Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Psychological Continuity - Forward
(Text as at 14/07/2019 18:05:46)
(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)
Plug Note1- I think there’s a conceptual difference between:-
- Forward psychological continuity, and
- Backward psychological continuity.
- Imagine the case where (on an endurantist2 account of persistence3), I’m put into a duplicating machine, but something goes wrong and my body is destroyed by the duplication process, though my duplicate wakes up perfectly happily. Then, it seems to me, I would never wake up, and would have no experience beyond entry to the duplicating machine. I have no forward psychological continuity. But my duplicate4 does have backward psychological continuity.
- Any duplicate of me, looking backward, would consider himself to be “me”, having my memories5, abilities, plans and so forth, and a body looking just like mine. But, would I ever wake up as the duplicate? My intuition on the endurantist account, as I have said, is that I would not, though I suspect that on the perdurantist6 account, this might be seen as a case of fission7 in which I might wake up twice, provided we consider that the right sort of causality8 is in place.
- But, what gives forward continuity of consciousness9 in the normal case of sleep and temporary unconsciousness? I cannot know “from the inside” that when I awake I’m the same human being as went to sleep in my bed. The reason I believe this is for external reasons: duplication is not physically possible (or at least practical), and in any case I have no reason to believe it happened to me last night.
- This seems a very important issue to me, and I need to make more of it. For example, in teletransportation10 thought experiment11, it seems to me that a new person wakes up, but I don’t, nor do I experience anything, though the new person claims to be me. Incidentally, it’s not just a new person12, but a new human being13.
- This is the sort of question that the Logical Positivists would denounce as meaningless, as no empirical evidence can decide it.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read14, include the following:-
- TBA.
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- TBA.
- This is mostly a place-holder15. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list.
Printable Versions:
Table of the Previous 4 Versions of this Note:
Summary of Note Links from this Page
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Note Links to this Page
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Blackburn (Simon) |
Has Kant Refuted Parfit? |
Paper  |
|
|
| Dainton (Barry) |
Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Ehring (Douglas) |
Personal Identity and Time Travel |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Immanent Causation and Life After Death |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Immortality |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) |
What Does It Mean to Be Me? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Continuity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Criterion |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Teletransportation |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Unity of the Person |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward |
Paper - By Subtopic |
|
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Black: Printable Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019