Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages

Personal Identity

Thought Experiments

(Text as at 12/08/2007 10:17:46)

(For other versions of this Note, see the tables at the end)

In general, I’m in favour of using thought experiments in philosophy. However, I’d like to consider, following Wilkes, whether some thought-experiments in pursuit of clarifying personal identity propose impossible scenarios, or trade on under-specification. Sometimes our intuitions are unreliable as to the truth or possibility of what we intuit. Some doubt the possible consciousness of complex artificial systems, but is this anything other than a fallacious argument from personal incredulity? Descartes argued for the real distinction between mind and body¹ by thinking he could imagine their separation, but could he really? Sometimes, our intuitions may give us no clue one way or the other, or only a gentle lead (as Williams seems to be suggesting in "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future"). "Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants" gives a helpful critique of Wilkes’s and Johnston’s arguments against thought experiments.