<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Dimensions of Dignity: The Moral Importance of Being Human (Egonsson (Dan)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_6633.htm">Dimensions of Dignity: The Moral Importance of Being Human</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/E/Author_Egonsson (Dan).htm">Egonsson (Dan)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_6633.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_6633.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><U>Author s Introduction</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>One idea has been almost universally embraced among people in the West, namely that there is something special about being human. This idea is rather vague and that is partly due, I believe, to the fact that it has been taken for granted for a very long time and not been much reflected upon until rather recently. </li><li>For example, it is not clear whether the thought is <ol type="i"><li>that being a human being is important in itself, or </li><li>it is important to be like a human being, that is, to have the capacities which a normal grown-up human being has. </ol></li><li>It is also possible to claim that both things are important; if two beings have exactly the same mental and physical capacities, it will make a difference to hear that one of the beings is a human one and the other not, and analogously if we have two human beings it may in some situations make a difference to hear that one is a normal adult and the other chronically unconscious. </li><li>However, making distinctions within the class of human beings in this way is not normally considered morally correct. </li><li>[& ]</li><li>Earlier I pointed out that the Western tradition concerning the value of being human contains two ideas. <ol type="i"><li>First, that human beings are more valuable than animals. </li><li>Second, that all human beings are equally valuable. </ol>This study will be particularly about the first of these ideas. The second one will only receive a very brief treatment. </li><li>Furthermore, the major part of the study will concentrate on the importance of being (a living) human per se, although towards the end I will also discuss and criticize two attempts to show that being (a living) human is a morally significant property only because of what normally is connected with this property. So whereas Part II discusses question (i) - see the opening of this chapter - Part III deals with question (ii). </li></ol></FONT> <BR><U>Contents</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>PROBLEM AND METHOD <ol type="1"><li>INTRODUCTION  3</li><li>METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND  8<BR>&rarr; 2.1 Simplicity <BR>&rarr; 2.2 Consistency <BR>&rarr; 2.3 The Species Concept <BR>&rarr; 2.4 Universalizability and Utilitarianism <BR>&rarr; 2.5 Intuitions <BR>&rarr; 2.6 Problems of Intuitionism <BR>&rarr; 2.7 Basic and Derived Moral Principles </li></ol></li><li>DIRECT IMPORTANCE <ol start = "3" type="1"><li>A "STANDARD ATTITUDE" (SA)  33 <BR>&rarr; 3.1 The Standard Attitude  33 <BR>&rarr; 3.2 Is it Important per se to Belong to a Certain Biological Species?  36 <BR>&rarr; 3.3 William E. May's Position  39 <BR>&rarr; 3.4 Humanity as a Gift  40 <BR>&rarr; 3.5 A Religious Foundation of Human Dignity  42 <BR>&rarr; 3.6 When Does a Human Being Get a Soul?  45 <BR>&rarr; 3.7 Concluding Remarks  47</li><li>THE DIRECT VALUE OF BEING HUMAN  49 <BR>&rarr; 4.1 Objectivism and Subjectivism  51 <BR>&rarr; 4.2 "Valued by" as an Active Process and "Valuable for"  52 <BR>&rarr; 4.3 Valuing as a Disposition  52 <BR>&rarr; 4.4 Sophisticated and Primitive Wanting  54 <BR>&rarr; 4.5 The Intrinsic Value of Being Non-Human  57 <BR>&rarr; 4.6 Two Assumptions  59<BR>&rarr; 4.7 On the Existence of the Wanter  60 <BR>&rarr; 4.8 Dworkin on External Preferences  62 <BR>&rarr; 4.9 Is Double Counting Morally Objectionable?  64 <BR>&rarr; 4.10 Hare on External Preferences  67 <BR>&rarr; 4.11 An Argument Against Counting Past Preferences  70</li><li>SA EXAMINED  73 <BR>&rarr; 5.1 Is the Denial of SA Serious?  74 <BR>&rarr; 5.2 A Third Aspect of a Moral Intuition  76 <BR>&rarr; 5.3 Taking into Account People's Moral Attitudes  80 <BR>&rarr; 5.4 A Brief Summary  83 <BR>&rarr; 5.5 The Rationality of Attitudes  84 <BR>&rarr; 5.6 Irrational Preferences in Preference Utilitarianism  85 <BR>&rarr; 5.7 A Serious Objection  86 <BR>&rarr; 5.8 Conclusion  89</li><li>ELEMENTS IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SA  91 <BR>&rarr; 6.1 Objectivity  91 <BR>&rarr; 6.2 Objective Values and Utilitarianism  93 <BR>&rarr; 6.3 Inviolability  94 <BR>&rarr; 6.4 Irreplaceability  97 <BR>&rarr; 6.5 Dignity  100 <BR>&rarr; 6.6 Equality  101</li><li>TOOLEY'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST SA  104 <BR>&rarr; 7.1 Tooley's First Counter-Argument  106 <BR>&rarr; 7.2 Tooley's Second Counter-Argument  109 <BR>&rarr; 7.3 Tooley's Third Counter-Argument  111<BR>&rarr; 7.4 The Intuitive Importance of Biological Ties  114 <BR>&rarr; 7.5 Are Biological Ties Important in Tooley's Third Counter-Argument?  116 <BR>&rarr; 7.6 Seeing As  118 <BR>&rarr; 7.7 Half-Believing and Vividness  121 <BR>&rarr; 7.8 Summing up this Chapter  124</li><li>EXAMPLES SUPPORTING SA  127 <BR>&rarr; 8.1 Warnock's Example  128 <BR>&rarr; 8.2 Warnock's First Claim  129 <BR>&rarr; 8.3 Absolute Principles  131 <BR>&rarr; 8.4 Does Warnock's Example Really Support SA  133 <BR>&rarr; 8.5 Two Cases  134 <BR>&rarr; 8.6 Warnock's Second Claim  138<BR>&rarr; 8.7 The Moral Status of Newly Fertilized Eggs  139 <BR>&rarr; 8.8 Summary So Far Plus Some More Examples  142 <BR>&rarr; 8.9 "The Compromise View"  145 <BR>&rarr; 8.10 "The Additive Assumption"  153 <BR>&rarr; 8.11 Summary, Conclusion and Further Reflections  157 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 8.11.1 SA and Agent-Relativity  159 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 8.11.2 Objections  161</li><li>CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FOR SA  166 <BR>&rarr; 9.1 Gaylin's List  168 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.1.1 Conceptual Thought  169 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.1.2 Capacity for Technology  171 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.1.3 The Range of Human Emotions  172 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.1.4 Lamarckian Genetics  174 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.1.5 Autonomy  175 <BR>&rarr; 9.2 Blumenfeld's Moral Collectivism  176 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.2.1 Species versus Other Biological Classes  178 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.2.2 A Counterpart of Blumenfeld's Principle  180 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.2.3 Positive and Negative Moral Collectivism  181 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.2.4 An Argument from Genetic Changes  183 <BR>&rarr; 9.3 Nozick's Defence of Speciesism  184 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.3.1 Nozick's First Suggestion  185 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 9.3.2 Nozick's Second Suggestion  188 <BR>&rarr; 9.4 A Short Summary of the Chapter  189 </li></ol></li><li> INDIRECT IMPORTANCE <ol start = "10" type="1"><li>PETER CARRUTHERS' CONTRACTUALISM  196 <BR>&rarr; 10.1 Two Demands  197 <BR>&rarr; 10.2 Utilitarianism and Intuitions  198 <BR>&rarr; 10.3 Contractualism  200 <BR>&rarr; 10.4 Practical Implications  203 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 10.4.1 A Slippery-Slope Argument  206 <BR>&rarr; &rarr; 10.4.2 Social Stability  209 <BR>&rarr; 10.5 Contractualism and Character  211 <BR>&rarr; 10.6 Cruelty and Culture  214 <BR>&rarr; 10.7 Conclusion  217</li><li>PETER SINGER ON KILLING PERSONS AND NON-PERSONS  219 <BR>&rarr; 11.1 The Direct wrongness of Killing  220 <BR>&rarr; 11.2 Positive Frustration  223<BR>&rarr; 11.3 Comparing the Quality of Different Lives <BR>&rarr; 11.4 Irreplaceability <BR>&rarr; 11.5 Singer's Argument for Irreplaceability <BR>&rarr; 11.6 Life as a Journey <BR>&rarr; 11.7 Does the Total View Apply to Persons? <BR>&rarr; 11.8 Conclusion </li></ol><BR>Summary and Conclusions<BR>References<BR>Index </li></ol> </FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Springer Science + Business Media, 1998</li><li>Downloaded during Springer promotion, Dec. 2015 </li></ul></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T05:24" pubdate>02/08/2018 05:24:29</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>