Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Corpses
(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- The “Corpse Problem”
- Corpses are troublesome2 for animalism3, which alleges (correctly in my view) that corpses are not animals4.
- The claim is that, at death5, something ontologically6 new comes on the scene – because a corpse has different persistence7 conditions8 (those of masses of matter9) to those of organisms10.
- Some philosophers – eg. Fred Feldman, in "Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death" – disagree. Feldman claims that we survive11 death12, but – rather disappointingly – as a corpse, which solves the “corpse problem”, but at the cost – most likely – of saying that we are bodies13 rather than organisms14.
- The problem if we don’t survive death as our corpses – it is said – is to answer the question where the corpse comes from, and to answer the objection that if it was there all along – as a “corpse-to-be” – then we have a situation where we have two things of different sorts15 in the same place16 at the same time.
- If this is taken seriously, then it can be used against the form of the animalism’s “too many thinkers17” argument.
- I’m willing to accept that this “thinking animal” argument is unsound. However, just how the analogy would work for the “corpse-to-be” needs to be spelled out. The corpse has the persistence conditions18 of a mass of matter19. What are the persistence conditions20 of the “corpse-to-be”? If they are those of an organism21, then then the corpse-to-be cannot be the same individual22 as the corpse, though the Constitution View23 might be happy with this situation.
Resurrection
Corpses are probably also important for most Christian materialists24 who hope for some form of resurrection25.
If there is a corpse to be resurrected26, it is easier to see how identity is preserved than if we have total destruction. This is obviously so in the case of resuscitation, but even where we have a real case of death27 – not just clinical death, or brain death28, but real death with a bit of mouldering – there is some physical thing that is responsible for preserving identity.
Further Remarks:
- This Note overlaps somewhat with the following:-
- I have tried to avoid items appearing in their reading-lists from the reading lists below.
References
- Relevant Works cited above:
- "Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death", 1992, Read
- For a Page of Links31 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read32, include the following:-
- Aeon:
- "Kaufman (Sharon) - Neither person nor cadaver", 2020, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Press (Michael) - Mummies among us", 2020, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- General:
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?", 2005, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Carter (William) - Death and Bodily Transfiguration", 1984, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?", 1999, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Feldman (Fred) - A Materialist Conception of Death", 1992
- "Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death", 1992
- "Francescotti (Robert) - Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity", 2005, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity", 2005, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", 1987, Annotations
- "Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People", 1999, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem", 2004, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death", 2010, Write-Up Note33, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - The Person and the Corpse", 2015, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View", 2001, Write-Up Note34, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Rosenberg (Jay) - Bodies, Corpses, and Chunks of Matter: A Reply to Carter", 1984, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection", 2000
- "Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities", 1999, Annotations
- "Yourgrau (Palle) - Can the Dead Really Be Buried?", 2000, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited", 2010, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- A further reading list might start with:-
- General:
- "Bullinger (E.W.) - The Rich Man and Lazarus - the Intermediate State", 1902/1992, Book, Read = 3%
- "DeGrazia (David) - Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
- "Feldman (Fred) - Death and the Disintegration of Personality", 2015, Read = 6%
- "Hershenov (David) - Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers", Undated, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
- "Hershenov (David) - Organisms and their Bodies: Response to LaPorte", 2009, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Hudson (Hud) - Pre-Persons, Post-Persons, Non-Persons, and Person-Parts", 2001
- "Johnston (Mark) - Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To? Addendum: From Corpse Snatching To Identity Voluntarism", 2010, Read = 3%
- "LaPorte (Joseph) - On Two Reasons for Denying That Bodies Can Outlast Life", 2009, Internal PDF Link
- "Sauchelli (Andrea) - The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person", 2016, Internal PDF Link, Read = 8%
- "Scheick (William J.) - The Author's Corpse and the Humean Problem of Personal Identity in Hawthorne's 'The House of the Seven Gables'", 1992, Internal PDF Link
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder35.
Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:
Note last updated |
Reading List for this Topic |
Parent Topic |
06/07/2023 00:43:12 |
Corpses |
Death |
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
Animalism |
Animalism - Objections |
Baker - Materialism with a Human Face, 2 |
Bodily Continuity |
Body Criterion |
Clones |
Connectedness vs Continuity |
Death |
DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons? |
Immortality |
Matter |
Metamorphosis |
Olson |
Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death |
Olson - What Are We? Animals |
Organisms |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 |
Resurrection, 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues), 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It), 2, 3 |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 |
Thesis - Current Stance |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
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|
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To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
Ayers (Michael R.) |
Locke on Living Things |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Materialism with a Human Face |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
When Do Persons Begin and End? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Blatti (Stephan) |
We Are Animals |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Bloom (Paul) |
Free Will Does Not Exist. So What? |
Paper  |
|
|
Burstein (Norman) |
Strawson on the Concept of a Person |
Paper  |
|
|
Carter (William) |
Death and Bodily Transfiguration |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Carter (William) |
Will I Be a Dead Person? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Cooper (John) |
Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Corcoran (Kevin) |
Dualism, Materialism and the Problem of Post Mortem Survival |
Paper  |
|
|
Corcoran (Kevin) |
I Believe in the Resurrection of the Body and the Life of the World to Come |
Paper  |
|
|
DeGrazia (David) |
Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
DeGrazia (David) |
Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence |
Paper  |
|
|
Dennett (Daniel) |
Where Am I? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Donnelly (John) |
Suicide and Rationality |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Feldman (Fred) |
A Materialist Conception of Death |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Feldman (Fred) |
Death and the Disintegration of Personality |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
|
Feldman (Fred) |
Life-Functional Theories of Life |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Feldman (Fred) |
The Survival of Death |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 |
Yes |
Feldman (Fred) |
The Termination Thesis |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Feldman (Fred) |
Vitalist Theories of Life |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Gasser (Georg) |
Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Yes |
Graziano (Michael) |
Endless fun |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Green (James W.) |
Beyond the Good Death: The Anthropology of Modern Dying |
Book  |
2 |
|
Hershenov (David) |
Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Hershenov (David) |
Organisms and their Bodies: Response to LaPorte |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Hershenov (David) |
Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection |
Paper  |
|
|
Hudson (Hud) |
A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person |
Book  |
|
|
Hudson (Hud) |
Pre-Persons, Post-Persons, Non-Persons, and Person-Parts |
Paper  |
|
|
Johnston (Mark) |
Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To? Addendum: From Corpse Snatching To Identity Voluntarism |
Paper  |
|
|
Kaufman (Sharon) |
Neither person nor cadaver |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Kotak (Aakash) |
The Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
LaPorte (Joseph) |
On Two Reasons for Denying That Bodies Can Outlast Life |
Paper  |
|
|
Larkin (William S.) |
Persons, Animals, and Bodies |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
|
Levy (Steven) |
Artificial Life: The Quest for a New Creation |
Paper  |
|
|
Liao (S. Matthew) |
The Organism View Defended |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Mackie (David) |
Personal Identity and Dead People |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Markosian (Ned) |
Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Moore (Adrian W.) |
Is the quest for immortality worse than death? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olding (A.) |
Resurrection Bodies and Resurrection Worlds |
Paper  |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Immanent Causation and Life After Death |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Is there a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Psychology and Personal Identity |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
The Person and the Corpse |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Thinking Animals and the Constitution View |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? Animals |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Price (Marjorie) |
Identity Through Time |
Paper  |
|
|
Puccetti (Roland) |
The Conquest of Death |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
|
Rosenberg (Jay) |
Bodies, Corpses, and Chunks of Matter: A Reply to Carter |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Rosenberg (Jay) |
Death and Personhood: Conceptual Preliminaries |
Paper  |
|
|
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Immortality |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 |
Yes |
Shoemaker (Sydney) |
Thinking Animals Without Animalism |
Paper  |
|
|
Thomas (Janice L.) |
What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Animalism |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Animalism - Objections |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Bodily Continuity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Body Criterion |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper  |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Clones |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Connectedness vs Continuity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Death |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Immortality |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Matter |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Metamorphosis |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Olson |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Organisms |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Resurrection |
Paper  |
2 |
Yes |
Tzinman (Rina) |
Memory, Organisms and the Circle of Life |
Paper  |
2 |
|
Wiles (Maurice) |
God's Action in Christ |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Wiles (Maurice) |
Where Does God Act? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Williamson (Colwyn) |
Attitudes towards the body: Philosophy and common sense |
Paper  |
|
|
Wilson (Jack) |
Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
Zimmerman (Dean) |
Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
Yes |
References & Reading List
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
When Do Persons Begin and End? |
Paper - Cited  |
Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005 |
Yes |
Bradley (Ben), Feldman (Fred) & Johansson (Jens) |
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death |
Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)  |
Bradley (Ben), Feldman (Fred) & Johansson (Jens) - The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death |
7% |
Bullinger (E.W.) |
The Rich Man and Lazarus - the Intermediate State |
Book - Cited  |
Bullinger (E.W.) - The Rich Man and Lazarus - the Intermediate State |
3% |
Carter (William) |
Death and Bodily Transfiguration |
Paper - Cited  |
Mind, 1984, 412-418 |
Yes |
Carter (William) |
Will I Be a Dead Person? |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p167, 5p; |
Yes |
DeGrazia (David) |
Human Identity and Bioethics |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
7% |
DeGrazia (David) |
Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence |
Paper - Cited  |
DeGrazia - Human Identity and Bioethics, 2005, Chapter 2 |
6% |
Feldman (Fred) |
A Materialist Conception of Death |
Paper - Cited  |
Feldman - Confrontations with the Reaper, Chapter 7 |
Yes |
Feldman (Fred) |
Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Feldman (Fred) |
The Survival of Death |
Paper - Cited  |
Feldman - Confrontations with the Reaper, Chapter 6 |
Yes |
Francescotti (Robert) |
Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Explorations, Mar2005, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p69-81, 13p |
Yes |
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) |
Aeon: G-K |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
31% |
Hershenov (David) |
Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine. Forthcoming. |
33% |
Hershenov (David) |
Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity |
Paper - Cited  |
Mind, 114, Number 453, 1 January 2005, pp. 31-59(29). |
Yes |
Hershenov (David) |
Organisms and their Bodies: Response to LaPorte |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Mind, Vol. 118, No. 471 (Jul., 2009), pp. 803-809 |
17% |
Kaufman (Sharon) |
Neither person nor cadaver |
Paper - Cited  |
Aeon, 06 February, 2020 |
Yes |
LaPorte (Joseph) |
On Two Reasons for Denying That Bodies Can Outlast Life |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Mind, Vol. 118, No. 471 (Jul., 2009), pp. 795-801 |
No |
Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper - Cited  |
Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 |
Yes |
Lockwood (Michael), Ed. |
Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
29% |
Luper (Steven) |
Mortal Harm |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 227 (Apr., 2007), pp. 239-251 |
17% |
Luper (Steven) |
Past Desires and the Dead |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Philosophical Studies; Dec. 2005, Vol. 126 Issue 3, p331-345, 15p |
17% |
Mackie (David) |
Personal Identity and Dead People |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophical Studies 95, Number 3, September 1999, pp. 219-242(24). |
Yes |
Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed. |
Mind - 114/453 (January 2005) |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
11% |
Olson (Eric) |
The Person and the Corpse |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death; ed. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (OUP, 2015), pp. 80-96 |
Yes |
Press (Michael) |
Mummies among us |
Paper - Cited  |
Aeon, 2020 |
Yes |
Quinn (Philip L.) |
Review of Antony Flew's 'The Logic of Mortality' |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Nous, Vol. 26, No. 1, Mar., 1992, pp. 102-104 |
Yes |
Rosenberg (Jay) |
Bodies, Corpses, and Chunks of Matter: A Reply to Carter |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Mind, 1984, 419-422 |
Yes |
Sauchelli (Andrea) |
The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Philosophical Studies: Published online on 20 April 2016 |
8% |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Corpses |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
|
Yes |
Vorobej (Mark) |
Past Desires |
Paper - By Subtopic  |
Philosophical Studies; Vol. 90, No. 3 (Jun., 1998) (pp. 305-318) |
No |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2023