Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Phase Sortals
(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- I may have misappropriated this term. In its standard usage (I am told), a phase sortal is a biologically-motivated term. The clearest examples are of individuals that metamorphose2; for example the butterfly: egg → larva (caterpillar) → pupa (chrysalis) → adult (butterfly). The caterpillar is a phase sortal of the organism, with clear spatio-temporal boundaries. My standard example is of Child, which is a (vaguely3-boundaried) biological phase of the substance sortal Human Being4.
- An example of a possible human phase sortal that is a non-person5 is Infant. This example might be especially relevant to the topic, because “infant” is derived from the Latin in-fans “without speech”, and the capacity for speech is often claimed to be an essential prerequisite for being a person6.
- Any suggestion that the concept Person7 is “no more than” a phase sortal of an umbrella concept isn’t intended to imply unimportance. Rather, simply that persons might not form a kind8 (and in particular a natural kind9), nor be substances10, but that personhood might be a property11 of substances (of animals12, for instance).
- What about “periodic” phase sortals such as Student? A human being can “pop in and out of” studenthood by registering or deregistering, but he can’t do this with childhood. Which model suits personhood? See the discussion of intermittent objects13.
- However, if the above suggestion that the concept Phase Sortal is biologically motivated is correct, a purely social concept such as Student is not a phase sortal in this sense, and Person might not be either. I could, of course, invent a new term of art.
- All roads seem to lead to Wiggins14 (Paul Snowdon refers to him a lot in the context of Animalism15, though I seem to remember that Eric Olson thinks Wiggins isn’t a true Animalist, but a supporter of the psychological view16).
Further Remarks:
- See under Sortals17 for the introduction of the concept ‘Phase Sortal’.
References
- Relevant Works cited above: No items to list.
- For a Page of Links18 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read19, include the following:-
- General:
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?", 2005, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism", 1998, Annotations
- "Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'", 2007, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", 1987, Annotations
- "Olson (Eric) - Persistence", 1999
- "Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity", 1999
- "Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities", 1999, Annotations
- A further reading list might start with:-
- General:
- "Campbell (Scott) - Persons and Substances", 2001
- "Price (Marjorie) - Identity Through Time", 1977, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 147%
- "Sauchelli (Andrea) - The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person", 2016, Internal PDF Link, Read = 8%
- "Tollefsen (Christopher) - Animalism and the Unborn Human Being", 2004, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 13%
- "Wiggins (David) - Metaphysics: Substance", 1998, No Abstract
- "Wiggins (David) - Outline of a Theory of Individuation (S&S)", 1980, Annotations
- "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance", 1980, Book, Read = 11%
- "Wiggins (David) - The Absoluteness of Sameness (S&S)", 1980, Annotations
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder20.
Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:
Note last updated |
Reading List for this Topic |
Parent Topic |
06/07/2023 00:43:12 |
Phase Sortals |
Sortals |
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
Baker - Persons in the Material World, 2 |
Clinical Observations, 2 |
Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood |
Existential Passage |
Garrett - Persons and Bodies - Response |
Human Beings |
Intermittent Objects, 2, 3 |
Kinds, 2, 3 |
Metamorphosis |
Noonan - Persons and Bodies - Response, 2, 3 |
Olson - What Are We? Animals, 2 |
Olson - What Are We? The Question, 2 |
Person |
Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1 |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3, 4 |
Psychological Continuity |
Reductionism |
Research - Proposal |
Sortals |
Substance |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?) |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?), 2, 3 |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time), 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2 |
Thesis - Current Stance |
Unity of the Person |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Wiggins |
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
Anscombe (G.E.M.) |
Objects and Identity: Foreward |
Paper  |
|
|
Baker (Deane-Peter) |
Taylor and Parfit on Personal Identity: a Response to Lotter |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Persons in the Material World |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
When Do Persons Begin and End? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Braddon-Mitchell (David) & Miller (Kristie) |
Talking about a Universalist World |
Paper  |
|
|
Campbell (Scott) |
Persons and Substances |
Paper  |
|
|
Dennett (Daniel) |
Conditions of Personhood |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Garrett (Brian) |
Animalism and Reductionism |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Garrett (Brian) |
The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies' |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Hershenov (David) |
Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Kazez (Jean) |
The Philosophical Parent: Asking the Hard Questions About Having and Raising Children |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Kotak (Aakash) |
The Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Noller (Jorg) |
A Transformative Account of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Noonan (Harold) |
Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies' |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Persistence |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Psychology and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
The Human Animal: Introduction |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? Animals |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes |
Paper  |
|
|
Price (Marjorie) |
Identity Through Time |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Smart (Brian) |
How can Persons be Ascribed M-Predicates? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Snowdon (Paul) |
The Self and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Clinical Observations |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Human Beings |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Intermittent Objects |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Kinds |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Metamorphosis |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Person |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Reductionism |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Sortals |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Substance |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Unity of the Person |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Wiggins |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Wilson (Jack) |
Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
References & Reading List
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
When Do Persons Begin and End? |
Paper - Cited  |
Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005 |
Yes |
Campbell (Scott) |
Persons and Substances |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Studies 104, Number 3, June 2001, pp. 253-267(15). |
No |
Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 |
Yes |
Lockwood (Michael), Ed. |
Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine |
Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)  |
Lockwood (Michael), Ed. - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine |
29% |
Marquis (Don) |
Why Abortion is Immoral |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, No. 4, Apr., 1989, pp. 183-202 |
No |
Olson (Eric) |
What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
99% |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? Animals |
Paper - Referencing  |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 2 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
81% |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper - Referencing  |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Phase Sortals |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
|
Yes |
Wiggins (David) |
Sameness and Substance |
Book - Cited  |
Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance |
11% |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2023