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Personal Identity

Psychological Continuity - Forward

(Work In Progress: output at 01/06/2024 05:16:35)

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Plug Note1


Essay
  1. Introduction
    • See the above Thesis Text, which I need to incorporate in due course.
    • This seems a very important issue to me, and I need to make more of it. For example, in the teletransportation22 thought experiment23, it seems to me24 that a new person wakes up, but I don’t, nor do I experience anything, though the new person claims to be me. Incidentally, it’s not just a new person25, but a new human being26 who wakes up.
    • I think there are connections here with the topic of Intermittent Existence27. There is backward psychological continuity after putative intermittent existence, but no forward psychological continuity.
    • Maybe this is also connected with what – in the case of Organisms28 – makes up a Life29.
    • Finally, as well as TEs such as Teleportation30, there is also the matter of Resurrection31.
  2. Further Thoughts
    • I will try another thought experiment32 I’ve been considering. It’s often said in the literature that if Teletransportation33 became commonplace as a means of travel, and was conventionally34 deemed to be such, rather than as a means of death35, then life would carry on just fine. Indeed, no-one could notice and difference, either from the inside or outside.
    • Let’s try a variant: imagine (as maybe many US citizens do) that each night when you’re tucked up in bed technologically-advanced aliens spirit you away and perform horrible experiments on you, in the process scanning your whole body so they can replace your mangled corpse with a perfect duplicate of the original that had been sleeping happily, and return this simulacrum to your bed. Naturally, your partner and anyone else would be unaware of any of this. Also, the person who wakes up – just like the teletransportee – would have no reason to think anything amiss. He would consider himself the same person as went to sleep36 the night before. Life would carry on ‘happily’. Yet in this – admittedly phantastical situation – our sleeper only lives for under 24 hours before coming to a grizzly end and being replaced by someone else. His experience ends on the operating table aboard the starship. If the reality became known, no-one would dare go to sleep. Maybe teletransportation is less grizzly, but it leads to the same death and recreation.
    • Maybe one could cavil at the details of the experiment: maybe it’s just not possible to extract the information from a human body sufficient to create a duplicate37 without destroying the original, so all the medical experimentation isn’t possible without a mangled body being returned, which would certainly be noticed. So, we might need to modify the TE so that your body is scanned – without anaesthetic, of course, to ensure this isn’t an experience you’d be comfortable with – and two copies are created – one for experimentation and the other for returning to bed. Then, one copy-you lives on happily for a day, and the other meets the grizzly end.
    • Now, what could make the waker the very same consciousness38 as the sleeper in this scenario? Usually, it is said that there needs to be the ‘right sort’ of causal connection39, in particular one internal to the continuant. In this case, there is a causal connection, but it is imposed externally by aliens and their (maybe tendentiously named) duplicating machine. Are objections based on causality of the wrong sort anything more than intuitions that others might not share? I leave this open at the moment.
    • On the Constitution View40, we are individuated by our First Person Perspective41. As far as I can see, all these duplicates are qualitatively identical42 (that is, exactly similar43), and so are their FPPs.

References



In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 2:
  1. On an endurantist account of persistence – see elsewhere for the distinction and its relevance to this case – between endurantism and perdurantism.
Footnote 3:
  1. I don’t think this is a tendentious term.
  2. The intended use of the machine is to produce an exact copy without destroying the original.
  3. So, this isn’t the same as Dennett’s “Telecloning” machine in "Dennett (Daniel) - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction", where the destruction of the original is intended, yet (despite the label) the machine is used as a means of transport.
Footnote 18: In "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality".

Footnote 24:


Table of the Previous 10 Versions of this Note:

Date Length Title
06/07/2023 00:43:12 9225 Psychological Continuity - Forward
28/09/2022 10:24:58 6151 Psychological Continuity - Forward
11/04/2022 00:01:26 5706 Psychological Continuity - Forward
17/02/2021 01:17:46 5544 Psychological Continuity - Forward
15/06/2020 18:28:48 4967 Psychological Continuity - Forward
14/07/2019 18:05:46 2327 Psychological Continuity - Forward
05/02/2018 20:02:24 3627 Psychological Continuity - Forward
18/12/2010 19:58:05 1982 Psychological Continuity - Forward
26/11/2007 23:25:26 1986 Psychological Continuity - Forward
12/08/2007 10:17:46 951 Psychological Continuity - Forward



Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
01/06/2024 05:16:36 Psychological Continuity - Forward Psychological Continuity


Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Causality Closest Continuer Consciousness
Constitution View Convention Death Duplication Endurantism
First-Person Perspective Fission Human Beings I Intermittent Objects
Intuition Life Logic of Identity Memory Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death
Only 'X' and 'Y' Principle Organisms Perdurantism Persistence Person
Plug Note Apologia Psychological Continuity Resurrection Similarity Sleep
Teletransportation Thought Experiments Time Works Read - Explanation  

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Continuity Duplication Metaphysics Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death
Olson - What Are We? Animals Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1 PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 Psychological Continuity Psychological Criterion
Psychology Research - Proposal Status: Personal Identity (2024 - March), 2 Status: Priority Task List (2024 - May) Status: Summary (2024 - March)
Teletransportation, 2 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3, 4, 5 Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3
Thesis - Current Stance Unity of the Person Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6    

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Blackburn (Simon) Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Paper Medium Quality Abstract    
Dainton (Barry) Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Dainton (Barry) The Phenomenal Self: Appendix - Reductionism Paper Medium Quality Abstract    
Ehring (Douglas) Personal Identity and Time Travel Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Lockwood (Michael) When Does a Life Begin? Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
McInerney (Peter K.) Person-Stages and Unity of Consciousness Paper Medium Quality Abstract    
Olson (Eric) Immanent Causation and Life After Death Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Olson (Eric) Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Olson (Eric) What Are We? Animals Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Shoemaker (David) Personal Identity and Immortality Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Shoemaker (David) Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me? Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2, 3, 4, 5 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2, 3 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Continuity Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Current Position Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Duplication Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Metaphysics Paper Low Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Psychological Continuity Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Psychological Criterion Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Psychology Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Teletransportation Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Unity of the Person Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Van Inwagen (Peter) Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
YouTube Video - The Trouble with Transporters Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes



References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Blackburn (Simon) Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dancy - Reading Parfit, 1997, Chapter 9 78%
Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies: Vol. 170, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 465-500 Yes
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Aeon, 19 August, 2019 Yes
Clark (Tom) A Notable Theoretical Convergence Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Naturalism.org. Yes
Clark (Tom) Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity Paper - By Subtopic Naturalism.org. Yes
Dainton (Barry) Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83/4: 549-71, 2005 10%
Dainton (Barry) Self: Philosophy In Transit Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 7%
Dainton (Barry) Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit, Prologue Yes
Dainton (Barry) The Phenomenal Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dainton (Barry) - The Phenomenal Self 1%
Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. Reading Parfit Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 17%
Dennett (Daniel) The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Hofstadter & Dennett - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul Yes
Ehring (Douglas) Personal Identity and Time Travel Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433 Yes
Epstein (Dmitry) What if We’re Still Here? A Selfish Reason to Care for Future Generations Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Medium, 29 March 2020 Yes
Gasser (Georg), Ed. Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 96%
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) Aeon: C-F Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 51%
Hofstadter (Douglas) & Dennett (Daniel), Eds. The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 14%
Lockwood (Michael) When Does a Life Begin? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 Yes
Lockwood (Michael), Ed. Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 29%
Noonan (Harold) Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 271-288, 1999 Yes
Olson (Eric) Immanent Causation and Life After Death Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010 Yes
Robert (David) The Existential Passage Hypothesis Paper - By Subtopic PhilArchive, July 14, 2018 (Updated Dec. 20, 2020) Yes
Shoemaker (David) Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Shoemaker (David) Personal Identity and Immortality Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 1 Yes
Shoemaker (David) Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 2 Yes
Sider (Ted) Asymmetric Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2018) pp. 127-146 6%
Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract BBC Website, April 2015 Yes
Stewart (Wayne) Metaphysics by Default Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Personal Website; pdf created 19 April 2011 12%
Stewart (Wayne) Metaphysics by Default - Chapter 17:  Application to Other Species Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Personal Website; pdf created 19 April 2011 38%
Stewart (Wayne) Metaphysics by Default - Chapter 20:  Proof and Speculation Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Personal Website; pdf created 19 April 2011 30%
Stewart (Wayne) Metaphysics by Default - Chapter 9:  Existential Passage Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Personal Website; pdf created 19 April 2011 Yes
Stewart (Wayne) Uzgalis: Accidentally Opening a Transmigration Window by Nixing the Proper Continuer Paper - By Subtopic Low Quality Abstract Reddit, 2019 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward Paper - By Subtopic Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Torek (Paul Volkening) Something To Look Forward To: Personal Identity, Prudence, and Ethics Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan (1995) 1%
Uzgalis (William) Review - Dainton - The Phenomenal Self Paper - By Subtopic Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews; 2008.12.08 Yes
Whiting (Jennifer E.) Friends and Future Selves Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Review 95.4 (Oct. 1986), 547 - 580 No



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