Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Psychological Continuity - Forward
(Text as at 05/02/2018 20:02:24)
(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)
Plug Note1- I think there’s a conceptual difference between:-
- Forward psychological continuity, and
- Backward psychological continuity.
- Imagine the case where (on an endurantist2 account of persistence3), I’m put into a duplicating machine, but something goes wrong and my body is destroyed by the duplication process, though my duplicate wakes up perfectly happily. Then, it seems to me, I would never wake up, and would have no experience beyond entry to the duplicating machine. I have no forward psychological continuity. But my duplicate4 does have backward psychological continuity.
- Any duplicate of me, looking backward, would consider himself to be “me”, having my memories5, abilities, plans and so forth, and a body looking just like mine. But, would I ever wake up as the duplicate? My intuition on the endurantist account, as I have said, is that I would not, though I suspect that on the perdurantist6 account, this might be seen as a case of fission7 in which I might wake up twice, provided we consider that the right sort of causality8 is in place.
- But, what gives forward continuity of consciousness9 in the normal case of sleep and temporary unconsciousness? I cannot know “from the inside” that when I awake I’m the same human being as went to sleep in my bed. The reason I believe this is for external reasons: duplication is not physically possible (or at least practical), and in any case I have no reason to believe it happened to me last night.
- This seems a very important issue to me, and I need to make more of it. For example, in teletransportation10 thought experiment11, it seems to me that a new person wakes up, but I don’t, nor do I experience anything, though the new person claims to be me. Incidentally, it’s not just a new person12, but a new human being13.
- This is the sort of question that the Logical Positivists would denounce as meaningless, as no empirical evidence can decide it.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read14, include15 the following:-
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- This is mostly a place-holder16. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 1: - A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
Footnote 14: - Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
Footnote 15: - I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
Printable Versions:
Table of the Previous 3 Versions of this Note:
Summary of Note Links from this Page
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Note Links to this Page
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Blackburn (Simon) |
Has Kant Refuted Parfit? |
Paper  |
|
|
| Dainton (Barry) |
Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Ehring (Douglas) |
Personal Identity and Time Travel |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Immanent Causation and Life After Death |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Immortality |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) |
What Does It Mean to Be Me? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Continuity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Criterion |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Teletransportation |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Unity of the Person |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward |
Paper - By Subtopic |
|
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Black: Printable Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)