Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Psychological Continuity - Forward
(Work In Progress: output at 15/01/2024)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- I think there’s a conceptual difference between:-
- Forward psychological continuity, and
- Backward psychological continuity.
- Imagine the case where2 I’m put into a duplicating machine3 that is intended to take a backup copy of me while preserving the original but where something goes wrong and my body is destroyed by the duplication4 process, though my duplicate wakes up perfectly happily. Then, it seems to me, I5 would never wake up and would have no future experience after entry to the duplicating machine. I would have no forward psychological continuity.
- However, my duplicate6 would have backward psychological continuity. Any duplicate of me, looking backward, would consider himself to be “me”, having my memories7, abilities, plans and so forth, and a body looking just like mine. But would I8 ever wake up as the duplicate? My intuition on the endurantist9 account, as I have said, is that I would not, though I suspect that on the perdurantist10 account, this might be seen as a case of intended fission11 in which I was intended to wake up twice, provided we consider that the right sort of causality12 is in place.
- The above considerations raise issues similar to those in closest continuer13 accounts of personal identity, and the Only 'X' and 'Y' Principle14. How can what happens to someone else affect whether (so to speak) I am me? How could the “right sort of causality” have anything to do with how I experience things?
- Fission is, in any case, hard to imagine happening to oneself. Just what does it mean to “wake up twice”? I dare say one could get one’s head(s) around it. The two selves would then be distinct individuals, with distinct consciousnesses, but with a shared past. On the perdurantist account, we were always distinct, but had stages co-located with everything in common.
- Let’s consider forward psychological continuity in everyday life. What ensures forward continuity of consciousness15 in the normal case of sleep and temporary unconsciousness? I cannot know “from the inside” that when I awake I’m the same human being16 as the one that went to sleep in my bed. The reason I believe this is for external reasons: duplication17 is not physically possible (or at least practical), and in any case I have no reason to believe it happened to me last night. Other people assure me that there was nothing out of the ordinary going on.
- Andy Clark18, raises this question about what ensures psychological continuity – more or less than in the case of Teletransportation – in the case of dreamless sleep, or (hypothetically) being frozen and then thawed out. We might ask what it is in the normal waking case. Maybe the whole thing is related to the arrow of time19 or in the distinctions between forward-looking psychological properties – desires and intentions yet to be satisfied or acted upon – and memories of what has already taken place.
- This is the sort of question that the Logical Positivists would denounce as meaningless, as no empirical evidence can decide it.
Further Remarks:
- Producing a reading list on this topic is difficult as the distinction – to my knowledge – isn’t usually made. There’s a huge overlap with the general literature of psychological continuity and connectedness and that on Teletransportation. For these, see:-
→ Psychological Continuity20,
→ Teletransportation21.
Essay
- Introduction
- See the above Thesis Text, which I need to incorporate in due course.
- This seems a very important issue to me, and I need to make more of it. For example, in the teletransportation22 thought experiment23, it seems to me24 that a new person wakes up, but I don’t, nor do I experience anything, though the new person claims to be me. Incidentally, it’s not just a new person25, but a new human being26 who wakes up.
- I think there are connections here with the topic of Intermittent Existence27. There is backward psychological continuity after putative intermittent existence, but no forward psychological continuity.
- Maybe this is also connected with what – in the case of Organisms28 – makes up a Life29.
- Finally, as well as TEs such as Teleportation30, there is also the matter of Resurrection31.
- Further Thoughts
- I will try another thought experiment32 I’ve been considering. It’s often said in the literature that if Teletransportation33 became commonplace as a means of travel, and was conventionally34 deemed to be such, rather than as a means of death35, then life would carry on just fine. Indeed, no-one could notice and difference, either from the inside or outside.
- Let’s try a variant: imagine (as maybe many US citizens do) that each night when you’re tucked up in bed technologically-advanced aliens spirit you away and perform horrible experiments on you, in the process scanning your whole body so they can replace your mangled corpse with a perfect duplicate of the original that had been sleeping happily, and return this simulacrum to your bed. Naturally, your partner and anyone else would be unaware of any of this. Also, the person who wakes up – just like the teletransportee – would have no reason to think anything amiss. He would consider himself the same person as went to sleep36 the night before. Life would carry on ‘happily’. Yet in this – admittedly phantastical situation – our sleeper only lives for under 24 hours before coming to a grizzly end and being replaced by someone else. His experience ends on the operating table aboard the starship. If the reality became known, no-one would dare go to sleep. Maybe teletransportation is less grizzly, but it leads to the same death and recreation.
- Maybe one could cavil at the details of the experiment: maybe it’s just not possible to extract the information from a human body sufficient to create a duplicate37 without destroying the original, so all the medical experimentation isn’t possible without a mangled body being returned, which would certainly be noticed. So, we might need to modify the TE so that your body is scanned – without anaesthetic, of course, to ensure this isn’t an experience you’d be comfortable with – and two copies are created – one for experimentation and the other for returning to bed. Then, one copy-you lives on happily for a day, and the other meets the grizzly end.
- Now, what could make the waker the very same consciousness38 as the sleeper in this scenario? Usually, it is said that there needs to be the ‘right sort’ of causal connection39, in particular one internal to the continuant. In this case, there is a causal connection, but it is imposed externally by aliens and their (maybe tendentiously named) duplicating machine. Are objections based on causality of the wrong sort anything more than intuitions that others might not share? I leave this open at the moment.
- On the Constitution View40, we are individuated by our First Person Perspective41. As far as I can see, all these duplicates are qualitatively identical42 (that is, exactly similar43), and so are their FPPs.
References
- Relevant Works cited above: No items to list.
- The above caveats aside, works on this topic that I’ve actually read44, include the following:-
- Aeon:
- "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality", 2019, External Link
- General:
- "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?", 2014, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue", 2014
- "Dennett (Daniel) - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction", 1981, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel", 1987, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", 1987, Annotations
- "Noonan (Harold) - Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience", 1999, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death", 2010, Write-Up Note45, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality", 2009
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009
- "Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) - Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me?", 2015, External Link
- A further reading list might start with:-
- General:
- "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?", 1997, Write-Up Note46, Read = 156%
- "Dainton (Barry) - Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence", 2005, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 10%
- "Dainton (Barry) - The Phenomenal Self", 2008, Book, Read = 1%
- "Sider (Ted) - Asymmetric Personal Identity", 2018, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
- "Torek (Paul Volkening) - Something To Look Forward To: Personal Identity, Prudence, and Ethics", 1995, Internal PDF Link, Read = 1%
- "Whiting (Jennifer E.) - Friends and Future Selves", 1986, Internal PDF Link
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder47.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 2:
- On an endurantist account of persistence – see elsewhere for the distinction and its relevance to this case – between endurantism and perdurantism.
Footnote 3:
- I don’t think this is a tendentious term.
- The intended use of the machine is to produce an exact copy without destroying the original.
- So, this isn’t the same as Dennett’s “Telecloning” machine in "Dennett (Daniel) - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction", where the destruction of the original is intended, yet (despite the label) the machine is used as a means of transport.
Footnote 18: In "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality".
Footnote 24:
Table of the Previous 10 Versions of this Note:
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit? |
Continuity |
Duplication |
Metaphysics |
Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death |
Olson - What Are We? Animals |
Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1 |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 |
Psychological Continuity |
Psychological Criterion |
Psychology |
Research - Proposal |
Status: Personal Identity (2025 - March) |
Status: Priority Task List (2025 - May) |
Status: Summary (2025 - March) |
Teletransportation, 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3, 4, 5 |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3 |
Thesis - Current Stance |
Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Unity of the Person |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
|
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
Blackburn (Simon) |
Has Kant Refuted Parfit? |
Paper  |
|
|
Dainton (Barry) |
Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Dainton (Barry) |
The Phenomenal Self: Appendix - Reductionism |
Paper  |
|
|
Ehring (Douglas) |
Personal Identity and Time Travel |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Huenemann (Charlie) |
If I teleport from Mars, does the original me get destroyed? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
McInerney (Peter K.) |
Person-Stages and Unity of Consciousness |
Paper  |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Immanent Causation and Life After Death |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? Animals |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Immortality |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) |
Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Continuity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Duplication |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Metaphysics |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Personal Identity |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
|
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Criterion |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychology |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Teletransportation |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Unity of the Person |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
YouTube |
Video - The Trouble with Transporters |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
Blackburn (Simon) |
Has Kant Refuted Parfit? |
Paper - Cited  |
Dancy - Reading Parfit, 1997, Chapter 9 |
78% |
Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) |
The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe? |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Studies: Vol. 170, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 465-500 |
Yes |
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) |
Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality |
Paper - Cited  |
Aeon, 19 August, 2019 |
Yes |
Clark (Tom) |
A Notable Theoretical Convergence |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Naturalism.org. |
Yes |
Clark (Tom) |
Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Naturalism.org. |
Yes |
Dainton (Barry) |
Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence |
Paper - Cited  |
The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83/4: 549-71, 2005 |
10% |
Dainton (Barry) |
Self: Philosophy In Transit |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
7% |
Dainton (Barry) |
Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue |
Paper - Cited  |
Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit, Prologue |
Yes |
Dainton (Barry) |
The Phenomenal Self |
Book - Cited  |
Dainton (Barry) - The Phenomenal Self |
1% |
Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. |
Reading Parfit |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
17% |
Dennett (Daniel) |
The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction |
Paper - Cited  |
Hofstadter & Dennett - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul |
Yes |
Ehring (Douglas) |
Personal Identity and Time Travel |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433 |
Yes |
Epstein (Dmitry) |
What if We’re Still Here? A Selfish Reason to Care for Future Generations |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Medium, 29 March 2020 |
Yes |
Gasser (Georg), Ed. |
Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
96% |
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) |
Aeon: C-F |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
51% |
Hofstadter (Douglas) & Dennett (Daniel), Eds. |
The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
14% |
Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper - Cited  |
Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 |
Yes |
Lockwood (Michael), Ed. |
Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
29% |
Noonan (Harold) |
Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience |
Paper - Cited  |
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 271-288, 1999 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Immanent Causation and Life After Death |
Paper - Cited  |
Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010 |
Yes |
Robert (David) |
The Existential Passage Hypothesis |
Paper - By Subtopic |
PhilArchive, July 14, 2018 (Updated Dec. 20, 2020) |
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Immortality |
Paper - Cited  |
Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 1 |
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper - Cited  |
Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 2 |
Yes |
Sider (Ted) |
Asymmetric Personal Identity |
Paper - Cited  |
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2018) pp. 127-146 |
6% |
Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) |
Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me? |
Paper - Cited  |
BBC Website, April 2015 |
Yes |
Stewart (Wayne) |
Metaphysics by Default |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Personal Website; pdf created 19 April 2011 |
12% |
Stewart (Wayne) |
Metaphysics by Default - Chapter 09: Existential Passage |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Personal Website; pdf created 19 April 2011 |
Yes |
Stewart (Wayne) |
Metaphysics by Default - Chapter 17: Application to Other Species |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Personal Website; pdf created 19 April 2011 |
38% |
Stewart (Wayne) |
Metaphysics by Default - Chapter 20: Proof and Speculation |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Personal Website; pdf created 19 April 2011 |
30% |
Stewart (Wayne) |
Uzgalis: Accidentally Opening a Transmigration Window by Nixing the Proper Continuer |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Reddit, 2019 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
|
Yes |
Torek (Paul Volkening) |
Something To Look Forward To: Personal Identity, Prudence, and Ethics |
Paper - Cited  |
PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan (1995) |
1% |
Uzgalis (William) |
Review - Dainton - The Phenomenal Self |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews; 2008.12.08 |
Yes |
Whiting (Jennifer E.) |
Friends and Future Selves |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Review 95.4 (Oct. 1986), 547 - 580 |
No |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2025