Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages

Personal Identity

Fission

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. Fission is important in the philosophy of identity – especially of personal identity – in that it provides many thought-experiments² (TEs), and some real-life examples, that test out the various theories.
  2. The paradigm case of Fission is of two half-brain³ transplants⁴.
     1. It is difficult to consider this case without slipping into the “psychological view⁵”. Each hemisphere seems to preserve what matters⁶ to the fissioned individual⁷, and a perdurantist⁸ account can maintain identity⁹ after fission.
     2. An alternative account is to claim that the two half-brains¹⁰ always were separate persons¹¹ (and Roland Puccetti has maintained that they are separate persons, in all of us, even prior to the commissurotomy¹² in this TE and in everyday life), in a way slightly different from the usual Lewis¹³ view of non-identical spatially-coincident¹⁴ individuals¹⁵ (because the hemispheres aren’t spatially coincident, though the shared body¹⁶ is).
        
  3. We need to consider how the original person¹⁷ was unified¹⁸. We can press the realism of the thought experiment¹⁹ by asking how important are the spinal cord and Peripheral Nervous System generally to the psychological₂₀ integrity of the human organism²¹? The case of dicephalus²² twins may be relevant – where the functions of walking and even typing seem to be carried out perfectly adequately despite the coordinated limbs being controlled by different brains²³.
  4. We also need to consider whether the two half-brains²⁴ continue to constitute a single scattered²⁵ person²⁶, just parked in separate bodies²⁷. A single embodiment is important because it ensures synchronisation of experience, and external communication between the hemispheres (in the absence of the usual internal communication across the corpus callosum). Presumably, this could be achieved in other ways.
  5. We can – as in "Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?" – imagine a Brain in a Vat²⁸ linked by radio transmitters/receivers to a remote body²⁹.
     1. The brain³⁰ is part of the body³¹ – so a single physical thing can be spatially discontinuous.
     2. Why, if A fissions into B and C, can’t we consider B & C to be parts of the same person?
     3. They could fight / argue … but so can someone in two minds³² about things.
     4. What if one killed the other?
     5. They would have different perceptual experiences, but so (presumably) does a chameleon, with its eyes pointing in different directions (and sheep and other herbivores, and fish, with eyes on the sides of their heads).
        
  6. I need to consider in detail what is supposed to be going on in fission – ie. press the original thought experiment³³: there needs to be segregation / redundancy prior to separation – this can happen over time (or we would have plain duplication³⁴). At some point the person will split into two, with incommunicable consciousnesses³⁵ (cf. Locke³⁶’s day-person and night-person).

• ---

  Further Remarks:
  1. This Note overlaps with some others:-
     1. Brain Transplants³⁷
     2. Commissurotomy³⁸
     3. Multiple Personality Disorder³⁹
     4. Teletransportation⁴⁰
        
  2. In such cases, the reading is (usually) reserved for these notes and not repeated here.

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?", 1997, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
• For a Page of Links⁴¹ to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read⁴², include the following:-
  • General:
    1. "Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission", 1983, Write-Up Note⁴³, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?", 1997, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Garrett (Brian) - Fission", 1998
    4. "Hawley (Katherine) - Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts", 2005, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Nagel (Thomas) - Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness", 1979, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem", 2003, Annotations
    7. "Roache (Rebecca) - A Defence of Quasi-Memory", 2006, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Robinson (Denis) - Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?", 1985, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    9. "Unger (Peter) - Fission and the Focus of One's Life", 1992
    10. "Unger (Peter) - Fission and the Focus of One's Life (Excerpt)", 2003
    11. "Wilkes (Kathleen) - Being in Two Minds", 2003
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Brueckner (Anthony) - Branching in the psychological approach to personal identity", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
    2. "Burke (Michael) - Spatial Analogues of 'Annihilation and Re-creation'", 1985, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity", 2015, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 133%
    4. "Demarest (Heather) - Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)", 2016, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
    5. "Eklund (Matti) - Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence", 2002, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Gallois (Andre) - Counting Amoebas", 1998
    7. "Garrett (Brian) - Johnston on Fission", 2004, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    8. "Gustafsson (Johan E.) - Non-branching personal persistence", 2019, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
    9. "Hershenov (David) & Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Fission and Confusion", 2006, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    10. "Johnston (Mark) - Fission and the Facts", 1989, Internal PDF Link, Read = 21%
    11. "Martin (Raymond) - Fission Rejuvenated", 2003, No Abstract
    12. "Martin (Raymond), Barresi (John) & Giovannelli (Alessandro) - Fission Examples in 18th and Early 19th century Personal Identity Debate", 1998
    13. "Matthews (Gareth B.) - Surviving As", 1977
    14. "Merricks (Trenton) - Fission and Personal Identity Over Time", 1997, Internal PDF Link
    15. "Mills (Eugene) - Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity", 1993
    16. "Moyer (Mark) - A Survival Guide to Fission", 2008, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
    17. "Munzer (Stephen R.) - Transplantation, Chemical Inheritance, and the Identity of Organs", 1994, Internal PDF Link
    18. "Noonan (Harold) - Can One Thing Become Two?", 1980, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
    19. "Noonan (Harold) - Williams on 'The Self and the Future'", 1982, No Abstract
    20. "Oderberg (David) - Fission, Intermittence and the Primitiveness of Identity", 1993
    21. "Ord (Toby) - Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity", Undated, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 40%
    22. "Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?", 2002, Internal PDF Link
    23. "Prior (Arthur N.) - Opposite Number", 1957, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    24. "Pummer (Theron) - Does Division Multiply Desert?", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 3%
    25. "Roelofs (Luke) - Could a Person Persist as a Pair of Persons", Undated, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
    26. "Rovane (Carol) - Branching Self-Consciousness", 1990, Internal PDF Link
    27. "Seibt (Johanna) - Fission, Sameness, and Survival: Parfit’s Branch Line Argument Revisited", 2000, Internal PDF Link
    28. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Brown-Brownson Revisited", 2004, Internal PDF Link
    29. "Valberg (J.J.) - My Future: The Puzzle of Division", 2007
    30. "Wilkes (Kathleen) - How Many Selves Make Me?", 1991, No Abstract
    31. "Wright (John) - Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel", 2006, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 108%

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder⁴⁴.

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Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
20/09/2022 11:24:00	5987	Fission
12/05/2022 21:27:22	5660	Fission
02/07/2021 20:32:38	5059	Fission
11/02/2021 11:29:46	4715	Fission
25/09/2020 11:08:10	4016	Fission
15/02/2018 20:54:14	5296	Fission
18/12/2010 19:58:05	2605	Fission
26/11/2007 23:25:26	2609	Fission
12/08/2007 10:17:46	2506	Fission

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
06/07/2023 00:43:12	Fission	Thought Experiments

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Body	Brain	Brain Transplants	Brains in Vats
Carter – Artifacts of Theseus	Coincidence	Commissurotomy	Consciousness	Crypt - Friends
Dicephalus	Duplication	First-Person Perspective	Individual	Lewis
Locke	Logic of Identity	Mind	Multiple Personality Disorder	Note Links Explanation
Organisms	Perdurantism	Person	Plug Note Apologia	Psychological View
Scattered Objects	Teletransportation	Thought Experiments	Transplants	Unity of the Person
What Matters	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Aeon Papers	Androids	Baker - Materialism with a Human Face	Baker - Personal Identity Over Time	Birch - The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Brain Criterion	Brain Transplants, 2	Cerebrum	Clones
Commissurotomy	Counting Persons, 2	Dicephalus, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Endurantism	Fetuses, 2
Fusion, 2, 3	Kurtz - Persistence (Introduction)	Lewis	Narrative Identity	Occasional Identity
Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Olson - What Are We? Animals, 2, 3, 4	Parfit	Perdurantism	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Pregnancy	Psychological Continuity	Psychological Continuity - Forward	Psychological Criterion	Quantum Mechanics
Reduplication Objections	Replication	Research - Proposal	Ship of Theseus	Soul Criterion
Teletransportation, 2	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?), 2, 3	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time), 2, 3, 4, 5	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It), 2	Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It)	Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
Thesis - Current Stance	Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43	Thinking Animal Argument	Time, 2	Twinning, 2, 3
Unity of the Person	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	What Matters	Zygote

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Anscombe (G.E.M.)	Were You a Zygote?	Paper	2	Yes
Ayers (Michael R.)	Locke on Living Things	Paper		Yes
Baggott (Jim)	Calculate but don’t shut up	Paper		Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Materialism with a Human Face	Paper		Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Personal Identity Over Time	Paper		Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	When Do Persons Begin and End?	Paper		Yes
Belzer (Marvin)	Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction	Paper
Birch (Jonathan)	The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI	Paper		Yes
Blackburn (Simon)	Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Paper
Briggs (Rachael) & Nolan (Daniel)	Utility Monsters for the Fission Age	Paper	2
Buchanan (Rachael)	The battle to separate Safa and Marwa	Paper		Yes
Campbell (John)	The First Person: The Reductionist View of the Self	Paper		Yes
Campbell (Scott)	Persons and Substances	Paper
Carroll (Sean M.)	Splitting the Universe	Paper		Yes
Cerullo (Michael A.)	Uploading and Branching Identity	Paper
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence)	Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality	Paper		Yes
Dennett (Daniel)	Where Am I?	Paper		Yes
DiFrisco (James) & Mossio (Matteo)	Diachronic Identity in Complex Life Cycles: An Organizational Perspective	Paper
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal identity and the R-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation?	Paper
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper		Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Parfit and 'What Matters'	Paper		Yes
Gendler (Tamar Szabo)	Personal Identity and Thought Experiments	Paper
Gillett (Grant)	Brain Bisection and Personal Identity	Paper
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul)	Aeon: 2019+	Paper		Yes
Hanley (Richard)	The Metaphysics of Star Trek: Introduction: The Philosophic Enterprise	Paper		Yes
Hanley (Richard)	The Metaphysics of Star Trek: Personal Growth	Paper
Hershenov (David)	Animals, Persons and Bioethics	Paper
Huenemann (Charlie)	If I teleport from Mars, does the original me get destroyed?	Paper		Yes
Kent (Adrian)	Our quantum problem	Paper		Yes
Kingma (Elselijn)	Were You Part of Your Mother?	Paper		Yes
Kolak (Daniel)	Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity	Paper
Kurtz (Roxanne)	Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?	Paper		Yes
Lewis (David)	On the Plurality of Worlds (Selections)	Paper		Yes
Liao (S. Matthew)	The Organism View Defended	Paper		Yes
Lowe (E.J.)	Review of Noonan's 'Personal Identity'	Paper
Markosian (Ned)	Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity	Paper
Olson (Eric)	Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem	Paper	2	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Psychology and Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Ord (Toby)	Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity	Paper
Qureshi-Hurst (Emily)	Many worlds, many selves	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules)	Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me?	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Androids	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain Transplants	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Cerebrum	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?)	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Clones	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Commissurotomy	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Counting Persons	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Dicephalus	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Endurantism	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Fetuses	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Fusion	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Lewis	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Narrative Identity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Occasional Identity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Parfit	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Perdurantism	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Pregnancy	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Quantum Mechanics	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Reduplication Objections	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Replication	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Ship of Theseus	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Soul Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Teletransportation	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Thinking Animal Argument	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Time	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Twinning	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Unity of the Person	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - What Matters	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Zygote	Paper		Yes
Wilson (Jack)	Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities	Paper		Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Anderson (Robert M.) & Gonsalves (Joseph F.)	Sensory Suppression and the Unity of Consciousness	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 99-100, 1981	No
Apter (Andrew)	The Problem Of Who: Multiple Personality, Personal Identity And The Double Brain	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Psychology, Jun91, Vol. 4 Issue 2, p219, 30p, 1 diagram;	4%
Baars (Bernard), Banks (William) & Newman (James)	Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Baars (Bernard), Banks (William) & Newman (James) - Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness	1%
Balashov (Yuri)	Time, Fission, Fusion: An Argument against the Block Universe with Endurance	Paper - By Subtopic	Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas (Brazil): Vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 109-143, Jan - Mar 2017	3%
Barilan (Y. Michael)	One or Two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins from Malta	Paper - By Subtopic	Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Feb. 2003, 28.1, pp. 27-44	No
Belzer (Marvin)	Parfit and Lewis on Survival of Fission and What Matters in Survival: Why Parfit won the Debate	Paper - By Subtopic	2002, Draft. Personal Website.	No
Boccardi (Emiliano), Ed.	Manuscrito vol. 40 no.1: The Passage of Time and its Enemies: An Introduction to Time and Reality - II	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Boccardi (Emiliano), Ed. - Manuscrito vol. 40 no.1: The Passage of Time and its Enemies: An Introduction to Time and Reality - II	6%
Bogen (James)	Further discussion on split-brains and hemispheric capabilities	Paper - By Subtopic	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 28, No. 3, Sep., 1977, pp. 281-286	No
Bogen (Joseph E.)	Mental Numerosity: Is One Head Better Than Two?	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 100-101, 1981	No
Bradshaw (John L.)	In Two Minds	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 101-102, 1981	No
Braude (Stephen)	Multiple Personality and the Structure of the Self	Paper - By Subtopic	Kolak & Martin - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues	No
Brown (Jason)	Structural Levels and Mental Unity	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 102-103, 1981	No
Brown (M.T.)	Multiple Personality and Personal Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Psychology, Volume 14, Number 4, 1 December 2001, pp. 435-447(13).	No
Brueckner (Anthony)	Branching in the psychological approach to personal identity	Paper - Cited	Analysis 65, October 2005, pp. 294-301(8)	11%
Burke (Michael)	Spatial Analogues of 'Annihilation and Re-creation'	Paper - By Subtopic	Analysis 45, 1985, 24-29	No
Carter (William)	Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission	Paper - Cited	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61.3 (September 1983)	Yes
Churchland (Patricia)	How Many Angels … ?	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 103-104, 1981	No
Cockburn (David), Ed.	Human Beings	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Cockburn (David), Ed. - Human Beings	7%
Damasio (Antonio), Ed.	The 'Scientific American' Book of the Brain: The Best Writing on Consciousness	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Damasio (Antonio), Ed. - The 'Scientific American' Book of the Brain: The Best Writing on Consciousness	2%
Davidson (Richard)	Cognitive Processing Is Not Equivalent To Conscious Processing	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 104-105, 1981	No
Demarest (Heather)	Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XCIII No. 3, November 2016	7%
Dennett (Daniel)	Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	43%
Dennett (Daniel)	Where Am I?	Paper - Cited	Dennett - Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Chapter 17, 1978	Yes
DiGiovanna (James)	Fission, Fusion, and the Real World	Paper - By Subtopic	Academia.edu	14%
Ellis (Brian)	Australasian Journal of Philosophy - 61.3 (September 1983)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	83%
Gallois (Andre)	Counting Amoebas	Paper - By Subtopic	Gallois - Occasions of Identity, 1998, Chapter 4	No
Gallois (Andre)	Occasions of Identity : a Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Gallois (Andre) - Occasions of Identity : a Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness	No
Garrett (Brian)	A Further Reply to Noonan	Paper - By Subtopic	Analysis 47, 1987, pp. 204-207	No
Garrett (Brian)	Fission	Paper - Cited	Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 4	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Johnston on Fission	Paper - By Subtopic	Sorites 15, December 2004: 87-93	17%
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Self-consciousness	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Gazzaniga (Michael S.)	The Split Brain Revisited	Paper - By Subtopic	Damasio - The "Scientific American" Book of the Brain: The Best Writing on Consciousness	No
Geschwind (Norman)	The Perverseness of the Right Hemisphere	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 106-107, 1981	No
Gillett (Grant)	Brain Bisection and Personal Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Mind, New Series, Vol. 95, No. 378 (Apr., 1986), pp. 224-229	17%
Glover (Jonathan)	I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Glover (Jonathan) - I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity	6%
Glover (Jonathan)	Split Brains	Paper - By Subtopic	Glover - I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity, Chapter 2	No
Green (Michael)	May We Forget Our Minds For a Moment?	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 107-108, 1981	No
Gustafsson (Johan E.)	Non-branching personal persistence	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Studies (2019) 176:2307–2329	5%
Hanley (Richard)	The Metaphysics of Star Trek	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Hanley (Richard) - The Metaphysics of Star Trek	52%
Hanley (Richard)	The Metaphysics of Star Trek: Personal Growth	Paper - By Subtopic	Hanley (Richard) - The Metaphysics of Star Trek, Chapter 5	20%
Hawley (Katherine)	Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts	Paper - Cited	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming, issue dated November 2005)	Yes
Hershenov (David) & Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.)	Fission and Confusion	Paper - By Subtopic	Christian Bioethics, 12:237–254, 2006	No
Johansson (Jens)	Parfit on fission	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Studies: August 2010, Vol. 150, No. 1, pp. 21-35	17%
Johnston (Mark)	Fission and the Facts	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989), pp. 369-397	21%
Joynt (Robert J.)	Are Two Heads Better Than One?	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 108-109, 1981	No
Kolak (Daniel) & Martin (Raymond), Eds.	Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Kolak (Daniel) & Martin (Raymond), Eds. - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues	No
LeDoux (Joseph E.) & Gazzaniga (Michael S.)	The Brain and the Split Brain: A Duel With Duality As a Model of Mind	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 109-111, 1981	No
Marks (Charles)	Mental Duality: An Unmade Case	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 111-112, 1981	No
Martin (Raymond)	Fission Rejuvenated	Paper - By Subtopic	Martin & Barresi - Personal Identity, Chapter 8	No
Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds.	Personal Identity	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. - Personal Identity	13%
Martin (Raymond), Barresi (John) & Giovannelli (Alessandro)	Fission Examples in 18th and Early 19th century Personal Identity Debate	Paper - By Subtopic	History of Philosophy Quarterly, 15, 1998, pp. 323-348	No
Matthews (Gareth B.)	Surviving As	Paper - By Subtopic	Analysis 38, 1977, pp. 53-58	No
Mills (Eugene)	Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Mind 102.405, Jan. 1993, pp. 37-51	No
Moyer (Mark)	A Survival Guide to Fission	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Studies, Vol. 141, No. 3 (Dec., 2008), pp. 299-322	5%
Munzer (Stephen R.)	Transplantation, Chemical Inheritance, and the Identity of Organs	Paper - By Subtopic	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 2, Jun., 1994, pp. 555-570	No
Nagel (Thomas)	Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness	Paper - Cited	Nagel (Thomas) - Mortal Questions, 1979	Yes
Nagel (Thomas)	Mortal Questions	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	The Reduplication Problem	Paper - Cited	Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 7	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Williams on 'The Self and the Future'	Paper - By Subtopic	Analysis, vol. 42, 1982, pp. 158-163	No
Oderberg (David)	Fission, Intermittence and the Primitiveness of Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Oderberg - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time, 1993, Chapter 7	No
Oderberg (David)	The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited	Paper - By Subtopic	Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2008): 263-76	8%
Oderberg (David)	The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time	3%
Oderberg (David)	The Origination of a Human Being - Rejoinder to Persson	Paper - By Subtopic	Unpublished: obtained from Oderberg's website	17%
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed.	Philosophy - 81/316 (April 2006)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	18%
Ord (Toby)	Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity	Paper - By Subtopic	Website	40%
Perry (John)	Can the Self Divide?	Paper - By Subtopic	Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 3	No
Perry (John)	Identity, Personal Identity and the Self	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Perry (John) - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self	3%
Perry (John)	Time, Fission, and Personal Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Argumenta, May 2019	11%
Prior (Arthur N.)	Opposite Number	Paper - By Subtopic	Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Dec., 1957), pp. 196-201	17%
Puccetti (Roland)	Mind with a Double Brain	Paper - By Subtopic	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, Dec., 1993, pp. 675-691	No
Puccetti (Roland)	Multiple Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 54.3, 1973, 203-215	No
Puccetti (Roland)	The Case For Mental Duality: Author's Responses + References	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 116-123, 1981	No
Puccetti (Roland)	The Case For Mental Duality: Evidence From Split-Brain Data and Other Considerations	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 93-99, 1981	No
Puccetti (Roland)	The Mute Self: A Reaction to Dewitt's Alternative Account of the Split-Brain Data	Paper - By Subtopic	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 27, No. 1, Mar., 1976, pp. 65-73	No
Puccetti (Roland)	Two Brains, Two Minds? Wigan's Theory of Mental Duality	Paper - By Subtopic	Kolak & Martin - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues	No
Pummer (Theron)	Does Division Multiply Desert?	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Review, Vol. 123, No. 1, 2014	3%
Roache (Rebecca)	A Defence of Quasi-Memory	Paper - Cited	Philosophy - 81/316 (April 2006), pp. 323-356	Yes
Robinson (Daniel)	What Sort of Persons Are Hemispheres? Another Look at 'Split-Brain' Man	Paper - By Subtopic	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 27, No. 1, Mar., 1976, pp. 73-78	17%
Robinson (Denis)	Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?	Paper - Cited	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63.3, Sept. 1985, 299-319	Yes
Robinson (Denis)	Neurometaphorology: The New Faculty Psychology	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 112-113, 1981	No
Roelofs (Luke)	Could a Person Persist as a Pair of Persons	Paper - By Subtopic	Academia.edu	5%
Rovane (Carol)	Branching Self-Consciousness	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Review 99.3, July 1990, pp. 355-395	No
Sattig (Thomas)	The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Nov. 2012), pp. 594-623	4%
Seibt (Johanna)	Fission, Sameness, and Survival: Parfit’s Branch Line Argument Revisited	Paper - By Subtopic	Metaphysica 1.2 (2000), pp. 95-134	No
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Brown-Brownson Revisited	Paper - By Subtopic	Monist, Oct2004, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p573-593, 21p;	No
Sperry (Roger W.)	Hemisphere Deconnection and the Unity in Conscious Awareness	Paper - By Subtopic	Baars, Banks & Newman - Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness	11%
Sperry (Roger W.)	Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres	Paper - By Subtopic	Science, New Series, Vol. 217, No. 4566 (Sep. 24, 1982), pp. 1223-1226	33%
Thornton (Mark)	Double Brain, Double Person?	Paper - By Subtopic	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 2, Jun., 1994, pp. 761-763	No
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Fission	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Unger (Peter)	Fission and the Focus of One's Life	Paper - Cited	Unger - Identity, Consciousness and Value, Chapter 8	Yes
Unger (Peter)	Fission and the Focus of One's Life (Excerpt)	Paper - By Subtopic	Martin & Barresi - Personal Identity, Chapter 6	Yes
Unger (Peter)	Identity, Consciousness and Value	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Valberg (J.J.)	Dream, Death, and the Self	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self	1%
Valberg (J.J.)	My Future: The Puzzle of Division	Paper - By Subtopic	Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 23	No
van Dyke (Christina)	Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-Repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection	Paper - By Subtopic	Religious Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec., 2007), pp. 373-394	No
Von Eckardt (Barbara)	Puccetti's Mental-Duality Thesis: A Case Of Bad Arguments	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 113-114, 1981	No
Wilkes (Kathleen)	Being in Two Minds	Paper - By Subtopic	Wilkes - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments, Chapter 5	Yes
Wilkes (Kathleen)	Fugues, Hypnosis, and Multiple Personality	Paper - By Subtopic	Wilkes - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments, Chapter 4	Yes
Wilkes (Kathleen)	How Many Selves Make Me?	Paper - By Subtopic	Cockburn - Human Beings	No
Wilkes (Kathleen)	Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Wilkes (Kathleen) - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments	Yes
Wilkes (Kathleen)	Unfused Homunculi	Paper - By Subtopic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4: 115-116, 1981	No
Wright (John)	Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophia (2006) 34: 129–142	67%
Zimmerman (Dean) & Gendler (Tamar Szabo), Eds.	Monist Special Issue: Personal Identity	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Zimmerman (Dean) & Gendler (Tamar Szabo), Eds. - Monist Special Issue: Personal Identity	2%

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