<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Printable Note - Personal Identity - Research - Proposal (Theo Todman's Web Page) </title><link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <P ALIGN="Center"><FONT Size = 3 FACE="Arial"><B><HR>Theo Todman's Web Page<HR><p>For Text Colour-conventions (at end of page): <A HREF="#ColourConventions">Click Here</a></p><U>Personal Identity - Research - Proposal</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The <a name="48"></a><U>topic</U><SUP>1</SUP> I wish to <a name="48"></a><U>research</U><SUP>2</SUP> is  Personal Identity , with the <a name="48"></a><U>focus</U><SUP>3</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>4</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>5</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>6</SUP> on the <a name="48"></a><U>ontology</U><SUP>7</SUP> of, and persistence criteria for, human <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>8</SUP> and related <a name="48"></a><U>sortals</U><SUP>9</SUP>. Since it is a contingent fact that all existents that are universally agreed to be persons are members of the species homo <a name="48"></a><U>sapiens</U><SUP>10</SUP>, we must start with human beings in deciding what persons are. <BR><BR>I will scrutinise certain basic assumptions that I accept. Firstly, that the  identity involved in personal identity is the ordinary logical <a name="48"></a><U>notion</U><SUP>11</SUP>. Secondly, that some form of <a name="48"></a><U>physicalism</U><SUP>12</SUP> in the philosophy of mind is true and central to the topic. Thirdly, while it is analytic that survival involves identity, that what matters in <a name="48"></a><U>survival</U><SUP>13</SUP> is both <a name="48"></a><U>physical</U><SUP>14</SUP> & <a name="48"></a><U>psychological</U><SUP>15</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>continuity</U><SUP>16</SUP>. <BR><BR>In considering what a person is, I will need to consider <a name="48"></a><U>somatic</U><SUP>17</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>forensic</U><SUP>18</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>psychological</U><SUP>19</SUP> issues, and, in particular, focus on <a name="48"></a><U>self-consciousness</U><SUP>20</SUP> and the first-person <a name="48"></a><U>perspective</U><SUP>21</SUP>. I will need to consider semantic and <a name="48"></a><U>conceptual</U><SUP>22</SUP> issues as well as ontological issues. <BR><BR>I will focus on two views, namely <a name="48"></a><U>Animalism</U><SUP>23</SUP> and the Constitution <a name="48"></a><U>View</U><SUP>24</SUP>. I must consider just what Baker and others mean by  constitution , and evaluate the cogency of the supposedly knock-down  too many minds <a name="48"></a><U>argument</U><SUP>25</SUP> that Olson and others have raised against it. <BR><BR>Key questions are whether or not the concept of a person is a natural kind <a name="48"></a><U>concept</U><SUP>26</SUP>, and whether the various views take persons sufficiently <a name="48"></a><U>seriously</U><SUP>27</SUP>. That is, are persons no more than phase <a name="48"></a><U>sortals</U><SUP>28</SUP> of certain <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>29</SUP> or are they ontological novelties, as Baker suggests? <BR><BR>I will consider the usual problem cases, whether obtained from clinical <a name="48"></a><U>observation</U><SUP>30</SUP> or thought <a name="48"></a><U>experiment</U><SUP>31</SUP>, including brain transplant, <a name="48"></a><U>fission</U><SUP>32</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>fusion</U><SUP>33</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>duplication</U><SUP>34</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>replication</U><SUP>35</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>metamorphosis</U><SUP>36</SUP>. In particular, I want to compare <a name="48"></a><U>forward</U><SUP>37</SUP> and backward psychological continuity and the role of normal <a name="48"></a><U>causality</U><SUP>38</SUP> in preserving identity. However, I need to consider whether all talk of first-person perspectives depends on a, presumably non-existent, Cartesian <a name="48"></a><U>Ego</U><SUP>39</SUP>.<BR><BR>Since I m particularly averse to  closest <a name="48"></a><U>continuer </U><SUP>40</SUP> theories, I am tempted by <a name="48"></a><U>four-dimensionalism</U><SUP>41</SUP> and shared person-stages as a solution to some of the paradoxes where, otherwise, awkward choices have to be made. Since there are acknowledged difficulties for the perdurantist in not being able to <a name="48"></a><U>count</U><SUP>42</SUP> tokens of persons and other sortals, I need to address the attempted <a name="48"></a><U>solutions</U><SUP>43</SUP>.<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>44</SUP><BR><BR>I conclude this document (by way of an end-note) by considering the thought experiment of <a name="48"></a><U>teletransportation</U><SUP>45</SUP> to rehearse the key issues. I would need to repeat this exercise for all the favourites, including Unger s <a name="48"></a><U>Siliconisation</U><SUP>46</SUP> and Williams s <a name="48"></a><U>backup/restore</U><SUP>47</SUP>.<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>48</SUP><FONT COLOR = "000000"></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 26/09/2007 20:41:17<BR> </P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1: (Background)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> This study originated as a discussion document for my first (and only) tutorial when I was registered for the MPhilStud in 2005. I ve resurrected it as a research proposal, and added a fair amount of material, but the notes probably attempt too much at this stage. Additionally, I ve forgotten where the references are from, and haven t had time to hunt them out. The first few pages are probably important in the context of my current application. The notes are very much  work in progress . I ve removed all the acknowledgements of muddle that appeared in the immediately previous edition, but they are to be understood passim.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 2: (Research - Internet Technology)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Another of my interests is a metaphilosophical project to use internet technology in the service of philosophy. Already in this little document I have felt the need for many levels of footnoting. I wish to use this course of study as an experiment in implementing some ideas and developing some technology that s easy to use and freely available. It strikes me that any philosophical proposition is embedded in a host of other propositions held dear by its espouser, or depends on reasoning that's difficult to display in print. Cascading hyperlinks, contextual pop-ups and the like come to mind as potential aids to lucidity. Making such functions easy to generate and maintain would be difficult, so I see some prototyping coming along as part of my PhD scratch-work. Maybe the whole idea depends on epistemological foundationalism, but I think it s consistent with coherentism. Either way, it would rather mercilessly expose one's ignorance and biases. I understand that the thesis will have to be written up traditionally.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3: (Research - Focus)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Vastly more will be researched and written up than can be included in a 70,000-word thesis, though maybe some of this surfeit can be included in a book and in the above-mentioned internet site. <BR><BR>The issues in general philosophy that will require investigation in support of this research include:-<BR><ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a>Concepts</li><li><a name="48"></a>Causation</li><li><a name="48"></a>Change</li><li><a name="48"></a>Consciousness</li><li>Free <a name="48"></a>Will</li><li>Intuition and Thought <a name="48"></a>Experiments</li><li><a name="48"></a>Modality</li><li>Natural <a name="48"></a>Kinds</li><li><a name="48"></a>Psychopathology</li><li><a name="48"></a>Substance</li><li><a name="48"></a>Time</li><li><a name="48"></a>Vagueness</li><li>Etc & . </li></ul>Additionally, this project overlaps somewhat with a more ambitious one in the Philosophy of <a name="48"></a>Religion.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 4: (Research - Distractions)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> While I m admitting to potential distractions, I must mention another, which is to get an MSc in mathematics by the time I m 60. While this wouldn t start until I d completed my PhD, a fair amount of  warming up would be required in parallel. I'd like to do some philosophy of mathematics one day, but my handling of the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos was a complete disaster, so abject that I'm in need of some rehabilitation (on the grounds that those that can t do shouldn t philosophise). I'd been tempted to return to chess and bridge, but these are fundamentally a waste of time, and I'm hopeful that mathematics (pursued at a much more leisurely pace than the cracking one Cambridge required of its unfortunate undergraduates) might press the same buttons. Maybe being good at mathematics (in the "Cambridge" sense), like being able to play the violin in tune, is just a special skill that some people have and others can never acquire; and that if you don't have it, you should just concentrate on the talents you do have. What worries me is that philosophy is much less constrained by the merciless exposure of falsehoods or rewarded by the discovery of certain truths, and that the discipline of mathematics might be a good foil. Yet people who've excelled in both mathematics and philosophy (eg. Pascal, Leibniz, Russell) don t seem to have treated philosophy as a poor relation. The two disciplines involve, however, completely different ways of thinking - from the narrowest to the widest possible focus.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5: (Thesis - Method & Form)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u>Form of the Argument</u><ol type="1"><li>The thesis will present an abductive argument (as in my <A HREF="../../../Dissertation - POSA.pdf" TARGET="_top">BA Dissertation</A>  Poverty of Stimulus Arguments for Innate Grammar ), that is, an inference to the best explanation of the data. </li><li>That s why I have to consider so many aspects of the subject, so many thought <a name="48"></a>experiments and so much <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_6_2">clinical</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_6_2"></A> <a name="48"></a>data. Into which story does it all best fit? </li><li>I may have to reject some recalcitrant thought experiments as ill-formed, but I do not wish to ignore anything significant. </li><li>For some time, I have considered Animalism as the most likely account of what human beings are, and I propose this thesis to evaluate the arguments for and against it, using the rival  Constitution View as a foil. </li></ol><BR><u>Method</u> <ul type="disc"><li>Over the years I have read a lot of books and papers on the topic of Personal Identity. <ol type="1"><li>For some, I have made extensive on-line write-ups. </li><li>For others, the write-up is incomplete, or sketchy. </li><li>For yet others, I have (more or less) extensively annotated the margin (in so doing ruining many an expensive volume!). </li><li>Finally, some have simply been read (and probably forgotten). </li></ol></li><li>I have also written numerous Notes on almost every aspect of the subject, though many of them are place-holders awaiting filling-out. These Notes link to the Books and Papers, either explicitly or thematically, and to one another. </li><li>Follow this <a name="48"></a>Link for an explanation of the various Objects in my Research database, though the Note needs updating in the light of changes since 2010. </li><li>All this has resulted in a huge unfocussed cobweb of material, which needs to be subjected to some order and completeness. This has started by outlining the Chapters of the <a name="48"></a>Thesis, and specifying the limited subset of the problem I intend to address in detail. </li><li>For most Chapters, my approach to producing the first draft of the Chapter will be as follows:- <ol type="1"><li>Determine which Notes that I have written are relevant to this Chapter.</li><li>Fill out any Note-place-holders with whatever s in my head!</li><li>Use the reading lists associated with these Notes to establish a limited reading list for the Chapter.</li><li>Review whatever I ve written, in whatever format, on the items in the derived reading lists, and make necessary cosmetic changes in the process of evaluating the items. </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_6_6">Segregate</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_6_6"></A> this reading list into:-<BR>& Higher versus lower priority,<BR>& Read versus unread,<BR>& Annotated (by hand) versus unannotated<BR>& Those with an Abstract or Note Write-up versus those without</li><li>Cull items that are unlikely to be addressed in the next two years and list them as specifically excluded. I may pick up on these at a later stage of the project, but in the short term the culling process will be essential for making across-the-board progress. </li><li>Determine why the residue are important and relevant  if they are  and briefly document the reasons. </li><li>Migrate any Book or Paper Abstracts that I have written (as distinct from copied from elsewhere) to Write-Up Notes. </li><li>If the Book or Paper is important enough, migrate any hand-written annotations to a Write-Up Note, and complete any important incomplete Write-Up Notes. </li><li>Write and maintain a Chapter Summary, motivating and summarising the Chapter. Use this to ensure I don t get side-tracked. </li><li>Incorporate the key points of Write-Up Notes into the Topic Notes. </li><li>Incorporate the highest level thoughts from the Topic Notes into the Main Text of the Chapter. </li></ol></li><li>In principle, these actions should be effected in number sequence, though there will be some iteration, particularly with the last point, which presents my research findings in their most accessible form for outside interested parties.</li><li>There are many important papers that are on the reading lists that I have not read. At this stage, I do not intend to read them until I have processed all those papers that I have read. This will require discipline!</li><li>Most of the  detailed working of the Chapter should be retained in the topic Notes and Write-ups. The Chapter should be fairly high-level at this stage, with hyperlinks to more detailed or supportive work.</li><li>I need to have some method of evidencing how far along this trial I have got for each Chapter, but this can wait until there is some progress to report. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_6_2"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 2</B>: I am unsure how much of this I have actually attended to  but it is important to keep it in mind. <a name="On-Page_Link_6_6"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 6</B>: I need to develop a method for this  one probably variable depending on the length of the list. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 22/07/2014 22:23:31<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6: (Thesis - Current Stance)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The purpose of this Note is to provide a periodic refocusing of what my thoughts and beliefs about the topic of Personal Identity currently are. Previous versions can be found from the list below. This version has links to the various other Notes that expand further on the issues raised, and supply extensive reading lists. While very often these Notes are of the  promissory variety, the links will remind me to improve them as needed. <BR><ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>What are we? This is one of the most important questions we need to ask ourselves. Just what kind of things are we? The question is closely related to a similar one: just what sort of adventures can individuals such as ourselves survive? This second question sheds light on the first for if there are certain contingencies that we think we would  or would not  survive, when a typical member of that kind would not  or would  survive, then that kind may not represent what we really think we are. Of course, we might be wrong in our estimations, but at least this will raise the question. </li><li>Why is this not a trivial question? If we look at a dog, say, and ask what it is, the answer to such a question is obvious  it s a dog! It may be our pet  with a name  a particular <a name="48"></a>individual, but when we ask what <a name="48"></a>kind of thing it is, it s a member of the species <em>canis lupus</em>. So, when we look at ourselves, the obvious answer is that we are <a name="48"></a>human beings  specifically human animals, members of the species <em><a name="48"></a>homo sapiens</em>. That is the answer posited by the <a name="48"></a>Animalists, amongst whose number  broadly speaking  I place myself, who accept the <a name="48"></a>biological view of personal identity. </li><li>If this is true, then our <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions  the necessary and sufficient conditions for us to continue in existence  are the same as those of other <a name="48"></a>animals  the great apes, say, under which category we fall, biologically speaking. Why is this not the end of the story? Well, this is because  despite being a species of great ape  human beings are special in that we have enhanced cognitive capacities. We are morally accountable. In sum, we are <a name="48"></a>persons, and have a  <a name="48"></a>first person perspective (FPP) on the world  something most philosophers deny to other animals  and care about our <a name="48"></a>futures and  <a name="48"></a>wantons apart  agonise over our past mistakes. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> claims this perspective makes an <a name="48"></a>ontological difference, rather than being  as I think  a special property of human beings that may or may not be had in particular cases. <a name="48"></a>Baker accuses the animalists of <a name="48"></a>not taking persons seriously. I might just note that there s a facile and confusing answer to <a name="48"></a>what we are, that is  people . You may have noticed that I used the technical term  persons as the plural of  person . Some philosophers annoyingly use the term  people , but this confuses the issue. When we say there are ten people in the room, while it is clear in normal circumstances what we mean  dogs don t count, for instance  but if there happened to be a Klingon and a visiting angel, would they count as people or not? They are  we may suppose  persons, but they are not <a name="48"></a>human persons</li><li>Since at least <A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Locke (John).htm">John Locke</A>, this fact of our mental exceptionalism has tempted philosophers to say that it s our <a name="48"></a>psychological continuity that is more important for our identity-preservation than our <a name="48"></a>physical continuity. This view still has its supporters  not only for those such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A> and <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Swinburne (Richard).htm">Richard Swinburne</A> who believe in immaterial <a name="48"></a>souls  but for the many who think that psychological continuity and <a name="48"></a>connectedness is constitutive of the identity of persons. It is also implicit in the ideas of the <a name="48"></a>Transhumanists who think that  come <a name="48"></a>the Singularity  we might be capable of being <a name="48"></a>uploaded to <a name="48"></a>computers and thereby <a name="48"></a>live almost forever. </li><li>Before proceeding further we have to say something brief and sketchy about identity and <a name="48"></a>persistence.  Identity  in the sense of  <a name="48"></a>numerical identity  is a relation a thing holds to itself and to nothing else. A is identical to B if A and B are the very same thing. It is an equivalence relation, being transitive, reflexive and idempotent; and, many of the sticking points in the philosophy of personal identity arise from this fact. <ol type="i"><li>It has nothing to do with  identity as a sociological concept such as national identity, sexual identity or identification with a particular group. </li><li>Also, John may be said  not to be the same person since he took heroin, but he is still John and still the same individual; it s just that his <a name="48"></a>personality has changed. </li><li>It also has nothing to do with  <a name="48"></a>narrative identity which is the story we tell about ourselves in an attempt to make sense of our lives. </li><li>Finally, it has nothing to do with  <a name="48"></a>exact similarity : my television may be  identical to yours, but that doesn t mean I can have yours if mine breaks. They are  or were, when manufactured  exactly similar, but are distinct. </ol></li><li> Persisting is what a thing does in continuing in existence. As we noted above, there are what are called  persistence conditions  specific to a kind of thing  that set out what vicissitudes a thing can survive if it is to remain that very same thing. There are sometimes hard cases, and there can seem sometimes that there is an element of <a name="48"></a>convention: is a particular club still the same clubs after it has lost all its original members, changed its name, and so on? But we can t accept that our own existence is a matter of convention, though this could seem the case with the once-dominant <a name="48"></a>psychological view of personal identity: just how much psychological connection could I lose with my former self  philosophers wondered  and still be me? However, things seem simpler and more objective for organisms, which persist despite exchanging material with the environment and changing many of their <a name="48"></a>properties, provided they are caught up in a complex and hopefully long drawn-out event (or process) known as a  <a name="48"></a>life . </li><li>In the above I have assumed at least three things. <ol type="i"><li>Firstly, that  things  or at least some things  exist. There s a philosophical position known as  <a name="48"></a>Process Metaphysics (or  Naturalised Metaphysics ) that gives the focus to process rather than ontology, particularly in the case of organisms. I m not sure how fatal this is to my approach, since I admit that animals are individuated by their lives, which are processes. </li><li>Secondly, that <u>we</u> exist. This would seem hardly worth mentioning, other than that certain philosophers  <a name="48"></a>nihilists  have argued that we (whatever we are) or  for similar reasons  various common things like hands  don t exist. </li><li>Finally, I assume that things do indeed persist, at least some of the time. </ol>I can t really address these foundational issues here, but will just say a few words on the second issue. There are a lot of interconnected issues to do with the philosophy of time and change, in particular the problem of <a name="48"></a>temporary intrinsics. How can the leaf that was green yesterday be the same leaf if it is brown today? How can the old bald bloke I am today be the same individual as the hirsute teenager all those years ago? <ol type="i"><li>Some philosophers  the <a name="48"></a>exdurantists  say that there s no relation of identity across time, but merely a weaker counterpart relation analogous to that between an individual and its counterpart in another possible world. </li><li>Others  in particular <a name="48"></a>Derek Parfit  have said that even if there <em>is</em> identity across time, it s not <a name="48"></a>what matters. </ol>In what follows, I assume that we exist and that we continue to exist self-identically across time and that this identity relation is important. We could not carry on our lives without these assumptions even if  philosophically-speaking  they were false; but I think they are true: I don t want to distinguish the  strict and philosophical from the  loose and popular senses of identity first raised by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Butler (Joseph).htm">Joseph Butler</A>. I also assume the standard <a name="48"></a>logic of identity and reject all heretical accounts that are invented from time to time as radical solutions to the difficult questions of persistence. In particular, I reject the view  known as <a name="48"></a>occasional identity that  while (say) I am not identical to my younger self  yet I was that person, just not any more. </li><li>Now back to the main thread. Most Anglophone philosophers these days are <a name="48"></a>physicalists (though maybe most non-philosophers are unreflective <a name="48"></a>dualists). This gives physicalist philosophers a problem if they have hopes of <a name="48"></a>post-mortem <a name="48"></a>survival. If the human organism is totally destroyed  eg. by cremation, explosion, or eating of worms  just how does the very same individual <a name="48"></a>get from this life to the next? <a name="48"></a>Christian Materialists have had a go at thinking this through, and acknowledge the difficulties. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A> attempted to show that it is at least logically possible by having God snatch away the dying body immediately pre-mortem, replacing it with a simulacrum. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A>  while himself a dualist  has suggested a  falling elevator model to help out his materialist friends, whereby there is immanent <a name="48"></a>causation (by some unknown natural or supernatural process) between the dying body and the <a name="48"></a>resurrection one so that the dying individual escapes in the nick of time to the next world without loss of <a name="48"></a>numerical identity. Others claim that God s omnipotence is sufficient and is sovereign even over the laws of logic, so that problems raised by identity being an equivalence relation can be overcome by brute force. Maybe so, but without the constraints of logical <a name="48"></a>possibility, we have no way of arguing the matter, so let s not bother.</li><li>However, most Christian materialists prefer an alternative. They recognise that getting from here to the next world with temporal or spatial gaps raises difficult questions as to whether the numerical identity of the individual is preserved but adopt an alternative solution  the <a name="48"></a>Constitution View. On this thesis, the person is distinct from the human animal   just as the <a name="48"></a>statue is distinct from its <a name="48"></a>constituting marble  so that the very same person  tagged by the unique  first person perspective noted above  can be constituted first by its earthly body, and subsequently by its heavenly one. </li><li>Some Animalists have what they think of as a knock-down argument against the Constitution View. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> calls it the  <a name="48"></a>Thinking Animal argument. If the person and the animal are distinct things, albeit co-located, there are too many thinkers  because the animal can certainly think, as can the person, so we have two thinkers where we thought we had one  which is one problem; and there s another  how do we know which we are, the person or the animal? I m not impressed by this argument. There are several  multiple occupancy conundrums that have been claimed at one time or another to deny the existence of things we are sure do exist. <a name="48"></a>Dion and Theon, <a name="48"></a>Tib and Tibbles, the  <a name="48"></a>problem of the many and so on. We just need to sort out our rules for counting. Also, the whole question of three- versus <a name="48"></a>four-dimensionalism (4D)  whether a persisting thing is wholly present at a time  or whether only a temporal part is present, the thing as a whole being a  space-time worm  bears on the question of counting. If different things can share stages  say the person and the human animal, or the statue and the clay  then we have to be careful how we count. In the case of a future <a name="48"></a>fission  whereby two space-time worms share their past stages, but will ultimately diverge  we might not know how many to count at a time, but this will often not matter for practical purposes. </li><li>I think the idea of a first-person perspective is important. It is this that provides the pull against <a name="48"></a>animalism when linked to various <a name="48"></a>thought experiments (TEs) that we ll come on to presently. However, I still <a name="48"></a>don t like the Constitution View. My objection is that the FPP is a property of something else  like a smile  in this case of a human animal, though the smile might belong to a cat. You can t take the very same smile from one cat and place on another (it would be at best an exactly similar smile)  let alone have a disembodied smile like that of the Cheshire Cat. Similarly, you can t take the very same FPP from one body and plop it onto another. True, it might be a qualitatively exactly similar FPP, but not the same one. What s to stop that FPP being plopped on several resurrection bodies? Which would be numerically identical to me, given that they can t all be, in the absence of 4D? </li><li>What are the temptations for not sticking with the animalist approach  which ought these days to be the default position in the absence of anything more compelling? As noted, the apparent lack of rational expectation of an afterlife is one incentive to look elsewhere, so  elsewhere is a favourite for those who can t bear the thought of their <a name="48"></a>selves expiring with their <a name="48"></a>bodies. We ve noted the Christian dualists and materialists, but what about the Transhumanists? There s the relatively metaphysically uninteresting case of cryoscopy followed by repair and resuscitation; there we have material continuity, and no possibility of <a name="48"></a>reduplication, though some might claim there is too much outside interference for identity to be preserved. But, what about the  hope of  you being uploaded to a computer? There seems to be an idea about that  we are really software (or data), when we are clearly material beings. If we are software, it is said, then we might  run on different hardware. I have two issues with this, apart from the immense technical obstacles to be overcome both in  scanning the  real you and providing a computer of sufficient power to run your program and the virtual world for you to experience, Matrix-like. <ol type="i"><li>Firstly, what sort of thing is a program? It s an interesting question whether a program has persistence conditions. Is Windows 10 the same program as Windows 0? Whatever the answer to this question is, a program would seem to be a kind of <a name="48"></a>universal rather than a particular, and  we are particulars. </li><li>This leads to the second issue  a reduplication objection. Say we developed a sophisticated program that could run on an open-ended number of exactly similar robots. No two of these would be numerically identical to one another  they would be distinct, though exactly similar. So, were the program to be a simulation of your brain, it could run  presumably  on an open-ended number of computers  and these computers (or computer partitions) would not be identical to one another, so none of them could be you, as you could only be one of them, and there s <a name="48"></a>no principled way of saying which. The same objection prevents Star Trek-like <a name="48"></a>teletransportation  were it possible  being identity-preserving. I might also add that no  program is  in itself  <a name="48"></a>conscious, though a machine that runs it might conceivably be. Mind you, there are arguments here as well  originated by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Searle (John).htm">John Searle</A>  at least for digital computers. </ol>Incidentally, the transhumanists seem to imagine unending computer life as a secular heaven, but it could just as easily be a secular hell. </li><li>So, I remain wedded to my view that we are human animals with the persistence conditions of such.  Person is not a <a name="48"></a>substance term, but an honorific that refers to some substance during some periods of its existence when it has the requisite mental and <a name="48"></a>moral properties to qualify.  Person is a <a name="48"></a>Phase Sortal (like  teacher ) that  in the case of  person  applies to most humans most of the time, but need not apply to all humans all the time. There are ethical consequences for this view, but they are not as dramatic as is sometimes urged. Non-persons don t have moral responsibilities, as is already recognised for demented or infant humans, and all non-human animals. The obverse  that persons allegedly have <a name="48"></a>no moral obligations towards non-persons  or that non-persons have no rights  is the sticking point, and ought to be reflected in a more humane treatment of all non-persons rather than that we might contemplate sending human non-persons as well as non-human non-persons to the slaughter-house. </li><li>So, what are the <a name="48"></a>problems for animalists? There are several. Some  like the so-called  <a name="48"></a>corpse problem (is my corpse me  only dead  if not, where does it come from? It doesn t have the persistence conditions of an organism) are probably relatively easy to overcome. Recently, I ve discovered that animalists  like (but for different reasons) those who think we are essentially persons  allegedly have a  <a name="48"></a>fetus problem . Animalists  saying that we are essentially animals  have (it seems) to say that we were once foetuses  which appears to be what our animal once was. But was this fetus once a <a name="48"></a>proper part of its mother? There s work currently going on to suggest that this is so  and if so, just when did the new human animal come into existence? However, I don t think any of this seriously threatens animalism. Maybe animalists should have considered the problem more than they have, but animals do come into existence sometime  presumably by the time of birth at the latest  and that s enough for an animalist. </li><li>The real problems for animalism stem from the force of thought experiments such as the  <a name="48"></a>brain transplant intuition . An animalist seems forced to say that I would <em>not</em>  go with my brain in the circumstance where my brain is <a name="48"></a>transplanted into another body, when it seems to most people that I <em>would</em>. The alleged reason for this is that at least some animalists consider the brain to be  just another organ that we might lose like we might lose a kidney, provided the animal is kept alive. Doubts about this have led some to think that we are not  really whole human animals but proper parts thereof, maybe not <a name="48"></a>brains as such, but brains and a few other bits. This does seem comical. Just how large am I  would I fit into a hat-box, as <a name="48"></a>Olson asks? </li><li>My view is as follows. I am currently (thankfully) a whole human animal. My wife worked in the NHS with amputees, and I think it is right to say that they also are whole human animals, though they lack parts that most of us have. No doubt they could lose more parts  and some diabetics sadly do. So, we might view a  <a name="48"></a>brain in a vat  one ready for transplant  as a  maximally mutilated human animal. Maybe  in the case of a brain transplant  a prior animal has fissioned (divided into two) when the brain is extracted and we now have a case of the <a name="48"></a>fusion of two animals (the brain from one fusing with the body of the other). It might be argued that our identity-logic <a name="48"></a>isn t quite up to deciding who is who in such circumstances, but the stakes seem high enough to demand an answer, for which read on. </li><li>I doubt whether the transhumanist hopes of augmenting our physical or mental attributes by effectively converting us into <a name="48"></a>cyborgs is much of a threat to animalism. We don t worry about our spectacles or our mobiles phones making us any less mammalian. Closer integration with AI applications is only the next step for the extended mind. </li><li>So, is there any purchase in thought experiments that putatively have my first person perspective persisting in cases where there is no identity preservation. Could it be the case that  it seems to me that I have survived some vicissitude  a <a name="48"></a>cerebrum transplant, say  but I am mistaken? Some philosophers argue that this happens every night  I <a name="48"></a>go to sleep, and when I wake up I just assume that I am identical to the individual who got into bed, but how do I know? I might be intellectually convinced by third parties  those other than the sleeper and the waker  one way or another, but how would this affect how it seems to me? Take the teletranportation case. Because of the reduplication objection (unless we are 4-dimensionalists), we should say that numerical identity is not preserved. But  if the technology works, and I am the teletransportee  the individual (or 77 duplicates) would (all) wake up convinced they were me, yet they must be deceived. Thankfully, reduplication is not a problem for whole-brain transplants, but it is for idempotent half-brain transplants, though I think the identity problem there occurs during the fissioning process rather than when the half-brains are implanted. </li><li>I continue to think that there is a distinction to be made between <a name="48"></a>forward and backward psychological continuity, though I don t see how third parties  or even first or second parties  could tell the difference. It makes all the difference to me if I go to sleep and <em>someone else</em> wakes up thinking they are me  as against the normal case where I go to sleep and <em>I</em> wake up. In the former case  for me  there s just an endless nothingness, of which I know nothing, while in the latter case my experiential life carries on. However, backward psychological continuity  what it feels like looking back  is the same for a survivor and one who only thinks he s survived. </li><li>In the case of the split brain transplant, however, how is it all supposed to work, experientially? Neurosurgery is  even today  carried out on substantially conscious patients, as that way there s a quick feedback loop to tell the surgeon whether he s destroying any important areas of cognitive function. What would it be like to  fission ? Maybe I lack the imagination, but it seems to me that my First Person Perspective would go along with whatever was the dominant hemisphere, assuming this  seat of consciousness is initially located in one hemisphere or the other. If it is not, then it would presumably be destroyed and two new ones would be created in this miracle operation. Either way, this would sit comfortably with the logic of identity which would not be violated, as at most one of the recipients would be me. I can imagine being ripped apart psychologically, but I can t imagine going two ways. </li><li>Of course, there are physical and metaphysical issues with the whole idea of brain transplants  the physical structure of the <a name="48"></a>brain reflects  its body, and mental faculties are not fully localised, so it s not just the immensely complex task of  wiring up the brain to its new body that presents a challenge. Half-brain transplants are even more problematical as in the TEs the brain stem is not split, but only the cerebra are supposed to be transplanted. It s not clear to me whether there is pervasive confusion here and that these thought experiments are underspecified to the degree of incoherence. Some philosophers  eg. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wilkes (Kathleen).htm">Kathleen Wilkes</A>  think TEs are unhelpful in the philosophy of personal identity, and that our concepts are not up to being probed in this way. I m not so sure  the TEs are about <em>us</em>, not our <a name="48"></a>concepts. </li><li>There is finally the question whether there is any such thing as  the Self , which is what is supposed to have this FPP. Some contemporary philosophers argue that the Self is an illusion that the brain generates. Others  such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Hume (David).htm">David Hume</A>  have argued; and others  such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Strawson (Galen).htm">Galen Strawson</A>  do argue that when they introspect they find no evidence of a persisting Self. I don t know where they are coming from, as I can t think of anything more certain. But a <a name="48"></a>Buddhist-inspired  no-self view makes the animalist s task easier, if maybe less interesting. </li></ol></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 06/07/2018 18:56:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7: (Ontology)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Ontology is the study of what exists. </li><li>In the context of the philosophy of personal identity, ontological questions ask what <a name="48"></a>persons really are. </li><li>Maybe it s best first of all to step back, with <a name="48"></a>Locke, and consider the <a name="48"></a>sorts of thing that persist and establish the <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions for these sorts: <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>bodies, <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>animals, <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>human beings. </li><li>The ontological question is whether  with Locke  we should add persons to this list. </li><li><a name="48"></a>Baker holds the view that when a person comes into existence, so does a new entity, of a new <a name="48"></a>kind. A world without persons would be ontologically impoverished. </li><li>But is this so, or do existing entities simply gain new <a name="48"></a>properties? </li><li>We must even (on certain definitions of PERSON) ask whether there <a name="48"></a>are any, or whether the term can be eliminated. See:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1006.htm">Unger (Peter) - Why There Are No People</A>" and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>". </li><li>Since Unger s <a name="48"></a>sorites arguments eliminate all material entities with <a name="48"></a>parts, not just persons (though the elimination of persons on this account depends on the assumption that they are material entities with parts) I, along with the later Unger, wish to reject such conclusions.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the enormously bloated categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_8_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_8_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_8_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8: (Person)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with? Wiggins claims that the Greeks had no term for  person (I need to re-read the paper by "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7220.htm">Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person</A>" to double-check this). Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to <a name="48"></a>human beings rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons? </li><li>I need to start with some <a name="48"></a>conceptual analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely <a name="48"></a>semantic or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn t a <a name="48"></a>natural kind concept. </li><li>I accept <a name="48"></a>Locke s conceptual distinction between <a name="48"></a>Human Beings ( Men ), Persons and <a name="48"></a>Substances. I accept Locke s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man  the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics. </li><li><BR>Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke s definition of a person as <ol type="1"> <FONT COLOR = "800080">a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places</FONT> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" - Essay II.27.2)</ol>& be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image. </li><li>But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this  qua-ing can lead to <a name="48"></a>relative identity, and shows how difficult it is for me, at least, to maintain the strict <a name="48"></a>logic of identity in these discussions. </li><li>Some further, fairly random, thoughts:-<ul type="square"><li>We must not ignore potential differences between the Person, the <a name="48"></a>Self and the <a name="48"></a>Individual. </li><li>I doubt the truth of the contention that one s Self is the sum of one s projects, one s individual  <a name="48"></a>identity .</li><li>We must also note the potential for <a name="48"></a>degrees of personhood. </li><li>Are persons essentially sentient? Or rational? And is rationality, like the mental generally, overstated by philosophers whose favourite habitat it is? </li><li>What about <a name="48"></a>temporal gaps in sentience & rationality in the life of an individual  does the person pop in and out of existence? </li><li>What about legal persons: not companies, but the comatose, who still have estates (but then so do the <a name="48"></a>deceased)? </li><li>How important is  person , as against  <a name="48"></a>sentient being in my research concerns? The Cartesians denied sentience to <a name="48"></a>animals and until recently there has been a down-playing of the capacities of animals, particularly their emotional capacities. Consequently, the <a name="48"></a>persistence criteria for sentient non-humans may not have been given the focus they ought. I suspect that many of the <a name="48"></a>thought experiments work just as well if we drop some of the more onerous requirements of personhood in such contexts. Some of the thought experiments play on the thought of  <a name="48"></a>being tortured tomorrow . While animals may not have the concept TOMORROW, I presume the higher animals have some capacity for anticipating future ills about to befall them. I wonder whether my research concerns should be about all beings that care about the future, whether or not they have a clear concept of it as <em>their</em> future.</li></ul></li><li>I will probably start with Dennett s six criteria of personhood (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_545.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood</A>") & <ol type="1"><li>rationality, </li><li>intentionality   predicated of </li><li>intentionality   adopted towards </li><li>reciprocation of the personal stance, </li><li>verbal communication and </li><li>consciousness</li></ol> & in investigating what persons are. See the following <a name="48"></a>essay.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_23">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_23"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_24">include</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_24"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list, which is enormously bloated and needs considerable pruning. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_9_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_9_23"></A><B>Footnote 23</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_9_24"></A><B>Footnote 24</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9: (Sortals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Using Howard Robinson s terminology ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11924.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)</A>"), the <U>Ultimate Sort</U> of a thing is that <a name="48"></a>property without which the thing ceases to exist. </li><li>However, an individual falling under a <a name="48"></a>Phase Sortal can lose the property that defines the phase without ceasing to exist. </li><li>Ultimate Sorts are presumably the same as <a name="48"></a>Baker s <a name="48"></a>Primary Kinds, though I can t remember if she has an analogue of a Phase Sortal. </li><li>The standard example is of a <a name="48"></a>Human Being (as the Ultimate Sort) and Child (as a Phase Sortal). </li><li>So, is <a name="48"></a>personhood an attribute of a human being, like  childhood , that a human being can either possess or lack, or are persons <a name="48"></a>ontologically separate from  their human beings? </li><li><a name="48"></a>Wiggins argues that we can t talk of the <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions of anything until we know what sort it is. </li><li>Olson claims that it s futile to talk of the persistence conditions of persons per se  if human beings, God and angels are all persons  since their persistence conditions (assuming the existence of God and angels, for the sake of the argument) are completely different. This lack of a common set of persistence conditions would indicate that <a name="48"></a>Person is not an Ultimate Sort. </li><li>I (intend to) discuss the sorts that <U>we</U> may fall under in the Note on  <a name="48"></a>What are We .</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_13">Links</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_13"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_10_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5108.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3706.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Sortals</A>", Hirsch</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5144.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Identity and Sortals: Why Relative Identity Is Self-Contradictory</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22818.htm">Baldwin (Thomas) - Reviews: Sameness and Substance by David Wiggins; Objects and Identity by Harold Noonan</A>", Baldwin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4461.htm">Bennett (Daniel) - Essential Properties</A>", Bennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8441.htm">Bennett (Karen) - Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem</A>", Bennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6075.htm">Berglund (Stefan) - Identity and Reduction</A>", Berglund</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23009.htm">Braddon-Mitchell (David) & Miller (Kristie) - Talking about a Universalist World</A>", Braddon-Mitchell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3947.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Stages, Sortals, and Possible Worlds</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7324.htm">Burke (Michael) - Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem</A>", Burke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2011.htm">Burke (Michael) - Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Amongst Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions</A>", Burke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7169.htm">Campbell (John) - Sortals and the Binding Problem</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5885.htm">Carter (William) - On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4948.htm">Cocchiarella (Nino) - On the Logic of Natural Kinds</A>", Cocchiarella</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5500.htm">Feldman (Fred) - Sortal Predicates</A>", Feldman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6250.htm">Griffin (Nicholas) - Sortals</A>", Griffin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5396.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Sheer Coincidence?</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3430.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts</A>", Hughes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6411.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_16">Lowe</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_16"></A>, especially:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21745.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Individuals, Sorts, and Instantiation</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4463.htm">Mackie (Penelope) - Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5039.htm">Oderberg (David) - Coincidence Under a Sortal</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14525.htm">Runggaldier (Edmund) - Sortal Continuity of Material Things</A>", Runggaldier<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14526.htm">Rapp (Christof) - Runggaldier on the Cohabitation of Material Objects</A>", Rapp</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15879.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11355.htm">Stevenson (Leslie) - A formal theory of sortal quantification</A>", Stevenson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19951.htm">Stone (Jim) - Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus's Puzzle</A>", Stone</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9775.htm">Ujvari (Marta) - Cambridge Change and Sortal Essentialism</A>", Ujvari</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_17">Wiggins</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_17"></A>, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3501.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: and the Characteristic Activity or Function or Purpose of their Compliants</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22772.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: A Reply to Xu</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_10_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_10_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_10_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Maybe no need, therefore, to look at "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_640.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", though I ve read:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20013.htm">Baur (Michael) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20012.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20011.htm">Simons (Peter) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>No need to read Wiggins s earlier work in detail? </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 08/05/2018 00:54:43<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10: (Homo Sapiens)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>If <a name="48"></a>animalism is correct  and we are human animals  then we are members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em>. </li><li>Also relevant is <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Blatti (Stephan).htm">Stephan Blatti</A> s  Animal Ancestors Argument for Animalism (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19926.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - A New Argument for Animalism</A>", etc.). </li><li>Consequently, this page probably ought to say something about species, their reality and their status as <a name="48"></a>natural kind concepts. </li><li>I ought also to investigate human evolution, and just when our hominid ancestors became <a name="48"></a>persons. As these ancestors are all gone, investigation of the capacities of our nearest neighbours  the great apes  must make do as a proxy. </li><li>I don t think it s a conceptual truth that the only persons are <a name="48"></a>human persons. Consequently, I do not deny personhood to extinct hominids, or (possibly) to the great apes, dolphins, Klingons, machines, gods, angels and such-like. </li><li>However, I do think it s an empirical truth that the only persons whose personhood we reliably <U>know</U> anything about are human persons, members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em> so think we should start there. </li><li>Also, my main <U>interest</U> is in human persons, so this will be my initial focus. </li><li>Since, I will need to consider whether human persons can exist in non-human <a name="48"></a>bodies <a name="48"></a>(transmigration, <a name="48"></a>mechanisation, <a name="48"></a>resurrection bodies) or even as <a name="48"></a>disembodied <a name="48"></a>minds, I will need to move on from this base camp.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15677.htm">Krause (Johannes) - Our Ancestral Cave Gets More Crowded</A>", Krause</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15604.htm">McKie (Robin) - Out of Africa: The Sequel</A>", McKie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4762.htm">Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals</A>", Olson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3673.htm">Berry (R.J.) & Noble (T.A.) - Darwin, Creation and the Fall</A>", Berry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3667.htm">De Waal (Frans) - Our Inner Ape: The Best and Worst of Human Nature</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6531.htm">De Waal (Frans) - Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2441.htm">De Waal (Frans) - The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_204.htm">Eccles (John) - Evolution of the Brain, Creation of the Self</A>", Eccles</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1393.htm">Ghiselin (Michael) - Metaphysics and the Origin of Species</A>", Ghiselin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6699.htm">Harari (Yuval Noah) - Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind</A>", Harari</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1944.htm">Hartl (Daniel L.) - Our Uncertain Heritage: Genetics & Human Diversity</A>", Hartl</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1859.htm">Johanson (Donald) & Shreeve (James) - Lucy's Child: The Discovery of a Human Ancestor</A>", Johanson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5097.htm">Kitcher (Patricia) - Natural Kinds and Unnatural Persons</A>", Kitcher</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7403.htm">LaPorte (Joseph) - Essential Membership</A>", LaPorte</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_817.htm">Lieberman (Philip) - Eve Spoke - Human Language and Human Evolution</A>", Lieberman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4309.htm">Savage-Rumbaugh (E.Sue) & Lewin (Roger) - Kanzi: Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind</A>", Savage-Rumbaugh<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17121.htm">Pearce (E.K. Victor) - Review of 'Kanzi: Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind' by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh & Roger Lewin</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3101.htm">Schick (Kathy D.) & Toth (Nicholas) - Making Silent Stones Speak: Human Evolution and the Dawn of Technology</A>", Schick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6483.htm">Suddendorf (Thomas) - The Gap</A>", Suddendorf</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1870.htm">Tattersall (Ian), Delson (Eric) & Van Couvering (John), Eds. - Encyclopaedia of Human Evolution and Prehistory</A>", Tattersall</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6471.htm">Young (J.Z.) - An Introduction to the Study of Man</A>", Young</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_11_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_11_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_11_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 28/02/2018 18:40:19<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11: (Logic of Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_12_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_12_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> Identity as a logical concept is  or ought to be  rather uninteresting. </li><li>There s only one type of identity  that which satisfies <a name="48"></a>Leibniz s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals and is an equivalence relation. </li><li>While rejecting them, I will still need to consider various deviant  identities for the light they shed on the issues at hand; in particular:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Relative Identity, </li><li><a name="48"></a>Vague Identity, </li><li><a name="48"></a>Indeterminate Identity, </li><li><a name="48"></a>Contingent Identity, and </li><li><a name="48"></a>Occasional Identity. </li></ol></li><li>Wrong answers to tough questions can be enlightening. </li><li>I intend to cover the bulk of the work under the heads of the notes linked to. </li><li>Currently, standard Identity is covered under <a name="48"></a>Leibniz, though maybe it woud be better parked here. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_12_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_12_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_12_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_12_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3942.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Conditions of Identity: Introduction</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6538.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Identity: Introduction</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_548.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Identification and Externality</A>", Frankfurt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_32.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity</A>", Hirsch, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15898.htm">Hossack (Keith) - Five Lectures on the Logic and Metaphysics of Identity</A>", Hossack</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5837.htm">Jubien (Michael) - The Myth of Identity Conditions</A>", Jubien, 1996</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5978.htm">McGinn (Colin) - Identity</A>", McGinn, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20500.htm">McGinn (Colin) - Prcis of 'Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Prediction, Necessity, Truth'</A>", McGinn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3968.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Identity and Determinacy</A>", Noonan, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_541.htm">Perry (John) - The Importance of Being Identical</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1779.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis</A>", Quine, 1950</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5185.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Review of Milton Munitz's 'Identity and Individuation'</A>", Quine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_540.htm">Rey (Georges) - Survival</A>", Rey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20468.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Individuality</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3900.htm">Williams (Christopher) - Being, Identity and Truth: Preface</A>", Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3562.htm">Williams (Christopher) - What Is Identity?: Introduction and Analytical Table of Contents</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15852.htm">Akiba (Ken) - Identity Is Simple</A>", Akiba, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4420.htm">Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense</A>", Baxter, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15862.htm">Benfield (David) & Erwin (Edward) - Identity, Schmidentity: It's Not All the Same</A>", Benfield+Erwin, 1975</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9287.htm">Bostock (David) - Kripke on Identity and Necessity</A>", Bostock, 1977</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_568.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Conditions of Identity</A>", Brennan, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1386.htm">Brody (Baruch) - Identity and Essence</A>", Brody, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11398.htm">Butchvarov (Panayot) - Identity</A>", Butchvarov, 1977</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20299.htm">Dummett (Michael) - Identity</A>", Dummett, 1981</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1395.htm">Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics: On the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy</A>", Hill, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1413.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity</A>", Hughes, 2004</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6787.htm">Jubien (Michael) - Identity</A>", Jubien, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9785.htm">Monaghan (P.X.) - Property Possession, Identity, and the Nature of an Entity</A>", Monaghan, 2005</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1404.htm">Morris (Thomas) - Understanding Identity Statements</A>", Morris, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1372.htm">Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time</A>", Oderberg, 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5400.htm">Perry (John) - The Two Faces of Identity</A>", Perry, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6146.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Methods of Logic</A>", Quine, 1972 (Section 40  Identity , pp. 221-6)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9500.htm">Salmon (Nathan) - The Fact that x=y</A>", Salmon, 1987</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9502.htm">Salmon (Nathan) - Identity Facts</A>", Salmon, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6662.htm">Wertheimer (Roger) - Identity: Logic, Ontology, Epistemology</A>", Werthheimer, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11613.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity and Supervenience</A>", Wiggins, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1392.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Identity and Identities</A>", Williams, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_661.htm">Williams (Christopher) - What is Identity?</A>", Williams, 1989</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3904.htm">Williams (Christopher) - Selfsame</A>", Williams, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1387.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Identity and Discrimination</A>", Williamson, 2013</li><li>Also, see <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/problems/identity/" TARGET = "_top">Bob Doyle: Identity</A> (http://metaphysicist.com/problems/identity/). </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_12_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_12_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_12_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 03/02/2018 00:20:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12: (Physicalism)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_13_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_13_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Basically, I reject any form of mind-body <a name="48"></a>dualism or immaterialist monism. There are no <a name="48"></a>souls, if a soul is an immaterial substance separable from a <a name="48"></a>body. </li><li>But, I need to investigate <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A> s recent  emergent dualism (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11688.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism'</A>"), despite the fact that his main motivation is a desire to conform to a traditionalist reading of Christian doctrine. </li><li>Given my focus on physicalism, I will need to give some attention to the identity and <a name="48"></a>persistence criteria of material objects as such. </li><li>There are too many versions of physicalism for its endorsement to deliver much without clarification, so I will need to pursue the matter in some detail. </li><li>For the moment, I simply wish to note (or claim) that:<ol type="1"><li> The physical encompasses both body and <a name="48"></a>brain (ie. the <a name="48"></a>physical criterion of personal identity would be satisfied if continuity of brain were essential for the persistence of the person). </li><li>The brain is more important than other physical organs for the persistence of the <a name="48"></a>human being or the <a name="48"></a>human person. </li></ol></li><li>Consequently, I think it worthwhile to conduct a detailed investigation into the functional roles of the various parts of the brain, CNS (Central Nervous System) and PNS (peripheral ...) and how these and the residue of the body are coupled together. Such matters may be relevant to the realism of the various <a name="48"></a>thought experiments about <a name="48"></a>brain transplants, cerebrum transplants and such-like. </li><li>It is, however, debatable how important these details are. For example, debates seem to continue about the possible identity of pain and C-fibre-firing, when it s now acknowledged by all the participants in such debates that the physical realisation of pain-states in mammals requires a lot more than C-fibres. The assumption seems to be that the details don t matter and that similar arguments could be constructed whatever the physical realisation of mental states might be.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_13_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_13_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_13_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_13_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_13_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_13_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_13_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 13: (Survival)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_14_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_14_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I need to distinguish two interpretations of <a name="48"></a>Parfit according to whether survival and identity are or are not equated. </li><li>Also, by  survival does Parfit mean the same as other philosophers mean by  <a name="48"></a>persistence ?</li><li>A standard Parfitian claim is that  what matters in survival is not identity . Parfit is right that the issue isn t necessarily  am I (A) identical to B or C , but  will I have what <a name="48"></a>matters in survival if B, or C, or both survive , and that the reason the two questions are elided is that they don t usually come apart. </li><li>However, there s incoherence in an expression such as  will I survive as B , if I m not supposed identical to B, since survival and this use of the personal pronoun seem to imply identity. </li><li>Also in an expression such as  will I have what matters , to what does the  <a name="48"></a>I refer if I m assumed not to persist? To my present self only? I might now see that I might be happy that a certain future state of affairs, not involving me, appertains, but I would then not have what matters, nor indeed have anything at all. </li><li>So, I think we do need to distinguish, with Parfit, identity from what matters in survival. His idea seems to be that we can have what matters in survival without surviving. </li><li>Parfit s concerns are fundamentally ethical, with Buddhist tendencies. He s trying to remove <a name="48"></a>self from ethics and persuade us that we don t need self, and therefore don t need self-identity. </li><li>Parfit s claim, which I believe to be false, is that we don t really care about our persistence as such, but about the survival of our projects, which can as well or better be prosecuted by others. But we are more selfish than that, and in many circumstances justifiably so.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_14_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_14_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_14_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_14_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_14_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_14_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_14_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 14: (Physical Continuity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_15_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_15_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>In addition to considering just what contiguity and <a name="48"></a>causal conditions a physical object needs to satisfy in order to persist, I need to consider a couple of related issues:<ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Intermittent Objects: can things go in and out of existence? Does the disassembled bicycle still exist in a dispersed state? </li><li><a name="48"></a>Mereology: is the content of any region of spacetime  whether spatially or temporally contiguous or disconnected  or a thing? </li></ol></li><li>What do decisions here have to say about the possibility of <a name="48"></a>resurrection or <a name="48"></a>reincarnation? Is a physicalist able, even in principle, to allow the possibility of <a name="48"></a>disembodied survival, resurrection or reincarnation, given the need for a continuing physical substance to which the individual is identical? Some <a name="48"></a>Christians are physicalists, and <A HREF = "../../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A> has (as a wild speculation - see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>") God miraculously swapping out and preserving our corpses so he can resurrect the same individuals in due course. </li><li>I need to consider (but expect to reject) such suggestions.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_15_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_15_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_15_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_15_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_15_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_15_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_15_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 05/02/2018 20:02:24<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 15: (Psychological Continuity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_16_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_16_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Psychological continuity (and <a name="48"></a>connectedness) is central to personal identity for those who adopt the <a name="48"></a>Psychological View. However, it is said by some <a name="48"></a>animalists - <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> in particular  to be irrelevant to our <a name="48"></a>survival, given that <a name="48"></a>we are <a name="48"></a>Human Animals. </li><li>Following on from discussions on <a name="48"></a>survival, maybe the way to put things is that without psychological continuity I might survive, but not with <a name="48"></a>what matters to me in survival. </li><li>If  <a name="48"></a>Person is a <a name="48"></a>phase sortal of  <a name="48"></a>Human Animal , can there be sequential but different persons within the same animal (as <a name="48"></a>Lewis suggests, though not from the perspective of <a name="48"></a>animalism, in his  <a name="48"></a>Methuselah case) or can there be different and encapsulated <a name="48"></a>First Person Perspectives (either synchronically  as in <a name="48"></a>MPD  or diachronically) within the same animal? </li><li> Person may indeed come apart from  animal , but even then, the person cannot  float free of the animal, but <a name="48"></a>supervenes upon it. See the <a name="48"></a>CV for this. </li><li>This topic is related to others in this general area (in addition to those already noted):-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Psychology<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Psychological Criterion<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Psychopathology</li><li>I also distinguish between backward and <a name="48"></a>forward psychological continuity. The former  traditionally involving <a name="48"></a>memory and psychological traits  is the usual focus, but it is not necessarily identity-preserving even for those espousing the <a name="48"></a>PV, on account of <a name="48"></a>reduplication objections. The same may be true of <a name="48"></a>fission of the <a name="48"></a>FPP, but this is more difficult to imagine. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_16_29">Links</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_16_29"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_16_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>The list of works  to be read below is highly selective, given the overlap with other topics and my focus on <a name="48"></a>animalism. However, I ve been more liberal with those items I ve actually read. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_16_31">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_16_31"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_16_32">include</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_16_32"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3961.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy</A>", Ayers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3799.htm">Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: Preface</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3678.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4282.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7623.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases</A>", Blatti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11679.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7613.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Biology or Psychology? Human Persons and Personal Identity</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5807.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5929.htm">Gale (Richard) - On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments</A>", Gale</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5102.htm">Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5028.htm">Mackie (David) - Going Topless</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22090.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18372.htm">Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5041.htm">Olson (Eric) - Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4426.htm">Olson (Eric) - Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3506.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4739.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12010.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? The Question</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3573.htm">Parfit (Derek) - How We Are Not What We Believe</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3583.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16541.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Psychological continuity</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3617.htm">Unger (Peter) - Conscious Experiences and Subjects of Consciousness: Six Metaphysical Doctrines</A>", Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3618.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Psychological Approach To Our Survival</A>", Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5167.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Survival of the Sentient</A>", Unger</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20313.htm">Francescotti (Robert) - Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity</A>", Francescotti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21103.htm">Hershenov (David) - The Memory Criterion and the Problem of Backward Causation</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5981.htm">Kitcher (Patricia) - The Crucial Relation in Personal Identity</A>", Kitcher</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3404.htm">Madell (Geoffrey) - Personal Identity Through Time</A>", Madell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4328.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5939.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Perdurance and Psychological Continuity</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12011.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12013.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12014.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Temporal Parts</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19245.htm">Ord (Toby) - Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity</A>", Ord</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3572.htm">Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5941.htm">Rea (Michael) & Silver (David) - Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity</A>", Rea & Silver</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15846.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity</A>", Schechtman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11984.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Unger's Psychological Continuity Theory</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_657.htm">Slors (Marc) - The Diachronic Mind: An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem</A>", Slors, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3764.htm">Slors (Marc) - A Content-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20195.htm">Slors (Marc) - Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3660.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity</A>", Van Inwagen</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_16_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_16_29"></A><B>Footnote 29</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_16_31"></A><B>Footnote 31</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_16_32"></A><B>Footnote 32</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 06/05/2018 23:16:48<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 16: (Continuity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_17_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_17_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Continuity is one of the principle factors taken into account when determining or deciding whether an object of whatever sort has <a name="48"></a>survived some <a name="48"></a>change. </li><li> Spatio-temporal continuity is usually what is intended, though this might be deemed to beg the question against the <a name="48"></a>Psychological View of Personal Identity. </li><li>The change must not be too radical or too swift.</li><li>In particular, it is usually held that <ol type="i"><li>An object cannot survive the loss of one of its essential <a name="48"></a>properties.</li><li>Nor can it change too many of its parts at once, though some things may change all of their parts over time provided change is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_17_6">gradual</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_17_6"></A>. </li><li>Nor can it change <a name="48"></a>sortal, which makes radical <a name="48"></a>metamorphosis impossible. </li></ol>In all of the above there is deemed to be insufficient continuity between successive stages of a thing to allow for its <a name="48"></a>persistence. </li><li>This topic  and the associated reading material  is also covered further under the heads of the following specific applications of continuity:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Connectedness vs Continuity,<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Physical Continuity,<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Psychological Continuity, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Psychological Continuity  Forward. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_17_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_17_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_17_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_17_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3705.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Continuity</A>", Hirsch</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6000.htm">Oderberg (David) - Continuity as the Criterion of Identity Over Time: The Classical Theory of Continuity</A>", Oderberg</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3943.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Identity and Continuity</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18382.htm">Kilborn (William) - Contact and Continuity</A>", Kilborn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5323.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Continuants and Continuity</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6001.htm">Oderberg (David) - Continuity as the Criterion of Identity Over Time: Continuity Without Stages?</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6004.htm">Oderberg (David) - The Myth of Continuity: A Coherent Ontology?</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6425.htm">Park (Desiree) - Persons and Continuity</A>", Park</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22057.htm">Scaltsas (Theodore) - Identity, Origin and Spatiotemporal Continuity</A>", Scaltsas</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_17_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_17_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t think this  gradual means  slowly , though this will usually be the case. </li><li>What is needed is for there to be many intermediate steps to allow continuity. </li><li>Each change involved in each of the steps has to be  minor . </li><li>All this is somewhat vague. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_17_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_17_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 05/02/2018 20:02:24<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 17: (Body)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_18_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_18_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I intend to cover all somatic or corporeal identity-issues under this head, or under one of the two related Notes:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Bodily Continuity, or<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Body Criterion. <BR>I ve not quite decided how the labour would be best distributed. </li><li>The "<a name="48"></a>physical continuity" view of personal identity encompasses both the body and the <a name="48"></a>brain, with the latter being more important, so that physical continuity is satisfied by a <a name="48"></a>BIV. </li><li>Somatic continuity is underplayed by philosophers who (while engaged in philosophy) focus more on mental predicates than would those less intellectually inclined. </li><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3014.htm">James (Susan) - Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity</A>" and her objections to Williams s and Quinton s hasty avoidance of the somatic aspects of  <a name="48"></a>body swapping  ie. where very different bodies are involved, especially of different sexes; also, the depersonalising effects of trauma. </li><li>However, there may be confusion here between two meanings of  <a name="48"></a>what matters . Of course, it matters to the ballet dancer or heavyweight boxer that they are appropriately embodied, but this is beside the point as far as personal identity (in the <a name="48"></a>logical sense) is concerned. It matters to me if I lose a leg, but I m still the same person if I do (because I continue to have the same <a name="48"></a>first-person perspective  it s <U>me</U> that cares that I ve lost <U>my</U> leg). </li><li>That s why the  <a name="48"></a>Future Great Pain Test ("<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>" / "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>") is so useful  it focuses the mind on whether it will be <U>me</U> that <a name="48"></a>survives, even in the sad cases where I d prefer it if it wasn t.</li><li>Despite the above comments, and while focus on the body (that is, the brain) is an improvement on focus on the mind (considered as psychology abstracted from its physical enabler), focus on  the body has been superseded in philosophical popularity by focus on the <a name="48"></a>organism. See <a name="48"></a>animalism. </li><li>As noted above, the segregation of books and papers between these three related Notes is currently somewhat arbitrary. However, I ve decided to park the bulk of them under this head unless they specifically relate to  Continuity or  Criteria .</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_18_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_18_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_18_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_18_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21334.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' by Nancey Murphy</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4870.htm">Benson (Ophelia) - This Isn't My Body</A>", Benson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5109.htm">Carter (William) - Our Bodies, Our Selves</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21125.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3014.htm">James (Susan) - Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity</A>", James</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22174.htm">Medlock (Ben) - The body is the missing link for truly intelligent machines</A>", Medlock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21053.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Philosophy and the Mind/Body Problem</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4924.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Philosophers and the Words 'Human Body'</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2438.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Are Persons Bodies?</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4979.htm">Atkins (Kim) - Personal Identity and the Importance of One's Own Body: A Response to Derek Parfit</A>", Atkins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4848.htm">Ayer (A.J.) - Body and Mind</A>", Ayer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1027.htm">Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds. - The Body and the Self</A>", Bermudez etc.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7218.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Self-Profile (G. Bodies & H. Persons)</A>", Chisholm</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5901.htm">Erlandson (Douglas) - Body Transfer and Disembodiment</A>", Erlandson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5501.htm">Gert (Bernard) - Personal Identity and the Body</A>", Gert</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3779.htm">Glover (Jonathan) - Am I My Body?</A>", Glover</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13010.htm">Harrison (Jonathan) - The Embodiment of Mind or What Use Is Having a Body?</A>", Harrison</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5903.htm">Hazelton (W. Dean) - Strawson and Persons and their Bodies</A>", Hazelton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21097.htm">Hershenov (David) - Organisms and their Bodies: Response to LaPorte</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7455.htm">Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Souls and Bodies</A>", Hoffman & Rosenkrantz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1348.htm">Lakoff (George) & Johnson (Mark) - Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought</A>", Lakoff & Johnson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23242.htm">LaPorte (Joseph) - On Two Reasons for Denying That Bodies Can Outlast Life</A>", LaPorte</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22974.htm">Lennon (Kathleen) - Body Image and Bodily Imaginaries</A>", Lennon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5145.htm">Long (Douglas) - The Bodies of Persons</A>", Long</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3423.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Persons and Their Bodies</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2888.htm">Murphy (Nancey) - Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?</A>", Murphy</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5254.htm">Odegard (Douglas) - Personal and Bodily Identity</A>", Odegard</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4063.htm">Penelhum (Terence) - 'Bodily Transfer'</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4954.htm">Pollock (John L.) - Persons and Bodies</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5146.htm">Shaffer (Jerome) - Persons and Their Bodies</A>", Shaffer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_543.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Embodiment and Behavior</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5991.htm">Taylor (Richard) - Persons and Bodies</A>", Taylor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20967.htm">Taylor (Richard) - Persons and Bodies</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_18_17">Taylor</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_18_17"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3924.htm">Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Are Persons Identified Only By Reference to Their Bodies</A>", Vesey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21646.htm">Wartofsky (Marx W.) - Bodies, Body Parts, And Body Language: Reflections On Ontology And Personal Identity In Medical Practice</A>", Wartofsky</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_18_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_18_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_18_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_18_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Not the same as the other identically-entitled work by Taylor! </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/03/2018 21:17:17<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 18: (Forensic Property)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_19_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_19_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This Note will discuss the relation of personal identity to ethics, and how much ethical issues ought to drive our thoughts on the metaphysics of personal identity. </li><li><a name="48"></a>Locke had concerns about the correct attribution of moral blame or praise on the Great Day of Reckoning, but I doubt the importance to be given to forensic aspects for the topic of personal identity, other than as a historical motivator. </li><li>I reject Frankfurt s proposal (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_207.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person</A>") that <a name="48"></a>wantons are not <a name="48"></a>persons, on the grounds that they do satisfy the other standard conditions of personhood: they satisfy rationality and linguistic conditions, have a <a name="48"></a>first-person perspective and <a name="48"></a>survival <a name="48"></a>matters to them.</li><li>The issue of the punishment of already-reformed or amnesiac criminals has been thought relevant to issues of personal identity, as though any reluctance to punish was tied to doubts about identity. Such doubts only reflect confusion on the purpose of punishment; it depends whether we think of punishment as reformative, retributive, a deterrent, or merely treat incarceration or execution as a necessary evil for the protection of society (by eliminating the source of harm). </li><li>Only if we think of punishment as reformative, so there s no point punishing the seriously repentant, might we have doubts about the propriety of carrying out the punishment. However, the reason isn t that the criminal is a different person but that the needed reformation has already taken place. </li><li>From the other perspectives, for instance the retributive, there <I>is</I> still a point to the punishment of the already-reformed criminal (cf. C.S. Lewis s advice  probably in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4708.htm">Lewis (C.S.) - Mere Christianity</A>"  to the converted murderer as to his Christian duty  it is  to be hanged ; presumably because this was, in Lewis s day, his debt to the state, to which, as a good Christian, he must submit), and the temptation to provide reasons not to doesn t arise. </li><li>With respect to amnesiacs, again there s only a reluctance to punish on the reformatory view, but again the reluctance has nothing to do with questions of identity, but of the attempt at reformation being ineffective or even counter-productive. If I m punished for something I can t remember doing, I m likely to resent the authority that punishes me. </li><li>There is a question of whether <a name="48"></a>persons, as distinct from <a name="48"></a>human beings, are the subjects of special moral concern, or whether it is the reverse implication  that those for whom we feel a special moral concern should be accounted persons. </li><li>Whether all persons are morally equal is another matter altogether. This is relevant because if the Great Apes were to be counted as persons, of what moral status would they be? See "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11687.htm">Rachels (James) - Morality without the Idea that Humans are Special</A>", in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2189.htm">Rachels (James) - Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism</A>", for  Moral Individualism , the view that difference of moral treatment should depend only on the individual s characteristics, not their group membership, though thus baldly-stated this raises huge questions. </li><li>The Great Ape Project (absurdly, it seems to me; see "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_774.htm">Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity</A>") demands moral equality between humans and the great apes, on the grounds that the latter have intellectual capabilities on a par with human 2-3 year-olds. Even human beings aren t equal in their capacities, but we can invent a law demanding that we treat them equally, and we can enact a law extending this moral equality to encompass the great apes, or even stones, if we like. If the great apes satisfy the criteria for personhood, they are persons, but the right to equality of treatment is only loosely connected to capacities.</li><li>See also my  rather dubious  Note on <a name="48"></a>Degrees of Personhood</li><li>Several papers in the reading lists below are also covered under the Note on Locke, and are only partly relevant. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_19_11">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_19_11"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_19_12">include</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_19_12"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22752.htm">Benatar (David) - Kids? Just say no</A>", Benatar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_774.htm">Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity</A>", Cavalieri</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_207.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person</A>", Frankfurt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2189.htm">Rachels (James) - Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism</A>", Rachels</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12266.htm">Scheffler (Samuel) - The Independence and Distinctness of the Personal Point of View</A>", Scheffler</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3382.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7618.htm">Von Wachter (Daniel) - Free Agents as Cause</A>", Von Wachter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2443.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Ethical Consistency</A>", Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_546.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Persons, Character and Morality</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14537.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and the Natural Order</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6601.htm">Benatar (David) - Better Never to Have Been: The Harm Of Coming Into Existence</A>", Benatar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6382.htm">Bennett (Jonathan) - Locke on Diachronic Identity-Judgements</A>", Bennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3952.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Concepts of a Person</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12116.htm">Conee (Earl) - Metaphysics and the morality of abortion</A>", Conee<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12115.htm">Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) - The Relevance of Metaphysics to Bioethics: A Reply to Earl Conee</A>", Chappell<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12137.htm">Conee (Earl) - Reply to Timothy Chappell</A>", Conee</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18344.htm">Johnston (Mark) - What Is Found At The Center?</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3964.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Locke</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_405.htm">Rovane (Carol) - The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics</A>", Rovane<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12241.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - Review of 'The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics'</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12246.htm">Wallace (Kathleen) - Agency, Personhood, and Identity: Carol Rovane's The Bounds of Agency</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12242.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Theoretical Persons and Practical Agents</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7450.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Personal Identity</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21210.htm">Strawson (Galen) - 'The Secrets of All Hearts': Locke on Personal Identity</A>", Strawson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21850.htm">Strawson (Galen) - 'Where our responsibility lies': Locke on personal identity</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2343.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Moral Incapacity</A>", Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2446.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Idea of Equality</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_19_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_19_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_19_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 16/02/2018 00:30:14<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 19: (Psychology)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_20_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_20_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>If we adopt the <a name="48"></a>Psychological View of Personal Identity  which I don t  then it is psychological factors that are important in determining our <a name="48"></a>persistence criteria. </li><li> We must consider not just <a name="48"></a>memory but other psychological capacities, including character. </li><li>However, while these factors do <a name="48"></a>matter to the <a name="48"></a>survivor, they don t matter in the binary sense of  have I survived or not .</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_20_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_20_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_20_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_20_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_20_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_20_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_20_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 20: (Self-Consciousness)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This is more than just phenomenal <a name="48"></a>consciousness (which may be a watershed in itself with moral consequences greater than generally accepted) but the consciousness of oneself as a <a name="48"></a>self (as <a name="48"></a>Locke noted). </li><li>But we need also consider the view that this  watcher is an illusion, a falsely assumed <a name="48"></a>Cartesian Ego whose existence is undermined by neuroscience, the modularity of mind, and such-like.</li><li>I was alerted to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_6">quotation</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_6"></A> from <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Updike" TARGET = "_top">John Updike</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Updike) s "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6705.htm">Updike (John) - Self-Consciousness</A>":- <ul type="square"> <FONT COLOR = "800080">Not only are selves conditional but they die. Each day, we wake slightly altered, and the person we were yesterday is dead. So why, one could say, be afraid of death, when death comes all the time? </FONT> </ul>I think <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_7">this thought</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_7"></A> is muddled in several respects:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Death is a biological event that  at least in the ordinary case  can happen to an organism only once. Whatever <a name="48"></a>Selves are, they don t die every night. Follow the links for further discussion. </li><li>We do indeed  wake slightly altered ; indeed, we alter slightly whenever we encounter an event that has an impact on us. </li><li>I m not sure what Updike means by our selves being  conditional , but I can well believe it. </li><li>Updike seems to subscribe to some  strict and philosophical view of identity, whereby nothing survives change. This is not a useful understanding. </li><li>Any comfort we might get from such thoughts concerning our inevitable deaths is entirely spurious. </li></ol></li><li>For a page of Links to this Note, <a href="Notes_21_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>The categorised reading list is rather small; naturally, see also those on <a name="48"></a>Self and <a name="48"></a>Consciousness.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_97.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11981.htm">Kriegel (Uriah) - Strange Loops and Self-conscious Marbles</A>", Kriegel</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2053.htm">Eilan (Naomi), Marcel (Anthony) & Bermudez (Jose Luis) - Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Approach</A>", Eilan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2690.htm">Laycock (Stephen) - Consciousness It/Self</A>", Laycock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3697.htm">Neisser (Ulric) - Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge</A>", Neisser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4953.htm">Pollock (John L.) - The Self-Conscious Machine</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3831.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - The Self and the Contents of Consciousness</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3920.htm">Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Are We Intimately Conscious of What We Call Our Self</A>", Vesey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5067.htm">Vjecsner (Paul) - Searching for the Heart of Human Nature</A>", Vjecsner</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_21_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_21_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>It appeared in <em>The Week</em>, but it seems to be a popular one. </li><li>See <A HREF = "https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/939545-not-only-are-selves-conditional-but-they-die-each-day" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/939545-not-only-are-selves-conditional-but-they-die-each-day). </li><li>I m not yet clear of the context: the book is on order. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_21_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Which has little to do with self-consciousness other that the book s title. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_21_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_21_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/04/2018 00:12:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 21: (First-Person Perspective)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_22_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_22_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The concept of a  First-Person Perspective (FPP) is central to the <a name="48"></a>Constitution View of personal identity. </li><li>Just what this is needs spelling out  what does <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> think this is, and why does she think it so <a name="48"></a>ontologically important. She seems to be obsessed by the thought that beings that can contemplate their own <a name="48"></a>deaths are ontologically different. Why is it that this, rather than simply a phenomenally <a name="48"></a>conscious perspective, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_22_6">that counts</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_22_6"></A> as the ontological watershed? </li><li>We might instead posit another <a name="48"></a>property  that of consciousness of <a name="48"></a>Self  as the critical moment in the ontological ladder leading to persons. I suspect some philosophers of rigging the qualifications for personhood so that only <a name="48"></a>human beings  and maybe some others even more exalted (like God and angels)  qualify. Non-human <a name="48"></a>animals must be excluded to ensure the uniqueness and specialness of humans. </li><li>Also, can we really use this term to <a name="48"></a>explain personal identity, as  <a name="48"></a>person appears in it? If it s supposed to be elucidatory of personal identity, we seem to have a circle. </li><li>Really what s important  it seems to me  is that we have animals with certain properties that are important to them. We can t reify the property and make it a stand-alone thing, like the Cheshire Cat s smile. Nor can we assume without a lot of careful argument that this property can hop from one infrastructure to another  as in <a name="48"></a>uploading or <a name="48"></a>resurrection. </li><li>An argument I m fond of is that  despite whatever psychological differences there may be between me and my future self  I can both rationally anticipate his experiences and should display rational concern for his well-being. That is because we share the same  window on the world . Try out the <a name="48"></a>future great pain test and see if I'm worried! Now is this  window on the world the same as a FPP? After all, it may be that my senile old self no longer qualifies as a person, though is phenomenally conscious, and I should be concerned for him whatever his ontological status; only the absence of phenomenal consciousness would remove all that <a name="48"></a>matters. </li><li>In summary, I think the FPP is a useful concept, and represents our window on the world, and what matters to us in survival. But it is a property of a human animal, and that animal s <a name="48"></a>persistence doesn t rest upon it. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_22_18">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_22_18"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_22_19">include</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_22_19"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21344.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3676.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The First-Person Perspective</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6352.htm">Genova (Lisa) - Still Alice</A>", Genova</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>", Shoemaker_D</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_34.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - The First-Person Perspective</A>", Shoemaker_S</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21052.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Does God Know Our First-Person Perspectives?</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_634.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The First Person</A>", Anscombe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22996.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Cartesianism and the First-Person Perspective</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21187.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Can Subjectivity be Naturalized?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21204.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - First-Person Externalism</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6374.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22993.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The First-Person Perspective and its Relation to Cognitive Science</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_601.htm">Eilan (Naomi) - The First Person Perspective</A>", Eilan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18375.htm">Johnston (Mark) - 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23101.htm">Kolak (Daniel) - Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity</A>", Kolak</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21580.htm">Kripke (Saul) - The First Person</A>", Kripke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6403.htm">Metzinger (Thomas) - Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity</A>", Metzinger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23100.htm">Thomson (Garrett) - Counting subjects</A>", Thomson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12803.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - The Uses of the First Person</A>", Valberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12804.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - What Makes First-Person Reference First Personal?</A>", Valberg</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_22_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_22_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I suppose either both or neither might count ontologically. </li><li>Also, both might have enormous significance, yet not imply that an ontologically distinct entity had come on the scene. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_22_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_22_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 13/02/2018 00:07:12<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 22: (Concepts)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_23_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_23_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>" for the importance of concepts. Unger s answer to the problem of vagueness  as exemplified by the  disappearing chair problem (atom-wise annihilation of the chair & just when does it cease to be?) is that there never were any chairs, just our concept of a chair and atoms arranged chair-wise. We sit on the atoms, not on the concept, but we describe the atom-heap as a chair. But this concept is vague, or there is a family resemblance, so sometimes it s not clear whether it applies or not. The big question is whether <a name="48"></a>natural kind objects exist independently of our conceptual schemes. Certainly they do as atom-heaps, unclear whether they do as answers to our concepts. So, various atom-heaps carry on existing, but whether our concepts carry on applying is vague. </li><li>Others (<A HREF = "../../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A><a name="48"></a>?) take the view that only mereological simples and organisms exist, which seems to be a similar view. </li><li>There seems to be something special about natural-kind concepts, the persistence of whose exemplars (unlike those of artefact-concepts) don t in any sense seem to depend on us and our concepts. Is <a name="48"></a>PERSON a natural kind concept? If it isn t, then are we simply left with rather inconsequential <a name="48"></a>semantic arguments? </li><li>Are the arguments above really saying that artefacts don t exist? Presumably artefacts depend on us for their existence as <a name="48"></a>artefacts, though not as lumps of matter. </li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> argues that a new <a name="48"></a>ontological entity (a painting) comes into existence because of the relation of an object (a canvas plus paint appropriately distributed) to an art-world. I need to press Baker here. Are all her analogies truly analogous? Given evolution, even species-concepts (paradigms for natural kind concepts) are mobile rather than being eternally fixed. Yet Baker seems to think that it s a relation to evolutionary history that makes an <a name="48"></a>animal what it is (as distinct, presumably, from atoms arranged animal-wise).</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_23_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_23_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_23_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_23_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>", Unger</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_23_11">elsewhere</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_23_11"></A>) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20169.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21466.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - Invertebrate concepts confront the Generality Constraint (and win)</A>", Carruthers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_227.htm">Margolis (Eric) & Laurence (Stephen), Eds. - Concepts - Core Readings</A>", Margolis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20503.htm">McGinn (Colin) - Conceptual Causation: Some Elementary Reflections</A>", McGinn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20016.htm">Stephan (Achim) - Are Animals Capable of Concepts?</A>", Stephan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22768.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_23_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_23_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_23_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_23_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve also added a few interesting but maybe tangential papers!</li><li>These may expand the scope of this Note. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 04/02/2018 11:29:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 23: (Animalism)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_24_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_24_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There are different interpretations of Animalism, which I need to compare and contrast. My preferred option is <a name="48"></a>Olson s, namely, that animalism is the view that we are identical to human <a name="48"></a>animals and that, since human animals don t have any psychological properties essentially, neither do we. </li><li>Olson is probably the best known active <a name="48"></a>Animalist. See:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>" and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2710.htm">Olson (Eric) - What are We?</A>". <BR>Follow the above link for other animalists. </li><li>Olson s claim is not that there are no non-animal persons, but that human persons are essentially animals. Other animalists, such as <a name="48"></a>Wiggins, insist (or are said to insist, or used to insist) that the only persons are indeed <a name="48"></a>human beings, or are (maybe) other animals. </li><li>I incline to agree with Olson on the topic of <a name="48"></a>what we are, but need to press hard with <a name="48"></a>thought experiments to see why we can t separate the two  that is, why we can t separate where we go as <a name="48"></a>persons from where we go as animals: our personhood can t be pealed off from our animality and ported to some other infrastructure  or at least not while preserving our identity. </li><li>There is a distinction between persons and human animals. Is the distinction empirical or conceptual? Why can t I copy my <a name="48"></a>consciousness onto a <a name="48"></a>machine and that machine be me? There seem to be two issues here. <ol type="1"><li>Firstly, my intuition is that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves a brain-like infrastructure and </li><li>Secondly, copying a consciousness onto a machine isn t identity-preserving, even if possible, but is the creation of a <a name="48"></a>simulacrum. </li></ol></li><li>Basically, I reject both <a name="48"></a>functionalism and the idea of consciousness  hopping from one infrastructure to another . Incidentally, I rather hope we can t copy our phenomenal consciousness onto a machine, or the possibility of hell on earth unfolds. The nasty business of very extended torment could be delegated to another machine that neither knows nor cares what it is doing. </li><li>Also, should we consider <a name="48"></a>fetuses and the senile or those in a <a name="48"></a>PVS as persons? See <a name="48"></a>Baker who alleges that those who have, will have or have had the capacity for a <a name="48"></a>first-person perspective should be accounted persons. But is this simply arbitrary retrofitting of philosophy to Christian doctrine (though <a name="48"></a>Wiggins seems to share this view; individuals are persons if typical individuals of their kind are persons)?</li><li>I must also discuss <a name="48"></a>animals under this head. If we are identical to (human) animals then to what, exactly, <em>are</em> we identical  that is, just what <U>is</U> a human animal  and that are <em>their</em> <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions? Note that there are disagreements about the referent of  animal  is it the <a name="48"></a>organism or the <a name="48"></a>body? The key issue is with <a name="48"></a>corpses. Feldman thinks they are animals, but Olson thinks they aren t. <a name="48"></a>Death is central to the enquiry. Just when does the person or animal <a name="48"></a>commence or cease to be? If he is resuscitated (or <a name="48"></a>resurrected / <a name="48"></a>reincarnated, assuming these to be possible) what happens in the <a name="48"></a>interregnum? </li><li>As noted <a name="48"></a>elsewhere,<a name="48"></a>, I need to investigate the termini of human existence, and the issues they raise for the various views  the  <a name="48"></a>fetus problem for the constitution view and the  <a name="48"></a>corpse problem for animalism. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_24_33">Links</A></U><SUB>33</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_24_33"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_24_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_24_34">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_24_34"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_24_35">include</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_24_35"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3961.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy</A>", Ayers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_457.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Olson</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21333.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3304.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>", Baker, etc.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7620.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism (Continuum)</A>", Blatti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7624.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism and its Implications</A>", Blatti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7621.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism and Personal Identity</A>", Blatti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12073.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism Unburdened</A>", Blatti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7623.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases</A>", Blatti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19912.htm">Blatti (Stephan), Ed. - The Lives of Human Animals</A>", Blatti, etc.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11679.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5241.htm">Carter (William) - Death and Bodily Transfiguration</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5488.htm">Carter (William) - Do Zygotes Become People?</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4933.htm">Carter (William) - How to Change Your Mind</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4303.htm">Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7613.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Biology or Psychology? Human Persons and Personal Identity</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4340.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'</A>", Dainton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5629.htm">Francescotti (Robert) - Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity</A>", Francescotti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3741.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7611.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Some Thoughts on Animalism</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4719.htm">Gendler (Tamar Szabo) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'</A>", Gendler</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4546.htm">Hershenov (David) - Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4536.htm">Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3625.htm">Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person: Introduction</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19893.htm">Johansson (Jens) - What is Animalism?</A>", Johansson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20173.htm">Liao (S. Matthew) - The Organism View Defended</A>", Liao</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5075.htm">Mackie (David) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5028.htm">Mackie (David) - Going Topless</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5102.htm">Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22018.htm">Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence</A>", Madden</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14449.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4758.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5035.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_459.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3973.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_560.htm">Olson (Eric) - An Argument for Animalism</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5110.htm">Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18372.htm">Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4762.htm">Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5041.htm">Olson (Eric) - Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5192.htm">Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_440.htm">Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2002)</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5040.htm">Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity and the Radiation Argument</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14447.htm">Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5211.htm">Olson (Eric) - Relativism and Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14451.htm">Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4426.htm">Olson (Eric) - Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4721.htm">Olson (Eric) - Review of Hud Hudson's 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_24_36">Olson</A></U><SUB>36</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_24_36"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2673.htm">Olson (Eric) - There Is No Problem of the Self</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_460.htm">Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7734.htm">Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7610.htm">Olson (Eric) - Warum wir Tiere sind (Why we are animals)</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4739.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5208.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was Jekyll Hyde?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2929.htm">Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5242.htm">Rosenberg (Jay) - Bodies, Corpses, and Chunks of Matter: A Reply to Carter</A>", Rosenberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11449.htm">Scarlett (Brian) - The Moral Uniqueness of the Human Animal</A>", Scarlett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4720.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1220.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons and Personal Identity</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2056.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3395.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21001.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, Ourselves: Introduction</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7612.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Some Objections to Animalism</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21029.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5094.htm">Steinhart (Eric) - Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms</A>", Steinhart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5066.htm">Tollefsen (Christopher) - Abortion and the Human Animal</A>", Tollefsen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3532.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings: Preface</A>", van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3533.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings: Introduction</A>", van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3653.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Introduction</A>", van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4191.htm">Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4876.htm">Wollheim (Richard) - Living</A>", Wollheim</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5133.htm">Yourgrau (Palle) - Can the Dead Really Be Buried?</A>", Yourgrau</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14450.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6482.htm">Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity</A>", Blatti&Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11407.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Animals, Babies, and Subjects</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1385.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21923.htm">Hershenov (David) - Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21106.htm">Hershenov (David) - Merrick's Identification of the Person and Organism</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21102.htm">Hershenov (David) - Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21124.htm">Hershenov (David) - Soulless Organisms? Hylomorphism vs. Animalism</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21095.htm">Hershenov (David) - Who Doesn't Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_109.htm">Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14535.htm">Hudson (Hud) - I am Not an Animal!</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20170.htm">Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity</A>", Koch-Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5999.htm">Larkin (William S.) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies</A>", Larkin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20708.htm">Moran (Alexander P.) - Animalism and the Thinking Parts Problem</A>", Moran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16829.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010)</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22090.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23095.htm">Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2015)</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22066.htm">Olson (Eric) - Review of P. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12019.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? ('New Version')</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2710.htm">Olson (Eric) - What are We?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5906.htm">Persson (Ingmar) - Our Identity and the Separability of Person and Organism</A>", Persson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20427.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons, Animals, and Identity</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6358.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, Ourselves</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20706.htm">Sutton (Catherine S.) - The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem</A>", Sutton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23082.htm">Toner (Patrick) - Hylemorphic animalism</A>", Toner</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14534.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person</A>", van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_49.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings</A>", van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4723.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Material People</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_24_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_24_33"></A><B>Footnote 33</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_24_34"></A><B>Footnote 34</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_24_35"></A><B>Footnote 35</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>In the reading lists that follow, I ve intended to exclude items whose primary  home is in another Note, but have probably included a lot that might feature in <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">Click here for Note</A>. . </li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_24_36"></A><B>Footnote 36</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve not explicitly listed the individual chapters, though my comments and write-ups are variable. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 28/04/2018 00:07:12<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 24: (Constitution View)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_25_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_25_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The Constitution View is that <a name="48"></a>human persons are <a name="48"></a>constituted by their <a name="48"></a>bodies but are not identical to them, though a lot more needs to be said here. </li><li>The primary source is <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A>, starting with "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>". </li><li>Baker s account of constitution is not the standard <a name="48"></a>mereological account, of some larger body being constituted by its parts, but is her own idea that requires explication. She appears to have a non-mereological view of constitution which is hard to unravel, involving the relation of one complete thing to another (or to a context). </li><li>I also need to discuss her concern for primary <a name="48"></a>kinds, and the concept of  having of <a name="48"></a>properties derivatively . </li><li>It s unclear to me whether the <a name="48"></a>brain has a special place for Baker; as far as I remember, she uniformly refers to  bodies .</li><li>Baker also has a commitment to PERSONs being <a name="48"></a>substances in their own right, rather than personhood being an honorific title applied to substances that at other times might not deserve the honorific. </li><li>She also reifies a useful idea  that of a <a name="48"></a>First-person Perspective. It is the FPP that individuates persons, according to Baker, so the FPP requires explanation as well. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_25_11">Links</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_25_11"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_25_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_25_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_25_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_25_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_25_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5196.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on my 'The Ontological Status of Persons'</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21327.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - EmbryosandStemCellResearch</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7293.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>", Baker, especially & <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3674.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons in the Material World</A>" <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3678.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time</A>" <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3681.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons</A>" <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3682.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - In Favour Of the Constitution View</A>" </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5137.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21333.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7300.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Zimmerman s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism'</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7285.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Difference that Self-Consciousness Makes</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5194.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Ontological Status of Persons</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4282.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7312.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3304.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>", Baker, Etc.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12073.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism Unburdened</A>", Blatti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20715.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: Introduction - What Kind of Things Are We?</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5807.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_458.htm">Garrett (Brian) - The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21125.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22906.htm">Kazez (Jean) - The Philosophical Parent: Asking the Hard Questions About Having and Raising Children</A>", Kazez</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_460.htm">Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5195.htm">Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Reflections on the Ontological Status of Persons</A>", Rosenkrantz</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_25_14">might start with</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_25_14"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20169.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7293.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6205.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Materialism with a Human Face</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7298.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - On Being One s Own Person</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14537.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and the Natural Order</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7308.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person' by Hud Hudson</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6979.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Does a Person Begin?</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21959.htm">Buckareff (Andrei A.) & Van Wagenen (Joel S.) - Surviving Resurrection</A>", Buckareff </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8885.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Persons, Bodies and the Constitution Relation</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6335.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6469.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1398.htm">Lizza (John) - Persons, Humanity, & the Definition of Death</A>", Lizza</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6204.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3911.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Objects & Persons: Preface</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5209.htm">Olson (Eric) - Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12012.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Constitution</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1328.htm">Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - People and Their Bodies</A>", Thomson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4924.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Philosophers and the Words 'Human Body'</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5900.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Reply to Reviewers</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5359.htm">Wasserman (Ryan) - The Constitution Question</A>", Wasserman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6980.htm">Wilson (Robert) - Persons, Social Agency, and Constitution</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_25_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_25_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_25_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_25_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_25_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: This list needs a review.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/06/2018 16:32:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 25: (Constitution View - Objections)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_26_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_26_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The two obvious issues are:- <ol type="i"><li>The  too many minds objection (otherwise known as the  <a name="48"></a>thinking animal argument ), and </li><li>The  <a name="48"></a>fetus problem </li></ol></li><li><b>Thinking Animals</b><ul type="square"><li>In saying that Theo is a human <a name="48"></a>animal and that also that Theo is a <a name="48"></a>person that is ontologically distinct from, and merely <a name="48"></a>constituted by, the human animal, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> argues that we have too many thinkers and therefore the <a name="48"></a>constitution view is false. </li><li>I don t like this argument, in that the form would prove too much. I see analogies with various <a name="48"></a>mereological arguments:-<BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/U/Author_Unger (Peter).htm">Peter Unger</A> s argument that  there are no ordinary things , <BR>&rarr; The <a name="48"></a>Sorites arguments against the existence of material objects with parts, and maybe with <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Tib/Tibbles, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Dion/Theon <BR>All these arguments seem to have the same form  there are alleged to be too many co-located items, leading to the denial of some seemingly obvious premise. </li><li>Yet maybe I accept a version of this in disliking immaterial souls (again, too many thinkers  if the brain thinks, why do we need a soul that thinks as well). However, the degree of ontological distinctness between  the self and its brain is greater than that between the person and the human being that (maybe temporarily) constitutes it. I will reconsider this collection of arguments in due course. </li></ul></li><li><b>Fetus Problem</b> <ul type="square"><li>This is the question whether I was ever a Fetus. According to the Constitution View, I was not, as the Fetus had no <a name="48"></a>First Person Perspective (FPP), not even a rudimentary one and since the FPP is constitutive / individuative of me.</li><li>But, if I was not the Fetus, where did I come from?</li><li>I m not hugely impressed by this argument either. It s also a problem for Animalism (it is said)  is the early fetus an animal? Was the fetus a proper part of the mother? </li></ul></li><li>So, should I accept the CV? I think not. I am an animal, and <a name="48"></a>objections to Animalism can be overcome. The whole idea of Constitution as conceived of by the CV is very odd, and the CV was invented to provide the hope of <a name="48"></a>resurrection. I need to justify these assertions, of course!</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_26_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_26_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_26_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_26_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3304.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>", Baker Etc<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_458.htm">Garrett (Brian) - The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>", Garrett<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_459.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>", Noonan<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_460.htm">Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5196.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on my 'The Ontological Status of Persons'</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3681.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7734.htm">Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5195.htm">Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Reflections on the Ontological Status of Persons</A>", Rosenkrantz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19852.htm">Sider (Ted) - Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies</A>", Sider</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5636.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Replies to Zimmerman, Rea & Pereboom</A>", Baker<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5633.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons and Bodies: Constitution Without Mereology?</A>", Zimmerman<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5634.htm">Rea (Michael) - Lynne Baker on Material Constitution</A>", Rea<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5635.htm">Pereboom (Derek) - On Baker's Persons and Bodies</A>", Peerboom</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5984.htm">Burke (Michael) - Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism</A>", Burke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2441.htm">De Waal (Frans) - The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_26_17">De Waal</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_26_17"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7744.htm">Olson (Eric) - Review of Lynne Baker's 'Persons And Bodies'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_460.htm">Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12012.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Constitution</A>", Olson</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_26_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_26_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_26_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_26_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Argues against human uniqueness.</li><li>No doubt there are a number of other books of this ilk. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 06/02/2018 23:35:31<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 26: (Natural Kinds)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_27_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_27_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This Note is a subsidiary note to that on <a name="48"></a>Kinds. <ol type="i"><li>A kind is a way of categorising things. </li><li>Some ways of categorising things are more  natural than others  ie they reflect the way the world is, rather than the way we and our interests are. Natural kinds  carve the world at the joints . </li><li>So, toothbrushes form a kind, but it is not a natural kind, whereas lions form a natural kind, as does gold. </li></ol></li><li>I have <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_27_3">some questions</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_27_3"></A> on Natural Kinds related to the topic of PID:- <ol type="i"><li>Is the concept of a <a name="48"></a>PERSON a natural kind concept? </li><li>Can PERSON be analysed in terms of other concepts, or do we presuppose it? </li><li>See, for example, "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_645.htm">Madell (Geoffrey) - The Identity of the Self</A>" for the alleged unanalysability of the concept PERSON. </li><li>Maybe I should cover under this head whether SENTIENT BEING (or RATIONAL BEING) is the natural kind concept, and that PERSON, with its social / legal / moral overtones, is something cultures assign. </li><li>Even so, the concept <a name="48"></a>HUMAN ANIMAL is really the natural kind concept, exemplars of which gains or lose the <a name="48"></a>properties of sentience, rationality, and even the <a name="48"></a>first-person perspective. </li></ol></li><li>When does a natural kind come into existence? Natural kinds are concepts, and such questions are controversial. Side-step this question and simply talk about when the concept becomes instantiated.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_27_8">Links</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_27_8"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_27_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_27_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_27_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_27_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_27_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15869.htm">Arnold (Keith) - The Subject of Radical Change</A>", Arnold</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5108.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6828.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture III</A>", Kripke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7546.htm">Reid (Jasper) - Kripke on Naming and Necessity (Course Notes)</A>", Reid</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7548.htm">Salmon (Nathan) - Reference and Essence - Prefaces & Introduction</A>", Salmon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21184.htm">Schwartz (Stephen P.) - Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds: Introduction</A>", Schwartz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>", Wilson </li></ol></li><li>The study-list for Natural Kinds could be quite extensive, based on the categorised reading list, so I ve been highly selective. Probably best to start with "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21723.htm">Bird (Alexander) & Tobin (Emma) - Natural Kinds</A>" and then:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21723.htm">Bird (Alexander) & Tobin (Emma) - Natural Kinds</A>", Bird & Tobin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4341.htm">Brown (Jessica) - Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities</A>", Brown</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_299.htm">Dupre (John) - The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science</A>", Dupre</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7412.htm">Dupre (John) - Is 'Natural Kind' a Natural Kind Term?</A>", Dupre</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7406.htm">Ereshefsky (Marc) - Bridging the Gap between Human Kinds and Biological Kinds</A>", Ereshefsky</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19961.htm">Hawley (Katherine) & Bird (Alexander) - What are Natural Kinds?</A>", Hawley&Bird</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3714.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Natural Kinds and Natural Units</A>", Hirsch</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5097.htm">Kitcher (Patricia) - Natural Kinds and Unnatural Persons</A>", Kitcher</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7850.htm">LaPorte (Joseph) - Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change: Introduction</A>", LaPorte</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5850.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Natural Kinds</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2117.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Natural Kinds</A>", Quine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1445.htm">Wilkerson (T.E.) - Natural Kinds</A>", Wilkerson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7428.htm">Daly (Chris) - Review. Natural kinds. T.E. Wilkerson</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21020.htm">Dupre (John) - Wilkerson on Natural Kinds</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7429.htm">Elder (Crawford) - Review. Natural kinds. T.E. Wilkerson</A>"</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_27_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_27_3"></A><B>Footnote 3</B>: These are rather old, and need careful reviewing <a name="On-Page_Link_27_8"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_27_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_27_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 23/07/2018 00:40:19<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 27: (Taking Persons Seriously)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_28_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_28_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a>Baker accuses <a name="48"></a>animalists of  not taking persons seriously .</li><li>But, how seriously <u>should</u> they be taken (in metaphysics)? </li><li>Probably what really matters <a name="48"></a>ontologically is the possession of a <a name="48"></a>conscious (though not necessarily <a name="48"></a>self-conscious) perspective. This is what we must take seriously. </li><li>Baker would argue that there exists an ontological difference at this stage too & but, why is the <a name="48"></a>first-person perspective so very important  all that worrying about death? </li><li>Buddhists are trying to lose this sense of <a name="48"></a>self. Do all cultures have it? </li><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6941.htm">Wong (David) - Relativism</A>" for the Chinese view, which takes the community more seriously than the individual. </li><li>Whether we ought to take moral or rational beings <U>extra</U> seriously is the point at issue.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_28_9">Links</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_28_9"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_28_Links.htm">Click here</a>. Unfortunately, for this topic the page is rather diminutive. </li><li>It is difficult, in consequence, to prepare a reading list for this topic, which is touched on  usually parenthetically  in papers dealing with other topics. The lists below are to be treated in that light. Indeed, the only items  apart from Chapter 9 of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>"  are the papers in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3304.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>", though there are doubtless many other papers by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> that are relevant and which will be picked up as I review them in detail. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_28_10">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_28_10"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_28_11">include</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_28_11"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3682.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - In Favour Of the Constitution View</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5134.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Garrett</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_458.htm">Garrett (Brian) - The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_460.htm">Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_459.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>", Noonan</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>To be supplied?</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_28_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_28_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_28_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_28_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 25/05/2018 17:35:31<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 28: (Phase Sortals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_29_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_29_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>See under <a name="48"></a>Sortals for the introduction of the concept Phase Sortal. I seem to have misappropriated the term. In its standard usage (I am told), a phase sortal is a biologically-motivated term. The clearest examples are of individuals that <a name="48"></a>metamorphose; for example the butterfly: egg to larva (caterpillar) to pupa (chrysalis) to adult (butterfly). The caterpillar is a phase sortal of the organism, with clear spatio-temporal boundaries. My standard example is of Child, which is a (vaguely-boundaried) biological phase of the substance sortal <a name="48"></a>Human Being. </li><li>An example of a possible human phase sortal that is a non-person is Infant. This example might be especially relevant to the topic, because  infant is derived from the Latin in-fans  without speech , and the capacity for speech is often claimed to be an essential prerequisite for being a <a name="48"></a>person. </li><li>Any suggestion that the concept Person is  no more than a phase sortal of an umbrella concept isn t intended to imply unimportance. Rather, simply that persons might not form a <a name="48"></a>kind (and in particular a <a name="48"></a>natural kind), nor be <a name="48"></a>substances, but that personhood might be a <a name="48"></a>property of substances (of <a name="48"></a>animals, for instance). </li><li>What about  periodic phase sortals such as Student? A human being can  pop in and out of studenthood by registering or deregistering, but he can t do this with childhood. Which model suits personhood? See the discussion of <a name="48"></a>intermittent objects. </li><li>However, if the above suggestion that the concept Phase Sortal is biologically motivated is correct, a purely social concept such as Student is not a phase sortal in this sense, and Person might not be either. I could, of course, invent a new term of art.</li><li>All roads seem to lead to <a name="48"></a>Wiggins (<A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Snowdon (Paul).htm">Paul Snowdon</A> refers to him a lot in the context of <a name="48"></a>Animalism, though I seem to remember that <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> thinks Wiggins isn t a true Animalist, but a supporter of the <a name="48"></a>psychological view). </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_29_15">Links</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_29_15"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_29_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_29_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_29_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_29_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_29_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7312.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3741.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21125.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", Lockwood</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5099.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Persons and Substances</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5851.htm">Price (Marjorie) - Identity Through Time</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5481.htm">Wiggins (David) - Metaphysics: Substance</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_54.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance</A>", Wiggins, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3491.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Absoluteness of Sameness (S&S)</A>" and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3492.htm">Wiggins (David) - Outline of a Theory of Individuation (S&S)</A>"</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_29_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_29_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_29_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_29_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 01/05/2018 00:46:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 29: (Animals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_30_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_30_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>According to the <a name="48"></a>Animalists, human animals are what <a name="48"></a>we are. Some philosophers, eg. <a name="48"></a>Baker, seem to think that describing us as animals is demeaning, but this seems to muddle together all the varieties of animal into one bestial bunch. Clearly, there are a lot of differences between lug-worms and the great apes, and further  but much less significant  differences between the non-human great apes and ourselves. </li><li>Several points need to be made here. <ol type="1"><li>Firstly, what all animals have in common is that they are <a name="48"></a>organisms and have common <a name="48"></a>persistence-conditions (PCs) in virtue of this fact; in particular, our psychology  however important to us  is irrelevant to our <a name="48"></a>persistence, and hence, to our identity. </li><li>Secondly, the contentious point is whether aspects of the psychology of some higher animals are so distinctive that (as Baker claims) an ontological difference beyond the mere existence of a new species is in evidence. Baker thinks the watershed is a <a name="48"></a>FPP. </li><li>Leading on from this is the claim that the FPP is so important, that we are not animals, but <a name="48"></a>persons. </li></ol></li><li>A question to consider, probably under the topic of <a name="48"></a>organisms, is whether the PCs of all organisms are the same. Plants and animals are both organisms. </li><li>Non-animalists raise issues about the presumed supreme moral status and cognitive abilities of human beings. Demonstrating that these abilities  however well or badly exemplified by humans as a species or as individuals  are on a continuum with those of the higher animals  in particular the great apes  rather than unique in kind to human beings  requires the researcher into personal identity to investigate just what the cognitive and moral capacities of animals actually are. Similarly, this study is stimulated by <a name="48"></a>Locke s claim that personhood is a <a name="48"></a>forensic property. </li><li>The Note on <a name="48"></a>persons deals with the question of what the concept PERSON consists in. Whether any non-human animals fall under the concept PERSON will be covered in this Note. </li><li>The segregation of the reading lists below between this Note and that on <a name="48"></a>Animalism is intended to reflect the distinction between the investigation into the cognitive and moral capacities of the higher animals as such  including the comparison between human and non-human animals  and the claim that we human persons are animals.</li><li>I ve also segregated off to the note on <a name="48"></a>Animal Rights those matters specific to the ethical treatment of animals. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_30_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_30_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_30_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_30_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>Aeon<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22330.htm">Barash (David P.) - Animal magnetism</A>", Barash<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23109.htm">Delgado (Mikel Maria) - Tidy birds and neat bees: on conscientiousness in animals</A>", Delgado<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22442.htm">Edwards (Stassa) - From Aesop to doge</A>", Edwards<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22354.htm">Hilborn (Anne) - Bad mothers and why they make a dierence to cheetah survival</A>", Hilborn<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22100.htm">Jawer (Michael) - Do only humans have souls, or do animals possess them too?</A>", Jawer<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22266.htm">Martinho (Antone) - Pigs, parrots and people: the problem of animal personality</A>", Martinho<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22572.htm">Rowlands (Mark) - The kindness of beasts</A>", Rowlands<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22778.htm">Skillings (Derek J.) - Life is not easily bounded</A>", Skillings</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3593.htm">Bekoff (Marc) - The Emotional Lives of Animals: A Leading Scientist Explores Animal Joy, Sorrow, and Empathy and Why They Matter</A>", Bekoff</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_774.htm">Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity</A>", Cavalieri</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11450.htm">Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) - In Defence of Speciesism</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17036.htm">Conway Morris (Simon) - Darwin s Compass: How Evolution Discovers the Song of Creation</A>", Conway Morris</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17035.htm">Conway Morris (Simon) - Life's Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe (Preface)</A>", Conway Morris</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12125.htm">De Waal (Frans) - The Whole Animal: Childhood Talismans and Excessive Fear of Anthropomorphism</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7438.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Great Apes, Dolphins, and the Concept of Personhood</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7832.htm">Fetzer (James) - The evolution of intelligence: TOC & Preface</A>", Fetzer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20168.htm">Gallup (Gordon G.) - Animal Minds: Review</A>", Gallup</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20167.htm">Gallup (Gordon G.) - Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition</A>", Gallup</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20165.htm">Gallup (Gordon G.) - Levels, Limits, and Precursors to Self-Recognition: Does Ontogeny Recapitulate Phylogeny?</A>", Gallup</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20166.htm">Gallup (Gordon G.) - Self-Awareness in Primates: The sense of identity distinguishes man from most but perhaps not all other forms of life</A>", Gallup</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6218.htm">Gruen (Lori) - Ethics and Animals: An Introduction</A>", Gruen<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19924.htm">Moss (Justin) - Review of 'Ethics and Animals: An Introduction' by Lori Gruen</A>", Moss</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12638.htm">Hauser (Marc D.) - Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (Extract)</A>", Hauser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17031.htm">Le Fanu (James) - Doubts About Darwin</A>", Le Fanu</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17090.htm">Le Fanu (James) - Flights of Fancy</A>", Le Fanu</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17030.htm">Le Fanu (James) - The Queen of Beasts</A>", Le Fanu</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19209.htm">Lurz (Robert) - Animal Minds</A>", Lurz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20156.htm">Povinelli (Daniel) - Behind the Ape's Appearance: Escaping Anthropocentrism in the Study of Other Minds</A>", Povinelli</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2189.htm">Rachels (James) - Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism</A>", Rachels</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3669.htm">Sheldrake (Rupert) - Dogs That Know When Their Owners are Coming Home: And Other Unexplained Powers of Animals</A>", Sheldrake</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11520.htm">Wolpert (Lewis) - Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast: Animals</A>", Wolpert</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_30_18">not covered elsewhere</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_30_18"></A>) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6338.htm">Bermudez (Jose Luis) - Thinking Without Words</A>", Bermudez</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4277.htm">Conway Morris (Simon) - Life's Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe</A>", Conway Morris</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2031.htm">Davidson (Donald) - Rational Animals</A>", Davidson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_261.htm">Dawkins (Marian Stamp) - Through our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness</A>", Dawkins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3667.htm">De Waal (Frans) - Our Inner Ape: The Best and Worst of Human Nature</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6531.htm">De Waal (Frans) - Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2441.htm">De Waal (Frans) - The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_514.htm">Desmond (Adrian) - The Ape's Reflexion</A>", Desmond</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1953.htm">Diamond (Jared) - The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee: How Our Animal Heritage Affects the Way We Live</A>", Diamond</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2666.htm">Fetzer (James) - The Evolution of Intelligence: Are Humans the Only Animals with Minds?</A>", Fetzer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1470.htm">Griffin (Donald) - Animal Minds</A>", Griffin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3633.htm">Hurley (Susan) & Nudds (Matthew) - Rational Animals?</A>", Hurley&Nudds</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3003.htm">Keehn (J.D.) - Animal Models for Psychiatry</A>", Keehn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4276.htm">Le Fanu (James) - Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves</A>", Le Fanu</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1397.htm">Leiber (Justin) - Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : A Dialogue</A>", Leiber</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2341.htm">Mery (Fernand) - Animal Language</A>", Mery</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3226.htm">Morris (Desmond) - Animalwatching: A Field Guide to Animal Behaviour</A>", Morris</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2922.htm">Rowlands (Mark) - The Philosopher and the Wolf</A>", Rowlands</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4309.htm">Savage-Rumbaugh (E.Sue) & Lewin (Roger) - Kanzi: Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind</A>", Savage-Rumbaugh</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_257.htm">Sober (Elliott) & Wilson (David) - Unto Others - The Evolution & Psychology of Unselfish Behaviour</A>", Sober&Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6483.htm">Suddendorf (Thomas) - The Gap</A>", Suddendorf</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_30_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_30_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_30_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_30_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Ie. excluding those already read.</li><li>I ve focused on books rather than papers. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 29/01/2018 21:24:29<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 30: (Clinical Observations)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_31_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_31_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Clinical observations may be a better guides than <a name="48"></a>thought experiments as test cases for our theories of personal identity, because at least we know they represent a real possibility. <ul type="square"><li>One of the main objections to TEs is that they are underspecified and confused. </li><li>However, even with actual clinical observation, we still have the trouble of the correct <U>interpretation</U> of the clinical data, which affects the conclusions we can draw from it. </li><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2713.htm">Wegner (Daniel) - The Illusion of Conscious Will</A>" for the sort of controversy that arises in these circumstances. <BR>&rarr; [I need to explain this a bit further!] </li></ul></li><li>Examples of relevant clinical cases are <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Commissurotomy patients and <BR>&rarr; Those with <a name="48"></a>Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD). <BR>Is a commissurotomy or MPD patient  home to one or two persons? </li><li>I argue elsewhere (<a name="48"></a>where?) that PATIENT  like <a name="48"></a>PERSON  is a <a name="48"></a>Phase Sortal of the <a name="48"></a>Ultimate Sortal <a name="48"></a>HUMAN BEING. <ul type="square"><li>One human being can simultaneously be multiple patients (dental and chiropody, for instance), or a multiply-enrolled student. </li><li>Does this situation mirror those of our more seriously damaged human beings? </li></ul></li><li>One thing can t be two things (in the sense of  be identical to ), even if the two things are of a different <a name="48"></a>kind to the one thing. <ul type="square"><li>The <a name="48"></a>logic of identity would force the  two things to be identical. </li><li>But the Phase Sortal approach doesn t force this violation of logic, so could a human being with split personality literally be the home of two, or three, or seven different thinking beings? <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_31_12">(Wilkes</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_31_12"></A>). </li><li>I m inclined to say  yes , but what impact does that have on <a name="48"></a>animalism? </li></ul></li><li>This topic (and its reading list) overlaps with several others, some of which have already been mentioned:- <ul type="square"> <li><a name="48"></a>Commissurotomy, </li><li><a name="48"></a>Dicephalus,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Multiple Personality Disorder,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Psychopathology. </li></ul></li><li>Currently, there is no categorised reading-list for this topic. A reading list would be mostly covered by the above Notes. Currently I can otherwise only think of:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1393.htm">Harris (Henry) - An Experimentalist Looks at Identity</A>", Harris, 1995</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_31_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_31_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: Presumably in +BB+. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 10/04/2017 23:38:24<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_32_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_32_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>In general, I m in favour of using thought experiments in philosophy. </li><li>However, I d like to consider, following "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_159.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments</A>", whether some thought-experiments in pursuit of clarifying issues in personal identity <ul type="square"><li>Propose impossible scenarios, </li><li>Trade on under-specification, or </li><li>Put us in circumstances where our concepts no longer apply (or where we could no longer play the appropriate language-game using them  see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5929.htm">Gale (Richard) - On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments</A>"). </li></ul></li><li>Sometimes our intuitions are unreliable as to the truth or possibility of what we intuit. <ul type="square"><li>Some doubt the possible phenomenal consciousness of artificial systems, however complex, but is this anything other than a fallacious argument from personal incredulity? </li><li>Descartes argued for the <a name="48"></a>real distinction between mind and body by thinking he could imagine their separation, but could he really? </li><li>Sometimes, our intuitions may give us no clue one way or the other, or only a gentle lead (as Williams seems to be suggesting in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>"). </li></ul></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2637.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants</A>" gives a helpful critique of Wilkes s and Johnston s arguments (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>") against thought experiments.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>" thinks that TEs should be avoided where possible, and real examples used  as at least in actual circumstances we know that the situation is possible ( actual implies possible ), and we know, or can discover, all the background conditions. </li><li>The trouble is that there may not be enough naturally-occurring situations, or practically or ethically available experimental circumstances, to provide the occasions to put maximum pressure on our <a name="48"></a>concepts. </li><li>Then again, were our concepts designed to be put on the rack? What would their failure really tell us?</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_32_4">Links</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_32_4"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_32_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Items in the reading lists below are (or at least should be) split between two categories:- <ol type="i"><li>Theory of TEs, whether related to the philosophy of personal identity, philosophy in general (eg. philosophy of mind), or other areas (eg. science). </li><li>Examples of TEs in action, specifically in the arena of personal identity. </li></ol></li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_32_5">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_32_5"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_32_6">include</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_32_6"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22070.htm">Baggini (Julian) - Life-and-death thought experiments are correctly unsolvable</A>", Baggini</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3799.htm">Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: Preface</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3808.htm">Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: In Conclusion</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4982.htm">Beck (Simon) - Back To The Self And The Future</A>", Beck</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4984.htm">Beck (Simon) - Let's Exist Again (Like We Did Last Summer)</A>", Beck</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11679.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7617.htm">Cohnitz (Daniel) - Personal Identity and the Methodology of Imaginary Cases</A>", Cohnitz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21149.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue</A>", Dainton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20895.htm">Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel</A>", Ehring</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5929.htm">Gale (Richard) - On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments</A>", Gale</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5197.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3740.htm">Garrett (Brian) - The Problem (of Personal Identity) and Its Place in Philosophy</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4546.htm">Hershenov (David) - Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3014.htm">James (Susan) - Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity</A>", James</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20173.htm">Liao (S. Matthew) - The Organism View Defended</A>", Liao</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", Lockwood</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20229.htm">Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands</A>", Marshall & Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18372.htm">Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4762.htm">Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21029.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2637.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5520.htm">Sorensen (Roy) - Thought Experiments: Introduction</A>", Sorensen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3621.htm">Unger (Peter) - Physically Based Subjects and Their Experiences: Against the Six Metaphysical Doctrines</A>", Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_159.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments</A>", Wilkes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>", Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6122.htm">Alexander (Ronald) - A Major Problem With Parfit</A>", Alexander</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3804.htm">Baillie (James) - Methodology Matters</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5096.htm">Beck (Simon) - Should We Tolerate People Who Split?</A>", Beck</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11406.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Survival</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20426.htm">Brown (James Robert) & Fehige (Yiftach) - Thought Experiments</A>", Brown & Fehige</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15896.htm">Bunzl (Martin) - The Logic of Thought Experiments</A>", Bunzl</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20997.htm">Cole (David) - Thought and Thought Experiments</A>", Cole</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11681.htm">Coleman (Stephen) - Thought Experiments and Personal Identity</A>", Coleman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1414.htm">Haggqvist (Soren) - Thought Experiments In Philosophy</A>", Haggqvist</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1393.htm">Harris (Henry) - An Experimentalist Looks at Identity</A>", Harris</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9209.htm">Horowitz (Tamara) - Philosophical intuitions and psychological theory</A>", Horowitz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1370.htm">Horowitz (Tamara) & Massey (Gerald J.) - Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy</A>", Horowitz & Massey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5986.htm">Kolak (Daniel) - The Metaphysics and Metapsychology of Personal Identity: Why Thought Experiments Matter in Deciding Who We Are</A>", Kolak</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19895.htm">Nichols (Shaun) & Bruno (Michael) - Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study</A>", Nichols & Bruno</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21012.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Strengthening the Rejection of Transplant Arguments</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1358.htm">Sorensen (Roy) - Thought Experiments</A>", Sorensen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20209.htm">Sorensen (Roy) - The Cheated God: Death and Personal Time</A>", Sorensen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_577.htm">Sturgeon (Scott) - Zombies and Ghosts</A>", Sturgeon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22813.htm">Torrengo (Giuliano) & Buonomo (Valerio) - What's next? Time travel and phenomenal continuity</A>", Torrengo & Buonomo</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16120.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof</A>", Williamson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15959.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Thought Experiments</A>", Williamson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6690.htm">Zuboff (Arnold) - Moment Universals and Personal Identity</A>", Zuboff</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_32_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_32_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_32_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_32_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/05/2018 09:37:26<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 32: (Fission)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_33_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_33_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Fission is important in the philosophy of identity  especially of personal identity  in that it provides many <a name="48"></a>thought-experiments (TEs), and some real-life examples, that test out the various theories. </li><li>The paradigm case of Fission is of two <a name="48"></a>half-brain <a name="48"></a>transplants. It is difficult to consider these cases without slipping into the  <a name="48"></a>psychological view . Each hemisphere seems to preserve <a name="48"></a>what matters to the fissioned individual, and a <a name="48"></a>perdurantist account can maintain <a name="48"></a>identity after fission. </li><li>An alternative account is to claim that the two half-brains always were separate persons (and Puccetti has maintained that they are separate persons, in all of us, even prior to the <a name="48"></a>commissurotomy in this TE), in a way slightly different from the usual <a name="48"></a>Lewis view of non-identical <a name="48"></a>spatially-coincident <a name="48"></a>individuals (because the hemispheres aren t spatially coincident, though the shared <a name="48"></a>body is). </li><li>We need to consider how the original <a name="48"></a>person was <a name="48"></a>unified. We can press the realism of the thought-experiment by asking how important are the spinal cord and PNS generally to the psychological integrity of the human <a name="48"></a>organism? The case of <a name="48"></a>dicephalus twins may be relevant  where the functions of walking and even typing seem to be carried out perfectly adequately despite the coordinated limbs being controlled by different brains. </li><li>We also need to consider whether the two half-brains continue to constitute a single <a name="48"></a>scattered person, just parked in separate bodies. A single embodiment is important because it ensures synchronisation of experience, and external communication between the hemispheres (in the absence of the usual internal communication across the corpus callosum). Presumably, this could be achieved in other ways. </li><li>We can imagine a <a name="48"></a>BIV linked by radio transmitters/receivers to a remote body  the brain is part of the body  so a single physical thing can be spatially discontinuous. Why, if A fissions into B and C, can t we consider B & C to be parts of the same person? They could fight / argue & but so can someone in two minds about things. What if one killed the other? They would have different perceptual experiences, but so (presumably) does a chameleon, with its eyes pointing in different directions (and sheep and other herbivores, and fish, with eyes on the sides of their heads). </li><li>I need to consider in detail what is supposed to be going on in fission  ie. press the thought experiment: there needs to be segregation / redundancy prior to separation  this can happen over time (or we would have plain <a name="48"></a>duplication). At some point the person will split, with incommunicable <a name="48"></a>consciousnesses (cf. <a name="48"></a>Locke s day-person and night-person).</li><li>This Note overlaps with some others:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Brain Transplants<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Commissurotomy<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Multiple Personality Disorder<BR>In such cases, the reading is (usually) reserved for these notes and not repeated here. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_33_26">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_33_26"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_33_27">include</A></U><SUB>27</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_33_27"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3743.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Fission</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8899.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_190.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness</A>", Nagel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3969.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3623.htm">Unger (Peter) - Fission and the Focus of One's Life</A>", Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3670.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Being in Two Minds</A>", Wilkes</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5782.htm">Brueckner (Anthony) - Branching in the psychological approach to personal identity</A>", Brueckner</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6097.htm">Burke (Michael) - Spatial Analogues of 'Annihilation and Re-creation'</A>", Burke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21651.htm">Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity</A>", Cerullo</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6300.htm">Gallois (Andre) - Counting Amoebas</A>", Gallois</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9145.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Johnston on Fission</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12885.htm">Hershenov (David) & Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Fission and Confusion</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4320.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Fission and the Facts</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_556.htm">Martin (Raymond) - Fission Rejuvenated</A>", Martin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6616.htm">Martin (Raymond), Barresi (John) & Giovannelli (Alessandro) - Fission Examples in 18th and Early 19th century Personal Identity Debate</A>", Martin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6031.htm">Matthews (Gareth B.) - Surviving As</A>", Matthews</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4421.htm">Mills (Eugene) - Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity</A>", Mills</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22024.htm">Moyer (Mark) - A Survival Guide to Fission</A>", Moyer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5344.htm">Munzer (Stephen R.) - Transplantation, Chemical Inheritance, and the Identity of Organs</A>", Munzer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3969.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6006.htm">Oderberg (David) - Fission, Intermittence and the Primitiveness of Identity</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19245.htm">Ord (Toby) - Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity</A>", Ord</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_328.htm">Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4941.htm">Rovane (Carol) - Branching Self-Consciousness</A>", Rovane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9803.htm">Seibt (Johanna) - Fission, Sameness, and Survival: Parfit s Branch Line Argument Revisited</A>", Seibt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5057.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Brown-Brownson Revisited</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12810.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - My Future: The Puzzle of Division</A>", Valberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2644.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - How Many Selves Make Me?</A>", Wilkes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20899.htm">Wright (John) - Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel</A>", Wright</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_33_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_33_26"></A><B>Footnote 26</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_33_27"></A><B>Footnote 27</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 15/02/2018 20:54:14<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 33: (Fusion)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_34_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_34_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Like <a name="48"></a>Fission, though to a lesser degree, Fusion is important in the philosophy of identity  especially of personal identity  in that it provides many <a name="48"></a>thought-experiments (TEs), and some real-life examples, that test out the various theories. </li><li>We need to consider the merger of the two <a name="48"></a>psychologies: Parfit thinks we might like to inherit some of the better characteristics of our partner, as in a marriage  but the creation of a single <a name="48"></a>consciousness from two seems difficult to conceive of (much more so than the creation of two consciousnesses from one, as in fission). Do we end up with a single <a name="48"></a>first-person perspective, or with two? This needs to be related to <a name="48"></a>multiple personality disorder. Also, consider <a name="48"></a>Parfit s seasonal people that alternately fission and fuse. How conceivable are these TEs? </li><li>We also need to consider physical as well as psychological fusions, as in the case of the <a name="48"></a>dicephalus and <a name="48"></a>brain transplants.</li><li>There may be some overlap between this note and those on <a name="48"></a>Mereology, and <a name="48"></a>Constitution, which deal with the fusion of parts into a whole. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_34_13">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_34_13"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_34_14">include</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_34_14"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8899.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts</A>", Hawley</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5679.htm">Hudson (Hud) - On Constitution and All-Fusions</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3472.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Identity Over Time and Change Of Composition</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18378.htm">McGrath (Matthew) - Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence</A>", McGrath</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15855.htm">McInerney (Peter K.) - Conceptions of Persons and Persons through Time</A>", McInerney</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23003.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Issues of Composition</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19245.htm">Ord (Toby) - Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity</A>", Ord</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22052.htm">Tanksley (Charley) - The Mereological Constancy Of Masses</A>", Tanksley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20899.htm">Wright (John) - Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel</A>", Wright</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3658.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Composition As Identity</A>", Van Inwagen</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_34_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_34_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_34_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 15/02/2018 22:00:29<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 34: (Duplication)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_35_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_35_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Duplicate objects are  to use the definition in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19844.htm">Sider (Ted) - Naturalness, Intrinsicality, and Duplication</A>"   exactly similar, considered as they are in themselves . </li><li>There is considerable overlap between this topic and two other topics:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Replication, which may well be the same thing (though not restricted to a mere doubling), and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Reduplication Objections </li><li>The motivation for this Note comes mainly from the above Reduplication objections  where some putative change appears to preserve identity, but cannot for logical reasons, as explained in that Note. </li><li>If I accept Lewis s <a name="48"></a>perdurantist thesis, the straightforward objection to the identification of the duplicate with the original is undermined  they simply share stages. However, there are still <a name="48"></a>causal chain problems to address, and those of <a name="48"></a>physical continuity. </li><li>While <a name="48"></a>cloning falls under this head, there is no <a name="48"></a>identity preservation, even under a <a name="48"></a>perdurantist thesis, as there are no shared stages, just shared genetic material.</li><li>While I have a categorised reading-list associated with this topic, there s not much that s relevant other than works quoted above and:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5943.htm">Sidelle (Alan) - Finding an Intrinsic Account of Identity: What is the Source of Duplication Cases?</A>" </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_35_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 31/08/2017 19:35:02<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 35: (Replication)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_36_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_36_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Replication arises where an obvious copying process takes place. I would claim that <a name="48"></a>Teletransportation falls under this head. I'm currently not clear whether there's a distinction between replication and <a name="48"></a>duplication, other than that duplication would seem to be restricted to doubling, whereas replication is more open-ended. </li><li>Does amoebic division count as replication? When an amoeba divides, this is not a case of <a name="48"></a>fission but of reproduction. So, there are <U>three</U> amoebae involved  the original one and the two daughters. This is not the same situation as in fission.</li><li>The above said, does this case depend:<ol type="1"><li>on <a name="48"></a>how the case is described and</li><li>on how  empirically  the replication occurs?</li></ol></li><li>If the amoebic division occurs by budding of a daughter, so that we can continually "track" the parent, then we have straightforward reproduction. If the division is symmetrical, the case could be correctly described as replication, though maybe on a <a name="48"></a>perdurantist view we originally had two <a name="48"></a>coincident amoebae that both persist. </li><li>We need to watch out for <a name="48"></a>closest continuer descriptions of the case.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_36_9">Links</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_36_9"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_36_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_36_10">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_36_10"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_36_11">include</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_36_11"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>I don t really have a categorised reading-list for this Note; while there is one, it is empty. Any reading will be covered under a sister Note of this one: <a name="48"></a>Reduplication Objections. </li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_36_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_36_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_36_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_36_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 36: (Metamorphosis)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_37_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_37_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Metamorphosis involves a radical and fairly rapid  by comparison with  business as usual growth and maturation  change of bodily form in the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_37_2">same</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_37_2"></A> <a name="48"></a>individual. Catastrophic injury doesn t count. </li><li>Tadpoles to frogs and caterpillars to butterflies are, in seems to me, different kinds of cases of metamorphosis. If there is anything it s like to be a caterpillar or a tadpole, the caterpillar s experience of metamorphosis will differ from that of the tadpole s, as the caterpillar transforms into the butterfly via goo, whereas the tadpole s metamorphosis into the frog is <a name="48"></a>continuous with it remaining an active <a name="48"></a>organism. </li><li>Presumably there s no more a true metamorphosis in tadpole to frog than there is in <a name="48"></a>fetus to neonate in humans and mammals generally? The difference between the maturation of a tadpole and fetus is simply the environment and food-source? </li><li>If the account of <a name="48"></a>Sortals is correct, metamorphosis involving a change of Ultimate Sortal is a logical impossibility (in the sense of the very same thing metamorphosing as in the frog to prince case). I suppose, in this last case, we might have the Ultimate Sortal as <a name="48"></a>Organism of which <em>Frog</em> and <em>Prince</em> (or <a name="48"></a>Human Being) are <a name="48"></a>Phase Sortals, but then, what is an Ultimate Sortal in one context is a Phase Sortal in another. Is this an issue?</li><li>How should the (supposed) case of bodily changing to be expected of Christian at Christ s return be understood? In that case  see <a name="48"></a>1 Corinthians 15:52  rather than dying and being <a name="48"></a>resurrected to a new body, the living body is  & changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump . Is this a case of metamorphosis?</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_570.htm">Bynum (Caroline) - Metamorphosis and Identity</A>" is presumably the jumping-off point for this topic. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_37_13">Links</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_37_13"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_37_Links.htm">Click here</a>. In the reading lists below, some of the items may only touch on this topic tangentially. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_37_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_37_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_37_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_37_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15869.htm">Arnold (Keith) - The Subject of Radical Change</A>", Arnold</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5108.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14448.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_457.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Olson</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3678.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19029.htm">Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction</A>", Gasser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2262.htm">Kafka (Franz), Pasley (Malcolm) - Metamorphosis and Other Stories</A>", Kafka</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22906.htm">Kazez (Jean) - The Philosophical Parent: Asking the Hard Questions About Having and Raising Children</A>", Kazez</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", Lockwood</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14449.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14451.htm">Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_570.htm">Bynum (Caroline) - Metamorphosis and Identity</A>", Bynum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5851.htm">Price (Marjorie) - Identity Through Time</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_10/Abstract_10595.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - An Anthropologist on Mars: Seven Paradoxical Tales</A>", Sacks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21734.htm">Wexelblatt (Robert) - The Higher Parody: Ivan Ilych's Metamorphosis and the Death of Gregor Samsa</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_37_16">Wexelblatt</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_37_16"></A></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_37_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_37_2"></A><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This begs the question somewhat! </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_37_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_37_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_37_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_37_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This may be an interesting comparison of two novellas, both germane to my thesis. </li></ul></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 10/05/2018 10:07:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 37: (Psychological Continuity - Forward)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_38_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_38_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I think there s a conceptual difference between:- <ol type="i"><li>Forward psychological continuity, and </li><li>Backward psychological continuity. </li></ol></li><li>Imagine the case where (on an <a name="48"></a>endurantist account of <a name="48"></a>persistence), I m put into a duplicating machine, but something goes wrong and my body is destroyed by the duplication process, though my duplicate wakes up perfectly happily. Then, it seems to me, I would never wake up, and would have no experience beyond entry to the duplicating machine. I have no forward psychological continuity. But my <a name="48"></a>duplicate does have backward psychological continuity. </li><li>Any duplicate of me, looking backward, would consider himself to be  me , having my <a name="48"></a>memories, abilities, plans and so forth, and a body looking just like mine. But, would I ever wake up as the duplicate? My intuition on the endurantist account, as I have said, is that I would not, though I suspect that on the <a name="48"></a>perdurantist account, this might be seen as a case of <a name="48"></a>fission in which I might wake up twice, provided we consider that the right sort of <a name="48"></a>causality is in place. </li><li>But, what gives forward continuity of <a name="48"></a>consciousness in the normal case of sleep and temporary unconsciousness? I cannot know  from the inside that when I awake I m the same human being as went to sleep in my bed. The reason I believe this is for external reasons: duplication is not physically possible (or at least practical), and in any case I have no reason to believe it happened to me last night. </li><li>This seems a very important issue to me, and I need to make more of it. For example, in <a name="48"></a>teletransportation <a name="48"></a>thought experiment, it seems to me that a new person wakes up, but I don t, nor do I experience anything, though the new person claims to be me. Incidentally, it s not just a new <a name="48"></a>person, but a new <a name="48"></a>human being. </li><li>This is the sort of question that the Logical Positivists would denounce as meaningless, as no empirical evidence can decide it.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_38_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_38_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_38_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_38_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_38_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_38_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_38_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 05/02/2018 20:02:24<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 38: (Causality)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_39_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_39_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Causality (or Causation) is important in determining which <a name="48"></a>changes are identity-preserving and which aren t. There has to be the right kind of causal connection between A and B for A=B. This is sometimes given as an objection to <a name="48"></a>Teletransportation <a name="48"></a>TEs  the causal connection between the pre- and post-teletransportation individuals isn t of the right sort. </li><li>Similar objections are sometimes raised in response to tinkering with organisms  for instance <a name="48"></a>siliconisation, <a name="48"></a>brain transplants and such like. The causal connection between successive states of the supposed same organism isn t sufficient to preserve identity. </li><li>Also, <a name="48"></a>memories sometimes feature  fiddling with or implanting memories doesn t have the right causal connection to make them my memories, even though they might seem so to me. </li><li>In all cases, we need to consider internal change versus externally-imposed change, and why some externally-imposed changes preserve the individual, while others don t. See Olson below. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_39_8">Links</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_39_8"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_39_Links.htm">Click here</a>. I could have included key-words  cause and  causal , but  cause in particular expanded the list beyond measure, and the list is long enough as it is. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_39_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_39_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_39_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_39_10"></A> the following, often of fairly tangential relevance:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21334.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' by Nancey Murphy</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9626.htm">Chalmers (David) - How Cartesian Dualism Might Have Been True</A>", Chalmers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7094.htm">Crane (Tim) - Body</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_151.htm">Davidson (Donald) - Causal Relations</A>", Davidson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5391.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist: Introduction</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_129.htm">Lewis (David) - Causation</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8014.htm">Lewis (David) - Philosophical Papers Volume II: Introduction</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16087.htm">MacDonald (Cynthia) & MacDonald (Graham) - The Philosophy of Psychology: Debates in Psychological Explanation - Preface</A>", MacDonald</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6964.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time: Introduction and Summary</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6950.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II: Preface</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6951.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II: Introduction</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", Olson, 2010</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19915.htm">Olson (Eric) - Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3570.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Different Attitudes To Time</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19191.htm">Richmond (Alasdair) - Time Travel and Philosophy</A>", Richmond</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Shoemaker_D</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_514.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Causality and Properties</A>", Shoemaker_S</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21053.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Philosophy and the Mind/Body Problem</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20350.htm">Taylor (James Stacey) - The Myth of Posthumous Harm</A>", Taylor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7618.htm">Von Wachter (Daniel) - Free Agents as Cause</A>", Von Wachter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17140.htm">Wiggins (David) - Preface: Sameness and Substance</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8526.htm">Wiggins (David) - Preface: Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>The (rather bloated) categorised reading-list includes a lot of general material on causation A reading list should include some background, but (where not covered elsewhere) should be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_39_11">focused</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_39_11"></A> on items relevant to Personal Identity, so might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8887.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Metaphysics and Mental Causation</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5101.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?</A>", Campbell, 2005</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6763.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Causation: Introduction</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5007.htm">Elliot (Robert) - Personal Identity And The Causal Continuity Requirement</A>", Elliot, 1991</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_517.htm">Faye (Jan) - Backward Causation</A>", Faye</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6436.htm">Butchvarov (Panayot) - Relations</A>", Field</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6305.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_39_12">Funkhauser</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_39_12"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20423.htm">Hall (Ned) - Two Concepts of Causation</A>", Hall</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21103.htm">Hershenov (David) - The Memory Criterion and the Problem of Backward Causation</A>", Hershenov, 2007</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_519.htm">Hitchcock (Christopher) - Probabilistic Causation</A>", Hitchcock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6197.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism</A>", Kim, 2001</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19920.htm">Luper (Steven) - Retroactive Harms and Wrongs</A>", Luper</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11489.htm">Marcus (Eric) - Mental causation in a physical world</A>", Marcus</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20503.htm">McGinn (Colin) - Conceptual Causation: Some Elementary Reflections</A>", McGinn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6961.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Causation and Time</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_521.htm">Menzies (Peter) - Counterfactual Theories of Causation</A>", Menzies</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3917.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Mental Causation and Free Will</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1411.htm">Pietroski (Paul) - Causing Actions</A>", Pietroski</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5376.htm">Salmon (Wesley) - Causation</A>", Salmon, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_385.htm">Sosa (Ernest) & Tooley (Michael), Eds. - Causation</A>", Sosa & Tooley, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6624.htm">Swoyer (Chris) - Causation and Identity</A>", Swoyer, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8920.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Free Will Remains a Mystery</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12522.htm">Wegner (Daniel) - Precis and Peer Review of 'The Illusion of Conscious Will'</A>", Wegener</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4458.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Immanent Causation</A>", Zimmerman, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5128.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The Incompatibility of Two Humean Doctrines</A>", Zimmerman, 1998 </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder.</li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_39_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_39_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_39_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_39_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_39_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: I ve been tempted  successfully  to include a few items that are probably not relevant in the lists. <a name="On-Page_Link_39_12"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 12</B>: See the Chapter on Causation, which reviews some papers in this list. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 18/06/2018 23:25:26<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 39: (Cartesian Ego)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_40_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_40_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>That we are Cartesian Egos has been a popular suggestion in answer to the question of <a name="48"></a>what we are. It is presumably what those who support the <a name="48"></a>Psychological View have in mind. </li><li>There is some overlap with <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> s focus on a <a name="48"></a>First-Person perspective. Just what is it that s supposed to look out on the world if not a Cartesian Ego? But Baker is not a <a name="48"></a>dualist (at least not in the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_40_6">Cartesian</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_40_6"></A> sense)  she thinks of us as belonging to the <a name="48"></a>PERSON <a name="48"></a>substantial <a name="48"></a>kind, presently <a name="48"></a>constituted by a human <a name="48"></a>body. The person does not have separate existence to the human body, in the way in which the Cartesian Ego does  which is (allegedly) separable from the body (and capable of living in <a name="48"></a>disembodied form). I think for Baker we are essentially embodied  just not <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_40_13">by</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_40_13"></A> the same body. </li><li>I say more about dualism in the <a name="48"></a>Note thereon.</li><li>With respect to the Cartesian Ego, we need to consider just how psychologically <a name="48"></a>unified human persons are, and whether or not the mind is formally modular. In particular, is there massive modularity, or is there an executive? And is it the executive that is the Cartesian Ego? </li><li>In this connection, I must consider psychological accounts of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_40_16">modularity</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_40_16"></A> of mind from the identity perspective, rather than straying too far into philosophy of mind and psychology. This will feature mainly in discussion of <a name="48"></a>objections to Animalism. </li><li>There will be overlap between this Note and that on <a name="48"></a>I. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_40_19">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_40_19"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_40_20">include</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_40_20"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6480.htm">Bourgeois (Warren) - Modern Philosophers' Views on Persons: The Renaissance and the Early Moderns</A>", Bourgeois</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21357.htm">Cargile (James) - Review of Hintikka - Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?</A>", Cargile</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9626.htm">Chalmers (David) - How Cartesian Dualism Might Have Been True</A>", Chalmers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_4.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - The Cartesian Theatre and 'Filling In' the Stream of Consciousness</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_519.htm">Fodor (Jerry) - The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology</A>", Fodor</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21191.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Beyond the Cartesian Self</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1325.htm">Brink (David) - Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons</A>", Brink</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12288.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - Fragmentary consciousness and the Cartesian theatre</A>", Carruthers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6062.htm">Flew (Anthony) - The Cartesian Assumption</A>", Flew</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9564.htm">Flew (Anthony) - The Cartesian Turn</A>", Flew</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6196.htm">Foster (John) - A Brief Defense of the Cartesian View</A>", Foster</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_575.htm">Glover (Jonathan) - I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity</A>", Glover</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13010.htm">Harrison (Jonathan) - The Embodiment of Mind or What Use Is Having a Body?</A>", Harrison</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14529.htm">Hawthorne (John) - Cartesian Dualism</A>", Hawthorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21354.htm">Hintikka (Jaakko) - Cogito, Ergo Sum as an Inference and a Performance</A>", Hintikka</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21355.htm">Hintikka (Jaakko) - The Cartesian Cogito, Epistemic Logic and Neuroscience: Some Surprising Interrelations</A>", Hintikka</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21356.htm">Hintikka (Jaakko) - Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?</A>", Hintikka</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13223.htm">Kerr (Fergus) - The Modern Philosophy of Self in Recent Theology</A>", Kerr</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2636.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14531.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism</A>", Swinburne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12799.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - Imagination and the Cartesian Self</A>", Valberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5151.htm">Van Fraassen (Bas) - Transcendence of the Ego (The Non-Existent Knight)</A>", Van Fraassen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14533.htm">Wong (Hong Yu) - Cartesian Psychophysics</A>", Wong</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_40_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_40_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See her "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7299.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_40_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Or, rather than  embodied <u>by</u> ,  embodied  <u>as</u> ? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_40_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>For Modularity of Mind, see especially "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_519.htm">Fodor (Jerry) - The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_40_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_40_20"></A><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 03/02/2018 23:47:02<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 40: (Closest Continuer)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Another term for this concept is  Best Candidate . </li><li>This situation occurs where we have more than one candidate as the continuer of an individual, and we feel we have to make a choice because: <ol type="1"><li>There is only one social or legal role to fill, and </li><li>The logic of identity causes a problem.</li></ol></li><li>Consider <a name="48"></a>Locke s prince and cobbler or Williams s <a name="48"></a>body swapping, but without the swap (ie. where only half the thought experiment is performed, so we have two identical psychologies). If the cobbler s body is informed by the prince s mind, then Locke claims that the cobbler is the prince. But if the prince still exists in his own mind as well, there s a better candidate (says Nozick, for instance in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_552.htm">Nozick (Robert) - Personal Identity Through Time</A>" or "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3586.htm">Nozick (Robert) - The Identity of the Self: Introduction</A>"), so the cobbler then isn t the prince after all  but how (so the objection goes) can the existence of someone depend on the existence of someone else? </li><li>A <a name="48"></a>Perdurantist can accommodate these situations. This is by saying that prior to the point of decision, there were always two person stages co-located (ie. there were always two persons present, they just happened to share all their stages up to that point), and that only following the point of decision can we distinguish them. So, we don t have to choose who is <U>really</U> the prince  they both are, in the sense that each post-decision spatio-temporal worm forms part of a larger spatio-temporal worm that includes pre-decision princely stages. Logical identity only applies to complete spatio-temporal worms, and there were always two worms sharing stages. </li><li>Of course, we might have a <a name="48"></a>convention that enables us to choose in a principled manner who can fill which role (the prince remains in his palace, the cobbler s body informed by the prince s mind retires to a madhouse). Yet (if we adopt the perdurantist view and the <a name="48"></a>psychological criterion) they are both the prince for all that. </li><li>My own view used to be that the cobbler (ie. cobbler-body) just undergoes a radical psychological change, and so remains the cobbler all along. But I now think the thought experiment may be underspecified. Given the <a name="48"></a>supervenience of mind on <a name="48"></a>brain, the superposition of one psychology on another would have radical physical consequences that must destroy the original, and replace it with a clone of the copied brain. But it is a clone, for all that, and not the original. I need to consider more carefully what <a name="48"></a>change, and how rapid a change, a thing can undergo and remain the same thing.</li><li>For a page of Links to this Note, <a href="Notes_41_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_10">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_10"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_11">include</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_11"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7623.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_12">2007, Blatti</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_12"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3743.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Fission</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_13">1998, Garrett</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_13"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19029.htm">Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_14">2010, Gasser</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_14"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8899.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts</A>", 2005, Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3974.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Against the Closest Continuer Theory</A>", 2003, Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3586.htm">Nozick (Robert) - The Identity of the Self: Introduction</A>", Nozick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_15">1999, Olson</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_15"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3583.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain</A>", 1984, Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22152.htm">Parfit (Derek) - The Closest Continuer Schema</A>", 1984, Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3532.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings: Preface</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_16">1995, Van Inwagen</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_16"></A> </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_17">2010, Zimmerman</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_17"></A> </li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3801.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity and Survival</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_18">1993, Baillie</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_18"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6487.htm">Bourgeois (Warren) - Contemporary Philosophers' Views on Persons: Nozick's Self-Makers</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_19">2003, Bourgeois</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_19"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21651.htm">Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_20">2015, Cerullo</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_20"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5658.htm">Coburn (Robert) - Personal Identity Revisited</A>", 1985, Coburn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11405.htm">Garrett (Brian) - A Further Reply to Noonan</A>", 1987, Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6100.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Noonan, 'Best Candidate' Theories and the Ship of Theseus</A>", 1985, Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5655.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Extrinsicness</A>", 1990, Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9492.htm">Heller (Mark) - The best candidate approach to diachronic identity</A>", 1987, Heller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11401.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Reply to Garrett</A>", 1986, Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5659.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Closest Continuer Theory of Identity</A>", 1985, Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6102.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Only X and Y Principle</A>", 1985, Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21964.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Possibility of Reincarnation</A>", 1990, Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_552.htm">Nozick (Robert) - Personal Identity Through Time</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_21">1981, Nozick</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_21"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12809.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - My Future</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_41_22">2007, Valberg</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_41_22"></A></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_41_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_41_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>When considering duplication issues with double-hemispherectomy & transplant,  closest continuer resolutions to the problem (amongst other suggestions) are rejected. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The  closest continuer theory as a solution to the  split brain fission puzzle is considered in Sections 3 & 4.</li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Brief discussion of Hershenov s claim that Zimmerman s  Falling Elevator model of physical resurrection is effectively a  closest continuer theory. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson s rejection of  closest continuer solutions to the double-hemispherectomy & transplant problem (for the psychological view). </li><li>His objection isn t to the incoherence of the  closest continuer as such, but that the hemispheres might be equipollent, leading to no  closest continuer . </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_41_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The rejection of  closest continuer theories is the 10th of Van Inwagen s presuppositions. </li><li>Decisions of persistence are intrinsic. No outside facts  such as the existence of a better candidate  can affect whether something has persisted. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Zimmerman discusses the  closest continuer theory extensively in a reply to Hasker. </li><li>It seems that the  Falling Elevator model of resurrection requires both acceptance of the  closest continuer theory and the rejection of the  only X and Y principle. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Consideration of  closest continuer theories in Section 2. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Description and elaboration of Nozick s  closest continuer theory, followed by & </li><li>Its application to duplication puzzle-cases. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_20"></A><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Rejects the  closest continuer theory as a solution to the problem posed by putative uploadings of human brains to computers. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_41_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the relevant extract from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3586.htm">Nozick (Robert) - The Identity of the Self: Introduction</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_41_22"></A><B>Footnote 22</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The  closest continuer theory is discussed in Section 4. </li></ul></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/04/2018 11:16:48<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 41: (Perdurantism)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_42_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_42_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>As developed by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Q/Author_Quine (W.V.).htm">W.V. Quine</A>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Lewis (David).htm">David Lewis</A>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Sider (Ted).htm">Ted Sider</A> and others, Perdurance is to be contrasted with <a name="48"></a>Endurance and <a name="48"></a>Exdurance  see "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1339.htm">Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time</A>". </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12472.htm">Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What s the Problem?</A>", the introduction to "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>" provides a good overview of these matters. </li><li>The logical problems with 4-D need to be carefully considered and, for good or ill, the four-dimensional approach has the advantage  or maybe disadvantage  of undermining the <a name="48"></a>reduplication objection to <a name="48"></a>identity being maintained in certain <a name="48"></a>fission <a name="48"></a>thought experiments. </li><li>Does 4-D imply <a name="48"></a>fatalism? According to perdurantism, a thing is a 4-D object, but not only do we not know the future, but the future may not even exist. </li><li>How does this tie in with Lewis s realism about possible worlds? Maybe if possible worlds are real, all possible futures are real as well.</li><li>Note that perdurantism is inimical to a high view of <a name="48"></a>substance. A temporal worm cannot change, it just is. The purpose of positing substances is as the enduring things that <a name="48"></a>change. </li><li>Perdurance also impacts on Leibniz s Law, where property exemplification is usually taken to be relative to a time. </li><li>Look at the adverbial defence of endurantism. See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6036.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics</A>" (probably & this is the explicit response to Lewis, though there are also <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6676.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence, Change, and Explanation</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4724.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time</A>" and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5114.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things</A>"; and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12472.htm">Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What s the Problem?</A>" in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>" seems to cover much the same ground). </li><li>If perdurantism really is incompatible with a high view of substance, then I may not need a chapter on perdurance (though I would have thought that I would need to argue for the incompatibility), and I can thereby ignore perdurantist objections to the cogency of reduplication objections. </li><li>Note also that <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> sets perdurance to one side. He assumes that we are concrete substances that  endure through time by being wholly present at different times . He also sets to one side two other issues, namely that there are <a name="48"></a>no such things as persons (taken to be  rational conscious beings such as you and I ) and that the classical notion of strict <a name="48"></a>numerical identity is correct, rejecting <a name="48"></a>relative identity. See <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3506.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction</A>", pp. 4-5 and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3513.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives</A>", <BR>both in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>". He claims that if any of these assumptions is false, then there are no substantive metaphysical questions of our identity over time, only semantic ones.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_42_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_42_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_42_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_42_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_42_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_42_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_42_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 42: (Counting Persons)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_43_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_43_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I need to address the adverse consequences of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Lewis (David).htm">David Lewis</A> s <a name="48"></a>perdurantist approach to <a name="48"></a>fission in personal identity. </li><li>According to this theory, there were always coincident stages of the two space-time worms prior to fission. So, there were two persons there all along; yet we counted only one, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_43_4">being ignorant of</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_43_4"></A> the future fission. </li><li>What are the consequences of miscounting? No doubt this depends on what function (or more likely <u>functions</u>) our <a name="48"></a>concept <a name="48"></a>PERSON performs. </li><li>We might ask whether it is just persons who are miscounted, or are <a name="48"></a>human beings also miscounted? This will obviously depend on the <a name="48"></a>TE, which would need spelling out. </li><li>Take the case of a <a name="48"></a>half-brain <a name="48"></a>transplant. In this TE, a person s psychology is supposed to be <a name="48"></a>duplicated within two idempotent half-brains, one of which stays in the donor s head, the other being transplanted into the empty skull of a recipient. In this TE, the <a name="48"></a>psychological view of personal identity is assumed. We start off with one locus of psychology, and end up with two. This is the standard problem of fission  which successor is identical to the original person? We seem to want both to be, but  in the absence of perdurantism  the <a name="48"></a>logic of identity forbids it. Perdurantism helps us out, at the cost of there being more pre-fission persons than we thought. </li><li>What about other fall-out? Are the earlier stages of the  recipient patient  viewed as an animal  spatially distributed  so is such a <a name="48"></a>distributed thing a human being at all? </li><li>What is the core of humanness  is this always the <a name="48"></a>brain, so that the human goes along with the half-brain, and the <a name="48"></a>body is just like any other transplant, only bigger?</li><li>Problems with counting persons also allegedly arises in the context of:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Multiple Personality Disorder, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Commissurotomy<BR>While the latter is a precursor for the half-brain transplant described above, both are at least actual situations that are less open to the charge of under-description often alleged against TEs. </li><li>Finally, for now at least, and maybe most importantly  the issue of counting arises in <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> s <a name="48"></a>Thinking Animal Argument, and the various conundrums involving (partly) <a name="48"></a>coincident objects. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_43_21">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_43_21"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_43_22">include</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_43_22"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3670.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Being in Two Minds</A>", Wilkes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3669.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Fugues, Hypnosis, and Multiple Personality</A>", Wilkes</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6631.htm">Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Many-One Identity</A>", Baxter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6300.htm">Gallois (Andre) - Counting Amoebas</A>", Gallois</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5393.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Parts and Stages</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21106.htm">Hershenov (David) - Merrick's Identification of the Person and Organism</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4757.htm">Olson (Eric) - Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem</A>", Olson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9485.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson</A>", Lowe<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5209.htm">Olson (Eric) - Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6242.htm">Parsons (Terence) - Counting Objects</A>", Parsons</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21008.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Multiple Personality Disorder</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23100.htm">Thomson (Garrett) - Counting subjects</A>", Thomson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1392.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Identity and Identities</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_43_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_43_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>No doubt if this fanciful event could be planned or anticipated we would count differently. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_43_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_43_22"></A><B>Footnote 22</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 07/02/2018 19:42:14<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 43: (Ship of Theseus)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_44_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_44_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There s no Stanford entry on this topic per se, so see Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus)) for an introduction. </li><li>Versions:- <ul type="square"><li>The original version, recounted by Plutarch, just considers whether an artifact (specifically a ship) can continue the same thing if its parts are gradually replaced until all the original parts have been replaced. </li><li>Hobbes added the further paradox of collecting up the replaced parts and assembling them into a rival claimant to be the original ship. </li><li>There are various  minimalist cases in popular culture whereby half of an artifact is replaced, followed by the other half, and maybe the process is then repeated. <ol type="i"><li>The traditional example is  grandfather s axe (the blade and the handle being successively replaced). </li><li>A more recent one is  Trigger s Broom , from <em>Only Fools and Horses</em>, where the broom handle and head are successively replaced. </li></ol></li></ul></li><li>I m greatly attracted to <a name="48"></a>David Lewis s <a name="48"></a>solution to the Hobbesian version of the Ship of Theseus <a name="48"></a>thought experiment, but need to consider alternative solutions that don t depend on <a name="48"></a>Perdurantism, and whether this case is really relevant to personal identity. <ul type="square"><li>Is there anything special about <a name="48"></a>artifacts that makes identification arbitrary or a matter of <a name="48"></a>convention, while the continued identity of a <a name="48"></a>person (from the <a name="48"></a>first-person perspective, whatever society  which only has a third-person perspective  may say) is not arbitrary? </li><li><a name="48"></a>Organisms  it is said  do replace all their parts in the course of their lives, yet we are sure that the organism persists. Also, the matter that is lost and replaced are not  parts in the way that planks of a ship are parts. It s only in transplant surgery when parts properly so-called are replaced. </li><li>However, is there a fact of the matter whether the repaired ship or the reconstructed ship is the  true ship? </li><li>The minimalist case is interesting because it presses our intuitions. Personally, I don t think half or any large part of an artifact can be replaced while the thing remains the same, but this may just be a prejudice. Habituation comes into consideration  just as assimilation of new matter is important to organisms. If we become habituated to some major change in a building, say, then we may agree that it has persisted. Then we may become habituated  over generations  to the replacement of the other half. Then  if persistence is identity-preserving  we must be prepared to say  given the <a name="48"></a>logic of identity  that the original building is identical to the current one, even if it looks nothing like it. </li><li>I have such a conundrum with my house, where there s a proposal to rebuild the front <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_44_12">portion</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_44_12"></A>. </li></ul> </li><li>Returning to the specific case of the Ship, and generally where individuals lose parts, we need to consider what the status of the lost part is:- <ul type="square"><li>When a bicycle is disassembled with the intention of reassembling it again later, its parts are not <u>released</u> but merely dispersed and it becomes a <a name="48"></a>scattered object.</li><li>However, when an object loses a part in the normal case of wear and tear, that part  unless the artifact can be <u>mended</u> by having the part re-attached  is not dispersed but is returned to the environment for use elsewhere and is no longer associated with the object of which it once formed a part. </li><li>The same can be said where parts  in particular, planks  are removed and replaced. The ship (in this case) no longer has a lien over them. </li><li>If this account is correct, it solves Hobbes s problem of the Ship of Theseus without the need for <a name="48"></a>perdurantism, though this may still be useful for other puzzles of <a name="48"></a>fission. </li></ul></li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_44_16">Links</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_44_16"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_44_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_44_17">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_44_17"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_44_18">include</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_44_18"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12995.htm">Chandler (Hugh S.) - Theseus' Clothes-Pin</A>", Chandler, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5883.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - An Incredible Coincidence?</A>", Hughes, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22056.htm">Lowenthal ( David) - Material Preservation and Its Alternatives</A>", Lowenthal, 1989</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20229.htm">Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands</A>", Marshall & Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3969.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem</A>", Noonan </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1780.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Identity: an Excerpt From Quiddities</A>", Quine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4995.htm">Sider (Ted) - The Four-Dimensional Picture</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6269.htm">Simons (Peter) - Parts: A Study in Ontology - Introduction</A>", Simons</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22049.htm">Barnett (David) - The Problem of Material Origins</A>", Barnett, 2005</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7321.htm">Burke (Michael) - Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence</A>", Burke, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4735.htm">Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission</A>", Carter, 1983</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22050.htm">Davis (Lawrence H.) - Smart on Conditions of Identity</A>", Davis, 1973</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23331.htm">Doyle (Robert O.) - The Ship of Theseus</A>", Doyle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5321.htm">Fine (Kit) - A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis</A>", Fine, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6297.htm">Gallois (Andre) - The Puzzle Cases</A>", Gallois, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6100.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Noonan, 'Best Candidate' Theories and the Ship of Theseus</A>", Garrett, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22054.htm">Goodman (Charles) - Vaibhcika Metaphoricalism</A>", Goodman, 2005</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9492.htm">Heller (Mark) - The best candidate approach to diachronic identity</A>", Heller, 1987</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5879.htm">Hershenov (David) - Can There Be Spatially Coincident Entities of the Same Kind?</A>", Hershenov, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22055.htm">Horvath ( Christopher D.) - Some Questions about Identifying Individuals: Failed Intuitions about Organisms and Species</A>", Horvath, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5881.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - Same-kind coincidence and the ship of Theseus</A>", Hughes, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9796.htm">Johansson (Ingvar) - Identity Puzzles and Supervenient Identities</A>", Johansson, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22061.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - Of Persons and Organisms: A Reply to Howsepian</A>", Lockwood, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4324.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - On the Identity of Artifacts</A>", Lowe, 1983</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22058.htm">Morreau (Michael) - It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble With Overall Similarity</A>", Morreau, 2010</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22046.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Necessity of Origin</A>", Noonan, 1983</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6101.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Wiggins, Artifact Identity and 'Best Candidate' Theories</A>", Noonan, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11401.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Reply to Garrett</A>", Noonan, 1986</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22048.htm">Over (D.E.) - On a Temporal Slippery Slope Paradox</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_44_19">Over, 1986</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_44_19"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4428.htm">Rea (Michael) - The Problem of Material Constitution</A>", Rea, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22041.htm">Scaltsas (Theodore) - The Ship of Theseus</A>", Scaltsas, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22057.htm">Scaltsas (Theodore) - Identity, Origin and Spatiotemporal Continuity</A>", Scaltsas, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5882.htm">Simons (Peter) - On Being the Same Ship(s) - or Electron(s): Reply to Hughes</A>", Simons, 1981</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22042.htm">Smart (Brian) - How to Reidentify the Ship of Theseus</A>", Smart, 1972</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22043.htm">Smart (Brian) - The Ship of Theseus, the Parthenon and Disassembled Objects</A>", Smart, 1973</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22053.htm">Smythe (Thomas W.) - Chisholm on Personal Identity</A>", Smythe, 1975</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22044.htm">Symons (John) - The Individuality of Artifacts and Organisms</A>", Symons, 2010</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_44_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_44_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>And the  Trigger s Broom variant of the paradox was mentioned by a financial adviser. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_44_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_44_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_44_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_44_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See also "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22052.htm">Tanksley (Charley) - The Mereological Constancy Of Masses</A>". </li></ul></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/06/2018 16:32:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 44: (Methuselah)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_45_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_45_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I m unimpressed by <a name="48"></a>Lewis s solution to the Methuselah <a name="48"></a>thought experiment, which seems to be a <em>reductio ad absurdum</em> of the <a name="48"></a>psychological <a name="48"></a>connectedness approach to personal identity. </li><li>Can there really be an uncountable infinity of <a name="48"></a>persons residing in a single <a name="48"></a>body? But why not? Lewis thrives on pressing credibility. </li><li>The  no prudential concern for the future argument also seems to be another <em>reductio</em> of the connectedness approach. If I m not the same person as the future occupant of my body, why make provisions for him. Yet, he ll share my <a name="48"></a>first-person perspective and I ll be <a name="48"></a>psychologically continuous with him. </li><li>Of course, Lewis s model (of a 150-year cut-off for psychological connectedness) is admittedly too crude. <a name="48"></a>Parfit sees temporally extended persons as <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_45_11">persons of reduced degree</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_45_11"></A>, according to the degree of connectedness. However, this seems to destroy the natural growth and maturation of the person. </li><li>I m still the same person as was my immature self, even though most of my hopes and desires have changed. If I m in control of my life, I own these changes, brought them about, and often think them for the good. </li><li>What about where I don t own them, but regret my corruption (moral and physical)? It s still <U>my</U> corruption that I regret. I m the same <a name="48"></a>human being. </li><li>It depends what <a name="48"></a>concept we want to use the term  person for. We always have to distinguish <a name="48"></a>personality from persons. </li><li>Finally, consider <A HREF = "../../../Authors/K/Author_Kripke (Saul).htm">Saul Kripke</A> on individuation by <a name="48"></a>origin. Is this a possible objection to overlapping persons? If a person s origin is what <a name="48"></a>individuates it, how is it possible for persons to have <a name="48"></a>vague,<a name="48"></a> origins as in an un-simplified Methusalah case? There are two issues here that need spelling out.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_45_19">Links</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_45_19"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_45_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_45_20">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_45_20"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_45_21">include</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_45_21"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3968.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Identity and Determinacy</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_541.htm">Perry (John) - The Importance of Being Identical</A>", Perry</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23366.htm">Briggs (Rachael) & Nolan (Daniel) - Utility Monsters for the Fission Age</A>", Briggs & Nolan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23365.htm">Butkovic (Ana) - Does Identity Really Matter? Parfit vs Lewis</A>", Butkovic</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23364.htm">So (Paul) - Lewis Personal Identity</A>", So</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_45_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_45_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I need to re-read Parfit to see what he means (assuming he said this!). </li><li>I have a Note on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_870.htm">Degrees of Personhood</a>, but it is talking about something else, I think. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_45_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_45_20"></A><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_45_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 10/05/2018 10:07:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 45: (Teletransportation)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> A Case Study -  Beam me up Scottie : There are two obvious supposed mechanisms for teletransportation:<ol type="1"><li>Transferring both matter and information; or simply</li><li>Transferring information, utilising local matter. </li></ol>I gather that in the show itself, it's plasma that's transmitted, but as this is unlikely to get to its destination without causing havoc, the information-only transfer is more reasonable. However, even in the plasma-transfer case, I'm unconvinced that I'd <a name="48"></a>survive, for two reasons: <ol type="1"><li>Some things (eg. bicycles) <U>can</U> survive disassembly and re-assembly, but <U>only</U> if they are disassembled into recognisable parts. If a bicycle is disassembled into iron filings and latex goo, and then re-manufactured, we might be reluctant to say it's the same bicycle. </li><li>As a matter of empirical fact, fundamental particles are not distinguishable, so the labelling cannot be undertaken even in principle. If it doesn't matter which particle fits where, provided they are of the right sort, the case seems to collapse into the information-transfer variant.</li></ol> We now turn to the information-transfer case. My main worries initially here have to do with the possibility of <a name="48"></a>duplicates. We all know that a counterfeit, however well done, isn't the same as the original. The logic of <a name="48"></a>identity is constraining. A thing is identical to itself and to nothing else, so if a thing is identical to two "other" things, these "two" must be identical to one another. Given that my two beamed-up versions <U>aren't</U> identical to one another, at least one of them can't be identical to me. And, since they are exactly <a name="48"></a>similar, why choose one rather than the other? So, neither is me. Both are exactly similar to me, but identity is to be distinguished from exact similarity. This situation is similar to the case where the "original" human being isn't destroyed. This sort of thought <a name="48"></a>experiment is referred to as the branch-line case. Canonically, it's where I've only a few days left to live (because the scanner has done me a mischief). Would I be happy in the knowledge that my duplicate would go on and on, and take up with my partner and career where I left off? Is this as good as if I survived? Not likely, unless we re <a name="48"></a>Parfitian saints! Note, however, that the case is tendentiously described (ie. as teletransportation) to lead to this seemingly obvious conclusion. The "main line" candidate would be perfectly happy that his rival back home was about to perish. <BR><BR>Philosophers split into two main camps in response to these situations (though - jumping ahead a little - even if <a name="48"></a>perdurantism <U>is</U> true, we <U>still</U> might not have the teletransportation of a <a name="48"></a>persisting <a name="48"></a>individual, because of the wrong sort of <a name="48"></a>causal link leading to a lack of forward <a name="48"></a>continuity of <a name="48"></a>consciousness, or even of physical continuity). So there are multiple bifurcations, but we keep things simple here and just follow those who think that I either survive or have what <a name="48"></a>matters in survival:-<ol type="1"><li>4-dimensionalists (Perdurantists): A thing is really a 4-dimensional worm through space-time, which consists in a set of instantaneous 3-D stages. In this situation, where multiple teletransportations occur, all copies are me. They are different 4-D worms, but they share all their pre-beaming-up stages. There were <U>always</U> at least 2 people present. </li><li>3-dimensionalists (Endurantists) claim that while I'm not identical to the beamed-up person, yet I have what matters in survival.</li></ol>Note that there's a <a name="48"></a>modal argument to the effect that even in the usual case where only <U>one</U> copy is beamed up, and the original is destroyed, because there <U>might</U> have been multiple copies, this means that identity isn't preserved <U>even</U> in the case where there's only one teletransportation-result created. This seems to lead to paradox. Imagine the situation - I'm beamed up and think I've survived, and am then told that the machine has malfunctioned and produced a duplicate, and hence, contrary to my experience, I haven't survived after all! Unfortunately, some philosophers go along with a "closest <a name="48"></a>continuer" theory of identity across nasty cases of <a name="48"></a>fission or <a name="48"></a>fusion. I'm identical to (or even  survive as ) the continuer that <U>most</U> closely continues me, either <a name="48"></a>psychologically or <a name="48"></a>physically, according to taste. How can <U>my</U> survival depend on what happens to someone <U>else</U>, the thought goes? While this does seem odd, in fact you can t trust the feelings of the teletransportees  for even if multiple copies are made, they all subjectively <U>feel</U> like the original. <BR><BR>There are two questions outstanding. <ol type="1"><li>Do I survive the transfer? And, if I don t, </li><li>Does it matter that I'm not identical to the post-beamed person? </li></ol>I m here ignoring the (as it seems to <a name="48"></a>me) illogical  survival without identity option. <BR><BR>We have seen that it is possible that it appears to me that I survive, yet I do not. On the endurantist view, the logic of identity means that I cannot trust my experience. So, it seems possible that the person  waking up is not me. I never wake up  in the sense that I lose consciousness, but never experience a re-awakening - but someone else with my past in his memories is created in my stead. <BR><BR>So, is survival what matters? Well, on the perdurantist view, it s not even sufficient for me to have what matters. Imagine the case where the machine goes haywire and 1,000 exactly similar teletransportees are created. All these share my pre-teletransportation stages, so are all me (except that  I was always 1,000 co-located individuals  and maybe more  who knows how often the machine may go wrong in the future!). In this case 1,000 individuals would be squabbling over the same friends, relations, job etc, and that might be rather a nuisance. However, this isn't fundamental to whether I do or don't survive. If I'm a violin virtuoso or a body-builder, I might not find it much fun surviving as a brain in a vat, but that would just be tough. The standard philosophical test is the "future great pain test". I believe that the future continuant will be me, whether I like it or not, if I'm as terrified of that continuant being tortured as I would be if I were to be tortured in the normal course of events. Our <a name="48"></a>BIVs would be even more upset at the prospect of torture-simulation being fed into their brains than at the loss of their beautiful bodies. Our fears have to be moderated by logic, however. But this is no worse than ignoring a revivalist rant on Hellfire. If I m not identical to a particular teletransportatee, I won t survive, and if I don t survive I won t feel anything. I may have a moral obligation not to land others in a pickle, but it won t be the selfish problem of avoiding landing myself in one. <BR><BR>I can imagine fissioning, by the bungled-beaming-up process, into 1,000 continuants, none of which (on a 3-D view) is identical to me, but all of whom seem to themselves to continue my first-person perspective. I can imagine (just about) going into the machine, and coming out again 1,000 times (when the life-histories of the 1,000 then start to diverge). While the psychologies of the 1,000 are initially identical, they are not connected to one another, though they are each connected continuously to the pre-beamed-up person. So, if even one of them were to be threatened with torture, I'd be terrified if I thought that that one (even amongst all the others) would be me, in the sense that my experience continues into that body. <BR><BR>But, do I survive? I don't think I do, for reasons given above. It s not that I reject perdurantism, it s just that even accepting perdurantism there s too radical a discontinuity. It's clear that a duplicate, looking backwards, wouldn't be able to tell apart the situation from the normal one of (say) just having woken up after a dreamless sleep. However, I imagine it's possible (even in a supposedly successful teletransportation) for there to be nothing it's like for me after the beaming - it's as though I never woke up, though someone else woke up thinking he was me. This would be a tragedy but, we'd never know about it, because (on this hypothesis) I wouldn't be around to tell the tale, and my duplicate would claim everything was fine (he remembered going to bed and waking up, as it were). <BR><BR>This worries me slightly about our every-night bouts of unconsciousness. How do I know that  the me that wakes up is  the same me that went to sleep, and would it matter if it wasn't? Was my mother right in saying  it ll be all right in the morning , in the sense that I d have no further experience of the current problem, or indeed of anything at all? Is this worry parallel to beam-me-up case? Or is sleep a pain-free death?<BR><BR>I suspect the answer to these questions is that for a physical thing to persist, there needs to be appropriate physical continuity, and this continuity guarantees its persistence (though this intuition is a bit of a feeble response). On the assumption that my <a name="48"></a>brain supports my conscious experience, this is enough to reassure me that, as it's the same continuing brain in my skull overnight, it's the same me that's conscious in the morning. I don't have the same reassurance in the case of beaming-up. So, I wouldn't go in for it, even if it came to be seen as a cheap form of transportation.<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>Footnote  December 2009</U></B><BR><BR>There s a 10-minute animated cartoon - John Weldon's "To Be"  that discusses the question of teletransportation. It s presently on U-Tube at <A HREF = "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc). In it, a mad scientist invents a teletransportation device as a means of free travel. The necessity of destroying the original is discussed, initially to avoid overpopulation, and then to prevent disputes at to who is who. The branch-line case, where the original is destroyed five minutes after the replication, also features. There, it is clear that the original is a different individual to the teletransportee, and clings to life. Destroying the original is (in retrospect) murder  but what s the difference between this situation and the one where the original is immediately destroyed? There s obviously the anticipatory angle  in the  normal case, the original thinks of the situation as one of travel, and no-one thinks that identity is not preserved in the process, whereas in the branch-line case the confusion is exposed, and the original knows that the teletransportee is a clone. So, maybe the branch-line case is <U>clearly</U> a case of murder, whereas the  normal case is a case of accidental homicide where the perpetrator is unaware that he s killed someone? <BR><BR>The twist in the tail is that the heroine, overcome with guilt after the branch-line case (which she d originally just thought of as a logical demonstration)  and now understanding the metaphysics of teletransportation  thinks she can now (a) atone for her crime, (b) escape the guilt and (c) escape her creditors by being herself teletransported. For (a) she dies and is cloned and (b) / (c) the teletransportee is a different individual to the orignal, so why should this individual have any moral connection to the other? There seems to be something fishy about this, but maybe it s perfectly sound reasoning. <BR><BR>In the animation, the original and the teletransportee get muddled up (after all, both look alike and think alike), so for practical purposes we are in a situation similar to Locke s  amnesiac drunkard case  society has to find the drunkard guilty for his forgotten crimes (in that case because of the possibility of dissimulation); so, maybe the possibilty of dissimulation or devious intent (as in the animated case) would for practical purposes mean that the teletransportee would inherit the moral and legal baggage of the original  and surely they would, or the prctical consequences of people routinely escaping their debts would be grave. <BR><BR>Yet, metaphysically, it s no different from escaping your debts by committing suicide, because the teletransportee is not the same individual. And, I think the Branch-line case shows that it s not the same person either, unless we allow the non-substance term  Person to have multiple instances  as immediately post teletransportation, both the original and the teletransportee would seem to be the same person (however this is defined non-substantially) even though they would rapidly diverge into two different persons. Just as in the case of suicide, society has in the past tried to show that you  can t really escape  because of the prospect of Hell, so in the teletransportation case the same myth would be propagated. The teletransportee would be deemed to inherit the moral baggage of the original and, if not up to speed on the metaphysics, would think rightly so. But the original would have escaped for all that!</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 18/12/2010 19:58:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 46: (Siliconisation)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_47_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_47_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> Siliconisation is a name  there may be others  for <a name="48"></a>thought experiments such as, Unger s  zippering , the gradual replacement of neural tissue by silicon. </li><li>This is a subtle argument. We don t  of course  know whether this TE is metaphysically possible. We don t know whether silicon can sustain <a name="48"></a>consciousness, though <a name="48"></a>functionalists assume that it can. Gradually, it is said, we no longer have a human <a name="48"></a>animal, but one that will  behaviourally at least  will be indistinguishable from one. </li><li>I think the situation is best viewed as an <U>increasingly mutilated</U> human animal with an ever-growing prosthesis. I doubt that the silicon would maintain phenomenal consciousness, but just be a  <a name="48"></a>zombie simulacrum. </li><li>Any replacement that <U>would</U> maintain phenomenal consciousness would be indistinguishable from natural part-replacement. But I think this is a contingent, empirical matter, a long way off from an answer.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_47_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_47_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_47_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_47_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_47_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_47_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_47_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 47: (Brain State Transfer)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_48_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_48_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The idea that we can, even in principle, copy the information from a <a name="48"></a>brain to a backup device and then restore it to another (or the same) brain - as in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>" - without changing the <U>identity</U> of that brain seems fanciful to me. </li><li>This is partly because I am antipathetic to <a name="48"></a>functionalism. The information stored in brains appears to be in highly distributed representations along connectionist lines rather than according to classical AI. The very <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_48_4">physical structure</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_48_4"></A> of the brain changes along with what it represents. There is no simple software / hardware distinction in a realistic <a name="48"></a>psychology of <a name="48"></a>human beings. </li><li>Consequently, this is a case of an under-specified <a name="48"></a>TE that <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wilkes (Kathleen).htm">Kathleen Wilkes</A> so objects to. When we try to flesh out the details, we find that the TE doesn t really work. Any backup will need to be molecule by molecule to retain the informational richness of the original, and consequently any restore will not really simply modify the existing brain, but will destroy it and replace it with a <a name="48"></a>replica of the brain whose contents are supposedly being transferred. It will not simply feed information into a pre-existing brain. </li><li>Hence, I now think that Williams s intuitions about the post-transfer A-body-person remaining a  mixed up A-person are incorrect. Nor does A-body-person end up as B, but as a fusion of a confused replica of B s brain and A s <a name="48"></a>body. The situation is best described as a <a name="48"></a>transplant of (maybe only part of) a replica of B s brain into A-body-person s head.</li><li>This topic is related to other Notes, including:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Transhumanism, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Uploading.</li><li>Note that  uploading differs from  and builds on  BSTs because it requires the person s psychology and phenomenal consciousness to be realised (I would say merely simulated) on a digital computer, making a two-phase project, whereas BSTs  superficially at least  just require the copying phase. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_48_13">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_48_13"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_48_14">include</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_48_14"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21149.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue</A>", Dainton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20895.htm">Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel</A>", Ehring</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>The categorised reading-list doesn t provide much, though there must be many references in the literature. Many will mention BSTs only in passing. So, for now, the reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23095.htm">Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2015)</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5401.htm">Perry (John) - Williams on The Self and the Future</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>", Shoemaker</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_48_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_48_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Of course, even in a digital computer there are physical changes to the various gates and storage media. </li><li>But there is no growing or disassembling of connections. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_48_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_48_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 14/03/2018 14:38:24<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 48: (Thesis - References)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> I ve not had time to reference all the allusions in my Research proposal. However, I've made a start, and I do have a large database of papers & books, categorised by sub-topic, which I ve purchased, photocopied or downloaded; much of the tedious aspect of research is, I hope, over with. The database has been obtained thought reading lists on the Web, use of the Philosopher s Index, and following up references in papers. I have read a large number, though a small percentage, of these items, usually filling the margins with annotations. I think a useful preliminary task prior to commencing formal study is to put these jottings into some sort of order.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><BR><P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U></B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "000000">Black</FONT>: Printable Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018<LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018<LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</OL><hr><BR><a href = "../../../index.htm">Return to Home page</a><BR><B>Timestamp: 02/08/2018 15:52:01. Comments to <U>theo@theotodman.com</U>.</B></P></BODY></HTML>