and nothing else. Yet, form is very important. Are diamonds  nothing over and above the carbon atoms that constitute them? Would Wiggins say  yes ? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_14"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_14"><B>Footnote 14</B></A></U>: I find this paragraph very difficult to construe. I repeat it here for reference:- <ul type="disc"><FONT COLOR = "800080">If it is a materialistic thesis that T = W, then my denial that T = W is a form of denial of materialism. It is interesting how very uninteresting an obstacle these Leibnizian difficulties-real though they are-put in the way of the reduction of botany and all its primitive terms to organic chemistry or to physics. (If it does not follow from T # W that trees are something over and above their matter, how much the less can it follow that they are immanent or transcendent or supervenient or immaterial beings. This is obviously absurd for trees. A Leibnizian disproof of strict identity could never be enough to show something so intriguing or obscure.) I should expect there to be equally valid, and from the point of view of ontology almost equally unexciting, difficulties in the reduction of persons to flesh and bones ("<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_53.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity</A>", p. 57), in psychophysical event-materialism, and in the materialisms which one might formulate in other categories (such as the Aristotelian categories property and state or the categories situation and fact). Over and above is one question, identity is another. But of course the only stuff there is is stuff. </FONT></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_15"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_15"><B>Footnote 15</B></A></U>: What does he mean by this? That the obstacle is illusory? <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_16"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_16"><B>Footnote 16</B></A></U>: This seems to be a restatement of Leibniz s Law in <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</a> terms. <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_17"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_17"><B>Footnote 17</B></A></U>: Presumably, this survives Russell s failure to reduce mathematics to logic. Wiggins gives the following references:- <ul type="disc"><li>Russell  Lectures on Logical Atomism, VII (reprinted in <em>Logic and Knowledge</em>: presumably, this is "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6217.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - The Philosophy of Logical Atomism</A>", in particular, the opening lecture of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19911.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - The Philosophy of Logical Atomism - Part 4 (with Discussion)</A>" - ie.   . </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20057.htm">Ryle (Gilbert) - Categories</A>"</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P422_20"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P422_20"><B>Footnote 20</B></A></U>: He thanks Geach for allowing him to use the material, but gives no reference. For some reason, he doesn t mention the ancient <em><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_871.htm">Dion and Theon</a></em>, which is of exactly the same form as <em>Tib and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tibbles</a></em>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22769.htm">Wiggins (David) - Putnam's Concept of Natural Kind Words and Frege's Doctrines of Sense, Reference, and Extension: Can They Cohere?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22769_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22769_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>(This essay, revised slightly) <FONT COLOR = "800080">seeks to align Hilary Putnam's account of the semantics of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>2</SUP> terms with Frege's account of sense and reference. It defends and endorses the result.</li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally in Meaning and Reference, ed. A.W. Moore, OUP, 1993</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22769.htm">Wiggins (David) - Putnam's Concept of Natural Kind Words and Frege's Doctrines of Sense, Reference, and Extension: Can They Cohere?</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22769_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22769_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>".</li><li>This doesn t add much to the title, other than the notice of slight revision and endorsement. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22766.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness, Substance, and the Human Person</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22766_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22766_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>(This essay, revised, is) <FONT COLOR = "800080">concerned with persons as a special case of substances, and with some of the immediate practical and ethical consequences of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortalist</A><SUP>2</SUP> understanding of persons and their identity. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally in The Philosophers Magazine, August 2000</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22766.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness, Substance, and the Human Person</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22766_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22766_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>". </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22772.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: A Reply to Xu</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22772_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22772_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>(This essay, revised)<FONT COLOR = "800080"> is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortalist</A><SUP>2</SUP> commentary on Fei Xu's account of how particular substances can be singled out. It emphasizes the central importance of the determinable concept <em>object of some kind or other (to be determined)</em>. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><u>Note</u> <ol type="1"><li>This Chapter is a response to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22772_3">Fei Xu s Paper</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22772_3"></A> in <em>Mind and Language</em>, Volume 12, Issue 3-4, September 1997, pp 365 392, entitled  From Lot s Wife to a Pillar of Salt: Evidence that <em>Physical Object</em> is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">Sortal</A><SUP>4</SUP> Concept .</li><li>Xu s abstract is as follows:- <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>A number of philosophers of language have proposed that people do not have conceptual access to  bare particulars , or attribute-free individuals (e.g. Wiggins, 1980). Individuals can only be picked out under some <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>5</SUP>, a concept which provides principles of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">individuation</A><SUP>6</SUP> and identity. </li><li>Many advocates of this view have argued that <em>object</em> is not a genuine <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>7</SUP> concept. I will argue in this paper that a narrow sense of  object , namely the concept of any bounded, coherent, three-dimensional physical object that moves as a whole (Spelke, 1990) is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>8</SUP> for both infants and adults. </li><li>Furthermore, <em>object</em> may be the infant's first <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>9</SUP> and more specific <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortals</A><SUP>10</SUP> such as <em>cup</em> and <em>dog</em> may be acquired later in the first year of life. I will discuss the implications for infant categorization studies, trying to draw a conceptual distinction between a perceptual category and a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>11</SUP>, and I will speculate on how a child may construct <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>12</SUP> concepts such as <em>cup</em> and <em>dog</em>. </li></ul></FONT> </li></ol><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally in Mind and Language 12, 1997, pp. 413-21</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22772.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: A Reply to Xu</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22772_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22772_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>".</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P22772_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22772_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I haven t a copy of this paper. </li><li>I presume Fei Xu is this this lady: <A HREF = "https://vcresearch.berkeley.edu/faculty/fei-xu" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>, a cognitive psychologist at Berkeley specializing, inter alia, in  conceptual development, developmental psychology, cognitive development, language development, social cognition in infants and children . </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22765.htm">Wiggins (David) - Substance</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22765_1">Author s Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22765_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>(This essay, revised) expounds the Aristotelian doctrines from which <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortalism</A><SUP>2</SUP> derives. </li><li>It defends them, not without the help of Leibniz, against multiple misunderstandings and misconceptions of the category of substance. </li><li>It asserts the indispensability to us of that category. </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_595.htm">Grayling (Anthony), Ed. - Philosophy 1 - A Guide Through the Subject</A>", 1995, pp. 214-249</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22765.htm">Wiggins (David) - Substance</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22765_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22765_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>".</li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22768.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22768_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22768_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>(This essay, unrevised) <FONT COLOR = "800080">records some of the contributions made to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22768_2">our subject</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22768_2"></A> by Leibniz. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally in On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright, ed. J.J. Thomson, MIT Press, 1987</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22768.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22768_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22768_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P22768_2"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22768_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Presumable the subject is  Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity . </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22770.htm">Wiggins (David) - The De Re 'Must', Individuative Essentialism, and the Necessity of Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22770_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22770_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>(This essay, partly new)<FONT COLOR = "800080">reconsiders, among other things, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/K/Author_Kripke (Saul).htm">Saul Kripke</A> 's argument for the necessity of identity  this in the light of a variety of attacks by contingency theorists such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/A/Author_Ayer (A.J.).htm">A.J. Ayer</A> and <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Q/Author_Quine (W.V.).htm">W.V. Quine</A>. </li><li>My eagerness to defend that necessity amounts of course to a serious tribute to Quine's power and authority. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Originally in Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans & J. McDowell, Clarendon Press, 1976</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22770.htm">Wiggins (David) - The De Re 'Must', Individuative Essentialism, and the Necessity of Identity</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22770_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22770_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>".</li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2661.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Peacocke & Gillett - Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry, 1987, Chapter 4<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P2661_1">Editors Abstract</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P2661_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Wiggins addresses the philosophical problems of our concept of a person. He identifies three elements which need to be brought into a single focus: the notions of the person as biological entity, subject of consciousness, and bearer of ethical attributes. </li><li>He insists on the need to distinguish the <em>sense</em> of the term 'person' from its <em>reference</em>. In other words, we need to know not only what the term stands for, but also how it is being used, or the way of thinking implied by it. He notes that many words can be defined by some description or other, but that others are not susceptible to this kind of specification, so that one must appeal to what the entities being denoted are, what they are like. He suggests that 'person' is a term like this, that what it stands for and the way of thinking implied by it can only be grasped adequately by encounter with persons - indeed, with human beings. We need the idea of 'human being' to give some matter and substance to our idea of 'person'. </li><li>To strengthen this claim, Wiggins turns to P. F. Strawson's notion that 'person' is a primitive concept in our practices of mental and physical ascriptions to human beings. He regards Strawson's 'P-predicates' (that is, predicates not ascribable to material objects, such as actions, intentions, thoughts, feelings, perceptions, memories, sensations and so on) as predicates which stand for properties that are not reducible to predicates proper to the physical sciences, but which are also matter-involving. </li><li>If we remove a certain technical difficulty from Strawson's definition of these things, then perhaps every P-property is also an M-property (one ascribable to material objects). Wiggins illustrates this by reference to perception and memory. </li><li>Turning to Locke's conception of what it is to be a person, he proposes that a person is one of a kind whose typical members perceive, feel, think, take up attitudes to themselves, and so on. The 'and so on' indicates that the indefinite set of further properties which we bring to our concept of a person has to be filled out in the light of our experience with human beings. In this experience, human beings are not only conscious, but also make sense of one another. In so far as we do this - and there is no alternative but for us to try to do this - we are engaged with others. </li><li>Other persons and their thoughts and feelings cannot help but be significant to us. In so far as we understand others, we see them not only as organisms of a certain type, but also as thinking subjects and as objects of reciprocity - indeed, to put the culmination of a Humean argument in more Kantian terms, as members of the kingdom of ends. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Annotated photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5977.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 19 (W)</A>". </li><li>A revised version appears in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6549.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity</A>". </li></ul></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2661.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P2661_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P2661_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2658.htm">Peacocke (Arthur) & Gillett (Grant) - Persons and Personality: Introduction</A>".</li><li>In "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>", Wiggins adds  (This essay, revised, is) <FONT COLOR = "800080">concerned with persons as a special case of substances, and with some of the immediate practical and ethical consequences of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortalist</a> understanding of persons and their identity. </FONT> </li></ul> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T05:22" pubdate>02/08/2018 05:22:00</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>