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Personal Identity

Duplication

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. Duplicate objects are – to use the definition in "Sider (Ted) - Naturalness, Intrinsicality, and Duplication" – “exactly similar, considered as they are in themselves”. That said, it misses off the question “which is the original?”. A “duplicate” is – by implication – a copy of the original. I don’t think there’s the same implication in the term “double”, though saying that person X is person Y’s “double” – while it doesn’t imply precedence of one over the other – doesn’t even imply exact similarlity² – just that one might be mistaken for the other (and maybe not even that, quite).
  2. There is considerable overlap between this topic and two other topics:-
     1. Replication³, which is really the same thing (though not restricted to a mere doubling), and
     2. Reduplication Objections⁴
        
  3. The motivation for this discussion – and those above – comes mainly from the above (Re-)duplication objections – where some putative change appears to preserve identity, but cannot for logical reasons⁵.
  4. In Teletransportation⁶, something distinguishes the forward going psychological continuity⁷ of the original and the initial backward-looking psychological discontinuity of the duplicate, but I don’t know what it is. Handwavingly, it’s the “wrong sort of causal chain⁸”, and it’s this causal-chain failure that defeats such Thought Experiments⁹.
  5. If I were to accept Lewis’s perdurantist¹⁰ thesis, the straightforward objection to the identification of the duplicate with the original is undermined – they simply share stages. However, there are still causal chain¹¹ problems to address, and those of physical continuity¹².
  6. While cloning¹³ falls under this head, there is no identity¹⁴ preservation, even under a perdurantist¹⁵ thesis, as there are no shared stages, just shared genetic material.
  7. Also, philosophical Zombies¹⁶ are supposed to be physical duplicates of their conscious¹⁷ analogues. But this is a TE that cannot really be conceived of.

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  Further Remarks:
  1. The lists below included some items that clearly belonged to the note on the Reduplication Objection¹⁸. With one exception I’ve transfered them over to that Note. Also, I started adding almost all the references, but then focussed on those with multiple mentions of duplication and cognates.

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Sider (Ted) - Naturalness, Intrinsicality, and Duplication", 1993, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 3%
• For a Page of Links¹⁹ to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read²⁰, include the following:-
  • Aeon:
    1. "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality", 2019, External Link, Note: Reduplication Objection.
  • General:
    1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics", 2008, Write-Up Note²¹, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time", 2000, Write-Up Note²², Internal PDF Link
    3. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'", 2001, Write-Up Note²³, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    4. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Garrett", 2001, Write-Up Note²⁴, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?", 1999, Write-Up Note²⁵, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Footnote₂₆
    6. "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases", 2007, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    7. "Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?", 1997, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel", 1987, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    9. "Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem", 2003, Annotations, Note: Reduplication Objection.
    10. "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death", 2010, Write-Up Note²⁷, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    11. "Olson (Eric) - Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave", 2015, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    12. "Perry (John) - A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality", 1978, Book, Note: Reduplication Objection.
    13. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality", 2009, Note: Reduplication Objection.
    14. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009, Note: Reduplication Objection.
    15. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Personal Identity", 1996
    16. "Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) - Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me?", 2015, External Link
    17. "Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited", 2010, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Berglund (Stefan) - Problems of Reductive Personalism", 1995
    2. "Bourgeois (Warren) - Contemporary Philosophers' Views on Persons: Nozick's Self-Makers", 2003, Read = 5%
    3. "Carter (William) - Personal Identity", 1990, Note: Reduplication Objection.
    4. "Johnston (Mark) - Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To?", 2010, Read = 78%
    5. "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Souls", 2007, Internal PDF Link, Read = 42%
    6. "Reid (Mark D.) - A Case in Which Two Persons Exist in One Animal", 2016, Read = 42%
    7. "Seager (William) - The 'Intrinsic Nature' Argument for Panpsychism", 2006, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
    8. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account", 1984, Read = 22%, Note: Reduplication Objection.
    9. "Sidelle (Alan) - Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases?", 2000, Internal PDF Link
    10. "Sider (Ted) - Intrinsic Properties", 1996, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 4%
    11. "Sider (Ted) - Naturalness, Intrinsicality, and Duplication", 1993, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 3%

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder²⁸.

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 26:

• See Draft Note, Review Comments.

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Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
20/09/2022 11:24:00	4989	Duplication
12/05/2022 21:27:22	4608	Duplication
11/02/2021 11:29:46	4317	Duplication
04/10/2020 23:09:36	3226	Duplication
23/09/2020 10:39:22	1807	Duplication
31/08/2017 19:35:02	1800	Duplication
18/12/2010 19:58:05	673	Duplication
26/11/2007 23:25:26	577	Duplication
12/08/2007 10:17:46	532	Duplication

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
06/07/2023 00:43:12	Duplication	Thought Experiments

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Baker - Personal Identity Over Time	Baker - Persons and Bodies - Precis	Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Garrett	Baker - The Human Animal: Big-Tent Metaphysics
Baker - What Am I?	Causality	Clones	Consciousness	Jen_080317 (Baker)
Logic of Identity	Note Links Explanation	Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Perdurantism	Physical Continuity
Plug Note Apologia	Psychological Continuity - Forward	Reduplication Objections	Replication	Similarity
Teletransportation	Thought Experiments	Works Read - Explanation	Zombies

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal	Animalism	Baillie - What Am I?	Baker - Personal Identity Over Time, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Baker - Persons and Bodies
Baker - Persons and Bodies - Precis, 2, 3, 4, 5	Baker - The Human Animal: Big-Tent Metaphysics, 2, 3	Baker - What Am I?, 2, 3, 4, 5	Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?, 2	Clones, 2
Commissurotomy, 2	Counting Persons	Crane - Against the Identity Theory : Anti-reductionism, 2	Crane - The Argument for Externalism, 2, 3, 4, 5	Crane - The Problem of Mental Causation for Non-reductive Physicalism, 2
Dicephalus	Fine - A Counter-Example to Locke's Thesis	Fission	Future Great Pain Test	Garrett - Persons and Bodies - Response, 2, 3
Jen_071112 (Thesis Chapter Breakdown)	Jen_080303 (Olson, Baillie)	Jen_080317 (Baker), 2, 3	Johnston - Human Beings	Kagan - Death, 2
Modality	Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	Olson - Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online	Olson - What Are We?	Olson - What Are We? The Question
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3	Psychological Continuity - Forward, 2, 3, 4	Replication	Research - Proposal	Searle - Minds, Brains, and Programs, 2
Teletransportation, 2, 3, 4, 5	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16	Thesis - Current Stance, 2, 3, 4	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Zimmerman - The Human Animal: Objections

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Atkinson (Thomas)	A Reply to Anders’ ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being: van Inwagen and the Dilemma of Material Survival of Death’	Paper
Baillie (James)	What Am I?	Paper		Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Big-Tent Metaphysics	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Personal Identity Over Time	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	What Am I?	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5	Yes
Berglund (Stefan)	Problems of Reductive Personalism	Paper
Bermudez (Jose Luis)	Review of Robert Kirk's 'Zombies and Consciousness'	Paper
Blackburn (Simon)	Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Paper	2
Blatti (Stephan)	Animalism and its Implications	Paper		Yes
Blatti (Stephan)	Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases	Paper		Yes
Bourgeois (Warren)	Contemporary Philosophers' Views on Persons: Nozick's Self-Makers	Paper
Brown (Jessica)	Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities	Paper
Carter (William)	Personal Identity	Paper
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence)	Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Cole (David)	Chinese Room Argument	Paper
Davies (Paul C.W.)	Are We Alone? Implications of the Discovery of Extraterrestrial Life	Book
Dennett (Daniel)	Where Am I?	Paper	2	Yes
Dennett (Daniel)	Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain	Paper
Desmond (Adrian)	The Ape's Reflexion	Paper
Eccles (John)	A dualist-interactionist perspective	Paper		Yes
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper		Yes
Fine (Kit)	A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis	Paper		Yes
Flew (Antony)	Merely Mortal?	Book
Foster (John)	The Immaterial Self: Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind	Book
Funkhouser (Eric)	Notes on Parfit, 'Personal Identity'	Paper		Yes
Gale (Richard)	On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments	Paper	2	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Criteria of Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Garrett (Brian)	The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Gasser (Georg)	Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Gasser (Georg), Ed.	Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?	Book	2
Graziano (Michael)	Endless fun	Paper		Yes
Grossman (Lev), Kurzweil (Ray)	2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal	Paper		Yes
Heal (Jane)	How to Think About Thinking	Paper
Hershenov (David)	Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'	Paper	2	Yes
Hershenov (David)	Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers	Paper
Hershenov (David)	The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection	Paper	2
Hershenov (David)	Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection	Paper
Hughes (Christopher)	An Incredible Coincidence?	Paper
Johnston (Mark)	Human Beings	Paper		Yes
Johnston (Mark)	Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To?	Paper	2, 3, 4
Kagan (Shelly)	Personal identity, Part III: Objections to the personality theory	Paper		Yes
Kagan (Shelly)	Personal identity, Part IV; What matters?	Paper		Yes
Krauss (Lawrence M.)	The Physics of Star Trek: Atoms or Bits?	Paper		Yes
Lewis (David)	Lucas Against Mechanism	Paper	2
Lewis (David)	New Work for a Theory of Universals	Paper
Libet (Benjamin)	Mental phenomena and behavior	Paper		Yes
Lockwood (Michael)	When Does a Life Begin?	Paper		Yes
Lowe (E.J.)	On the Identity of Artifacts	Paper
Marshall (Dan) & Weatherson (Brian)	Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties	Paper	2
McGill (V.J.)	Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson	Paper		Yes
McInerney (Peter K.)	Conceptions of Persons and Persons through Time	Paper
McLaughlin (Brian) & Bennett (Karen)	Supervenience	Paper
Olson (Eric)	Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem	Paper	2	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Psychology and Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We?	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? The Question	Paper		Yes
Papineau (David)	Introducing Consciousness	Paper	2	Yes
Penelhum (Terence)	Immortality: Introduction	Paper		Yes
Perry (John)	A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality	Book	2, 3	Yes
Perry (John)	Williams on The Self and the Future	Paper
Pinker (Steven)	So How Does the Mind Work?	Paper
Puccetti (Roland)	The Chess Room: Further Demythologising of Strong AI	Paper		Yes
Reid (Mark D.)	A Case in Which Two Persons Exist in One Animal	Paper	2
Rey (Georges)	Survival	Paper		Yes
Rosen (Gideon)	The Limits of Contingency	Paper
Schechtman (Marya)	The Problem of Logical Form	Paper
Seager (William)	The 'Intrinsic Nature' Argument for Panpsychism	Paper	2, 3
Searle (John)	‘I Married a Computer’: An Exchange (between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle)	Paper	2, 3, 4
Searle (John)	Minds, Brains, and Programs	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Searle (John)	Minds, Brains, and Programs: Author's Response to Peer Review	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Seibt (Johanna)	Fission, Sameness, and Survival: Parfit’s Branch Line Argument Revisited	Paper
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8	Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Personal Identity: a Materialist Account	Paper	2, 3
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Persons and Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Yes
Sidelle (Alan)	Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases?	Paper	2, 3
Sider (Ted)	Intrinsic Properties	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Sider (Ted)	Naturalness, Intrinsicality, and Duplication	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5
Simons (Geoff)	Are Computers Alive? Evolution and New Life Forms	Book
Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules)	Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me?	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Stich (Stephen) & Nichols (Shaun)	Second Thoughts on Simulation	Paper
Thomas (Janice L.)	What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Animalism	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Clones	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Commissurotomy	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Counting Persons	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Dicephalus	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Fission	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Future Great Pain Test	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Modality	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Replication	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Teletransportation	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5	Yes
Tye (Michael)	Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can?	Paper		Yes
Tye (Michael)	The Ten Problems	Paper		Yes
Tye (Michael)	What What It's Like Is Really Like	Paper		Yes
Unger (Peter)	A Physically Based Approach To Our Survival	Paper		Yes
Unger (Peter)	Precis of 'Identity, Consciousness and Value'	Paper	2	Yes
Unger (Peter)	The Appreciation Of Our Actual Values	Paper		Yes
Van Inwagen (Peter)	The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts	Paper
Zimmerman (Dean)	Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16	Yes
Zimmerman (Dean)	Problems for Animalism	Paper		Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Big-Tent Metaphysics	Paper - Cited	Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil)	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Personal Identity Over Time	Paper - Cited	Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 5, pp. 118-146	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'	Paper - Cited	Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View"	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Reply to Garrett	Paper - Cited	Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View"	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	What Am I?	Paper - Cited	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p151, 9p;	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc.	E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Berglund (Stefan)	Human and Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	1%
Berglund (Stefan)	Problems of Reductive Personalism	Paper - Cited	Berglund - Human and Personal Identity (PhD Dissertation, Lund University), Chapter 6, 1995, pp. 128-158	No
Blatti (Stephan)	Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 595–608	Yes
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence)	Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality	Paper - Cited	Aeon, 19 August, 2019	Yes
Dennett (Daniel)	Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	43%
Dennett (Daniel)	Where Am I?	Paper - Cited	Dennett - Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Chapter 17, 1978	Yes
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433	Yes
Gasser (Georg), Ed.	Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	95%
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul)	Aeon: C-F	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	51%
Noonan (Harold)	Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	The Reduplication Problem	Paper - Cited	Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 7	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Paper - Cited	Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? The Question	Paper - Referencing	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Olson (Eric), Etc.	Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Perry (John)	A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality	Book - Cited	Perry (John) - A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality	Yes
Rigterink (Roger J.)	Puccetti and Brain Bisection: An Attempt at Mental Division	Paper - By Subtopic	Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10:429-452 (1980)	No
Sidelle (Alan)	Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases?	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, No. 2, Sep., 2000, pp. 415-430	No
Sider (Ted)	Naturalness, Intrinsicality, and Duplication	Paper - Cited	Ted Sider's Website: Sider's unpublished PhD Dissertation.	3%
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Duplication	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Reduplication Objections	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes

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Text Colour Conventions

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2023

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