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Personal Identity

Androids

(Work In Progress: output at 15/01/2024)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. Briefly, an Android (Wikipedia: Android) is – or would be were one to be built – a robot with no organic parts that looks and acts like a human being; those looking otherwise are simply “droids”.
     • The Android needs to behave as if it had an appropriate psychology² – at least one that passes the Turing Test.
     • This psychology need not involve phenomenal consciousness³ – indeed it is one of the problems of philosophy to consider how we could ever know whether or not an android is phenomenally conscious.
     • Could it not be a zombie⁴?
     • Compare and contrast with Cyborgs⁵.
  2. The relevance of Androids to the topic of Personal Identity stems from whether or not Androids would be persons⁶.
     • On the presumption that they might be, then the question arises whether a human person⁷ might metamorphose⁸ into an android by a process of siliconisation⁹ (and cyborgisation¹⁰ – for the non-psychological elements).
     • On the presumption that an android cannot be identical to a human animal¹¹, this Thought Experiment¹² seems to pull apart animal¹³ identity and personal¹⁴ identity.
       
• Further Remarks
  1. None as yet!

Essay – The Persistence of Androids

1. Introduction
   • When we consider the question of the persistence of ourselves – on the presumption that we are human animals – we still suffer from conflicting Intuitions¹⁵. In particular, the Brain Transplant¹⁶ intuition whereby we ‘go with our brains’. This is a problem because it’s hardly obvious that Brains¹⁷ are Animals¹⁸. Also, when we talk about ‘our’ Persistence Conditions¹⁹, we’re talking about us as we are – as we have evolved – and not how we might be. Also, how we Human Animals²⁰ ‘are’ is an empirical question.
   • However, with Androids²¹, the situation is somewhat different. While they might look and act somewhat like human animals, which is why they are called ‘androids’, they are Artifacts²² for all that, and not instances of a Natural Kind²³ Concept²⁴. As such, their Persistence Conditions²⁵ can be defined rather than discovered. I often think that philosophers confuse us with Artifacts, as though our Persistence conditions are a matter of Convention²⁶.
   • In what follows I will compare and contrast our Persistence Conditions²⁷ with those of Androids²⁸ to see where this leads us.
2. Our persistence conditions compared with those of Androids
   • Firstly, as Organisms²⁹ we can – and do – survive the gradual replacement of all – or most – of our cells over time. An android isn’t an organism, and it is unspecified whether it would be self-repairing or would need large parts (‘organs’) replaced periodically as they get damaged or wear out.
   • We can survive the replacement of major organs – this is proved by successful Transplant³⁰ surgery now that techniques have been perfected and immunosuppressant drugs developed to prevent organ rejection. I think we are all agreed that this is a case of genuine Persistence³¹, because these organs are – ultimately – assimilated into our bodily structure.
   • Whether the Brain³² is ‘just another organ’ is a major point of dispute, which we’ll reserve for later.
   • Where we receive inorganic Transplants³³ – titanium rods to replace or strengthen broken bones, hip or knee replacements and the like – we theoretically become Cyborgs³⁴. Strict Animalists³⁵ believe we become smaller in such circumstances, at the inorganic parts are never properly assimilated. I don’t think this is the right judgement as these parts do get assimilated in the sense of having bone grow around them and being included in our Body³⁶ plans as far as proprioception is concerned.
   • Androids will persist through the replacement of major parts, or so we would intuit³⁷. The Persistence³⁸ of Artifacts³⁹ is to a degree conventional, and there are ancient conundrums such as the Ship of Theseus⁴⁰ (not to mention ‘Trigger’s Broom’). Basically, provided part-replacement is piecemeal and gradual, we’re happy. But there may not be a fact of the matter. It’s up to us whether we allow that the android has persisted. However, for human beings there would seem to be a fact of the matter for organ Transplants⁴¹. We agree that – after (say) a liver transplant – the individual remains the same human being (and the same person). No doubt this has much to do with a latent presumption that we persist provided our Psychology⁴² does and that our ‘mere Bodies⁴³’ don’t matter as much.
   • What about the mental life of androids – assuming some version of Functionalism⁴⁴ is correct and that Androids⁴⁵ have mental lives. No doubt it would depend on what the android is for. There’s discussion on the ethics of AI: if Androids⁴⁶ should be conscious, then would employing them as assistants without consideration of their welfare constitute slavery? If so, it would most probably be the case that androids employed in dangerous or menial jobs would have no conscious mental lives.
   • In such situations, while the android’s programming might be upgraded to enable it to take on new tasks, or to execute existing ones better, there would be no temptation to suggest that it ceased to persist, as might be the case – according to the Psychological View⁴⁷ – for human persons should they suffer psychological interventions of this sort.
   • Should it be possible to create an android with the mental capacities approximating to those of human beings, including phenomenal Consciousness⁴⁸, then – I suppose – there would be no reason to have a different view to their Persistence⁴⁹ than we have to Human Beings⁵⁰, all things being equal. However, things are not equal, because Androids⁵¹ are not Human Animals⁵² as Animalists⁵³ claim that we are.
   • In such cases, there would be less reason to resist the Brain Transplant⁵⁴ Intuition⁵⁵. However, there would be opportunities to Fission⁵⁶ the Psychology⁵⁷ of an android onto multiple successors, all of which could not be viewed as identical to the original.
   • Maybe this is a bit quick. Thought Experiments⁵⁸ involving Brain⁵⁹ scans and Uploading⁶⁰ of human brains are implausible for many reasons. It seems less implausible to scan a ‘silicon brain’ because we have something like a desktop computer in mind. But if an android really did have the mental capacity and experience of a human being, it would be much more complex than that.
3. To be continued …

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References

• For a page of Links⁶¹ to this Note, Click here.
• Relevant Works cited above: No items to list.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read⁶², include the following:-
  • Aeon:
    1. "Floridi (Luciano) - Should we be afraid of AI?", 2016, No Abstract, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Rini (Regina) - Raising good robots", 2017, No Abstract, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Shanahan (Murray) - Conscious exotica", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link
  • AI:
    1. "Price (Huw), Cave (Stephen), Iida (Fumiya), Etc. - Preparing for the future: artificial intelligence and us: Part 1", 2018, External Link
  • General:
    1. "Anders (Charlie Jane) & Krell (Jason) - 10 Robot Deaths That Were More Moving Than Almost Any Human's", External Link
    2. "Grossman (Lev), Kurzweil (Ray) - 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal", 2011, Write-Up Note⁶³, Annotations
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • AI:
    1. "Meincke (Anne Sophie) - Bio-Agency and the Possibility of Artificial Agents", 2018, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
  • Machines:
    1. "Churchland (Paul) & Churchland (Patricia) - Could a Machine Think?", 1990, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Kaess (Genevieve) - Could Consciousness Emerge from a Machine Language?", 2011, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Leiber (Justin) - Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : A Dialogue", 1985, Book, Footnote₆₄
    4. "Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon", 1989, Book, Read = 4%
    5. "Putnam (Hilary) - Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?", 1964, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Robinson (Guy) - How to Tell Your Friends From Machines", 1972, Internal PDF Link
• For further papers held on-line of potential interest, follow this Link⁶⁵. Total papers = 1.

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read:
     • General:
       1. "Papineau (David) - Introducing Consciousness", 2000, Book, Missed Cut: Too little relevance
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder⁶⁶.

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 64:

• This is very elementary, but short and maybe entertaining.

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Table of the Previous 11 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
06/07/2023 00:43:12	3056	Androids
20/09/2022 11:24:00	2915	Androids
15/05/2022 13:19:12	2476	Androids
02/07/2021 20:32:38	2275	Androids
11/02/2021 11:29:46	2213	Androids
13/05/2020 18:57:36	1735	Androids
04/05/2018 12:25:55	3844	Androids
10/04/2017 23:38:24	2014	Androids
18/12/2010 19:58:05	1072	Androids
18/08/2009 20:39:50	929	Androids
12/08/2007 10:17:46	230	Androids

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
03/05/2025 12:25:03	Androids	Cyborgs

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal	Androids	Animalists	Animals	Artifacts
Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Body	Brain	Brain Transplants	Concepts
Consciousness	Convention	Cyborgs	Fission	Functionalism
Human Animals	Human Beings	Human Persons	Intuition	Metamorphosis
Natural Kinds	Note Links Explanation	Organisms	Persistence	Persistence Criteria
Person	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage	Plug Note Apologia	Psychological View	Psychology
Ship of Theseus	Siliconisation	Thought Experiments	Transplants	Uploading
Works Read - Explanation	Zombies

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal	Baker - Materialism with a Human Face	Bodily Continuity	Cyborgs	Death
Non-Human Persons, 2	Olson - What Are We? Animals	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3, 4, 5	Siliconisation	Status: Personal Identity (2025 - March)
Status: Priority Task List (2025 - May)	Status: Summary (2025 - March)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?), 2	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)	Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Thisness (Haecceity)	Transhumanism
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Materialism with a Human Face	Paper		Yes
Grossman (Lev), Kurzweil (Ray)	2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal	Paper		Yes
Hanley (Richard)	The Metaphysics of Star Trek: Insufficient Data	Paper
Hanley (Richard)	The Metaphysics of Star Trek: Introduction: The Philosophic Enterprise	Paper		Yes
Lyons (Siobhan)	Death and the Machine: Intersections of Mortality and Robotics	Book	2, 3, 4, 5
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper		Yes
Papineau (David)	Introducing Consciousness	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Price (Huw), Cave (Stephen), Iida (Fumiya), Etc.	Preparing for the future: artificial intelligence and us: Part 1	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Bodily Continuity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Cyborgs	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Death	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Non-Human Persons	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Siliconisation	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Thisness (Haecceity)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Transhumanism	Paper		Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Anders (Charlie Jane) & Krell (Jason)	10 Robot Deaths That Were More Moving Than Almost Any Human's	Paper - By Subtopic	Gizmodo, 05 December 2013	Yes
Churchland (Paul) & Churchland (Patricia)	Could a Machine Think?	Paper - By Subtopic	Scientific American, January 1990	No
Churchland (Paul) & Churchland (Patricia)	On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987 - 1997	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Churchland (Paul) & Churchland (Patricia) - On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987 - 1997	No
Floridi (Luciano)	Should we be afraid of AI?	Paper - Cited	Aeon, 09 May, 2016	Yes
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul)	Aeon: C-F	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	51%
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul)	Aeon: Q-S	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) - Aeon: Q-S	29%
Hanley (Richard)	The Metaphysics of Star Trek	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Hanley (Richard) - The Metaphysics of Star Trek	52%
Hanley (Richard)	The Metaphysics of Star Trek: Insufficient Data	Paper - By Subtopic	Hanley (Richard) - The Metaphysics of Star Trek, Chapter 2	19%
Kaess (Genevieve)	Could Consciousness Emerge from a Machine Language?	Paper - By Subtopic	Macalester Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 20: Iss. 1, 2011, Article 8	No
Leiber (Justin)	Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : A Dialogue	Book - Cited	Leiber (Justin) - Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : A Dialogue	No
Leiber (Justin)	Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : Introduction, Setting, Notes & Reading List	Paper - By Subtopic		No
Meincke (Anne Sophie)	Bio-Agency and the Possibility of Artificial Agents	Paper - Cited	Philosophy of Science - Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. ed. by G. Schurz. Dordrecht: Springer. 2018	5%
Papineau (David)	Introducing Consciousness	Book - Cited	Papineau (David) - Introducing Consciousness	Yes
Pollock (John L.)	Cognitive Carpentry	Paper - By Subtopic	Pollock - How to Build a Person, Chapter 6	No
Pollock (John L.)	How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon	4%
Pollock (John L.)	The Language of Thought	Paper - By Subtopic	Pollock - How to Build a Person, Chapter 5	No
Putnam (Hilary)	Philosophical Papers 2 - Mind, Language and Reality	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Putnam (Hilary) - Philosophical Papers 2 - Mind, Language and Reality	No
Putnam (Hilary)	Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?	Paper - By Subtopic	Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 21, (Nov. 12, 1964), pp. 668-691	No
Rini (Regina)	Raising good robots	Paper - By Subtopic	Aeon, 18 April, 2017	Yes
Robinson (Guy)	How to Tell Your Friends From Machines	Paper - By Subtopic	Mind, 1972, 504-518	No
Shanahan (Murray)	Conscious exotica	Paper - By Subtopic	Aeon, 19 October, 2016	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Androids	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes

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Text Colour Conventions

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2025

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