(Text as at 12/08/2007 10:17:46)
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In general, I’m in favour of using thought experiments in philosophy. However, I’d like to consider, following Wilkes, whether some thought-experiments in pursuit of clarifying personal identity propose impossible scenarios, or trade on under-specification. Sometimes our intuitions are unreliable as to the truth or possibility of what we intuit. Some doubt the possible consciousness of complex artificial systems, but is this anything other than a fallacious argument from personal incredulity? Descartes argued for the real distinction between mind and body1 by thinking he could imagine their separation, but could he really? Sometimes, our intuitions may give us no clue one way or the other, or only a gentle lead (as Williams seems to be suggesting in "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future"). "Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants" gives a helpful critique of Wilkes’s and Johnston’s arguments against thought experiments.
Date | Length | Title |
30/11/2019 22:58:05 | 4058 | Thought Experiments |
Date | Length | Title |
11/05/2018 09:37:26 | 5643 | Thought Experiments |
11/03/2018 20:19:41 | 3329 | Thought Experiments |
26/03/2014 19:24:58 | 1688 | Thought Experiments |
18/12/2010 19:58:05 | 1020 | Thought Experiments |
26/11/2007 23:25:26 | 924 | Thought Experiments |
This version updated | Reading List for this Topic | Parent Topic |
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12/08/2007 10:17:46 | Thought Experiments | Research - Proposal |
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