The Ontology of Spacetime
Dieks (Dennis), Ed.
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Contents

    List of Contributors – vii
    Introduction – ix
  1. PART I: THE ONTOLOGY OF SPACETIME
    1. John Earman – The Implications of General Covariance for the Ontology and Ideology of Spacetime – 3
    2. Carlo Rovelli – The Disappearance of Space and Time – 25
    3. Jonathan Bain – Spacetime Structuralism – 37
    4. Harvey R. Brown & Oliver Pooley – Minkowski Space-Time: A Glorious Non-Entity – 67
  2. PART II: TIME, BECOMING AND RELATIVITY: COMPATIBILIST POSITIONS
    1. "Dorato (Mauro) - The Irrelevance of the Presentist / Eternalist Debate for the Ontology of Minkowski Spacetime" – 93
    2. Steven F. Savitt – Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective – 111
    3. Richard T.W. Arthur – Minkowski Spacetime and the Dimensions of the Present – 129
    4. Dennis Dieks – Becoming, Relativity and Locality – 157
    5. Yuval Dolev – How to Square A Non-localized Present with Special Relativity – 177
    6. Storrs McCall – Philosophical Consequences of the Twins Paradox – 191
  3. PART III: TIME, BECOMING AND RELATIVITY: INCOMPATIBILIST VOICES
    1. Vesselin Petkov – Is There an Alternative to the Block Universe View? – 207
    2. Nicholas Maxwell – Special Relativity, Time, Probabilism and Ultimate Reality – 229
    3. Kent A. Peacock – Temporal Presentness and the Dynamics of Spacetime – 247
    4. Bradley Monton – Presentism and Quantum Gravity – 263

    Author Index – 281
    Subject Index – 285

BOOK COMMENT:
  • Philosophy and Foundations of Physics, Elsevier, 2006, Electronic copy
  • Downloaded from academia.edu, 30th July 2019.



"Dorato (Mauro) - The Irrelevance of the Presentist / Eternalist Debate for the Ontology of Minkowski Spacetime"

Source: Philosophy and Foundations of Physics: The Ontology of Spacetime, D. Dieks (Editor), Chapter 5, 2006, Elsevier


Author’s Abstract
  1. I argue that the debate between the so-called presentists and eternalists either lacks substance or is merely pragmatical.
  2. Consequently, I show that such a debate has no implications whatsoever both for our understanding of Minkowski spacetime and for notions like change, persistence and becoming.
  3. In particular, becoming should not be construed as presupposing an ontological asymmetry between past (or present) and future, but as the successive occurrence of timelike-related events, an issue related to the various arrows that have been taken to mark the asymmetry of time.


COMMENT:




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