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Personal Identity

First-Person Perspective

(Text as at 18/12/2010 19:58:05)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)


This needs spelling out – what does Baker think this is, and why does she think it so ontologically1 important. She seems to be obsessed by the thought that beings that can contemplate their own deaths2 are ontologically different. Why is this, rather that simply a phenomenally conscious3 perspective, that counts as the ontological watershed? Also, can we really use this term to explain4 personal identity, as “person5” appears in this term? If it’s supposed to be elucidatory of personal identity, we seem to have a circle. Really what’s important is that we have animals6 with these properties7. We can’t reify the property and make it a stand-alone thing, like the Cheshire Cat’s smile.

An argument I’m fond of is that – despite whatever psychological differences there may be between me and my future self – I can both rationally anticipate his experiences and should display rational concern for his well-being. That is because we share the same “window on the world”. Try out the future great pain test8 and see if I'm worried! Now is this “window on the world” the same as a FPP? After all, it may be that my senile old self no longer qualifies as a “person9”, though is phenomenally conscious.

This is mostly a place-holder10. Currently, mostly see the categorised reading-list.



Printable Versions:



Table of the Previous 2 Versions of this Note:

Date Length Title
26/11/2007 23:25:26 974 First-Person Perspective
12/08/2007 10:17:46 728 First-Person Perspective



Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
18/12/2010 19:58:05 First-Person Perspective Person

Summary of Note Links from this Page

Animals Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Consciousness Death Explanation
Future Great Pain Test Ontology Person Properties  

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Summary of Note Links to this Page

Abbreviations Animal Rights Animalism Animals Baker
Body Cartesian Ego Connectedness vs Continuity Consciousness Convention
Forensic Property Fusion Human Beings Johnston - Human Beings, 2, 3, 4, 5 Methuselah
Multiple Personality Disorder Natural Kinds Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death, 2 Origins Parfit
Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1 Psychological Continuity Psychological Criterion Research - Proposal Self
Ship of Theseus Status: Consciousness Studies (2017 - September) Strawson - Why I Have No Future Taking Persons Seriously Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) Thesis - Current Stance Unity of the Person Zombies  

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem? Paper High Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) When Do Persons Begin and End? Paper High Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Dennett (Daniel) The Fantasy of First-Person Science Paper Medium Quality Abstract    
Dennett (Daniel) Where Am I? Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Ehring (Douglas) Personal Identity and Time Travel Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Genova (Lisa) Still Alice Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Johnston (Mark) Human Beings Paper High Quality Abstract 2, 3, 4, 5 Yes
Johnston (Mark) 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal Paper Medium Quality Abstract    
Liao (S. Matthew) The Organism View Defended Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Madell (Geoffrey) The Identity of the Self Book Medium Quality Abstract    
Metzinger (Thomas) Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity Book Medium Quality Abstract    
Miller (Kristie) Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists Paper Medium Quality Abstract    
Olson (Eric) Immanent Causation and Life After Death Paper High Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Olson (Eric) Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Olson (Eric) Persistence Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Olson (Eric) Psychology and Personal Identity Paper High Quality Abstract 2, 3 Yes
Papineau (David) Introducing Consciousness Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Shoemaker (David) Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern Paper High Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Snowdon (Paul) Persons, Animals, Ourselves: Introduction Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Abbreviations Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Animal Rights Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Animalism Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Animals Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Baker Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Body Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Cartesian Ego Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Connectedness vs Continuity Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Consciousness Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Convention Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Current Position Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - First-Person Perspective Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Forensic Property Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Fusion Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Human Beings Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Methuselah Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Multiple Personality Disorder Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Natural Kinds Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Origins Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Parfit Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Psychological Continuity Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Psychological Criterion Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Self Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Ship of Theseus Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Taking Persons Seriously Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Unity of the Person Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Zombies Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Zimmerman (Dean) Can We Survive Our Death? Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Zimmerman (Dean) Does God Know Our First-Person Perspectives? Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes



References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder) A Metaphysical Framework for the First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 8 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 9 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Arguments against First-Person Naturalization Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 5 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Cartesianism and the First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Phenomenology and Mind, (7):20–30, 2014 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 4 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) First-Person Externalism Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Modern Schoolman, 84:155–70, 2007 10%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 6 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 7 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective Book - Referenced Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective 28%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Georg Gasser, Ed., How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 203–26. Ontos-Verlag, Frankfurt, 2007 4%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem? Paper - By Subtopic High Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Introduction Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Neuroscience and the Human Mind Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Seminar on Creating Mind, Harvard Center for the Study of World Religions, (February 23, 2001) No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 2 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 3 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Social Externalism and First-Person Authority Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Erkenntnis, 67:287–300, 2007 12%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The First-Person Perspective and its Relation to Cognitive Science Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Matthew Haug, editor, Philosophical Methods, pages 318–334. Routledge, London, 2014 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Why Computers Can't Act Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, 18:157–63, 1981 No
Block (Ned), Flanagan (Owen) & Guzeldere (Guven) The Nature of Consciousness Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) Medium Quality Abstract Block (Ned), Flanagan (Owen) & Guzeldere (Guven) - The Nature of Consciousness 48%
Castaneda (Hector-Neri) Indicators and Quasi-Indicators Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1967), pp. 85-100 No
Catterson (Troy) Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Synthese, Vol. 162, No. 3 (Jun., 2008), pp. 385-404 6%
Catterson (Troy), Ed. Synthese Special Issue on Personal Identity Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) Catterson (Troy), Ed. - Synthese Special Issue on Personal Identity 9%
Coliva (Annalisa) The First Person: Error through Misidentification, the Split between Speaker's and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 100, No. 8 (Aug., 2003), pp. 416-431 No
Dennett (Daniel) The Fantasy of First-Person Science Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Dennett's Website 50%
Kolak (Daniel) Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Synthese, Vol. 162, No. 3 (Jun., 2008), pp. 341-372 4%
Kripke (Saul) Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) Medium Quality Abstract Kripke (Saul) - Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 1%
Kripke (Saul) The First Person Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Kripke (Saul) - Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 6%
Metzinger (Thomas) Being No One: Questions Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Metzinger (Thomas) - Being No One, Chapter 1 67%
Metzinger (Thomas) Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity Book - Referenced Medium Quality Abstract Metzinger (Thomas) - Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity 1%
Papineau (David) Introducing Consciousness Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Papineau (David) Introducing Consciousness Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract Papineau - Introducing Consciousness Yes
Povinelli (Daniel) Causality, Tool Use, and Folk Physics: A Comparative Approach Paper - By Subtopic D. Povinelli, Folk Physics for Apes (Oxford, 2000), Chapter 3 No
Povinelli (Daniel) Folk Physics Cannot Be Assumed Paper - By Subtopic D. Povinelli, Folk Physics for Apes (Oxford, 2000), Chapter 1 No
Povinelli (Daniel) & Dunphy-Lelii (Sarah) Do Chimpanzees Seek Explanations? Preliminary Comparative Investigations, Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2001, 55:2, 187-195 No
Scheffler (Samuel) The Independence and Distinctness of the Personal Point of View Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Scheffler - The Rejection of Consequentialism, Chapter 3 No
Scheffler (Samuel) The Rejection of Consequentialism Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) Scheffler (Samuel) - The Rejection of Consequentialism Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney) The First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Block, Flanagan & Guzeldere - The Nature of Consciousness Yes
Thomson (Garrett) Counting subjects Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract Synthese, Vol. 162, No. 3 (Jun., 2008), pp. 373-384 8%
Todman (Theo) Thesis - First-Person Perspective Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Torrengo (Giuliano) & Buonomo (Valerio) What's next? Time travel and phenomenal continuity Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Draft (final version in The Persistence of persons. Studies in the metaphysics of personal identity over time (2018), V. Buonomo (ed.), Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae: pp. 184-201) 17%
Valberg (J.J.) Dream, Death, and the Self Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) Medium Quality Abstract Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self 1%
Valberg (J.J.) The Uses of the First Person Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 16 No
Valberg (J.J.) What Makes First-Person Reference First Personal? Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 17 No
Zimmerman (Dean) Does God Know Our First-Person Perspectives? Paper - By Subtopic High Quality Abstract YouTube; accessed August 2015. Interview at the Templeton Conference on Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Munich 2012. Yes



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