Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
Atkinson (Thomas) |
A Reply to Anders’ ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being: van Inwagen and the Dilemma of Material Survival of Death’ |
Paper  |
|
|
Baillie (James) |
What Am I? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Big-Tent Metaphysics |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Personal Identity Over Time |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
What Am I? |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
Yes |
Berglund (Stefan) |
Problems of Reductive Personalism |
Paper  |
|
|
Bermudez (Jose Luis) |
Review of Robert Kirk's 'Zombies and Consciousness' |
Paper  |
|
|
Blackburn (Simon) |
Has Kant Refuted Parfit? |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Blatti (Stephan) |
Animalism and its Implications |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Blatti (Stephan) |
Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Bourgeois (Warren) |
Contemporary Philosophers' Views on Persons: Nozick's Self-Makers |
Paper  |
|
|
Brown (Jessica) |
Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities |
Paper  |
|
|
Carter (William) |
Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) |
Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Cole (David) |
Chinese Room Argument |
Paper  |
|
|
Davies (Paul C.W.) |
Are We Alone? Implications of the Discovery of Extraterrestrial Life |
Book  |
|
|
Dennett (Daniel) |
Where Am I? |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Dennett (Daniel) |
Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain |
Paper  |
|
|
Desmond (Adrian) |
The Ape's Reflexion |
Paper  |
|
|
Eccles (John) |
A dualist-interactionist perspective |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Ehring (Douglas) |
Personal Identity and Time Travel |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Fine (Kit) |
A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Flew (Antony) |
Merely Mortal? |
Book  |
|
|
Foster (John) |
The Immaterial Self: Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind |
Book  |
|
|
Funkhouser (Eric) |
Notes on Parfit, 'Personal Identity' |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Gale (Richard) |
On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Garrett (Brian) |
Criteria of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Garrett (Brian) |
The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies' |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Gasser (Georg) |
Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Gasser (Georg), Ed. |
Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? |
Book  |
2 |
|
Graziano (Michael) |
Endless fun |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Grossman (Lev), Kurzweil (Ray) |
2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Heal (Jane) |
How to Think About Thinking |
Paper  |
|
|
Hershenov (David) |
Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Hershenov (David) |
Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers |
Paper  |
|
|
Hershenov (David) |
The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Hershenov (David) |
Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection |
Paper  |
|
|
Hughes (Christopher) |
An Incredible Coincidence? |
Paper  |
|
|
Johnston (Mark) |
Human Beings |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Johnston (Mark) |
Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To? |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
|
Kagan (Shelly) |
Personal identity, Part III: Objections to the personality theory |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Kagan (Shelly) |
Personal identity, Part IV; What matters? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Krauss (Lawrence M.) |
The Physics of Star Trek: Atoms or Bits? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Lewis (David) |
Lucas Against Mechanism |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Lewis (David) |
New Work for a Theory of Universals |
Paper  |
|
|
Libet (Benjamin) |
Mental phenomena and behavior |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Lowe (E.J.) |
On the Identity of Artifacts |
Paper  |
|
|
Marshall (Dan) & Weatherson (Brian) |
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties |
Paper  |
2 |
|
McGill (V.J.) |
Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
McInerney (Peter K.) |
Conceptions of Persons and Persons through Time |
Paper  |
|
|
McLaughlin (Brian) & Bennett (Karen) |
Supervenience |
Paper  |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Immanent Causation and Life After Death |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Psychology and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Papineau (David) |
Introducing Consciousness |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Penelhum (Terence) |
Immortality: Introduction |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Perry (John) |
A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality |
Book  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Perry (John) |
Williams on The Self and the Future |
Paper  |
|
|
Pinker (Steven) |
So How Does the Mind Work? |
Paper  |
|
|
Puccetti (Roland) |
The Chess Room: Further Demythologising of Strong AI |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Reid (Mark D.) |
A Case in Which Two Persons Exist in One Animal |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Rey (Georges) |
Survival |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Rosen (Gideon) |
The Limits of Contingency |
Paper  |
|
|
Schechtman (Marya) |
The Problem of Logical Form |
Paper  |
|
|
Seager (William) |
The 'Intrinsic Nature' Argument for Panpsychism |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
|
Searle (John) |
‘I Married a Computer’: An Exchange (between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
|
Searle (John) |
Minds, Brains, and Programs |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Searle (John) |
Minds, Brains, and Programs: Author's Response to Peer Review |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Seibt (Johanna) |
Fission, Sameness, and Survival: Parfit’s Branch Line Argument Revisited |
Paper  |
|
|
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Immortality |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 |
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Yes |
Shoemaker (Sydney) |
Personal Identity: a Materialist Account |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
|
Shoemaker (Sydney) |
Persons and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Yes |
Sidelle (Alan) |
Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases? |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
|
Sider (Ted) |
Intrinsic Properties |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
|
Sider (Ted) |
Naturalness, Intrinsicality, and Duplication |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
|
Simons (Geoff) |
Are Computers Alive? Evolution and New Life Forms |
Book  |
|
|
Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) |
Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me? |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Stich (Stephen) & Nichols (Shaun) |
Second Thoughts on Simulation |
Paper  |
|
|
Thomas (Janice L.) |
What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Animalism |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Clones |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Commissurotomy |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Counting Persons |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Dicephalus |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Fission |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Future Great Pain Test |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Modality |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Replication |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Teletransportation |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
Yes |
Tye (Michael) |
Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Tye (Michael) |
The Ten Problems |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Tye (Michael) |
What What It's Like Is Really Like |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Unger (Peter) |
A Physically Based Approach To Our Survival |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Unger (Peter) |
Precis of 'Identity, Consciousness and Value' |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Unger (Peter) |
The Appreciation Of Our Actual Values |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts |
Paper  |
|
|
Zimmerman (Dean) |
Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 |
Yes |
Zimmerman (Dean) |
Problems for Animalism |
Paper  |
|
Yes |