Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Connectedness vs Continuity
(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- When defining persistence conditions2, we need to distinguish between connectedness and continuity.
- Continuity is a transitive relation that relates adjacent stages.
- Connectedness is intransitive and requires enough of the properties of interest to be maintained over time.
- At root, this is just the message of the Old Soldier, raised against Locke3, and answered by Ancestrals of the “remembers” relation.
- Indeed, "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings" describes Continuity as the ancestral of Connectedness.
- Persons4 – like animals5 – develop and “grow” (not necessarily physically – that would be begging the question as to what persons are). We can admit that we have the same animal from fetus6 to corpse7 (with some arguments about the termini). However, do we have the same person?
- I’d contend that whatever physical and psychological discontinuities8 the human animal undergoes, we do have the same person where we have a person at all, provided a single First Person Perspective9 (FPP) is maintained.
- If one’s character changes radically over time, do you remain the same person? Yes, if we want the child and the adult to be the same person (as we do), or the convert to be the same person as the unbeliever.
- The relevance of this to the present debate is that it is continuity that is relevant to personal identity, and not connectedness. This applies whatever view of Personal Identity we hold.
- Derek Parfit – who doesn’t think identity is what matters10 – holds a different view; that it is connectedness that matters, and so we need have no concern for future selves11 that are psychologically unconnected to our current selves. I think this view is mistaken, as we are locked in to a First Person Perspective12 and will have to experience the fate of that future self, however unconnected.
Further Remarks:
- This Note doesn’t cover the topic of topological connectedness, which is relevant for the metaphysics of pregnancy13, and much else.
- I don’t – and won’t – have a Note on Connectedness per se: this Note will cover all I have to say on the topic.
- However, this note is linked to two others:-
References
- Relevant Works cited above:
- "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings", 1987, Write-Up Note16, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read
- For a Page of Links17 to this Note, Click here. This covers Connectedness only; Continuity is covered under its own Note.
- In the lists of references below, it’s sometimes best to jump to them via the “Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note” list, which takes you directly to the appropriate passage(s), which may be tangential to the reference’s main thread.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read18, include the following:-
- General:
- "Carter (William) - How to Change Your Mind", 1989, Annotations
- "Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) - Seeds: On Personal Identity and the Resurrection", 2016, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Parfit, 'Personal Identity'", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'", 2007, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Hirsch (Eli) - Minds and Bodies: Introduction", 1982
- "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings", 1987, Write-Up Note19, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity", 1983, Internal PDF Link
- "Noonan (Harold) - Quasi-Memory", 2003, Annotations
- "Olson (Eric) - Persistence", 1999
- "Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain", 1986
- "Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity and Rationality", 1986
- "Parfit (Derek) - Summary of Discussion", 1982, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - Psychological continuity", 2000
- "Wiggins (David) - The Concern to Survive", 1987, Annotations
- A further reading20 list might start with:-
- General:
- "Belzer (Marvin) - Notes on Relation R", 1996, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Bradley (Ben) - The Worst Time to Die", 2008, Internal PDF Link
- "Brennan (Andrew) - Amnesia and Other Problems", 1988
- "Brown (M.T.) - Multiple Personality and Personal Identity", 2001, Internal PDF Link
- "Butkovic (Ana) - Does Identity Really Matter? Parfit vs Lewis", 2010, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
- "Campbell (Scott) - Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival?", 2001, Internal PDF Link
- "Campbell (Scott) - Rapid Psychological Change", 2004, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
- "Carter (William) - Personal Identity", 1990
- "Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) - Personal Identity, 'R-Relatedness' And The Empty Question Argument", 1995, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Ehring (Douglas) - Survival and Trivial Facts", 1987, Read = 17%
- "Gillett (Grant) - Brain Bisection and Personal Identity", 1986, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Hershenov (David) - The Memory Criterion and the Problem of Backward Causation", 2007, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Johnston (Mark) - Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To?", 2010, Read = 78%
- "McInerney (Peter K.) - Conceptions of Persons and Persons through Time", 2000, Internal PDF Link
- "McMahan (Jeff) - Death and the Value of Life", 1988, Internal PDF Link, Read = 3%
- "Mills (Eugene) - Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity", 1993
- "Otsuka (Michael) - Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming", 2018, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 25%
- "Slors (Marc) - A Content-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity", 2001, Internal PDF Link
- "Stone (Jim) - Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People", 1988, Internal PDF Link
- "Stone (Jim) - Why there are still no people", 2005, Internal PDF Link
- "Wolf (Susan) - Self-Interest and Interest in Selves", 1986, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder21.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 20:
- I became aware while compiling this list that it overlaps with papers by – and discussion of – Parfit’s work, which is covered under that Note and elsewhere.
- Hence, I’ve omitted most works by Derek Parfit unless they discuss the difference between connectivity and connectedness.
Table of the Previous 10 Versions of this Note:
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
Artifacts |
Bodily Continuity |
Continuity |
Existential Passage |
Fetuses |
Johnston - Human Beings |
Methuselah |
Olson - What Are We? The Question, 2 |
Parfit |
Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1 |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 |
Psychological Continuity, 2 |
Psychological Criterion |
Psychological View |
Strawson - Why I Have No Future |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time), 2, 3, 4, 5 |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) |
Thesis - Current Stance |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
|
|
|
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
Belzer (Marvin) |
Notes on Relation R |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Bradley (Ben) |
The Worst Time to Die |
Paper  |
|
|
Brennan (Andrew) |
Amnesia and Other Problems |
Paper  |
|
|
Brown (M.T.) |
Multiple Personality and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Butkovic (Ana) |
Does Identity Really Matter? Parfit vs Lewis |
Paper  |
|
|
Campbell (Scott) |
Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival? |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
|
Campbell (Scott) |
Rapid Psychological Change |
Paper  |
|
|
Carter (William) |
How to Change Your Mind |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Carter (William) |
Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) |
Personal Identity, 'R-Relatedness' And The Empty Question Argument |
Paper  |
|
|
Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) |
Seeds: On Personal Identity and the Resurrection |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) |
Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Ehring (Douglas) |
Survival and Trivial Facts |
Paper  |
|
|
Funkhouser (Eric) |
Notes on Parfit, 'Personal Identity' |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Gillett (Grant) |
Brain Bisection and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Hershenov (David) |
Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Hershenov (David) |
The Memory Criterion and the Problem of Backward Causation |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Hirsch (Eli) |
Minds and Bodies: Introduction |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) |
On the Unity of the Parts of Organisms |
Paper  |
|
|
Johnston (Mark) |
Human Beings |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Johnston (Mark) |
Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To? |
Paper  |
|
|
Keefe (Rosanna) |
Vagueness by Numbers |
Paper  |
|
|
Kingma (Elselijn) |
Lady Parts: The Metaphysics of Pregnancy |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Kingma (Elselijn) |
Were You Part of Your Mother? |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Lewis (David) |
Survival and Identity |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Lewis (David) |
The Paradoxes of Time Travel |
Paper  |
|
|
Martin (Raymond) |
Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival |
Book  |
|
Yes |
McInerney (Peter K.) |
Conceptions of Persons and Persons through Time |
Paper  |
|
|
McMahan (Jeff) |
Death and the Value of Life |
Paper  |
|
|
Merricks (Trenton) |
Review of Jonathan Dancy's 'Reading Parfit' |
Paper  |
|
|
Mills (Eugene) |
Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Noonan (Harold) |
Quasi-Memory |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Noonan (Harold) |
The Possibility of Reincarnation |
Paper  |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Persistence |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Psychology and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Otsuka (Michael) |
Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming |
Paper  |
|
|
Parfit (Derek) |
A Response (to Gillett - Reasoning About Persons) |
Paper  |
|
|
Parfit (Derek) |
Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes |
Paper  |
|
|
Parfit (Derek) |
Lewis, Perry, and What Matters |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
Nagel's Brain |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
Personal Identity and Rationality |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
Summary of Discussion |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
What We Believe Ourselves To Be |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Radden (Jennifer) |
A Metaphysics of Successive Selves |
Paper  |
|
|
Roberts (Melinda) |
Lewis's Theory Of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Robinson (John) |
Personal Identity and Survival |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
|
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Ethical Theory |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Ethics - Introduction |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 |
Yes |
Shoemaker (Sydney) |
Persons and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Slors (Marc) |
A Content-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity |
Paper  |
|
|
Slors (Marc) |
A Content-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity |
Paper  |
|
|
Stone (Jim) |
Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Stone (Jim) |
Why there are still no people |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Strawson (Galen) |
Why I Have No Future |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Swinburne (Richard) |
How To Determine Which Is The True Theory Of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Tammet (Daniel) |
N/A |
Author  |
|
|
Thomas (Janice L.) |
Psychological continuity |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 |
Yes |
Thomas (Janice L.) |
What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Artifacts |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Bodily Continuity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Continuity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Fetuses |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Methuselah |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Parfit |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Criterion |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological View |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Tollefsen (Christopher) |
Animalism and the Unborn Human Being |
Paper  |
|
|
Wiggins (David) |
Preface: Sameness and Substance Renewed |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Wiggins (David) |
The Concern to Survive |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Williams (Bernard) |
The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Wolf (Susan) |
Self-Interest and Interest in Selves |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
|
References & Reading List
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
Belzer (Marvin) |
Notes on Relation R |
Paper - Cited  |
Analysis, Vol. 56, No. 1, Jan., 1996, pp. 56-62 |
17% |
Bradley (Ben) |
The Worst Time to Die |
Paper - Cited  |
Ethics 118 (January 2008): 291–314 |
No |
Campbell (Scott) |
Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival? |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Ratio 14.3, September 2001, pp. 193-202(10). |
No |
Campbell (Scott) |
Rapid Psychological Change |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Analysis; Jul2004, Vol. 64 Issue 3, p256-264, 9p |
11% |
Carter (William) |
How to Change Your Mind |
Paper - Cited  |
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 1989, pp. 1-14 |
Yes |
Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) |
Seeds: On Personal Identity and the Resurrection |
Paper - Cited  |
Cholbi, Michael ed. Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. London: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 85–98. |
Yes |
Funkhouser (Eric) |
Metaphysics, Spring 2014 |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
94% |
Funkhouser (Eric) |
Notes on Parfit, 'Personal Identity' |
Paper - Cited  |
Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014 |
Yes |
Hershenov (David) |
Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' |
Paper - Cited  |
Religious Studies, 43:2, June 2007, 237-242 |
Yes |
Hirsch (Eli) |
Minds and Bodies: Introduction |
Paper - Cited  |
Hirsch - The Concept of Identity, 1982, Introduction to Part 2 |
Yes |
Hirsch (Eli) |
The Concept of Identity |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Johnston (Mark) |
Human Beings |
Paper - Cited  |
Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83 |
Yes |
Lewis (David) |
Philosophical Papers Volume I |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Lewis (David) |
Survival and Identity |
Paper - Cited  |
Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 1: Ontology, Chapter 5 |
Yes |
Noonan (Harold) |
Personal Identity |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Noonan (Harold) |
Quasi-Memory |
Paper - Cited  |
Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 8 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Persistence |
Paper - Cited  |
The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 2, pp. 22-41 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
99% |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper - Referencing  |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
Nagel's Brain |
Paper - Cited  |
Parfit - Reasons and Persons, Appendix D |
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
Personal Identity and Rationality |
Paper - Cited  |
Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 307-321(15). |
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
Reasons and Persons |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Parfit (Derek) |
Summary of Discussion |
Paper - Cited  |
Synthese, Vol. 53, No. 2, Matters of the Mind (Nov., 1982), pp. 251-256 |
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper - Cited  |
Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Connectedness vs Continuity |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
|
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2023