<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Printable Note - Personal Identity - Research - Proposal (Theo Todman's Web Page) </title><link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <P ALIGN="Center"><FONT Size = 3 FACE="Arial"><B><HR>Theo Todman's Web Page<HR><p>For Text Colour-conventions (at end of page): <A HREF="#ColourConventions">Click Here</a></p><U>Personal Identity - Research - Proposal</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The <a name="48"></a>topic I wish to <a name="48"></a>research is  Personal Identity , with the <a name="48"></a>focus,<a name="48"></a>,<a name="48"></a>,<a name="48"></a> on the <a name="48"></a>ontology of, and persistence criteria for, human <a name="48"></a>persons and related <a name="48"></a>sortals. Since it is a contingent fact that all existents that are universally agreed to be persons are members of the species homo <a name="48"></a>sapiens, we must start with human beings in deciding what persons are. <BR><BR>I will scrutinise certain basic assumptions that I accept. Firstly, that the  identity involved in personal identity is the ordinary logical <a name="48"></a>notion. Secondly, that some form of <a name="48"></a>physicalism in the philosophy of mind is true and central to the topic. Thirdly, while it is analytic that survival involves identity, that what matters in <a name="48"></a>survival is both <a name="48"></a>physical & <a name="48"></a>psychological <a name="48"></a>continuity. <BR><BR>In considering what a person is, I will need to consider <a name="48"></a>somatic, <a name="48"></a>forensic and <a name="48"></a>psychological issues, and, in particular, focus on <a name="48"></a>self-consciousness and the first-person <a name="48"></a>perspective. I will need to consider semantic and <a name="48"></a>conceptual issues as well as ontological issues. <BR><BR>I will focus on two views, namely <a name="48"></a>Animalism and the Constitution <a name="48"></a>View. I must consider just what Baker and others mean by  constitution , and evaluate the cogency of the supposedly knock-down  too many minds <a name="48"></a>argument that Olson and others have raised against it. <BR><BR>Key questions are whether or not the concept of a person is a natural kind <a name="48"></a>concept, and whether the various views take persons sufficiently <a name="48"></a>seriously. That is, are persons no more than phase <a name="48"></a>sortals of certain <a name="48"></a>animals or are they ontological novelties, as Baker suggests? <BR><BR>I will consider the usual problem cases, whether obtained from clinical <a name="48"></a>observation or thought <a name="48"></a>experiment, including brain transplant, <a name="48"></a>fission, <a name="48"></a>fusion, <a name="48"></a>duplication, <a name="48"></a>replication and <a name="48"></a>metamorphosis. In particular, I want to compare <a name="48"></a>forward and backward psychological continuity and the role of normal <a name="48"></a>causality in preserving identity. However, I need to consider whether all talk of first-person perspectives depends on a, presumably non-existent, Cartesian <a name="48"></a>Ego.<BR><BR>Since I m particularly averse to  closest <a name="48"></a>continuer theories, I am tempted by <a name="48"></a>four-dimensionalism and shared person-stages as a solution to some of the paradoxes where, otherwise, awkward choices have to be made. Since there are acknowledged difficulties for the perdurantist in not being able to <a name="48"></a>count tokens of persons and other sortals, I need to address the attempted <a name="48"></a>solutions.<a name="48"></a><BR><BR>I conclude this document (by way of an end-note) by considering the thought experiment of <a name="48"></a>teletransportation to rehearse the key issues. I would need to repeat this exercise for all the favourites, including Unger s <a name="48"></a>Siliconisation and Williams s <a name="48"></a>backup/restore.<a name="48"></a><FONT COLOR = "000000"></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 26/09/2007 20:41:17<BR> </P><HR> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><BR><P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U></B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "000000">Black</FONT>: Printable Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018<LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</OL><hr><BR><a href = "../../../index.htm">Return to Home page</a><BR><B>Timestamp: 02/08/2018 15:49:46. Comments to <U>theo@theotodman.com</U>.</B></P></BODY></HTML>