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Personal Identity

Psychological Continuity - Forward

(Text as at 28/09/2022 10:24:58)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. I think there’s a conceptual difference between:-
     1. Forward psychological continuity, and
     2. Backward psychological continuity.
  2. Imagine the case where₂, I’m put into a duplicating machine₃, but something goes wrong and my body is destroyed by the duplication⁴ process, though my duplicate wakes up perfectly happily. Then, it seems to me, I⁵ would never wake up, and would have no experience beyond entry to the duplicating machine. I would have no forward psychological continuity.
  3. However, my duplicate⁶ does have backward psychological continuity. Any duplicate of me, looking backward, would consider himself to be “me”, having my memories⁷, abilities, plans and so forth, and a body looking just like mine. But, would I⁸ ever wake up as the duplicate? My intuition on the endurantist account, as I have said, is that I would not, though I suspect that on the perdurantist⁹ account, this might be seen as a case of intended fission¹⁰ in which I was intended to wake up twice, provided we consider that the right sort of causality¹¹ is in place.
  4. The above considerations raise issues similar to those in closest continuer¹² accounts of personal identity, and the Only 'X' and 'Y' Principle¹³. How can what happens to someone else affect whether (so to speak) I am me? How could the “right sort of causality” have anything to do with how I experience things?
  5. Fission is, in any case, hard to imagine happening to oneself. Just what does it mean to “wake up twice”? I dare say one could get one’s head(s) around it. The two selves would then be distinct individuals, with distinct consciousnesses, but with a shared past. On the perdurantist account, we were always distinct, but co-located with everything in common.
  6. Let’s consider forward psychological continuity in everyday life. What ensures forward continuity of consciousness¹⁴ in the normal case of sleep and temporary unconsciousness? I cannot know “from the inside” that when I awake I’m the same human being¹⁵ as the one that went to sleep in my bed. The reason I believe this is for external reasons: duplication¹⁶ is not physically possible (or at least practical), and in any case I have no reason to believe it happened to me last night. Other people assure me that there was nothing out of the ordinary going on.
  7. Andy Clark₁₇, raises this question about what ensures psychological continuity – more or less than in the case of Teletransportation – in the case of dreamless sleep, or (hypothetically) being frozen and then thawed out. We might ask what it is in the normal waking case. Maybe the whole thing is related to the arrow of time¹⁸ or in the distinctions between forward-looking psychological properties – desires and intentions yet to be satisfied or acted upon – and memories of what has already taken place.
  8. This is the sort of question that the Logical Positivists would denounce as meaningless, as no empirical evidence can decide it.
• This seems a very important issue to me, and I need to make more of it. For example, in the teletransportation¹⁹ thought experiment²⁰, it seems to me₂₁ that a new person wakes up, but I don’t, nor do I experience anything, though the new person claims to be me. Incidentally, it’s not just a new person²², but a new human being²³ who wakes up.
• Producing a reading list on this topic is difficult as the distinction – to my knowledge – isn’t usually made. There’s a huge overlap with the general literature of psychological continuity and connectedness and that on Teletransportation. For these, see:-
  → Psychological Continuity²⁴,
  → Teletransportation²⁵.
• The above caveats aside, works on this topic that I’ve actually read²⁶, include the following:-
  • Aeon:
    1. "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality", 2019, External Link
  • General:
    1. "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?", 2014, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue", 2014
    3. "Dennett (Daniel) - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction", 1981, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    4. "Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel", 1987, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", 1987, Annotations
    6. "Noonan (Harold) - Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience", 1999, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    7. "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death", 2010, Write-Up Note²⁷, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality", 2009
    9. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009
    10. "Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) - Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me?", 2015, External Link
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?", 1997, Write-Up Note²⁸, Read = 156%
    2. "Dainton (Barry) - Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence", 2005, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 10%
    3. "Dainton (Barry) - The Phenomenal Self", 2008, Book, Read = 1%
    4. "Sider (Ted) - Asymmetric Personal Identity", 2018, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
    5. "Torek (Paul Volkening) - Something To Look Forward To: Personal Identity, Prudence, and Ethics", 1995, Internal PDF Link, Read = 1%
    6. "Whiting (Jennifer E.) - Friends and Future Selves", 1986, Internal PDF Link

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in my Thesis, see the following lists of Works Read / Further items:-
  1. Read:-
  2. Further Reading:-
     
• This is mostly a place-holder²⁹.

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 2:

1. On an endurantist account of persistence – see elsewhere for the distinction and it’s relevance to this case – between endurantism and perdurantism.

Footnote 3:

1. I don’t think this is a tendentious term.
2. The intended use of the machine is to produce an exact copy without destroying the original.
3. So, this isn’t the same as Dennett’s “Telecloning” machine in "Dennett (Daniel) - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction", where the destruction of the original is intended, yet (despite the label) the machine is used as a means of transport.

Footnote 17: In "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality".

Footnote 21:

• I want to make this more than just an Intuition, one that many – but by no means all – philosophers share.
• See "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?".

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Table of the Previous 8 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
11/04/2022 00:01:26	5706	Psychological Continuity - Forward
17/02/2021 01:17:46	5544	Psychological Continuity - Forward
15/06/2020 18:28:48	4967	Psychological Continuity - Forward
14/07/2019 18:05:46	2327	Psychological Continuity - Forward
05/02/2018 20:02:24	3627	Psychological Continuity - Forward
18/12/2010 19:58:05	1982	Psychological Continuity - Forward
26/11/2007 23:25:26	1986	Psychological Continuity - Forward
12/08/2007 10:17:46	951	Psychological Continuity - Forward

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
28/09/2022 10:24:58	Psychological Continuity - Forward	Psychological Continuity

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Causality	Closest Continuer	Consciousness
Duplication	Endurantism	Fission	Human Beings	I
Intuition	Memory	Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Only 'X' and 'Y' Principle	Perdurantism
Persistence	Person	Plug Note Apologia	Psychological Continuity	Teletransportation
Thought Experiments	Time	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Continuity	Duplication	Metaphysics	Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death
Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3	Psychological Continuity	Psychological Criterion	Psychology
Research - Proposal	Status: Personal Identity (2022 - September), 2	Status: Priority Task List (2022 - November)	Status: Summary (2022 - September)	Teletransportation, 2
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3, 4, 5	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3	Thesis - Current Stance
Unity of the Person	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Blackburn (Simon)	Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Paper
Dainton (Barry)	Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue	Paper		Yes
Dainton (Barry)	The Phenomenal Self: Appendix - Reductionism	Paper
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper		Yes
Lockwood (Michael)	When Does a Life Begin?	Paper		Yes
McInerney (Peter K.)	Person-Stages and Unity of Consciousness	Paper
Olson (Eric)	Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern	Paper		Yes
Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules)	Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me?	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Continuity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Duplication	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Metaphysics	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychology	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Teletransportation	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Unity of the Person	Paper		Yes
Van Inwagen (Peter)	Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity	Paper		Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Blackburn (Simon)	Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Paper - Cited	Dancy - Reading Parfit, 1997, Chapter 9	78%
Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David)	The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies: Vol. 170, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 465-500	Yes
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence)	Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality	Paper - Cited	Aeon, 19 August, 2019	Yes
Dainton (Barry)	Self: Philosophy In Transit	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	7%
Dainton (Barry)	Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue	Paper - Cited	Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit, Prologue	Yes
Dainton (Barry)	The Phenomenal Self	Book - Cited	Dainton (Barry) - The Phenomenal Self	1%
Dancy (Jonathan), Ed.	Reading Parfit	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	17%
Dennett (Daniel)	The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction	Paper - Cited	Hofstadter & Dennett - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul	Yes
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433	Yes
Gasser (Georg), Ed.	Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	95%
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul)	Aeon: C-F	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	51%
Hofstadter (Douglas) & Dennett (Daniel), Eds.	The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	14%
Lockwood (Michael)	When Does a Life Begin?	Paper - Cited	Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987	Yes
Lockwood (Michael), Ed.	Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	29%
Noonan (Harold)	Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience	Paper - Cited	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 271-288, 1999	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Paper - Cited	Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010	Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper - Cited	Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 1	Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern	Paper - Cited	Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 2	Yes
Sider (Ted)	Asymmetric Personal Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2018) pp. 127-146	6%
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Torek (Paul Volkening)	Something To Look Forward To: Personal Identity, Prudence, and Ethics	Paper - By Subtopic	PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan (1995)	1%

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Text Colour Conventions

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2022

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