Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Brains in Vats
(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- There are three variants that I want to consider:-
- The traditional disembodied brain in a vat of nutrients, connected to the world by input sensory and output motor devices.
- The Matrix-case, where the “vat” is a living human body, but where we have the same exchange of sensory and motor messages with a computer. I have a real body2, but not the one I think I have.
- The simulation case (which depends on Functionalism3 for any plausibility whatever), whereby I am living in a computer simulation. I am a computer program.
- I’m not sure how well-motivated these supposed possibilities are for an explanation of what we are4. Within the context of my research project, I’ve no interest in the sceptical use of these TEs5, but there may be other uses.
- "Bostrom (Nick) - Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?" (2003) argues that it is highly probable that we are computer simulations (Case ‘c’ above). See also the altercation below:-
→ "Weatherson (Brian) - Are You a Sim?" (2003), and
→ "Bostrom (Nick) - The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson" (2005).
- While the claim that we are computer programs is often made by futurologists, it doesn’t make sense to me.
- Computer programs are universals. I am a particular.
- What I am6 – in the sense intended here – is a particular implementation of a computer program “running” on a particular piece of hardware.
- So, I would be a particular partition of a particular piece of hardware, configured in an appropriate way.
- "Chalmers (David) - The Matrix as Metaphysics" (2005) seems to take the possibility of our being brains in vats (in the traditional Case ‘a’ sense) more seriously than might have been expected. However, I think his interest is purely in rebutting the sceptical conclusions of traditional epistemology. He thinks that if we were BIVs, we’d still know what we claim to know, because our words would have meanings appropriate to our envatted status.
→ See "Lloyd (Peter) - A Review of David Chalmers' essay 'The Matrix as Metaphysics'", 2008, for an attempted refutation.
References
- Relevant Works cited above:
- "Bostrom (Nick) - Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?", 2003, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
- "Bostrom (Nick) - The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson", 2005, Internal PDF Link
- "Chalmers (David) - The Matrix as Metaphysics", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Read
- "Lloyd (Peter) - A Review of David Chalmers' essay 'The Matrix as Metaphysics'", 2008, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Weatherson (Brian) - Are You a Sim?", 2003, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- For a Page of Links7 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read8, include the following:-
- General:
- "Bauby (Jean-Dominique) - The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly", 1998, Book
- "Bostrom (Nick) - Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?", 2003, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Bostrom (Nick) - How Long Before Superintelligence?", 1998, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Chalmers (David) - The Matrix as Metaphysics", 2005, Internal PDF Link
- "Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?", 1997, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains", 2007, Write-Up Note9, Internal PDF Link
- "Searle (John) - Minds, Brains, and Programs: Author's Response to Peer Review", 1980, Internal PDF Link
- A further reading list might start with:-
- General:
- "Barrow (John) - Living in a Simulated Universe", 2007, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Bostrom (Nick) - The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson", 2005, Internal PDF Link
- "Brueckner (Anthony) - Brains in a Vat", 1986, Internal PDF Link
- "Brueckner (Anthony) - If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat", 1992, Internal PDF Link
- "Brueckner (Anthony) - The Simulation Argument Again", 2008, Internal PDF Link
- "Collier (John) - Could I conceive being a brain in a vat?", 1990, Internal PDF Link
- "Grau (Christopher) - Philosophers Explore 'The Matrix'", 2005, Book, Read = 8%
- "Haggqvist (Soren) - Application", 1996
- "Haggqvist (Soren) - The Central Cases", 1996
- "Haggqvist (Soren) - Thought Experiments and Arguments", 1996
- "Lloyd (Peter) - A Review of David Chalmers' essay 'The Matrix as Metaphysics'", 2008, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Madden (Rory) - Could a Brain in a Vat Self-Refer?", 2010, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
- "Mcintyre (Jane) - Putnam's Brains", 1984, Internal PDF Link
- "Moravec (Hans) - Pigs in Cyberspace", 2013
- "Murray (David) - Disembodied Brains", 1970
- "Noe (Alva) - Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness", 2009, Book, Read = 8%, Footnote10
- "Pautz (Adam) - Brains in Vats, Inverts, and Swampmen: The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism", 2012, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 10%
- "Veber (Michael) - What’s It Like to Be a BIV? A Dialogue", 2015, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
- "Weatherson (Brian) - Are You a Sim?", 2003, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder11.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 10:
- See the conclusion of Chapter 8.
Table of the Previous 11 Versions of this Note:
Note last updated |
Reading List for this Topic |
Parent Topic |
06/07/2023 00:43:12 |
Brains in Vats |
Brain |
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
Abbreviations |
Baker - Persons in the Material World |
Body |
Brain, 2 |
Brain Transplants |
Disembodied Existence |
Fission |
Human Beings |
Olson - What Are We? The Question |
Organisms |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 |
Teletransportation, 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3, 4 |
Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) |
Thesis - Current Stance |
Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
|
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Persons in the Material World |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Bauby (Jean-Dominique) |
The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly |
Book  |
|
Yes |
Chalmers (David) |
The Matrix as Metaphysics |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Collier (John) |
Could I conceive being a brain in a vat? |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Dainton (Barry) |
Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Dancy (Jonathan) |
Scepticism |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Dennett (Daniel) |
Where Am I? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Frankish (Keith) |
The mind isn’t locked in the brain but extends far beyond it |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Haggqvist (Soren) |
Application |
Paper  |
|
|
Haggqvist (Soren) |
The Central Cases |
Paper  |
|
|
Haggqvist (Soren) |
Thought Experiments and Arguments |
Paper  |
|
|
Madden (Rory) |
Could a Brain in a Vat Self-Refer? |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Monti (Alessandro) |
A stable sense of self is rooted in the lungs, heart and gut |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Moravec (Hans) |
Pigs in Cyberspace |
Paper  |
|
|
Noe (Alva) |
Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness |
Paper  |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Psychology and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Pautz (Adam) |
Brains in Vats, Inverts, and Swampmen: The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism |
Paper  |
|
|
Pritchard (Duncan) |
What do you know? What is Knowledge? And Do We Have Any? |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Abbreviations |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Body |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Brain |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Brain Transplants |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Disembodied Existence |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Fission |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Human Beings |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Organisms |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Personal Identity |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 |
|
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Teletransportation |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
Dualism and Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem? |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
References & Reading List
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
Barrow (John) |
Living in a Simulated Universe |
Paper - Cited  |
Website |
No |
Bauby (Jean-Dominique) |
The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly |
Book - Cited  |
Bauby (Jean-Dominique) - The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly |
Yes |
Bostrom (Nick) |
Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Birkbeck Philosophy Society, 11th February 2003 |
No |
Bostrom (Nick) |
Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Quarterly, 2003, Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255 |
Yes |
Bostrom (Nick) |
How Long Before Superintelligence? |
Paper - Cited  |
Personal Website. |
Yes |
Bostrom (Nick) |
The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 55, No. 218, pp. 90-97 |
No |
Brueckner (Anthony) |
Brains in a Vat |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 3 (Mar., 1986) (pp. 148-167) |
No |
Brueckner (Anthony) |
If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Mind, New Series, Vol. 101, No. 401 (Jan., 1992), pp. 123-128 |
No |
Brueckner (Anthony) |
The Simulation Argument Again |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Analysis, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Jul., 2008) (pp. 224-226) |
No |
Chalmers (David) |
The Matrix as Metaphysics |
Paper - Cited  |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
Yes |
Clark (Andy) |
The Twisted Matrix: Dream, Simulation, or Hybrid? |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Dreyfus (Hubert L.) & Dreyfus (S.D.) |
Existential Phenomenology and the Brave New World |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Driver (Julia) |
Artificial Ethics |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Fredkin (Edward) |
A New Cosmogony |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Website |
No |
Fredkin (Edward) |
A Physicist's Model of Computation |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Website |
No |
Fredkin (Edward) |
Digital Mechanics (Book) |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Website |
No |
Fredkin (Edward) |
Finite Nature |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Website |
No |
Grau (Christopher) |
Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Grau (Christopher) |
Philosophers Explore 'The Matrix' |
Book - Cited  |
Grau (Christopher) - Philosophers Explore 'The Matrix' |
8% |
Grau (Christopher) |
Philosophers Explore 'The Matrix': Introduction |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Hanley (Richard) |
Never the Twain Shall Meet: Reflections on the Very First Matrix |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Lloyd (Peter) |
A Review of David Chalmers' essay 'The Matrix as Metaphysics' |
Paper - Cited  |
Discusiones Filosóficas 9 (12):175 - 192 (2008) |
No |
Madden (Rory) |
Could a Brain in a Vat Self-Refer? |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
European Journal of Philosophy, 2010 |
6% |
Mawson (Tim J.) |
Morpheus and Berkeley on Reality |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
McGinn (Colin) |
The Matrix of Dreams |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
McKenna (Michael) |
Neo's Freedom … Whoa! |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Murray (David) |
Disembodied Brains |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1969-70, 121-140 |
No |
Partridge (John) |
Plato's Cave and The Matrix |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Pautz (Adam) |
Brains in Vats, Inverts, and Swampmen: The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
New Waves in Philosophy of Mind, Online Conference, 3rd-17th December 2012 |
10% |
Pryor (James) |
What's So Bad about Living in the Matrix |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Sprevak (Mark), Etc |
New Waves in Philosophy of Mind |
Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)  |
Sprevak (Mark), Etc - New Waves in Philosophy of Mind |
15% |
Todman (Theo) |
Birkbeck Philosophy Society - 2002/2003 Programme |
Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) |
Todman (Theo) - Birkbeck Philosophy Society - 2002/2003 Programme |
2% |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Brains in Vats |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
|
Yes |
Veber (Michael) |
What’s It Like to Be a BIV? A Dialogue |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2015) pp. 734-756 |
5% |
Wagner (Rachel) & Flannery-Dailey (Frances) |
Wake Up! Worlds of Illusion in Gnosticism, Buddhism, and The Matrix Project |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Warwick (Kevin) |
The Matrix - Our Future? |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 |
No |
Weatherson (Brian) |
Are You a Sim? |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Quarterly, 2003, Vol. 53: 425-31 |
No |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2025