The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins
Humphreys (Paul W.) & Fetzer (James), Eds.
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BOOK ABSTRACT: None.


BOOK COMMENT:



"Burgess (John P.) - How Not to Write History of Philosophy: A Case Study"

Source: Humphreys & Fetzer, Eds. - The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins



"Burgess (John P.) - Marcus, Kripke, and Names"

Source: Philosophical Studies: Vol. 84, No. 1 (Oct., 1996), pp. 1-47


Author’s Introduction
  1. Ruth Barcan Marcus, in several incidental passages in her later published writings, seems to imply a claim, which has subsequently been stated more explicitly by others, and given very wide publicity, that certain remarks on names in her colloquium talk "Marcus (Ruth Barcan) - Modalities and Intensional Languages" anticipate in an important but unacknowledged way Saul Kripke's discussion of names in his lecture series "Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity". My aim in the present study is to assess the textual evidence bearing on such claims.
  2. Marcus' talk was presented early in 1962 at a legendary session of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, and was followed by a commentary by W. V. Quine1, and a discussion2 between the two speakers and some members of their audience, mainly Kripke and Dagfinn Follesdal. Even though this was not a pre-arranged panel discussion - Kripke's opinion was invited by Quine on the spot, not in advance - it was recorded. All three components of the symposium were published in the journal Synthese, the talk and commentary in an issue bearing the date 1961 - apparently a spurious date, since according to Quine (1985, p. 35) the publication was subsequent to the colloquium - and an edited transcript of the discussion in an issue bearing the date 1962. Talk, commentary, and discussion were also published together in the official colloquium proceedings volume Wartofsky (1963), whose pagination I will use in giving quotations.
  3. A partial account of Kripke's then-unpublished views on naming was given in the latter part of Kaplan (1969). Kripke's famous public lectures were given in early 1970, and a virtually verbatim transcript with some further footnotes and a section of addenda somewhat belatedly published in Davidson and Harman (1972). A partial version of the same material had in the meantime appeared in Munitz (1971). The reprinting in "Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity" contains a substantial new preface.


COMMENT: Reply to:-




In-Page Footnotes ("Burgess (John P.) - Marcus, Kripke, and Names")

Footnote 1: Footnote 2:



"Follesdal (Dagfinn) - Referential Opacity and Modal Logic, §§ 16-19"

Source: Humphreys & Fetzer, Eds. - The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins



"Humphreys (Paul W.) & Fetzer (James), Eds. - The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins"

Source: Humphreys (Paul W.) & Fetzer (James), Eds. - The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins



"Lindstrom (Sten) - An Exposition and Development of Kanger's Early Semantics for Modal Logic"

Source: Humphreys & Fetzer, Eds. - The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins



"Neale (Stephen) - No Plagiarism Here - The Originality of Saul Kripke"

Source: TLS, 9th February 2001

COMMENT:



"Smith (Quentin) - A More Comprehensive History of the New Theory of Reference"

Source: Humphreys & Fetzer, Eds. - The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins



"Smith (Quentin) - Direct, Rigid Designation and A Posteriori Necessity: A History and Critique"

Source: Humphreys & Fetzer, Eds. - The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins



"Smith (Quentin) - Marcus and the New Theory of Reference: A Reply to Scott Soames"

Source: Synthese, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Aug., 1995), pp. 217-244


Author’s Abstract
  1. This paper is a reply to some of Scott Soames' comments on my colloquium paper "Smith (Quentin) - Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of The New Theory of Reference". Except for the indicated parts added in May, 1995, this paper was written on December 16th-25th, 1994 as my reply to Soames for the APA colloquium in Boston, December 28, 1994.
  2. In this paper, I argue that Soames' contention that Marcus is not one of the "primary founders of contemporary non-descriptivist theories of reference" is false. Soames presents numerous arguments for his thesis that Marcus did not originate ideas later elaborated upon by Kripke, but his arguments are unsound; they are based in part on a misunderstanding of Marcus' theory and in part on an inadequate grasp of some of the key notions of the New Theory of Reference, such as the notion of a posteriori necessities and the notion of reference-fixing descriptions.


COMMENT: Reply to "Soames (Scott) - Revisionism about Reference: A Reply to Smith".



"Smith (Quentin) - Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of The New Theory of Reference"

Source: Synthese, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Aug., 1995), pp. 179-189


Author’s Abstract
  1. this paper, presented at an APA colloquium in Boston on December 28, 1994, it is argued that "Marcus (Ruth Barcan) - Modalities and Intensional Languages" (1961) originated many of the key ideas of the New Theory of Reference that have often been attributed to Saul Kripke and others.
  2. For example, Marcus argued that names are directly referential and are not equivalent to contingent descriptions, that names are rigid designators, and that identity sentences with co-referring names are necessary if true.
  3. She also first presented the modal argument that names are directly referential, the epistemic argument that names are directly referential, and the argument that there are a posteriori necessities.

Author’s Introduction
  1. The New Theory of Reference in the philosophy of language became widespread in the 1970s and is still flourishing today. The New Theory implies that many locutions (e.g. proper names) refer directly to items, which contrasts with the traditional or old theory of reference, which implies that names and relevantly similar locutions express descriptive senses or are disguised descriptions. The New Theory encompasses such notions as direct reference, rigid designation, identity across possible worlds, the necessity of identity, a posteriori necessities, singular propositions, essentialism about natural kinds, the argument from the failure of substitutivity in modal contexts that proper names are not equivalent to contingent definite descriptions, and related ideas and arguments. Some of the contributors to the development of this theory include Kripke, Kaplan, Donnellan, Putnam, Perry, Salmon, Soames, Almog, Wettstein and a number of other contemporary philosophers.
  2. The point of this paper is to correct a fundamental and widespread misunderstanding about the origins of the New Theory of Reference; the main misunderstanding is that it is widely believed that Kripke originated the major ideas of this theory, presented in his 1972 article on "Naming and Necessity" (Kripke, 19721) and his 1971 article "Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity". The fact of the matter is that the key ideas in the New Theory were developed by Ruth Barcan Marcus, in her writings and especially in her 1961 article "Marcus (Ruth Barcan) - Modalities and Intensional Languages" (reprinted with small changes in (Marcus, 1993)). "Modalities and Intensional Languages" was presented in February, 1962 at the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science; Marcus's commentator was Quine and Kripke participated in the discussion which followed2.


COMMENT: See "Soames (Scott) - Revisionism about Reference: A Reply to Smith" for a reply.




In-Page Footnotes ("Smith (Quentin) - Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of The New Theory of Reference")

Footnote 1:
  • Kripke, Saul: 1972, 'Naming and Necessity', in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 253-355
  • I don’t seem to have this – or be able to obtain it on-line – but it seems to be the same text as the book of the same name ("Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity"), which I have.
Footnote 2: See "Marcus (Ruth Barcan), Kripke (Saul), Quine (W.V.), Follesdal (Dagfinn) - On the Paper of Ruth B. Marcus".



"Soames (Scott) - More Revisionism about Reference"

Source: Humphreys & Fetzer, Eds. - The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, And Its Origins



"Soames (Scott) - Revisionism about Reference: A Reply to Smith"

Source: Synthese, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Aug., 1995), pp. 191-216


Author’s Introduction
  1. My task today is an unusual and not very pleasant one. I am not here to debate the adequacy of any philosophical thesis. Rather, my job is to assess claims involving credit and blame. According to Quentin Smith, the central doctrines of Naming and Necessity, were developed by Ruth Marcus in her pioneering papers on quantified modal logic in the late 40's, and in her paper "Marcus (Ruth Barcan) - Modalities and Intensional Languages" in 1961. Smith maintains that Saul Kripke learned these doctrines from her, initially misunderstood them, and, when he later straightened things out, mistakenly took the doctrines to be his own. Finally, Kripke is supposed to have published them without properly citing her. The entire profession was allegedly fooled, despite the fact that Kripke and Marcus were among its most well-known members, and their work was familiar to leading researchers in the field. For years nobody said anything. Now, more than 20 years later, Smith claims to be bringing the truth to light.
  2. In what follows I show that the charges Smith makes against Kripke are false, and that the historical picture he paints is inaccurate. However, before I begin, I want to make clear that although Smith takes himself to be championing Marcus, my criticisms are of him, not her. I take a back seat to no one in my respect, admiration, and affection for both Ruth and Saul. As you will see from my comments on particular matters of substance, Marcus, along with certain other philosophers, do deserve credit for anticipating important aspects of contemporary theories of reference. However this credit in no way diminishes the seminal role of Saul Kripke.
  3. With this in mind let me review some of the accomplishments of Ruth Marcus1. She is, deservedly, one of the most distinguished and well-known philosophers in America. She is widely recognized and admired for her pioneering work in quantified modal logic, and for her important contributions to a variety of related topics. ….


COMMENT:




In-Page Footnotes ("Soames (Scott) - Revisionism about Reference: A Reply to Smith")

Footnote 1:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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