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Personal Identity

Natural Kinds

(Text as at 12/08/2007 10:17:46)

(For other versions of this Note, see the tables at the end)


This has been partly addressed elsewhere under semantic1 and conceptual2 issues. Is the concept of a person3 a natural kind concept? Can “person” be analysed in terms of other concepts, or do we presuppose it? See, for example, Madden (or was it "Madell (Geoffrey) - The Identity of the Self") for the alleged unanalysability of the concept “person”. Maybe I should cover under this head whether “sentient being” (or “rational being”) is the natural kind, and that “person”, with its social / legal / moral overtones, is something cultures assign. Even so, the human animal4 is really the natural kind, which gains or loses the properties5 of sentience, rationality, and even the first-person perspective6.



Live Version of this Archived Note

Date Length Title
17/08/2018 17:35:31 4457 Natural Kinds


Table of the 4 Later Versions of this Note

Date Length Title
23/07/2018 00:40:19 4457 Natural Kinds
05/04/2016 23:19:41 2453 Natural Kinds
18/12/2010 19:58:05 913 Natural Kinds
26/11/2007 23:25:26 817 Natural Kinds



This version updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
12/08/2007 10:17:46 Natural Kinds Kinds



Summary of Notes Links from this Page

Animals Concepts First-Person Perspective Person Properties
Semantics . . . .

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Summary of Note Links to this Page

Concepts Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood, 2 Homo Sapiens Person Research - Focus
Research - Proposal, 2 Thesis - Outline      

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018




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