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Personal Identity

Concepts

(Text as at 17/08/2018 17:35:31)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)

Plug Note₁

• See "Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist" for the importance of concepts. Unger’s answer to the problem of vagueness – as exemplified by the “disappearing chair” problem (atom-wise annihilation of the chair … just when does it cease to be?) is that there never were any chairs, just our concept of a chair and atoms arranged chair-wise. We sit on the atoms, not on the concept, but we describe the atom-heap as a chair. But this concept is vague, or there is a family resemblance, so sometimes it’s not clear whether it applies or not. The big question is whether natural kind² objects exist independently of our conceptual schemes. Certainly they do as atom-heaps, unclear whether they do as answers to our concepts. So, various atom-heaps carry on existing, but whether our concepts carry on applying is vague.
• Others (Peter Van Inwagen?³) take the view that only mereological simples and organisms exist, which seems to be a similar view.
• There seems to be something special about natural-kind concepts, the persistence of whose exemplars (unlike those of artefact-concepts) don’t in any sense seem to depend on us and our concepts. Is PERSON⁴ a natural kind concept? If it isn’t, then are we simply left with rather inconsequential semantic⁵ arguments?
• Are the arguments above really saying that artefacts don’t exist? Presumably artefacts depend on us for their existence as artefacts⁶, though not as lumps of matter.
• Lynne Rudder Baker argues that a new ontological⁷ entity (a painting) comes into existence because of the relation of an object (a canvas plus paint appropriately distributed) to an art-world. I need to press Baker here. Are all her analogies truly analogous? Given evolution, even species-concepts (paradigms for natural kind concepts) are mobile rather than being eternally fixed. Yet Baker seems to think that it’s a relation to evolutionary history that makes an animal⁸ what it is (as distinct, presumably, from atoms arranged animal-wise).
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read₉, include₁₀ the following:-
  1. "Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist", Unger
• A reading list (where not covered elsewhere₁₁) might start with:-
  1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality", Baker
  2. "Carruthers (Peter) - Invertebrate concepts confront the Generality Constraint (and win)", Carruthers
  3. "Margolis (Eric) & Laurence (Stephen), Eds. - Concepts - Core Readings", Margolis
  4. "McGinn (Colin) - Conceptual Causation: Some Elementary Reflections", McGinn
  5. "Stephan (Achim) - Are Animals Capable of Concepts?", Stephan
  6. "Wiggins (David) - The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate", Wiggins
• This is mostly a place-holder¹². Currently, just see the categorised reading-list.

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 1:

• A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
• I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
• As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
• The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.

Footnote 9:

• Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
• In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
• In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
• My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.

Footnote 10:

• I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
• Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.

Footnote 11:

• I’ve also added a few interesting but maybe tangential papers!
• These may expand the scope of this Note.

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Printable Versions:

• Follow (this link) for level 0 (with reading list), and
• Follow (this link) for level 0.

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Table of the Previous 3 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
25/08/2009 21:38:53	1964	Concepts
26/11/2007 23:25:26	1751	Concepts
12/08/2007 10:17:46	1748	Concepts

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
17/08/2018 17:35:31	Concepts	Semantics

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Summary of Note Links from this Page

Animals	Artifacts	Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Natural Kinds	Ontology
Person	Semantics

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Note Links to this Page

Convention	Counting Persons	Language of Thought	Methuselah	Person
Reductionism	Research - Focus	Research - Proposal	Semantics	Thesis - Current Stance
Thought Experiments	Wantons

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Olson (Eric)	Persistence	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Concepts	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Convention	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Counting Persons	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Language of Thought	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Methuselah	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Person	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Reductionism	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Semantics	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Thought Experiments	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Wantons	Paper		Yes
Wilson (Jack)	Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities	Paper		Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality	Paper - Cited	The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 313-333	6%
Baron (Samuel) & Miller (Kristie)	Our Concept of Time	Paper - By Subtopic	B. Mölder, Arstila & P. Ohrstrom (eds.), Philosophy and Psychology of Time. Springer, 2015. pp. 29-52	5%
Carruthers (Peter)	Invertebrate concepts confront the Generality Constraint (and win)	Paper - Cited	R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. CUP, 2009	8%
Dretske (Fred)	Concepts and Meaning	Paper - By Subtopic	Dretske - Knowledge and the Flow of Information, 1981, Chapter 9	No
Dretske (Fred)	Knowledge and the Flow of Information	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Dretske (Fred) - Knowledge and the Flow of Information	15%
Fodor (Jerry)	Information and Representation	Paper - By Subtopic	Margolis & Laurence - Concepts - Core Readings	No
French (Peter) & Wettstein (Howard), Eds.	Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XXVIII) - The American Philosophers	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	French (Peter) & Wettstein (Howard), Eds. - Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XXVIII) - The American Philosophers	No
Goodman (Russell B.)	James (1842-1910) on the Nonconceptual	Paper - By Subtopic	French (Peter) & Wettstein (Howard), Eds. - Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XXVIII) - The American Philosophers	No
MacDonald (Graham)	Perception & Identity - Essays Presented to A J Ayer with His Replies	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	2%
Machery (Edouard)	Concepts: Investigating the Heterogeneity Hypothesis	Paper - By Subtopic	Sytsma - Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 8	No
Margolis (Eric) & Laurence (Stephen), Eds.	Concepts - Core Readings	Book - Cited	Margolis (Eric) & Laurence (Stephen), Eds. - Concepts - Core Readings	No
McGinn (Colin)	Conceptual Causation: Some Elementary Reflections	Paper - Cited	Mind, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 4, Mind and Content (Oct., 1991), pp. 573-586	17%
Miller (Kristie)	On The Concept Of Sexual Perversion	Paper - By Subtopic	The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 60, No. 241 (October 2010), pp. 808-830	No
Stephan (Achim)	Are Animals Capable of Concepts?	Paper - Cited	Erkenntnis, Vol. 51, No. 1, Animal Mind (1999) (pp. 79-92)	No
Sytsma (Justin), Ed.	Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Sytsma (Justin), Ed. - Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind	2%
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Concepts	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Unger (Peter)	I Do Not Exist	Paper - Cited	MacDonald - Perception & Identity - Essays Presented to A J Ayer with His Replies, 1979	Yes
Wiggins (David)	Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	13%
Wiggins (David)	The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate	Paper - Cited	Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity	11%

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Text Colour Conventions

1. Black: Printable Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
2. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019

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