<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Printable Note - Personal Identity - Research - Proposal (Theo Todman's Web Page) </title><link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <P ALIGN="Center"><FONT Size = 3 FACE="Arial"><B><HR>Theo Todman's Web Page<HR><p>For Text Colour-conventions (at end of page): <A HREF="#ColourConventions">Click Here</a></p><U>Personal Identity - Research - Proposal</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The <a name="48"></a><U>topic</U><SUP>1</SUP> I wish to <a name="48"></a><U>research</U><SUP>2</SUP> is  Personal Identity , with the <a name="48"></a><U>focus</U><SUP>3</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>4</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>5</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>6</SUP> on the <a name="48"></a><U>ontology</U><SUP>7</SUP> of, and persistence criteria for, human <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>8</SUP> and related <a name="48"></a><U>sortals</U><SUP>9</SUP>. Since it is a contingent fact that all existents that are universally agreed to be persons are members of the species homo <a name="48"></a><U>sapiens</U><SUP>10</SUP>, we must start with human beings in deciding what persons are. <BR><BR>I will scrutinise certain basic assumptions that I accept. Firstly, that the  identity involved in personal identity is the ordinary logical <a name="48"></a><U>notion</U><SUP>11</SUP>. Secondly, that some form of <a name="48"></a><U>physicalism</U><SUP>12</SUP> in the philosophy of mind is true and central to the topic. Thirdly, while it is analytic that survival involves identity, that what matters in <a name="48"></a><U>survival</U><SUP>13</SUP> is both <a name="48"></a><U>physical</U><SUP>14</SUP> & <a name="48"></a><U>psychological</U><SUP>15</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>continuity</U><SUP>16</SUP>. <BR><BR>In considering what a person is, I will need to consider <a name="48"></a><U>somatic</U><SUP>17</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>forensic</U><SUP>18</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>psychological</U><SUP>19</SUP> issues, and, in particular, focus on <a name="48"></a><U>self-consciousness</U><SUP>20</SUP> and the first-person <a name="48"></a><U>perspective</U><SUP>21</SUP>. I will need to consider semantic and <a name="48"></a><U>conceptual</U><SUP>22</SUP> issues as well as ontological issues. <BR><BR>I will focus on two views, namely <a name="48"></a><U>Animalism</U><SUP>23</SUP> and the Constitution <a name="48"></a><U>View</U><SUP>24</SUP>. I must consider just what Baker and others mean by  constitution , and evaluate the cogency of the supposedly knock-down  too many minds <a name="48"></a><U>argument</U><SUP>25</SUP> that Olson and others have raised against it. <BR><BR>Key questions are whether or not the concept of a person is a natural kind <a name="48"></a><U>concept</U><SUP>26</SUP>, and whether the various views take persons sufficiently <a name="48"></a><U>seriously</U><SUP>27</SUP>. That is, are persons no more than phase <a name="48"></a><U>sortals</U><SUP>28</SUP> of certain <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>29</SUP> or are they ontological novelties, as Baker suggests? <BR><BR>I will consider the usual problem cases, whether obtained from clinical <a name="48"></a><U>observation</U><SUP>30</SUP> or thought <a name="48"></a><U>experiment</U><SUP>31</SUP>, including brain transplant, <a name="48"></a><U>fission</U><SUP>32</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>fusion</U><SUP>33</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>duplication</U><SUP>34</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>replication</U><SUP>35</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>metamorphosis</U><SUP>36</SUP>. In particular, I want to compare <a name="48"></a><U>forward</U><SUP>37</SUP> and backward psychological continuity and the role of normal <a name="48"></a><U>causality</U><SUP>38</SUP> in preserving identity. However, I need to consider whether all talk of first-person perspectives depends on a, presumably non-existent, Cartesian <a name="48"></a><U>Ego</U><SUP>39</SUP>.<BR><BR>Since I m particularly averse to  closest <a name="48"></a><U>continuer </U><SUP>40</SUP> theories, I am tempted by <a name="48"></a><U>four-dimensionalism</U><SUP>41</SUP> and shared person-stages as a solution to some of the paradoxes where, otherwise, awkward choices have to be made. Since there are acknowledged difficulties for the perdurantist in not being able to <a name="48"></a><U>count</U><SUP>42</SUP> tokens of persons and other sortals, I need to address the attempted <a name="48"></a><U>solutions</U><SUP>43</SUP>.<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>44</SUP><BR><BR>I conclude this document (by way of an end-note) by considering the thought experiment of <a name="48"></a><U>teletransportation</U><SUP>45</SUP> to rehearse the key issues. I would need to repeat this exercise for all the favourites, including Unger s <a name="48"></a><U>Siliconisation</U><SUP>46</SUP> and Williams s <a name="48"></a><U>backup/restore</U><SUP>47</SUP>.<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>48</SUP><FONT COLOR = "000000"></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 26/09/2007 20:41:17<BR> </P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1: (Background)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> This study originated as a discussion document for my first (and only) tutorial when I was registered for the MPhilStud in 2005. I ve resurrected it as a research proposal, and added a fair amount of material, but the notes probably attempt too much at this stage. Additionally, I ve forgotten where the references are from, and haven t had time to hunt them out. The first few pages are probably important in the context of my current application. The notes are very much  work in progress . I ve removed all the acknowledgements of muddle that appeared in the immediately previous edition, but they are to be understood passim.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 2: (Research - Internet Technology)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Another of my interests is a metaphilosophical project to use internet technology in the service of philosophy. Already in this little document I have felt the need for many levels of footnoting. I wish to use this course of study as an experiment in implementing some ideas and developing some technology that s easy to use and freely available. It strikes me that any philosophical proposition is embedded in a host of other propositions held dear by its espouser, or depends on reasoning that's difficult to display in print. Cascading hyperlinks, contextual pop-ups and the like come to mind as potential aids to lucidity. Making such functions easy to generate and maintain would be difficult, so I see some prototyping coming along as part of my PhD scratch-work. Maybe the whole idea depends on epistemological foundationalism, but I think it s consistent with coherentism. Either way, it would rather mercilessly expose one's ignorance and biases. I understand that the thesis will have to be written up traditionally.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3: (Research - Focus)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Vastly more will be researched and written up than can be included in a 70,000-word thesis, though maybe some of this surfeit can be included in a book and in the above-mentioned internet site. <BR><BR>The issues in general philosophy that will require investigation in support of this research include:-<BR><ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a><U>Concepts</U><SUP>1</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Causation</U><SUP>2</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Change</U><SUP>3</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Consciousness</U><SUP>4</SUP></li><li>Free <a name="48"></a><U>Will</U><SUP>5</SUP></li><li>Intuition and Thought <a name="48"></a><U>Experiments</U><SUP>6</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Modality</U><SUP>7</SUP></li><li>Natural <a name="48"></a><U>Kinds</U><SUP>8</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Psychopathology</U><SUP>9</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Substance</U><SUP>10</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Time</U><SUP>11</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Vagueness</U><SUP>12</SUP></li><li>Etc & . </li></ul>Additionally, this project overlaps somewhat with a more ambitious one in the Philosophy of <a name="48"></a><U>Religion</U><SUP>13</SUP>.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.1 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 22: (Concepts)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 38: (Causality)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 16.3: (Change)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.11: (Consciousness)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.5: (Free Will)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_120_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_120_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This may be somewhat peripheral to my concerns, unless free-will should prove essential to our concept of a <a name="48"></a>PERSON, as is alleged in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_207.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person</A>". </li><li>Maybe Dennett s views in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_85.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting</A>" will be of interest, following on from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_545.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood</A>". </li><li>The topic of future contingents was covered in my essay on <a name="48"></a>Aristotle s Sea Battle. I ve not repeated the associated literature here. </li><li>Free will also features in discussions of backward <a name="48"></a>Time Travel. </li><li>I cannot cover here the interesting topic of the  Free Will defence in theodicy to the problem of apparent gratuitous suffering, though relevant items will appear in the categorised reading-list below. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_120_5">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_120_5"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_120_6">include</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_120_6"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2368.htm">Ayer (A.J.) - Fatalism</A>", Ayer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22797.htm">Cave (Stephen) - The free-will scale</A>", Cave</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5086.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - Free Will</A>", Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6766.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Freedom and Determinism: Introduction</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22554.htm">Dresser (Sam) - How Camus and Sartre split up over the question of how to be free</A>", Dresser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_173.htm">Dupre (John) - The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will</A>", Dupre</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_205.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility</A>", Frankfurt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_207.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person</A>", Frankfurt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22671.htm">Frith (Christopher D.) - Our illusory sense of agency has a deeply important social purpose</A>", Frith</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12531.htm">Holt (James) - Target Article: Daniel M Wegner: The Illusion of Conscious Will 2002 MIT Press</A>", Holt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_133.htm">Lewis (David) - Are We Free to Break the Laws</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20233.htm">Marshall (Richard) & Churchland (Patricia) - Patricia Churchland: Causal Machines</A>", Marshall & Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3639.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Freedom</A>", Nagel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_182.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Moral Luck</A>", Nagel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_531.htm">Pink (Thomas) - Reason and Agency</A>", Pink</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6831.htm">Schopenhauer (Arthur) - Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will (extract)</A>", Schopenhauer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20447.htm">Smith (Quentin) - Time, Change and Freedom: Introduction</A>", Smith</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_529.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Freedom and Resentment</A>", Strawson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22517.htm">Tessman (Lisa) - Sometimes giving a person a choice is an act of terrible cruelty</A>", Tessman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_528.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7618.htm">Von Wachter (Daniel) - Free Agents as Cause</A>", von Wachter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_420.htm">Watson (Gary) - Free Agency</A>", Watson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2342.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A reading list <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_120_7">might start with</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_120_7"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_85.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_201.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Freedom Evolves</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6462.htm">Doyle (Robert O.) - Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy</A>", Doyle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6628.htm">Earman (John) - A Primer On Determinism</A>", Earman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_402.htm">Honderich (Ted) - How Free are You - The Determinism Problem</A>", Honderich</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_138.htm">Pink (Thomas) - The Psychology of Freedom</A>", Pink</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_405.htm">Rovane (Carol) - The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics</A>", Rovane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6308.htm">Smith (Quentin) & Oaklander (L. Nathan) - Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics</A>", Smith & Oaklander</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_48.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - An Essay on Free Will</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_51.htm">Watson (Gary), Ed. - Free Will: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", Watson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2713.htm">Wegner (Daniel) - The Illusion of Conscious Will</A>", Wegner<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12522.htm">Wegner (Daniel) - Precis and Peer Review of 'The Illusion of Conscious Will'</A>"</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_120_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_120_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_120_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_120_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve restricted the list almost exclusively to books, and not all of those in the categorised reading list are included! </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 19/02/2018 00:40:19<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.7: (Modality)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_121_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_121_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Modality  the logic of possibility and necessity  is important to my thesis because discussions of Personal Identity often range over possible  rather than merely actual  events that an individual may encounter and which may call that individual s continued existence into doubt. </li><li>This is particularly the case with the numerous popular <a name="48"></a>thought experiments (TEs), one of which  <a name="48"></a>Teletransportation  has a link to this Note (the bungled duplication case, and what this has to say about the standard singular case).</li><li>Modality also features in the arguments over the <a name="48"></a>logic of identity  in particular the standard view that Identity is a necessary relation, contra the heretical positions. </li><li>I doubt I need to get into Modal Realism <a name="48"></a>(Lewis) or other discussions about what modality reduces to ontologically.</li><li>The same goes for the intricacies of Modal Logic, though a quick read through "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2076.htm">Girle (Rod) - Modal Logics and Philosophy</A>" might be beneficial. </li><li>I need to review my old notes on "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_441.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity</A>". </li><li>The topic found its way into an early note on the <a name="48"></a>Focus of my research, but didn t find its way into <a name="48"></a>Chapter 4, which deals with basic metaphysical issues. Maybe it should be there?</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_577.htm">Sturgeon (Scott) - Zombies and Ghosts</A>" has a useful categorisation of types of modality, and their relation to conceivability and genuine possibility. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_121_8">Links</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_121_8"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_121_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_121_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_121_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_121_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_121_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>There are lots of books and papers in the categorised reading list below, but I suppose the following are the ones to start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1931.htm">Hale (Bob) - Modality</A>", Hale, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5397.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Modality</A>", Hawley, 2004</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_505.htm">Jubien (Michael) - Modality</A>", Jubien, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1427.htm">MacBride (Fraser), Ed. - Identity and Modality</A>", MacBride, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1428.htm">Melia (Joseph) - Modality</A>", Melia, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7663.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking</A>", Williamson, 2005</li></ol></li><li>This is a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_121_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_121_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_121_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_121_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 26: (Natural Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.22: (Psychopathology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.9: (Substance)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.11: (Time)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I don t think I need to wade too deeply in the topic of time for the purposes of my thesis, but it s clearly central to the topic of diachronic identity, ie. identity over time.</li><li> Aspects of particular interest include:- <ol type="1"><li>The <a name="48"></a>endurantism, <a name="48"></a>exdurantism, <a name="48"></a>Perdurantism debate. Perdurantism may solve the identity-related problems of <a name="48"></a>fission, at least according to <a name="48"></a>Lewis. </li><li><a name="48"></a>Parfit s contention that we should discount the concern we owe to our future selves proportionate to our likely lack of psychological connection.</li><li><a name="48"></a>Time Travel: maybe surprisingly, this alleged possibility appears in various <a name="48"></a>TEs on <a name="48"></a>Fission. I have given it its own Note and Reading List. <BR> </li></ol></li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_11">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_11"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_12">include</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_12"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2814.htm">Bais (Sander) - Very Special Relativity: An Illustrated Guide</A>", Bais</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23297.htm">Crull (Elise) - You thought quantum mechanics was weird: check out entangled time</A>", Crull</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20948.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Time and Space: Preface</A>", Dainton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20945.htm">Dyke (Heather) - Review of Craig Bourne's 'A Future for Presentism'</A>", Dyke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19244.htm">Hawking (Stephen) - Space and Time Warps</A>", Hawking</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7798.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Travels in Four Dimensions: Preface</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7811.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Travels in Four Dimensions: Concluding Thoughts</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1781.htm">Lewis (David) - The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17911.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Time</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_51.htm">McTaggart (J. McT. E.) - Time (The Unreality of Time)</A>", McTaggart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6963.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time: Preface</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6964.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time: Introduction and Summary</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6950.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II: Preface</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6951.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II: Introduction</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23277.htm">Rovelli (Carlo) - Hot black holes and the arrow of time</A>", Rovelli</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13156.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime: Preface for the Paperback Edition</A>", Sklar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17149.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime: Introduction</A>", Sklar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17154.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime: Epilogue</A>", Sklar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23279.htm">Torrengo (Giuliano) & Mariani (Cristian) - Review of James Harrington, 'Time: A Philosophical Introduction'</A>", Torrengo & Mariani</li></ol></li><li>I ve always thought it foolish to expatiate on the philosophy of time while in ignorance of special relativity, but this is a difficult <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_13">sub-sub-topic</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_13"></A>. </li><li>Thereafter, a reading list (where <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_14">not covered elsewhere</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_14"></A>) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20424.htm">Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Actualism and Thisness</A>", Adams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16821.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Temporal Reality</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16168.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Time</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22623.htm">Besson (Corine) & Hattiangadi (Anandi) - The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion</A>", Besson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5270.htm">Bigelow (John) - Presentism and Properties</A>", Bigelow</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6536.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: A Philosophical Enquiry</A>", Botros</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6349.htm">Bourne (Craig) - A Future for Presentism</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_15">Bourne</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_15"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4112.htm">Campbell (Joseph Keim), O'Rourke (Michael) & Silverstein (Harry S.) - Time and Identity</A>", Campbell, etc. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22628.htm">Coope (Ursula) - Why Does Aristotle Say That There Is No Time without Change?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_16">Coope</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_16"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6388.htm">Craig (William Lane) - The Tensed Theory of Time</A>", Craig</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6387.htm">Craig (William Lane) - The Tenseless Theory of Time</A>", Craig</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6347.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Time and Space</A>", Dainton<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20906.htm">Oaklander (L. Nathan) - Review of Barry Dainton's 'Time and Space'</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22624.htm">Dyke (Heather) - McTaggart and the Truth about Time</A>", Dyke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22647.htm">Lebens (Samuel) & Goldschmidt (Tyron) - The Promise of a New Past</A>", Lebens & Goldschmidt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1449.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1159.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) & MacBeath (Murray), Eds. - The Philosophy of Time: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", LePoidevin & MacBeath</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6380.htm">Markosian (Ned) - A Defense of Presentism</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4325.htm">Markosian (Ned) - How Fast Does Time Pass?</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5893.htm">Markosian (Ned) - The Open Past</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22626.htm">Markosian (Ned) - The Truth About the Past and the Future</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13102.htm">McTaggart (J. McT. E.) - The Unreality of Time</A>", McTaggart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1420.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_17">Mellor</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_17"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14455.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Passage of Time</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14446.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Rate of Time s Passage</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22633.htm">Paul (L.A.) - Temporal Experience</A>", Paul</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_706.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - Papers on Time and Tense</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1772.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - Some Free Thinking About Time</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19880.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - Thank Goodness That's over</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1768.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - The Notion of the Present</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1465.htm">Putnam (Hilary) - Time and Physical Geometry</A>", Putnam</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6725.htm">Lizza (John) - Introduction: The Biological Paradigm of Death</A>", Rovelli</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1452.htm">Sattig (Thomas) - The Language and Reality of Time</A>", Sattig</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_54.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Time Without Change</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5013.htm">Sider (Ted) - Against Presentism</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4436.htm">Sider (Ted) - Presentism and Ontological Commitment</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22637.htm">Skow (Bradford) - On the meaning of the question 'How fast does time pass?'</A>", Skow</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22651.htm">Skow (Bradford) -  One Second Per Second </A>", Skow</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4441.htm">Smart (J.C.C.) - The River of Time</A>", Smart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4442.htm">Smart (J.C.C.) - Spatialising Time</A>", Smart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22627.htm">Sullivan (Meghan) - Change We Can Believe In (and Assert)</A>", Sullivan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22645.htm">Sullivan (Meghan) - The minimal A-theory</A>", Sullivan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22643.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Beginning of the Universe</A>", Swinburne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20972.htm">Taylor (Richard) - Space and Time</A>", Taylor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20973.htm">Taylor (Richard) - The Relativity of Time and Space</A>", Taylor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20974.htm">Taylor (Richard) - Temporal Passage</A>", Taylor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4452.htm">Williams (Donald C.) - The Myth of Passage</A>", Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6633.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence and Presentism</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1782.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8467.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and  Taking Tense Seriously </A>", Zimmerman </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_103_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_103_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_103_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_103_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Books / Chapters to read would include:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6346.htm">Davies (Paul C.W.) - About Time: Einstein's Unfinished Revolution</A>", Davies<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2022.htm">French (A.P.) - Special Relativity</A>", French<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19875.htm">Godfrey-Smith (William) - Special Relativity and the Present</A>", Godfrey-Smith<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22630.htm">Maxwell (Nicholas) - Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?</A>", Maxwell <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22629.htm">Maxwell (Nicholas) - Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible?</A>", Maxwell<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17186.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Special Relativity and Present Truth</A>", Mellor<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2021.htm">Rindler (Wolfgang) - Introduction to Special Relativity</A>", Rindler<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4431.htm">Savitt (Steven) - There's No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime)</A>", Savitt<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2023.htm">Schutz (Bernard) - A First Course in General Relativity</A>", Chapter 1, Schutz<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22634.htm">Skow (Bradford) - Relativity and the Moving Spotlight</A>", Skow<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4448.htm">Stein (Howard) - A Note on Time and Relativity Theory</A>", Stein<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4447.htm">Stein (Howard) - On Einstein-Minkowski Space-Time</A>", Stein<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1145.htm">Taylor (Edwin F.) & Wheeler (John Archibald) - Spacetime Physics - Introduction to Special Relativity</A>", Taylor<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4451.htm">Weingard (Robert) - Relativity and the Reality of Past and Future Events</A>", Weingard</li><li>Plus the occasional item in the  already read list! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_103_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Ie. works cited above, or those related to Persistence or Time travel.</li><li>I have considered all the references in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17911.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Time</A>", acquired what I can, and listed them all one way or another in this Note where they are not pre-emptively relevant to the above topics. </li><li>There appears to be a distressingly large number of books on this list!</li><li>I note a further bunch, which I ll decide on in due course:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21286.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - On the Mind-Dependence of Temporal Becoming</A>", Baker<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21287.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Temporal Becoming: The Argument from Physics</A>", Baker<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21583.htm">Kripke (Saul) - A Puzzle about Time and Thought</A>", Kripke<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19901.htm">Lombard (Lawrence B.) - On the Alleged Incompatibility of Presentism and Temporal Parts</A>", Lombard<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_509.htm">Lucas (J.R.) - The Future - An Essay on God, Temporality and Truth</A>", Lucas<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19903.htm">Markosian (Ned) - On Language and the Passage of Time</A>", Markosian<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19870.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - The Self from Time to Time</A>", Mellor<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2009.htm">Myro (George) - Identity and Time</A>", Myro<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20570.htm">Oaklander (L. Nathan) - Time and Identity</A>", Oaklander<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22048.htm">Over (D.E.) - On a Temporal Slippery Slope Paradox</A>", Over<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19907.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - On the Experience of Time</A>", Russell<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5124.htm">Savitt (Steven) - The Replacement of Time</A>", Savitt<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17200.htm">Schlesinger (George N.) - How Time Flies</A>", Schlesinger<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2887.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime</A>", Sklar<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16159.htm">Stump (Eleonore) & Kretzmann (Norman) - Eternity</A>", Stump<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21820.htm">Torrengo (Giuliano) - Feeling the Passing of Time</A>", Torrengo<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22413.htm">Torrengo (Giuliano) - The Myth of Presentism s Intuitive Appeal</A>", Torrengo<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4086.htm">Trupp (Andreas) - Time</A>", Trupp<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12807.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - Time and the Horizon</A>", Valberg<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20470.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Temporality</A>", Van Inwagen </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_103_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Maybe read "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20943.htm">Bourne (Craig) - A Theory of Presentism</A>" before / instead. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_103_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Also:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4895.htm">Coope (Ursula) - Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14</A>", and<BR>&rarr; <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1166.htm">My essay on Aristotle s future Sea Battle</a> </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_103_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>As this supercedes "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1160.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time</A>", the latter may not be worth reading.</li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 28/07/2018 13:35:02<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.12: (Vagueness)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Vagueness is a wide and interesting area of enquiry, but I need to be careful to stay on topic, namely restrict most of my investigations to areas relevant to personal identity. So, <BR>&rarr; While there can be clear paradigm cases it may be vague (ie. uncertain, or indeterminate) whether some particular instance is a paradigm case. <BR>&rarr; There can be vague boundaries to the concept <a name="48"></a>person. <BR>&rarr; Also, maybe there can be persons of varying degrees. <BR>&rarr; Maybe some higher mammals possess many of the qualities of persons, but to a reduced degree. </li><li>There will be some overlap between this Note and two others:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Vague Identity, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Indeterminate Identity. </li><li>Additionally, there is a link between this Note and yet two others:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Problem of the Many, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Sorites. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_443.htm">Evans (Gareth) - Can There Be Vague Objects?</A>", Evans</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3744.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Identity and Vagueness</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7170.htm">Hossack (Keith) - Vagueness and Personal Identity</A>", Hossack</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23024.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13111.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought</A>", Robinson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22834.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - On vagueness, or, when is a heap of sand not a heap of sand?</A>", Williamson</li></ol></li><li>Given that this topic is slightly tangential to my main topic, and the literature is vast, I need to be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_9">highly selective</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_9"></A>. So, a reading list (where not covered <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_10">elsewhere</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_10"></A>) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16167.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Metaphysical Vagueness</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4287.htm">Greenough (Patrick) - Vagueness: A Minimal Theory</A>", Greenough</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5395.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Vagueness</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3628.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Vagueness and Composition</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_33.htm">Keefe (Rosanna) & Smith (Peter) - Vagueness: A Reader</A>", Keefe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22035.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Varieties of Vagueness</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23032.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Blocking the path from vagueness to four dimensionalism</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6112.htm">Sainsbury (Mark) - What Is a Vague Object?</A>", Sainsbury</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19830.htm">Sider (Ted) - Against Vague and Unnatural Existence - Reply to Liebesman and Eklund</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20749.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Why Vagueness Is A Mystery</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6290.htm">Varzi (Achille) - Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness</A>", Varzi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3264.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness</A>", Williamson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11611.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Williamson</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_122_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_122_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>In this case, with some overlap with the notes just noted!</li><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_122_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_122_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>So, I ve selected the standard reader and papers / chapters by my favourite authors that might be included under other topics. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_122_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>In particular, those covered under the Notes on Vague and Indeterminate Identity, or in the  already read list above. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 17/01/2018 13:43:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.13: (Religion)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This Note doesn t directly relate to my studies in the Philosophy of Religion, which has its own set of pages on my website, and quarterly <a name="48"></a>Status Report.</li><li>Rather this Note has to do with the  historical and contemporary  ways in which religious questions and commitments have influenced philosophers in their discussions of personal identity. </li><li>I disagree fundamentally with philosophers such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/P/Author_Plantinga (Alvin).htm">Alvin Plantinga</A> that belief in God is  epistemologically basic , but claim that philosophy asks questions that are prior to any others, except <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_3">metaphilosophical questions</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_3"></A>.</li><li><a name="48"></a>Locke s thoughts on personal identity were initially motivated by worries about the metaphysics of <a name="48"></a>Resurrection, theodicy and other <a name="48"></a>forensic concerns. </li><li>I ve noted elsewhere contemporary <a name="48"></a>Christian Materialist <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_8">Philosophers</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_8"></A> and their thoughts on the topic of personal identity. </li><li>I ve not yet made much of a study of Jewish views where these diverge from Christian views. </li><li>No doubt Muslim philosophers have similar concerns and motivations, but I have not investigated them (yet). </li><li>I have, however, had a brief look at Hindu and <a name="48"></a>Buddhist thought on the topic of <a name="48"></a>Reincarnation and Karma. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_11">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_11"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_12">include</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_12"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_118_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_118_3"></A><B>Footnote 3</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Which are also philosophical, so part of philosophy itself. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_118_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The Note on Christian Materialism also references other contemporary philosophers with Christian affiliation, and their thoughts on personal identity. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_118_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_118_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 4: (Research - Distractions)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> While I m admitting to potential distractions, I must mention another, which is to get an MSc in mathematics by the time I m 60. While this wouldn t start until I d completed my PhD, a fair amount of  warming up would be required in parallel. I'd like to do some philosophy of mathematics one day, but my handling of the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos was a complete disaster, so abject that I'm in need of some rehabilitation (on the grounds that those that can t do shouldn t philosophise). I'd been tempted to return to chess and bridge, but these are fundamentally a waste of time, and I'm hopeful that mathematics (pursued at a much more leisurely pace than the cracking one Cambridge required of its unfortunate undergraduates) might press the same buttons. Maybe being good at mathematics (in the "Cambridge" sense), like being able to play the violin in tune, is just a special skill that some people have and others can never acquire; and that if you don't have it, you should just concentrate on the talents you do have. What worries me is that philosophy is much less constrained by the merciless exposure of falsehoods or rewarded by the discovery of certain truths, and that the discipline of mathematics might be a good foil. Yet people who've excelled in both mathematics and philosophy (eg. Pascal, Leibniz, Russell) don t seem to have treated philosophy as a poor relation. The two disciplines involve, however, completely different ways of thinking - from the narrowest to the widest possible focus.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5: (Thesis - Method & Form)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u>Form of the Argument</u><ol type="1"><li>The thesis will present an abductive argument (as in my <A HREF="../../../Dissertation - POSA.pdf" TARGET="_top">BA Dissertation</A>  Poverty of Stimulus Arguments for Innate Grammar ), that is, an inference to the best explanation of the data. </li><li>That s why I have to consider so many aspects of the subject, so many thought <a name="48"></a><U>experiments</U><SUP>1</SUP> and so much <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_6_2">clinical</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_6_2"></A> <a name="48"></a><U>data</U><SUP>3</SUP>. Into which story does it all best fit? </li><li>I may have to reject some recalcitrant thought experiments as ill-formed, but I do not wish to ignore anything significant. </li><li>For some time, I have considered Animalism as the most likely account of what human beings are, and I propose this thesis to evaluate the arguments for and against it, using the rival  Constitution View as a foil. </li></ol><BR><u>Method</u> <ul type="disc"><li>Over the years I have read a lot of books and papers on the topic of Personal Identity. <ol type="1"><li>For some, I have made extensive on-line write-ups. </li><li>For others, the write-up is incomplete, or sketchy. </li><li>For yet others, I have (more or less) extensively annotated the margin (in so doing ruining many an expensive volume!). </li><li>Finally, some have simply been read (and probably forgotten). </li></ol></li><li>I have also written numerous Notes on almost every aspect of the subject, though many of them are place-holders awaiting filling-out. These Notes link to the Books and Papers, either explicitly or thematically, and to one another. </li><li>Follow this <a name="48"></a><U>Link</U><SUP>4</SUP> for an explanation of the various Objects in my Research database, though the Note needs updating in the light of changes since 2010. </li><li>All this has resulted in a huge unfocussed cobweb of material, which needs to be subjected to some order and completeness. This has started by outlining the Chapters of the <a name="48"></a><U>Thesis</U><SUP>5</SUP>, and specifying the limited subset of the problem I intend to address in detail. </li><li>For most Chapters, my approach to producing the first draft of the Chapter will be as follows:- <ol type="1"><li>Determine which Notes that I have written are relevant to this Chapter.</li><li>Fill out any Note-place-holders with whatever s in my head!</li><li>Use the reading lists associated with these Notes to establish a limited reading list for the Chapter.</li><li>Review whatever I ve written, in whatever format, on the items in the derived reading lists, and make necessary cosmetic changes in the process of evaluating the items. </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_6_6">Segregate</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_6_6"></A> this reading list into:-<BR>& Higher versus lower priority,<BR>& Read versus unread,<BR>& Annotated (by hand) versus unannotated<BR>& Those with an Abstract or Note Write-up versus those without</li><li>Cull items that are unlikely to be addressed in the next two years and list them as specifically excluded. I may pick up on these at a later stage of the project, but in the short term the culling process will be essential for making across-the-board progress. </li><li>Determine why the residue are important and relevant  if they are  and briefly document the reasons. </li><li>Migrate any Book or Paper Abstracts that I have written (as distinct from copied from elsewhere) to Write-Up Notes. </li><li>If the Book or Paper is important enough, migrate any hand-written annotations to a Write-Up Note, and complete any important incomplete Write-Up Notes. </li><li>Write and maintain a Chapter Summary, motivating and summarising the Chapter. Use this to ensure I don t get side-tracked. </li><li>Incorporate the key points of Write-Up Notes into the Topic Notes. </li><li>Incorporate the highest level thoughts from the Topic Notes into the Main Text of the Chapter. </li></ol></li><li>In principle, these actions should be effected in number sequence, though there will be some iteration, particularly with the last point, which presents my research findings in their most accessible form for outside interested parties.</li><li>There are many important papers that are on the reading lists that I have not read. At this stage, I do not intend to read them until I have processed all those papers that I have read. This will require discipline!</li><li>Most of the  detailed working of the Chapter should be retained in the topic Notes and Write-ups. The Chapter should be fairly high-level at this stage, with hyperlinks to more detailed or supportive work.</li><li>I need to have some method of evidencing how far along this trial I have got for each Chapter, but this can wait until there is some progress to report. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_6_2"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 2</B>: I am unsure how much of this I have actually attended to  but it is important to keep it in mind. <a name="On-Page_Link_6_6"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 6</B>: I need to develop a method for this  one probably variable depending on the length of the list. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 22/07/2014 22:23:31<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.1 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 30: (Clinical Observations)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.4: (Website Generator Documentation - Database Objects)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Most of the papers in this website are made up of hyperlinked Notes, which are small sections of text which themselves link to other Notes, and so on. Such documents are supposed to be viewed on-line, but I recognise that not everyone likes to read in this way. In particular, while this is a good way of chasing up details of an argument, it can be difficult to see the overall picture. It is also difficult to scribble in the margins of a web-page. So, printable versions will be required until technology for marginal annotation improves (but note that you can copy and paste my printable versions into MS Word and annotate those if you want to save trees). <BR><BR>There are several parameters (explained below) that are accounted for in the file-name of the printed Note:- <ol type="1"><li>The depth of scan.</li><li>Whether the Printed Note is archived. </li><li>Whether all inter-Note references are indicated. </li><li>Whether Private Notes are printed. </li><li>Whether Reading Lists are included. </li></ol>There are, in general, hyperlinks to an appropriate selection of printable Notes that satisfy these options. <BR><BR>Within the printable note itself, there are no  inter-Note hyperlinks, though the links to external websites and to Book and Paper summaries within the reading lists work. <BR><BR>A straight print of a frames-based page only prints the first page, which is why most professional sites have printable versions of their pages to allow printing of the full document, and without the other frames interfering. My printable pages do this, of course, but the main difficulty is to print the footnotes (pages hyperlinked to within the site: I don't make any attempt to print the results of linking to external sites). <BR><BR>Printing all the footnotes associated with the main Note precisely once in a sensible sequence is a particular challenge. This is firstly because (intentionally or otherwise) a referential loop may occur. Secondly, we don't want to print the same note more than once if it is referred to on multiple occasions (which is part of the point of having separable notes in the first place). Finally, we don't necessarily want to print Notes when they first appear, but in some sort of sensible sequence.<BR><BR><U><B>Depth of Scan</U></B><BR>To address the first of these problems, I have introduced a depth of scan, so that we don't loop endlessly. This also allows topics to be looked at in greater or lesser depth. Consequently, several printed Notes may appear for the same underlying Note. Also, where a Note in another Notes Group is referenced, I only print the Note itself, not its footnotes. This is to avoid the printed Notes ballooning with irrelevancies.<BR><BR><U><B>Inter-Note Referencing</U></B><BR>Secondly, I only print footnotes once within any particular printed Note. There are two options. In the first, all the footnote indicators appear as in the on-screen version as superscripts (subscripts in the case of private notes which don t appear on the published website), but those that are duplicated refer forward or backward to where the footnote actually appears. Since this can lead to a lot of clutter in certain circumstances, I have an alternative view whereby (for a footnote that's "not printed here") both the subscript / superscript and the  Note forwarding Note are omitted. There are then gaps in the sequencing of the superscripts. I ve decided to leave this in to alert the reader to the existence of the omitted references. The alternative  all footnotes showing view can be consulted it required. <BR><BR>The referencing convention is effectively the Tractatus standard, but with full-stops separating the level of references. So, the 5th footnote on the main form appears as Footnote 5: (Title); the 3rd footnote on that note appears as Footnote 5.3: (Title2); the 7th footnote on that note as Footnote 5.3.7 (Title3); and so on. <BR><BR>Deciding when to print a Note is an art in itself. Currently all I do is print the Note in the place in which it appears as high up the hyperlinking hierarchy as possible. I ought probably to take into account the fact that each Note has encoded a  Natural parent, and print it below that parent where possible; but I ve not done this yet. <BR><BR><U><B>Archived Notes</U></B><BR>The Notes pages are dynamic, but each time a Note is changed, the previous version is archived and can be accessed by a hyperlink at the bottom of the Note. This version crystallises the view at that time (ie. all the Notes linked-to from that archived Note are the currently latest archived versions; to achieve this, a Note is archived as soon as it is entered. The printable versions follow this pattern, and earlier versions archived whenever the main Note is changed (this is still work in progress as I can t store printable versions of all Notes, to any depth, each time anything within range changes. Or at least I don t think so.) <BR><BR><U><B>Private Notes</U></B><BR>There are two  privacy systems in operation. The first allows me to flag a Note as private, in which case a polite message appears on the public site. The second method is to put the Note in a password-protected area. I have a flag that allows printed Notes to include or exclude  flagged as Private Notes. I think a Note in the secure area would print if it were referred to by a Note from a non-Secure area. <BR><BR><U><B>Reading Lists</U></B><BR>Some Notes have associated reading lists. These arise either because the Note (or a referenced Note within the depth of scan) directly references a Book or Paper, or indirectly via the association between the Note Title, and the Sub-Topic of the Books and Papers. A list of papers (together with hyperlinks to the Paper or Book summaries within the website is produced. This element is currently under development, as the lists (in author sequence) are very long. Currently, a reference appears if it is directly cited, or priority 1-3 within the first level of hyperlinking, or priority 1 below that. Consequently, I ve allowed the Notes to be printed with or without reading lists. <BR><BR>Note that all this is an on-going research project.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 13/01/2015 19:07:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.5: (Thesis - Outline)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The Thesis seems to fall naturally into three sections (other than the Introduction and Conclusion); namely, Chapters 2-5 (setting up the problem), chapters 6-9 (Olson and Baker s views contrasted); and Chapters 10-11 (testing the preferred solution). Consequently, I anticipate my Thesis having the following chapters:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 01: Introduction</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 02: <a name="48"></a>What are We?</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 03: What is a Person?</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 04: Basic Metaphysical Issues</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 05: Persistence and Time</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 06: Animalism and Arguments for It</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 07: The Constitution View and Arguments for It</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 08: Arguments against Animalism</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 09: Arguments against the Constitution View</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 10: Thought Experiments</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 11: Resurrection</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 12: Conclusion</li></ol>I ve started a <a name="48"></a>Note listing  parked future reading. <BR><BR>For convenience, brief abstracts (as currently intended) of the above chapters are given below. I have included hyperlinks in the above list to my initial thoughts on these topics (and to reading lists and plans for further research) by way of further clarification. I ve also included links from the  Thought Experiment abstract below, for the same reason. The reading lists are rather full, and I ll need to whittle them down to those I actually intend to read (and, better, address). <BR><BR><B><U>Chapter abstracts</B></U><BR><ol type="1"><li><B>Introduction</B>: Something like this document, but in narrative form, maybe including a brief historical general survey of Personal Identity. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>What are We? </B>: The topic  personal identity has historically presupposed that we are (in the sense of  identical to , or  most fundamentally ) persons, whereas I (along with other animalists) claim that we are identical to human animals.  We requires explanation. This chapter will sort out the topic of discussion for the Thesis as a whole. </li><li><B>What is a Person?</B>: This Chapter will canvass the various views and consider how important issues in this area are to my main concern of our identity. </li><li><B>Basic Metaphysical Issues</B>: Substances and sortals are central to the persistence of anything, and in particular to my claim that persons are phase sortals of human animals (the substances). I need to address the concept of a SOUL as souls are the major counter-claim to the persisting entity being an animal; or at least popularly so. The question of Natural Kinds arises in considering whether PERSON is a natural kind concept. </li><li><B>Persistence and Time</B>: A number of thought experiments that feature in the following chapter seem to fail if perdurantism is true (because the reduplication objections fail). Depending on whether any of these are critical to my arguments, I may need to consider the impact of perdurantism. But this complex area may be a step too far within a fairly limited word-count. I m also unsure whether it should feature before or after the account of Thought Experiments. </li><li><B>Animalism and Arguments for it</B>: This Chapter describes what Animalism is, with an excursus on animals and organisms and their persistence. It puts forward the arguments in favour of animalism, those against being reserved for a later Chapter. It focuses on the account of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A>, the primary contemporary exponent of Animalism. </li><li><B>The Constitution View and Arguments for it</B>: This Chapter gives an account of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> s thesis that human persons are not identical to human animals, but are  temporarily at least  constituted by them. </li><li><B>Arguments against Animalism</B>: A discussion of the arguments against animalism, as given by those of anti-animalist persuasion and defended by the principal animalists (with a focus on Olson), with a critique. </li><li><B>Arguments against the Constitution View</B>: A discussion of the arguments against the Constitution View, focusing on the principal animalists, with a critique. In particular, I intend to critique Olson s <a name="48"></a> thinking animal argument against the Constitution View (though I think this argument is unnecessary for Olson to establish the case for Animalism).</li><li><B>Thought Experiments</B>: Any account of personal identity needs to give an account of what is going on in the various thought experiments that have been thought relevant to the topic. It s also the area that s most fun. Indeed, I think that the entire Thesis will be an exercise in inference to the best explanation. It needs to account for our intuitions (if there is a universal response) or explain them away as confused. I will firstly briefly consider the propriety of using thought experiments in this domain of enquiry, and then consider the usual suspects, such as: <ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a>Fission, <a name="48"></a>fusion and <a name="48"></a>replication in general</li><li><a name="48"></a>Commissurotomy</li><li><a name="48"></a>Multiple Personality Disorder</li><li><a name="48"></a>Brain-state Transfer</li><li><a name="48"></a>Brain Transplants</li><li><a name="48"></a>Teletransportation</li><li><a name="48"></a>Siliconisation</li><li>Etc?</li></ul></li><li><B>Resurrection</B>: If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection. Since the body is destroyed at death, it would seem that any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong. Consideration of arguments by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A> in this respect. This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued, and factually correct concerning what is actually believed by intellectually Christians and Muslims (unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion). Maybe I should also cover reincarnation. </li><li><B>Conclusion</B>: Brief summary of the above; <ul type="disc"><li>We are human animals, </li><li>Human persons fall under phase sortals of the concept HUMAN ANIMAL,</li><li>The person is inseparable from the animal, </li><li>The animal is utterly destroyed at death, </li><li>Substance dualism is false, and </li><li>Consequently (given the sort of thing we are) resurrection or any other post-mortem survival is impossible for us. </li></ul></li></ol></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/04/2018 00:12:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6: (Thesis - Current Stance)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The purpose of this Note is to provide a periodic refocusing of what my thoughts and beliefs about the topic of Personal Identity currently are. Previous versions can be found from the list below. This version has links to the various other Notes that expand further on the issues raised, and supply extensive reading lists. While very often these Notes are of the  promissory variety, the links will remind me to improve them as needed. <BR><ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a><U>What are we</U><SUP>1</SUP>? This is one of the most important questions we need to ask ourselves. Just what kind of things are we? The question is closely related to a similar one: just what sort of adventures can individuals such as ourselves survive? This second question sheds light on the first for if there are certain contingencies that we think we would  or would not  survive, when a typical member of that kind would not  or would  survive, then that kind may not represent what we really think we are. Of course, we might be wrong in our estimations, but at least this will raise the question. </li><li>Why is this not a trivial question? If we look at a dog, say, and ask what it is, the answer to such a question is obvious  it s a dog! It may be our pet  with a name  a particular <a name="48"></a><U>individual</U><SUP>2</SUP>, but when we ask what <a name="48"></a><U>kind</U><SUP>3</SUP> of thing it is, it s a member of the species <em>canis lupus</em>. So, when we look at ourselves, the obvious answer is that we are <a name="48"></a><U>human beings</U><SUP>4</SUP>  specifically human animals, members of the species <em><a name="48"></a><U>homo sapiens</U><SUP>5</SUP></em>. That is the answer posited by the <a name="48"></a><U>Animalists</U><SUP>6</SUP>, amongst whose number  broadly speaking  I place myself, who accept the <a name="48"></a><U>biological view</U><SUP>7</SUP> of personal identity. </li><li>If this is true, then our <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>8</SUP>  the necessary and sufficient conditions for us to continue in existence  are the same as those of other <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>9</SUP>  the great apes, say, under which category we fall, biologically speaking. Why is this not the end of the story? Well, this is because  despite being a species of great ape  human beings are special in that we have enhanced cognitive capacities. We are morally accountable. In sum, we are <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>10</SUP>, and have a  <a name="48"></a><U>first person perspective</U><SUP>11</SUP> (FPP) on the world  something most philosophers deny to other animals  and care about our <a name="48"></a><U>futures</U><SUP>12</SUP> and  <a name="48"></a><U>wantons</U><SUP>13</SUP> apart  agonise over our past mistakes. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> claims this perspective makes an <a name="48"></a><U>ontological</U><SUP>14</SUP> difference, rather than being  as I think  a special property of human beings that may or may not be had in particular cases. <a name="48"></a><U>Baker</U><SUP>15</SUP> accuses the animalists of <a name="48"></a><U>not taking persons seriously</U><SUP>16</SUP>. I might just note that there s a facile and confusing answer to <a name="48"></a><U>what we are</U><SUP>17</SUP>, that is  people . You may have noticed that I used the technical term  persons as the plural of  person . Some philosophers annoyingly use the term  people , but this confuses the issue. When we say there are ten people in the room, while it is clear in normal circumstances what we mean  dogs don t count, for instance  but if there happened to be a Klingon and a visiting angel, would they count as people or not? They are  we may suppose  persons, but they are not <a name="48"></a><U>human persons</U><SUP>18</SUP></li><li>Since at least <A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Locke (John).htm">John Locke</A>, this fact of our mental exceptionalism has tempted philosophers to say that it s our <a name="48"></a><U>psychological continuity</U><SUP>19</SUP> that is more important for our identity-preservation than our <a name="48"></a><U>physical continuity</U><SUP>20</SUP>. This view still has its supporters  not only for those such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A> and <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Swinburne (Richard).htm">Richard Swinburne</A> who believe in immaterial <a name="48"></a><U>souls</U><SUP>21</SUP>  but for the many who think that psychological continuity and <a name="48"></a><U>connectedness</U><SUP>22</SUP> is constitutive of the identity of persons. It is also implicit in the ideas of the <a name="48"></a><U>Transhumanists</U><SUP>23</SUP> who think that  come <a name="48"></a><U>the Singularity</U><SUP>24</SUP>  we might be capable of being <a name="48"></a><U>uploaded</U><SUP>25</SUP> to <a name="48"></a><U>computers</U><SUP>26</SUP> and thereby <a name="48"></a><U>live almost forever</U><SUP>27</SUP>. </li><li>Before proceeding further we have to say something brief and sketchy about identity and <a name="48"></a><U>persistence</U><SUP>28</SUP>.  Identity  in the sense of  <a name="48"></a><U>numerical identity</U><SUP>29</SUP>  is a relation a thing holds to itself and to nothing else. A is identical to B if A and B are the very same thing. It is an equivalence relation, being transitive, reflexive and idempotent; and, many of the sticking points in the philosophy of personal identity arise from this fact. <ol type="i"><li>It has nothing to do with  identity as a sociological concept such as national identity, sexual identity or identification with a particular group. </li><li>Also, John may be said  not to be the same person since he took heroin, but he is still John and still the same individual; it s just that his <a name="48"></a><U>personality</U><SUP>30</SUP> has changed. </li><li>It also has nothing to do with  <a name="48"></a><U>narrative identity</U><SUP>31</SUP> which is the story we tell about ourselves in an attempt to make sense of our lives. </li><li>Finally, it has nothing to do with  <a name="48"></a><U>exact similarity</U><SUP>32</SUP> : my television may be  identical to yours, but that doesn t mean I can have yours if mine breaks. They are  or were, when manufactured  exactly similar, but are distinct. </ol></li><li> Persisting is what a thing does in continuing in existence. As we noted above, there are what are called  persistence conditions  specific to a kind of thing  that set out what vicissitudes a thing can survive if it is to remain that very same thing. There are sometimes hard cases, and there can seem sometimes that there is an element of <a name="48"></a><U>convention</U><SUP>33</SUP>: is a particular club still the same clubs after it has lost all its original members, changed its name, and so on? But we can t accept that our own existence is a matter of convention, though this could seem the case with the once-dominant <a name="48"></a><U>psychological view</U><SUP>34</SUP> of personal identity: just how much psychological connection could I lose with my former self  philosophers wondered  and still be me? However, things seem simpler and more objective for organisms, which persist despite exchanging material with the environment and changing many of their <a name="48"></a><U>properties</U><SUP>35</SUP>, provided they are caught up in a complex and hopefully long drawn-out event (or process) known as a  <a name="48"></a><U>life</U><SUP>36</SUP> . </li><li>In the above I have assumed at least three things. <ol type="i"><li>Firstly, that  things  or at least some things  exist. There s a philosophical position known as  <a name="48"></a><U>Process Metaphysics</U><SUP>37</SUP> (or  Naturalised Metaphysics ) that gives the focus to process rather than ontology, particularly in the case of organisms. I m not sure how fatal this is to my approach, since I admit that animals are individuated by their lives, which are processes. </li><li>Secondly, that <u>we</u> exist. This would seem hardly worth mentioning, other than that certain philosophers  <a name="48"></a><U>nihilists</U><SUP>38</SUP>  have argued that we (whatever we are) or  for similar reasons  various common things like hands  don t exist. </li><li>Finally, I assume that things do indeed persist, at least some of the time. </ol>I can t really address these foundational issues here, but will just say a few words on the second issue. There are a lot of interconnected issues to do with the philosophy of time and change, in particular the problem of <a name="48"></a><U>temporary intrinsics</U><SUP>39</SUP>. How can the leaf that was green yesterday be the same leaf if it is brown today? How can the old bald bloke I am today be the same individual as the hirsute teenager all those years ago? <ol type="i"><li>Some philosophers  the <a name="48"></a><U>exdurantists</U><SUP>40</SUP>  say that there s no relation of identity across time, but merely a weaker counterpart relation analogous to that between an individual and its counterpart in another possible world. </li><li>Others  in particular <a name="48"></a><U>Derek Parfit</U><SUP>41</SUP>  have said that even if there <em>is</em> identity across time, it s not <a name="48"></a><U>what matters</U><SUP>42</SUP>. </ol>In what follows, I assume that we exist and that we continue to exist self-identically across time and that this identity relation is important. We could not carry on our lives without these assumptions even if  philosophically-speaking  they were false; but I think they are true: I don t want to distinguish the  strict and philosophical from the  loose and popular senses of identity first raised by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Butler (Joseph).htm">Joseph Butler</A>. I also assume the standard <a name="48"></a><U>logic of identity</U><SUP>43</SUP> and reject all heretical accounts that are invented from time to time as radical solutions to the difficult questions of persistence. In particular, I reject the view  known as <a name="48"></a><U>occasional identity</U><SUP>44</SUP> that  while (say) I am not identical to my younger self  yet I was that person, just not any more. </li><li>Now back to the main thread. Most Anglophone philosophers these days are <a name="48"></a><U>physicalists</U><SUP>45</SUP> (though maybe most non-philosophers are unreflective <a name="48"></a><U>dualists</U><SUP>46</SUP>). This gives physicalist philosophers a problem if they have hopes of <a name="48"></a><U>post-mortem</U><SUP>47</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>survival</U><SUP>48</SUP>. If the human organism is totally destroyed  eg. by cremation, explosion, or eating of worms  just how does the very same individual <a name="48"></a><U>get from this life to the next</U><SUP>49</SUP>? <a name="48"></a><U>Christian Materialists</U><SUP>50</SUP> have had a go at thinking this through, and acknowledge the difficulties. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A> attempted to show that it is at least logically possible by having God snatch away the dying body immediately pre-mortem, replacing it with a simulacrum. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A>  while himself a dualist  has suggested a  falling elevator model to help out his materialist friends, whereby there is immanent <a name="48"></a><U>causation</U><SUP>51</SUP> (by some unknown natural or supernatural process) between the dying body and the <a name="48"></a><U>resurrection</U><SUP>52</SUP> one so that the dying individual escapes in the nick of time to the next world without loss of <a name="48"></a><U>numerical identity</U><SUP>53</SUP>. Others claim that God s omnipotence is sufficient and is sovereign even over the laws of logic, so that problems raised by identity being an equivalence relation can be overcome by brute force. Maybe so, but without the constraints of logical <a name="48"></a><U>possibility</U><SUP>54</SUP>, we have no way of arguing the matter, so let s not bother.</li><li>However, most Christian materialists prefer an alternative. They recognise that getting from here to the next world with temporal or spatial gaps raises difficult questions as to whether the numerical identity of the individual is preserved but adopt an alternative solution  the <a name="48"></a><U>Constitution View</U><SUP>55</SUP>. On this thesis, the person is distinct from the human animal   just as the <a name="48"></a><U>statue</U><SUP>56</SUP> is distinct from its <a name="48"></a><U>constituting</U><SUP>57</SUP> marble  so that the very same person  tagged by the unique  first person perspective noted above  can be constituted first by its earthly body, and subsequently by its heavenly one. </li><li>Some Animalists have what they think of as a knock-down argument against the Constitution View. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> calls it the  <a name="48"></a><U>Thinking Animal</U><SUP>58</SUP> argument. If the person and the animal are distinct things, albeit co-located, there are too many thinkers  because the animal can certainly think, as can the person, so we have two thinkers where we thought we had one  which is one problem; and there s another  how do we know which we are, the person or the animal? I m not impressed by this argument. There are several  multiple occupancy conundrums that have been claimed at one time or another to deny the existence of things we are sure do exist. <a name="48"></a><U>Dion and Theon</U><SUP>59</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>Tib and Tibbles</U><SUP>60</SUP>, the  <a name="48"></a><U>problem of the many</U><SUP>61</SUP> and so on. We just need to sort out our rules for counting. Also, the whole question of three- versus <a name="48"></a><U>four-dimensionalism</U><SUP>62</SUP> (4D)  whether a persisting thing is wholly present at a time  or whether only a temporal part is present, the thing as a whole being a  space-time worm  bears on the question of counting. If different things can share stages  say the person and the human animal, or the statue and the clay  then we have to be careful how we count. In the case of a future <a name="48"></a><U>fission</U><SUP>63</SUP>  whereby two space-time worms share their past stages, but will ultimately diverge  we might not know how many to count at a time, but this will often not matter for practical purposes. </li><li>I think the idea of a first-person perspective is important. It is this that provides the pull against <a name="48"></a><U>animalism</U><SUP>64</SUP> when linked to various <a name="48"></a><U>thought experiments</U><SUP>65</SUP> (TEs) that we ll come on to presently. However, I still <a name="48"></a><U>don t like the Constitution View</U><SUP>66</SUP>. My objection is that the FPP is a property of something else  like a smile  in this case of a human animal, though the smile might belong to a cat. You can t take the very same smile from one cat and place on another (it would be at best an exactly similar smile)  let alone have a disembodied smile like that of the Cheshire Cat. Similarly, you can t take the very same FPP from one body and plop it onto another. True, it might be a qualitatively exactly similar FPP, but not the same one. What s to stop that FPP being plopped on several resurrection bodies? Which would be numerically identical to me, given that they can t all be, in the absence of 4D? </li><li>What are the temptations for not sticking with the animalist approach  which ought these days to be the default position in the absence of anything more compelling? As noted, the apparent lack of rational expectation of an afterlife is one incentive to look elsewhere, so  elsewhere is a favourite for those who can t bear the thought of their <a name="48"></a><U>selves</U><SUP>67</SUP> expiring with their <a name="48"></a><U>bodies</U><SUP>68</SUP>. We ve noted the Christian dualists and materialists, but what about the Transhumanists? There s the relatively metaphysically uninteresting case of cryoscopy followed by repair and resuscitation; there we have material continuity, and no possibility of <a name="48"></a><U>reduplication</U><SUP>69</SUP>, though some might claim there is too much outside interference for identity to be preserved. But, what about the  hope of  you being uploaded to a computer? There seems to be an idea about that  we are really software (or data), when we are clearly material beings. If we are software, it is said, then we might  run on different hardware. I have two issues with this, apart from the immense technical obstacles to be overcome both in  scanning the  real you and providing a computer of sufficient power to run your program and the virtual world for you to experience, Matrix-like. <ol type="i"><li>Firstly, what sort of thing is a program? It s an interesting question whether a program has persistence conditions. Is Windows 10 the same program as Windows 0? Whatever the answer to this question is, a program would seem to be a kind of <a name="48"></a><U>universal</U><SUP>70</SUP> rather than a particular, and  we are particulars. </li><li>This leads to the second issue  a reduplication objection. Say we developed a sophisticated program that could run on an open-ended number of exactly similar robots. No two of these would be numerically identical to one another  they would be distinct, though exactly similar. So, were the program to be a simulation of your brain, it could run  presumably  on an open-ended number of computers  and these computers (or computer partitions) would not be identical to one another, so none of them could be you, as you could only be one of them, and there s <a name="48"></a><U>no principled way</U><SUP>71</SUP> of saying which. The same objection prevents Star Trek-like <a name="48"></a><U>teletransportation</U><SUP>72</SUP>  were it possible  being identity-preserving. I might also add that no  program is  in itself  <a name="48"></a><U>conscious</U><SUP>73</SUP>, though a machine that runs it might conceivably be. Mind you, there are arguments here as well  originated by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Searle (John).htm">John Searle</A>  at least for digital computers. </ol>Incidentally, the transhumanists seem to imagine unending computer life as a secular heaven, but it could just as easily be a secular hell. </li><li>So, I remain wedded to my view that we are human animals with the persistence conditions of such.  Person is not a <a name="48"></a><U>substance</U><SUP>74</SUP> term, but an honorific that refers to some substance during some periods of its existence when it has the requisite mental and <a name="48"></a><U>moral properties</U><SUP>75</SUP> to qualify.  Person is a <a name="48"></a><U>Phase Sortal</U><SUP>76</SUP> (like  teacher ) that  in the case of  person  applies to most humans most of the time, but need not apply to all humans all the time. There are ethical consequences for this view, but they are not as dramatic as is sometimes urged. Non-persons don t have moral responsibilities, as is already recognised for demented or infant humans, and all non-human animals. The obverse  that persons allegedly have <a name="48"></a><U>no moral obligations towards non-persons</U><SUP>77</SUP>  or that non-persons have no rights  is the sticking point, and ought to be reflected in a more humane treatment of all non-persons rather than that we might contemplate sending human non-persons as well as non-human non-persons to the slaughter-house. </li><li>So, what are the <a name="48"></a><U>problems for animalists</U><SUP>78</SUP>? There are several. Some  like the so-called  <a name="48"></a><U>corpse problem</U><SUP>79</SUP> (is my corpse me  only dead  if not, where does it come from? It doesn t have the persistence conditions of an organism) are probably relatively easy to overcome. Recently, I ve discovered that animalists  like (but for different reasons) those who think we are essentially persons  allegedly have a  <a name="48"></a><U>fetus problem</U><SUP>80</SUP> . Animalists  saying that we are essentially animals  have (it seems) to say that we were once foetuses  which appears to be what our animal once was. But was this fetus once a <a name="48"></a><U>proper part</U><SUP>81</SUP> of its mother? There s work currently going on to suggest that this is so  and if so, just when did the new human animal come into existence? However, I don t think any of this seriously threatens animalism. Maybe animalists should have considered the problem more than they have, but animals do come into existence sometime  presumably by the time of birth at the latest  and that s enough for an animalist. </li><li>The real problems for animalism stem from the force of thought experiments such as the  <a name="48"></a><U>brain transplant</U><SUP>82</SUP> intuition . An animalist seems forced to say that I would <em>not</em>  go with my brain in the circumstance where my brain is <a name="48"></a><U>transplanted</U><SUP>83</SUP> into another body, when it seems to most people that I <em>would</em>. The alleged reason for this is that at least some animalists consider the brain to be  just another organ that we might lose like we might lose a kidney, provided the animal is kept alive. Doubts about this have led some to think that we are not  really whole human animals but proper parts thereof, maybe not <a name="48"></a><U>brains</U><SUP>84</SUP> as such, but brains and a few other bits. This does seem comical. Just how large am I  would I fit into a hat-box, as <a name="48"></a><U>Olson</U><SUP>85</SUP> asks? </li><li>My view is as follows. I am currently (thankfully) a whole human animal. My wife worked in the NHS with amputees, and I think it is right to say that they also are whole human animals, though they lack parts that most of us have. No doubt they could lose more parts  and some diabetics sadly do. So, we might view a  <a name="48"></a><U>brain in a vat</U><SUP>86</SUP>  one ready for transplant  as a  maximally mutilated human animal. Maybe  in the case of a brain transplant  a prior animal has fissioned (divided into two) when the brain is extracted and we now have a case of the <a name="48"></a><U>fusion</U><SUP>87</SUP> of two animals (the brain from one fusing with the body of the other). It might be argued that our identity-logic <a name="48"></a><U>isn t quite up to deciding</U><SUP>88</SUP> who is who in such circumstances, but the stakes seem high enough to demand an answer, for which read on. </li><li>I doubt whether the transhumanist hopes of augmenting our physical or mental attributes by effectively converting us into <a name="48"></a><U>cyborgs</U><SUP>89</SUP> is much of a threat to animalism. We don t worry about our spectacles or our mobiles phones making us any less mammalian. Closer integration with AI applications is only the next step for the extended mind. </li><li>So, is there any purchase in thought experiments that putatively have my first person perspective persisting in cases where there is no identity preservation. Could it be the case that  it seems to me that I have survived some vicissitude  a <a name="48"></a><U>cerebrum</U><SUP>90</SUP> transplant, say  but I am mistaken? Some philosophers argue that this happens every night  I <a name="48"></a><U>go to sleep</U><SUP>91</SUP>, and when I wake up I just assume that I am identical to the individual who got into bed, but how do I know? I might be intellectually convinced by third parties  those other than the sleeper and the waker  one way or another, but how would this affect how it seems to me? Take the teletranportation case. Because of the reduplication objection (unless we are 4-dimensionalists), we should say that numerical identity is not preserved. But  if the technology works, and I am the teletransportee  the individual (or 77 duplicates) would (all) wake up convinced they were me, yet they must be deceived. Thankfully, reduplication is not a problem for whole-brain transplants, but it is for idempotent half-brain transplants, though I think the identity problem there occurs during the fissioning process rather than when the half-brains are implanted. </li><li>I continue to think that there is a distinction to be made between <a name="48"></a><U>forward and backward psychological continuity</U><SUP>92</SUP>, though I don t see how third parties  or even first or second parties  could tell the difference. It makes all the difference to me if I go to sleep and <em>someone else</em> wakes up thinking they are me  as against the normal case where I go to sleep and <em>I</em> wake up. In the former case  for me  there s just an endless nothingness, of which I know nothing, while in the latter case my experiential life carries on. However, backward psychological continuity  what it feels like looking back  is the same for a survivor and one who only thinks he s survived. </li><li>In the case of the split brain transplant, however, how is it all supposed to work, experientially? Neurosurgery is  even today  carried out on substantially conscious patients, as that way there s a quick feedback loop to tell the surgeon whether he s destroying any important areas of cognitive function. What would it be like to  fission ? Maybe I lack the imagination, but it seems to me that my First Person Perspective would go along with whatever was the dominant hemisphere, assuming this  seat of consciousness is initially located in one hemisphere or the other. If it is not, then it would presumably be destroyed and two new ones would be created in this miracle operation. Either way, this would sit comfortably with the logic of identity which would not be violated, as at most one of the recipients would be me. I can imagine being ripped apart psychologically, but I can t imagine going two ways. </li><li>Of course, there are physical and metaphysical issues with the whole idea of brain transplants  the physical structure of the <a name="48"></a><U>brain</U><SUP>93</SUP> reflects  its body, and mental faculties are not fully localised, so it s not just the immensely complex task of  wiring up the brain to its new body that presents a challenge. Half-brain transplants are even more problematical as in the TEs the brain stem is not split, but only the cerebra are supposed to be transplanted. It s not clear to me whether there is pervasive confusion here and that these thought experiments are underspecified to the degree of incoherence. Some philosophers  eg. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wilkes (Kathleen).htm">Kathleen Wilkes</A>  think TEs are unhelpful in the philosophy of personal identity, and that our concepts are not up to being probed in this way. I m not so sure  the TEs are about <em>us</em>, not our <a name="48"></a><U>concepts</U><SUP>94</SUP>. </li><li>There is finally the question whether there is any such thing as  the Self , which is what is supposed to have this FPP. Some contemporary philosophers argue that the Self is an illusion that the brain generates. Others  such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Hume (David).htm">David Hume</A>  have argued; and others  such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Strawson (Galen).htm">Galen Strawson</A>  do argue that when they introspect they find no evidence of a persisting Self. I don t know where they are coming from, as I can t think of anything more certain. But a <a name="48"></a><U>Buddhist-inspired</U><SUP>95</SUP>  no-self view makes the animalist s task easier, if maybe less interesting. </li></ol></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 06/07/2018 18:56:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.1 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.6: (What are We?)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 32.12: (Individual)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.6: (Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.5 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10: (Homo Sapiens)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.4: (Animalists)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.7: (Biological View)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The Biological View is that <a name="48"></a>we are biological <a name="48"></a>organisms, and  in particular  have the <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions of biological organisms. Since the organisms we are are obviously human <a name="48"></a>animals, this view is effectively just <a name="48"></a>Animalism. </li><li>The BV is to be distinguished from older physicalist variants  in particular the  <a name="48"></a>Body View .</li><li>The primary work addressing this topic is"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>", though its focus is on what the persistence criteria of organisms are, rather on whether or not we are organisms.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_8">Links</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_8"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_53_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21327.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - EmbryosandStemCellResearch</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4282.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?</A>", Baker<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4426.htm">Olson (Eric) - Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20713.htm">Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - What Do Philosophers Believe?</A>", Bourget&Chalmers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4303.htm">Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1385.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics</A>", DeGrazia, 2005 <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21119.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of David DeGrazia s Human Identity and Bioethics</A>", Hershenov, 2008</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_11">Olson</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_11"></A><BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4739.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?</A>", Olson </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3382.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction</A>", Shoemaker, 2009 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start as below. It is somewhat arbitrary as to which works fall under this topic, and which under the <a name="48"></a>Biological Criterion or <a name="48"></a>Animalism. I ve tended to have a rather full list of those items above that I ve read, but the  outstanding list is minimalist. <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21651.htm">Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_14">Cerullo</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_14"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6471.htm">Young (J.Z.) - An Introduction to the Study of Man</A>", Young</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_53_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_53_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_53_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_53_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_53_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson is one of the primary exponents of the Biological View, so almost anything by him might be cited. </li><li>I ve restricted the list to those items that  in the text or comments I ve incorporated on-line  explicitly use the term. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_53_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Very tangentially relevant, but <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">Uploading</a> and the BV are antithetical theories of PID. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/06/2018 20:44:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.5: (Persistence Criteria)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 29: (Animals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 21: (First-Person Perspective)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.12 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17.11: (Future Great Pain Test)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.13 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18.3: (Wantons)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.14 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 7: (Ontology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.15 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.16: (Baker)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.16 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 27: (Taking Persons Seriously)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.17 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.6: (What are We?)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.18 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.5: (Human Persons)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.19 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15: (Psychological Continuity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.20 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14: (Physical Continuity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.21 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.11: (Souls)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.22 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.2: (Connectedness vs Continuity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.23 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 47.11: (Transhumanism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.24: (The Singularity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> This Note discusses in detail the somewhat extravagant thoughts in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16893.htm">Grossman (Lev) - 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal</A>". The footnotes in the Abstract for the paper link to the sections in this <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_972_1">Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_972_1"></A>. It is currently very much work in progress. <ol type="1"><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Kurzweil"></a><B>Kurzweil</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See <BR>&rarr; Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Kurzweil" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Kurzweil)), <BR>&rarr; Kurzweil s website (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/)), <BR>and much else besides. </li><li>I seem to have one of Kurzweil s books  "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4136.htm">Kurzweil (Ray) - The Age of Spiritual Machines</A>". </li><li>This book has been criticised by Searle  see <A HREF = "http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/04/08/i-married-a-computer/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/04/08/i-married-a-computer/). Unfortunately, only the opening section is available for free. But &rarr;</li><li>Kurzweil s site (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/chapter-2-i-married-a-computer" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/chapter-2-i-married-a-computer)) seems to hold an updated version. </li><li>Moreovever, there s an ensuing debate between Searle and Kurzweil, that is fully available on-line at <em>New York Review of Books</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/05/20/i-married-a-computer-an-exchange/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/05/20/i-married-a-computer-an-exchange/)). And see my transcripts &rarr;<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17002.htm">Kurzweil (Ray) -  I Married a Computer : An Exchange (between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle)</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17003.htm">Searle (John) -  I Married a Computer : An Exchange (between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle)</A>". </li><li>In fact, Kurtzweil s site has a bunch of free e-books, ie:-<BR>&rarr; Ray Kurtzweil (Editor)  <em>Are We Spiritual Machines? </em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/are-we-spiritual-machines" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/are-we-spiritual-machines)). This contains (as Chapter 2) the critique by Searle noted above. <BR>&rarr; Eric Drexler  <em>Engines of Creation 2.0  The Coming Era of Nanotechnology</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/engines-of-creation-book-excerpts-features" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/engines-of-creation-book-excerpts-features))<BR>&rarr; Ray Kurtzweil  <em>The Age of Intelligent Machines</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the-age-of-intelligent-machines" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the-age-of-intelligent-machines))<BR>&rarr; Ray Kurtzweil  <em>The Age of Spiritual Machines</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the-age-of-spiritual-machines" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the-age-of-spiritual-machines))<BR>&rarr; Neil Gershenfeld  <em>When Things Start to Think</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/when-things-start-to-think" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/when-things-start-to-think)) </li><li>I dare say that the substance of the <em>Time</em> article is already well worked-over in <em>Are We Spiritual Machines? </em> </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Creativity"></a><B>Creativity</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There s presumably a distinction between rules-based creativity, which is what (presumably) computers can do, and creativity of a less constrained sort, that we don t know how to get computers to do (yet)? </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Self"></a><B>Self</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>And  self-expression  facon de parler, in this context? Musical composition seems more a skill than a matter of self-expression (as would be a literary composition). I can t see why a sense of self would be necessary for creative composition in either music or the graphic arts. Certain <em>Idiot Savants</em> are no doubt adept in these areas, despite autistic tendencies, that mitigate against a sense of self.</li><li>What I have to say on Selves should be under <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Self, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Self-Consciousness,<BR>Though I don t seem to have said anything yet. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Intelligence"></a><B>Intelligence and Consciousness</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There s a sharp distinction between intelligence and consciousness. </li><li>As far as we know, consciousness is the preserve of organic intelligence. </li><li>We can presume that lots of rather dim animals are phenomenally conscious (even if not self-conscious &rarr; this distinction is important) so, there s no link between getting smarter and smarter and then (as a result) getting phenomenally conscious. </li><li>I m not sure of the link between intelligence and self-consciousness. </li><li>There s an old <em>Time</em> article  Can Machines Think?  stimulated by the Kasparov vs Deep Blue chess match (at <A HREF = "http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,984304,00.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,984304,00.html)). </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Imminence"></a><B>Imminence of the  Singularity </B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is predicated on the assumption of continued exponential growth. It s a standard principle in scientific practice to be suspicious of exponentials, at least when they are unprincipled  ie. where there is no underlying theory that would lead us to expect them. </li><li>Also, as noted elsewhere in this discussion, the occurrence of the Singularity relies on the achievement of numerous conceptual and technological breakthroughs that we have no warrant for assuming will happen any time soon. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Civilization"></a><B>Human Civilization</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>So far, computers have only enhanced human civilisation. </li><li> Ending human civilisation ( as we know it ) depends on delivering (in an uncontrolled manner) the various promissory-notes of the <em>Time</em> article. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Faster"></a><B>Faster <em>Faster</em></B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Is this really the case that the rate of improvement in computing power is accelerating, and will it really continue to accelerate indefinitely, if it is so doing currently? </li><li>Note that Kurzweil's graph muddles together speed and cost. See the comments below. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Emulation"></a><B>Emulation</B>: Two points here. <ul type="disc"><li>Firstly, emulation isn t the real thing. Models of hurricanes aren t wet and windy, so why should emulations of consciousness be conscious? </li><li>Secondly, digital computers are serial devices in which the components are (now) very quick, and brains are massively parallel devices whose components are very slow. Why should simulating one by the other produce the same (phenomenal) effect, and even be possible at all? </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Intelligent_Actions"></a><B>Intelligent Actions</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The items on the list ( driving cars, writing books, making ethical decisions, appreciating fancy paintings, making witty observations at cocktail parties ) can all (presumably) be rules-based and situation-driven. No doubt this is true of human intelligence as well (ultimately) but modelling it is not straightforward, as we don t know how the brain does it. The issue isn t really (in this case) to do with  whether , but  when , as there are lots of major breakthroughs required before the promissory note can be delivered on. Also, all these functions can be delivered unconsciously (if they can be delivered at all). </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Smart_people"></a><B>Smart people</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Does it matter how smart they are? Lots of equally smart people don t share the optimism of the futurologists. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Computer_Power"></a><B>Increasingly Powerful Computers</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Are there really no reasons to doubt that their onward exponential growth is really never going to end? Miniaturisation of components has to stop soon due to QM effects. So, a radically-new technology is needed. Some ideas are there, but we might get  stuck on their delivery, as has been the case for controlled nuclear fusion (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#Current_status" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#Current_status)), which in the 1950s was expected soon, in the 1970s by 2000 and in 2006  not within 100 years . </li><li>There s no doubt that computers will continue to get more powerful, as hardware and software continues to improve, as it always will. The issue is really over the rate of change (can exponential growth continue indefinitely) and can certain conceptual breakthroughs be made?</li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Bootstrapping"></a><B>Bootstrapped Development</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is certainly an important point, as we certainly use computers to help manufacture computers. But the extrapolation to development may involve the solution of the real  machine creativity problem. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Prediction"></a><B>Prediction</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Is this true? It would be true if machines became  smarter than humans in every dimension of  smartness . But  unpredictability (ie. non-rules-based) is one of the aspects of machine-intelligence yet to be delivered by AI. </li><li>Also, this argument sounds a bit like the  you can t know the mind of God (at all) arguments, which may or may not be sound. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Cyborgs"></a><B>Cyborgs</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This sounds a more promising approach than simulation, and it d relieve computers from having to realise consciousness. But any cognitive interlinking would still require a fuller understanding of how the brain works than is currently on the horizon. </li><li>See <a name="48"></a>Cyborgs for my thoughts on the matter. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Integration"></a><B>Integration</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>We don t  integrate with cars and planes any more than we integrate with computers. They are just tools. Prosthetics are the nearest analogues, but there s a long way from that to true integration. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Nanotechnology"></a><B>Nanotechnology</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>At this stage of the argument, it s not clear how intelligent machines will help repair our bodies and brains (especially  indefinitely ). Usually nanotechnology is invoked at this stage (see <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanotechnology" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanotechnology) for an overview). Now, it s true that intelligent machines would be needed to manufacture, and probably program, these myriads of tiny, very specialised machines, but the possibilities are very schematic. There s no evidence that anything workable is around the corner. </li><li>It looks like the free eBook by Eric Drexler <em>Engines of Creation 2.0  The Coming Era of Nanotechnology</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/engines-of-creation-book-excerpts-features" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/engines-of-creation-book-excerpts-features)) might prove useful. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Consciousness"></a><B>Consciousnesses</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Just what is meant here? Is this just loose speaking? A thing (an animal) is conscious, and the animal can t be scanned and downloaded anywhere. No-one really knows (at the theoretical level) what phenomenal consciousness is, though there are many theories. What s probably intended here is that  the contents of our brains would be read and uploaded to some device that can simulate our brains. This, of course, assumes that mind-body substance dualism is false (as it probably is), but even so  and admitting that whatever runs the downloaded software is at best a copy of the original, there s a long way to go before this sort of thing becomes even a worked-out theoretical possibility. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Software"></a><B>Software</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Well, philosophically-speaking, this is an outrageous idea. It depends on <a name="48"></a>what we are, and we re almost certainly not software, though software is important to us. And there are issues of identity  since software is easy to copy, and copies aren t identical, what reason would an individual have for thinking any particular installed copy was (identical to) him? </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Annihilation"></a><B>Annihilation</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Well, this is certainly something to watch out for, but I dare say it s a way off. It s more of a worry in genetic engineering or (if it gets going in the futurist mini-robot sense) nanotechnology. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Singularity"></a><B>The Singularity</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This term is defined later, but see <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity) and <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Singularity_Is_Near" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Singularity_Is_Near) <BR>(amongst much else). </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Moore's_Law"></a><B>Moore's Law</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_law" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_law)). </li><li>The Wikipedia article mentions Kurzweil and other futurologists, and the possible breakdown of Moore s Law within the next 5 years or so (ie. well before 2045). It also notes that Moore s Law is a self-fulfilling prophesy, in that the industry has taken it as a paradigm for R&D aims. Also, that the R&D costs of keeping up with Moore s Law are also increasing exponentially. </li></ul><IMG ALIGN=RIGHT ALT="Kurzweil's Graph" WIDTH=412 HEIGHT=293 SRC="../../../Photos/Notes/Kurzweil_Graph.jpg"></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Kurzweil's_Graph"></a><B>Kurzweil's Graph</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This graph intentionally muddles together speed and cost, but so-doing can lead others to draw the wrong conclusions from it. </li><li>Currently, while there continue to be improvements in computing power, the current driver behind the continuing exponential growth of Kurzweil s graph is economic  ie. computer hardware is being delivered <U>cheaper</U>, faster, not <U>faster</U> faster. </li><li>Even if Kurzweil s graph did continue for ever, it might still not lead to the singularity, in that the (infinitely cheap) computer hardware might still not deliver what Kurzweil needs. It might still be too slow. </li></ul> </li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_xxx"></a><B>Dummy Section</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Details to be supplied later! </li></ul></li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_972_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: Currently the links are one-way. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 20/04/2018 23:25:26<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.25 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 21.13: (Uploading)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.26: (Computers)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This Note is restricted to the role Computers play in the philosophy of Mind and Personal Identity. While I am an <a name="48"></a>animalist, the <a name="48"></a>mind and <a name="48"></a>brain are important topics in alternative accounts  in particular the <a name="48"></a>Psychological View and the <a name="48"></a>Constitution View. </li><li>The  Computer Model of the mind seems to be the dominant paradigm in neuroscience. This is the view that the brain operates like a digital computer. This is disputed by (eg.) "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22515.htm">Epstein (Robert) - The empty brain</A>". </li><li>There s a cross-over in much of the above topic with <a name="48"></a>Functionalism. </li><li>Where this gets exciting is in the <a name="48"></a>Transhumanist hope of uploading <a name="48"></a>(you, or your mind) to a computer. This will be dealt with under the head of <a name="48"></a>Uploading. </li><li>A related issue  also currently noted under Transhumanism  is whether we are (most probably) living in a computer simulations, whether or not we might have been uploaded there. </li><li>Also, there s the whole question of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_11">Artificial Intelligence</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_11"></A>, and in particular whether computers  or maybe even computer programs  might ever become <a name="48"></a>persons. </li><li>This topic might get caught up in the  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_13">Connectionism</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_13"></A> debate, and whether connectionism  which seeks to adopt the neural connectionist architecture of the brain  can account for the  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_14">systematicity of cognition</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_14"></A> . I don t want to stray too far down this interesting path. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_15">Links</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_15"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1244_Links.htm">Click here</a>. Unfortunately, there are so many links that I ve not been able to make use of them as yet. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21910.htm">Ball (Philip) - We might live in a computer program, but it may not matter</A>", Ball</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6319.htm">Bostrom (Nick) - Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?</A>", Bostrom</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6322.htm">Bostrom (Nick) - How Long Before Superintelligence?</A>", Bostrom</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5744.htm">Christian (Brian) - The Most Human Human: A Defence of Humanity in the Age of the Computer</A>", Christian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21149.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue</A>", Dainton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_18">Dennett</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_18"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22515.htm">Epstein (Robert) - The empty brain</A>", Epstein</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22232.htm">Graziano (Michael) - Endless fun</A>", Graziano</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19188.htm">Lavelle (Suilin) - Minds, Brains and Computers</A>", Lavelle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6065.htm">MacKay (Donald) - Computer Software and Life After Death</A>", MacKay</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_732.htm">Maxwell (Grover) - Intentionality: Hardware, not software</A>", Maxwell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23280.htm">Price (Huw), Cave (Stephen), Iida (Fumiya), Etc. - Preparing for the future: artificial intelligence and us: Part 1</A>", Price Etc</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23286.htm">Price (Huw), Cave (Stephen), Iida (Fumiya), Etc. - Preparing for the future: artificial intelligence and us: Part 2</A>", Price Etc</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1336.htm">Searle (John) - Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures</A>", Searle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_678.htm">Searle (John) - Minds, Brains, and Programs</A>", Searle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21053.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Philosophy and the Mind/Body Problem</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4531.htm">Shipley (G.J.) - Review of Andy Clark's 'Natural-Born Cyborgs'</A>", Shipley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3672.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Models of Mind</A>", Wilkes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman </li></ol></li><li>There is currently no categorised reading-list for this topic. A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_19">might start with</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_19"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21284.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Why Computers Can't Act</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12568.htm">Barberousse (Anouk), Francescelli (Sara) & Imbert (Cyrille) - Computer Simulations as Experiments</A>", Barberousse</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13215.htm">Barbour (Ian) - Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical Reflections</A>", Barbour</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_402.htm">Block (Ned) - The Mind as the Software of the Brain</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_20">Block</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_20"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11406.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Survival</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15968.htm">Bynum (Terrell Ward) - Two Philosophers of the Information Age</A>", Bynum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5099.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Persons and Substances</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5867.htm">Churchland (Paul) & Churchland (Patricia) - Could a Machine Think?</A>", Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6703.htm">Cole (David) - Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity</A>", Cole</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21627.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Artifactual Selves: a Response to Lynne Rudder Baker</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21635.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - When Hal Kills, Who's to Blame? Computer Ethics</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_797.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12378.htm">Fetzer (James) - Computers and Cognition</A>", Fetzer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12570.htm">Frigg (Roman) & Reiss (Julian) - The Philosophy of Simulation: Hot New Issues or Same Old Stew?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_21">Frigg</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_21"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_471.htm">Gelernter (David) - The Muse in the Machine - Computers and Creative Thought</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_22">Gelernter</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_22"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20822.htm">Goertzel (Ben) - Artificial General Intelligence and the Future of Humanity</A>", Goertzel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17044.htm">Graham (George) - Mind and Belief in Computers</A>", Graham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19210.htm">Hauser (Larry) - Artificial Intelligence</A>", Hauser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15889.htm">Hofstadter (Douglas) - Who Shoves Whom around inside the Careenium? Or What Is the Meaning of the Word 'I'?</A>", Hofstadter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22062.htm">Kaess (Genevieve) - Could Consciousness Emerge from a Machine Language?</A>", Kaess</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_750.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - Mind as a Computer: Machine Functionalism</A>", Kim</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6789.htm">Leiber (Justin) - Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : Introduction, Setting, Notes & Reading List</A>", Leiber</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1578.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Searle: Why We Are Not Computers</A>", Nagel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7350.htm">Olson (Eric) - Computer-Generated Life</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12564.htm">Parker (Wendy) - Does Matter Really Matter? Computer Simulations, Experiments, and Materiality</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_23">Parker</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_23"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1338.htm">Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20277.htm">Pollock (John L.) - What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21673.htm">Sandberg (Anders) & Bostrom (Nick) - Whole Brain Emulation: A Roadmap</A>", Sandberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4916.htm">Searle (John) - Can Computers Think?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_24">Searle</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_24"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21940.htm">Searle (John) - Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_25">Searle</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_25"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17003.htm">Searle (John) -  I Married a Computer : An Exchange (between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle)</A>", Searle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_148.htm">Searle (John) - The Rediscovery of the Mind</A>", Searle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_550.htm">Simons (Geoff) - Are Computers Alive? Evolution and New Life Forms</A>", Simons</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15890.htm">Steele (Guy L.) - Comments on Hofstadter's 'Who Shoves Whom around inside the Careenium?'</A>", Steele</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_745.htm">Wilensky (Robert) - Computers, cognition and philosophy</A>", Wilensky</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: I can t get into this in any detail. <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_13"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have the following items on Connectionism (amongst many others):-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_696.htm">Bechtel (William) - The Case For Connectionism</A>", Bechtel<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7700.htm">Davies (Martin) - Connectionism, Modularity, and Tacit Knowledge</A>", Davis<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_764.htm">Garson (James) - Connectionism</A>", Garson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5740.htm">MacDonald (Cynthia) & MacDonald (Graham), Eds. - Connectionism: Debates in Psychological Explanation - Vol. 2</A>", MacDonald (many useful papers)<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_847.htm">Smolensky (Paul) - Connectionist Modelling; Neural Computation / Mental Connections</A>", Smolenski </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I was interested in this debate during my undergraduate days, and have the following interesting items on the topic:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8177.htm">Blackmon (James), Byrd (David), Cummins (Robert), Poirier (Pierre), Schwarz (Georg) & Roth (Martin) - Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains</A>", Blackmon<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8181.htm">Cummins (Robert) - Systematicity</A>", Cummins<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3152.htm">Fodor (Jerry) - Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work</A>", Fodor<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4729.htm">Matthews (Robert) - Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity?</A>", Matthews </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_985.htm">Sanford (David H.) - Where Was I?</A>" for a follow-up (with a commentary by Dennett). </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The list is rather long, and will need pruning when I get down to this topic. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_20"></A><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1965.htm">Block (Ned) - The Computer Model of the Mind</A>" for a shorter version.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This paper no doubt considers the use of computers for simulating situations other than minds, so might not be directly relevant.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_22"></A><B>Footnote 22</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_842.htm">Gelernter (David) - Mirror Worlds</A>" is more a prediction of the internet, and is probably (even) less relevant.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_23"></A><B>Footnote 23</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This seems somewhat tangential, as it s not focused on simulating persons, but it might be useful background. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_24"></A><B>Footnote 24</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There s quite a lot by Searle that is relevant, but it s important not to get dragged in too far into his  outlier perspective  unless, of course, he s right! </li><li>It may be best to start with the whole of the book from which this paper is taken, ie. "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1336.htm">Searle (John) - Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_25"></A><B>Footnote 25</B>: See also "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21941.htm">Searle (John) - Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program? MIT Comments</A>". </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 27/06/2018 09:24:29<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.27: (Immortality)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This is a sub-topic of <a name="48"></a>Life after death, the others being:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Resurrection, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Reincarnation. <BR>To these historical options we can now add the various hopes of:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Transhumanism</li><li>In the Biblical Christian tradition, God is the only being with natural immortality (see 1 Timothy 6:16  God & who alone is immortal , NIV), but Plato (and his Platonising Christian followers) had it that the (human) <a name="48"></a>soul is also naturally immortal. So, the Biblical view is rather that God gives or denies immortality to whoever he wishes (and there is consequently no need to eternally roast the immortal souls of the wicked). </li><li>St, Paul has it that  the perishable must clothe itself with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality (1 Corinthians 15:53, NIV). This is in the context of the resurrection of the just at the return of Christ. </li><li>In the context of identity theory, it is doubtful whether the very same thing can at one time be perishable and at another time immortal, because a thing s <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions are taken to be essential properties of the <a name="48"></a>sort it is, and a single thing cannot change sort. </li><li>As such, (as "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4033.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death</A>" notes), natural immortality of the soul is the only hope for post-mortem survival. But this hope is itself dashed by the lack of empirical evidence for the existence of the substantial soul, immortal or otherwise. </li><li>It does seem incongruous to talk about post-mortem immortality  how can something that has died be immortal? The idea, no doubt, is that it is the body that the soul occupied that was mortal. Hence, the soul needs a new immortal body to be clothed with. That seems to be the Pauline picture, though debated by the  Conditional Immortality people. </li><li>The <a name="48"></a>Transhumanists hope that <a name="48"></a>Uploading to a computer might lead to indefinitely extended life, though this is hardly immortality. Indefinite dentity-preserving life extensions might be possible using repair-microbots. </li><li>In all this, I m talking about the persistence of the <a name="48"></a>individual. I m not talking about  immortality in the sense of  undying fame . As Woody Allen <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_12">quipped</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_12"></A>   <FONT COLOR = "800080">I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality through not dying. I don't want to live on in the hearts of my countrymen; I want to live on in my apartment</FONT> . </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2425.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality</A>" argues that we wouldn t even want immortality, but I m not convinced. However, a bad immortality  uploading to an evil computer, for instance  would be worse than no immortality, though <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_13">some</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_13"></A> are not even convinced of that. Reading associated with this topic is covered under:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Makropulos Case</li><li>Of course, if <a name="48"></a>animalism is the correct account of personal identity, immortality is not on offer, though if the <a name="48"></a>transhumanists succeed, an indefinite extension of life might be possible. </li><li>I have some other notes on this and related topics as part of <a name="48"></a>Philosophy of Religion and my <a name="48"></a>Blog, including:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Death and Eternal Life,</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_20">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_20"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_21">include</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_21"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11762.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction: Introduction</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22798.htm">Cave (Stephen) - Everlasting glory</A>", Cave</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22800.htm">Cave (Stephen) - Remember Herostratus</A>", Cave</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7949.htm">Edwards (Paul) - Dr. Kubler-Ross, Dr. Moody, and the New Immortality Movement</A>", Edwards</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16893.htm">Grossman (Lev) - 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal</A>", Grossman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15780.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Plato, Part II: Arguments for the immortality of the soul</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15781.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Plato, Part III: Arguments for the immortality of the soul (cont.)</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15782.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Plato, Part IV: Arguments for the immortality of the soul (cont.)</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15791.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - The badness of death, Part III; Immortality, Part I</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15792.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Immortality Part II; The value of life, Part I</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_651.htm">Perry (John) - A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2425.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_22">reading list</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_22"></A> (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1781.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1582.htm">Barr (James) - The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality</A>", Barr</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_14/PaperSummary_14513.htm">Bostock (David) - The Soul and Immortality in Plato's Phaedo</A>", Bostock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12610.htm">Cullmann (Oscar) - Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?</A>", Cullmann</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_573.htm">Edwards (Paul), Ed. - Immortality</A>", Edwards</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1477.htm">Flew (Anthony) - Merely Mortal?</A>", Flew</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14539.htm">Forrest (Peter) - The Tree of Life: Agency and Immortality in a Metaphysics Inspired by Quantum Theory</A>", Forrest</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2920.htm">Gillman (Neil) - The Death Of Death: Resurrection and Immortality in Jewish Thought</A>", Gillman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4048.htm">Hick (John) - Death and Eternal Life</A>", Hick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4033.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6334.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death</A>", Martin & Augustine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6206.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12852.htm">Murray (Michael J.) & Rea (Michael) - Mind, body, and immortality</A>", Murray & Rea</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20217.htm">Nussbaum (Martha) - Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature</A>", Nussbaum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2717.htm">Penelhum (Terence), Ed. - Immortality</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4765.htm">Penny (Michael) - Immortality! When?</A>", Penny</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5826.htm">Tolkein (J.R.R.) - The Lord of the Rings: Part I - The Fellowship of the Ring</A>", Perrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20216.htm">Perrett (Roy W.) - Regarding Immortality</A>", Perrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4036.htm">Phillips (D.Z.) - Death and Immortality</A>", Phillips</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2412.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Immortality and Dualism</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16563.htm">Sutherland (Stewart R.) - Immortality and Resurrection</A>", Sutherland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1403.htm">Tipler (Frank) - The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead</A>", Tipler</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_979_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_979_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not sure where this is from, but see <A HREF = "https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1066-i-don-t-want-to-achieve-immortality-through-my-work-i" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1066-i-don-t-want-to-achieve-immortality-through-my-work-i). </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_979_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Eg. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/U/Author_Unamuno (Miguel De).htm">Miguel De Unamuno</A>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_979_20"></A><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_979_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_979_22"></A><B>Footnote 22</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The categorised reading-list requires some pruning in order to fit to identity-related issues only. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 01/03/2018 23:49:55<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.28 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.3: (Persistence)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.29 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41.12: (Numerical Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.30 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 44.14: (Personality)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.31: (Narrative Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_905_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_905_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Narrative identity isn t really an account of numerical identity, but is dependent on it. It is analogous to the <a name="48"></a>PV, but is closer to what most non-philosophers usually mean by  personal identity ; saying someone is  no longer the same person implies such a change in personality that their life no longer fits into a single narrative. </li><li>The most convenient introduction is probably in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11993.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics</A>", section 2.3 (<A HREF = "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/#NarCri" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/#NarCri)). </li><li>To quote:- <ul type="square"><FONT COLOR = "800080"><li>what makes some feature mine may actually be making reference to a non-numerical type of identity, a type of identity we are thinking of when addressing the familiar question of an identity crisis:  Who am I really? This is the question of identity as proper attributability, as providing an account of one's true self and the various attributes genuinely belonging to it. </li><li>the <em>Narrative Criterion of Personal Identity</em>: what makes an action, experience, or psychological characteristic properly attributable to some person (and thus a proper part of his or her true identity) is its correct incorporation into the self-told story of his or her life. & Narrative identity is thus really about a kind of psychological unity, but not just an artless or random unity. </li><li>for that subject of experiences to be a person, a genuine moral agent, those experiences must be actively unified, must be gathered together into the life of one narrative ego by virtue of a story the subject tells that weaves them together, giving them a kind of coherence and intelligibility they wouldn't otherwise have had. This is how the various experiences and events come to have any real meaning at all  rather than being merely isolated events  by being part of a larger story that relates them to one another within the context of one life </li><li>What explains my special sort of concern for myself is that I'm in fact an extended narrative ego  not some time-slice concerned about the well-being of some future time-slice  and I'm constantly extending that narrative into the future, so my concern is <em>global</em>, a concern for the whole self I'm creating via this story, the whole self whose various parts are mine.</li><li>what makes some past action mine (for which I'm eligible for praise or blame) is that it flowed from my central values, beliefs, and experiences, that there's a coherent story I may tell uniting it to the other elements of my life. </li></ul></FONT> </li><li>Shoemaker sees a problem:- <ul type="square"><FONT COLOR = "800080"><li>What matters to us with respect to all of our practical concerns is that we ourselves continue to exist: it's a necessary presupposition of my rational anticipation, self-concern, possibilities for compensation, and so on that I myself persist, but this is an issue of numerical identity. Another way to put this is that one can't be a person, on the narrative view, unless one gathers up the various experiences one has as a subject of experiences into a coherent narrative, but then the identity of that subject of experiences must be preserved across time for its experiences to be so gathered up. </FONT></li><li>If narrative identity depends on numerical identity, then it is as subject to <a name="48"></a>fission-problems as accounts of numerical identity. </li></ul> </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_905_4">Links</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_905_4"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_905_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_905_5">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_905_5"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_905_6">include</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_905_6"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A fairly full reading list might be:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6120.htm">Alexander (Ronald) - The Self and Narrative Identity</A>", Alexander</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6470.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Human Persons: Narrative Identity and Self-Creation</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5444.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Narrative Self-Constitution View</A>", Schechtman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15139.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics - Alternative Approaches</A>", Shoemaker_David</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5003.htm">Teichert (Dieter) - Narrative, Identity and the Self</A>", Teichert </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2561.htm">Thomas (Laurence) - Group Autonomy and Narrative Identity: Blacks and Jews</A>", Thomas </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_905_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_905_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_905_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_905_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.32 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 45.4: (Similarity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.33 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 40.5: (Convention)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.34 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.25: (Psychological View)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.35 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 16.5: (Properties)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.36: (Life)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_942_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_942_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There are (at least) two sub-topics that fall under this topic:- <ul type="square"><li><b>Lives</b>: Life as an (extended) event  the career of an individual. </li><li><b>Life</b>: Life as a biological process. </li></ul></li><li>I assume that lives can be had by individuals that do not have (biological) life, but think it unhelpful to talk of non-biological individuals as  alive , except in a figurative sense. </li><li>Life  and its correlate, <a name="48"></a>death  is a biological process, on which the word of the biologist (maybe as clarified by the philosopher) is final. </li><li>So, interesting philosophical questions about <b>Life</b> include:- <ul type="square"><li>Just what is (biological) life? </li><li>When does biological life begin? This is presumably an empirical question, the answer to which will vary from species to species. </li><li>Are there borderline cases of life?</li><li>When does life cease? Again, the answer to this question will be species-dependent. </li><li>Can life <a name="48"></a>intermit? Does it make sense to say that so-and-so died (on the operating table, say) and then revived? </li></ul> </li><li>Interesting philosophical questions about <b>Lives</b> include:- <ul type="square"><li>How are lives individuated? </li><li>What sort of things can have lives? </li><li>How closely coupled is the life of a human <a name="48"></a>organism with the life of a human <a name="48"></a>person?</li><li>Can a life lived courtesy of a human organism be continued after the death of that organism? </li></ul></li><li>A starting point for <b>Life</b> is "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>".</li><li>Similarly, for <b>Lives</b>: "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4876.htm">Wollheim (Richard) - Living</A>", from "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_270.htm">Wollheim (Richard) - The Thread of Life</A>". </li><li>For a discussion of the possibility of Life after Death, see this <a name="48"></a>Note. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_942_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_942_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_942_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_942_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, mainly see the rather bloated reading list below. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_942_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_942_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_942_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.37: (Process Metaphysics)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>A foundation-stone of my  and most philosophers  account of identity is that  things  or at least <u>some</u>  things  exist. Without things to persist, there can be no persistence and no diachronic identity. </li><li>There has been much discussion about just which things exist, and which things make up  or <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_2">compose</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_2"></A>  other things  see, for instance:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3628.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Vagueness and Composition</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5891.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Brutal Composition</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23021.htm">Miller (Kristie) - The Existential Quantifier, Composition and Contingency</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5333.htm">Parsons (Josh) - Conceptual Conservatism and Contingent Composition</A>"<BR>And especially & <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3534.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Special Composition Question</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5620.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - When are Objects Parts?</A>"</li><li>However, some recent papers I ve seen on Aeon cast doubt on the existence of things, and prefer to focus on processes  in particular, biological ones. This is  process metaphysics , or  naturalistic metaphysics . See:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22814.htm">Vieira (Celso) - Which is more fundamental: processes or things?</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22899.htm">Dupre (John) - Metaphysics of metamorphosis</A>"<BR>The above two papers are all I ve read on the subject thus far. </li><li>Relevant books include:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6556.htm">Rescher (Nicholas) - Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4890.htm">Ladyman (James), Ross (Don), Spurrett (David) & Collier (John) - Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized</A>"</li><li>Books by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Whitehead (Alfred North).htm">Alfred North Whitehead</A>  while historically important  are not a priority in this context. Nor are those on Process Theology. Back in the previous century, around 1993, I used to attend the meetings of  The Society for Process Thought , and corresponded frequently with its chairman, Patrick Lewin. A quick Google didn t reveal anything about the Society, or Patrick, so maybe both are extinct. I did find an old Newsletter that mentioned both: <A HREF = "https://conwayhall.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ETHICAL-RECORD-DECEMBER-1993.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://conwayhall.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ETHICAL-RECORD-DECEMBER-1993.pdf), on the Conway Hall Website (<A HREF = "https://conwayhall.org.uk/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://conwayhall.org.uk/)). </li><li>I m not sure how much of an impact this stance has on my research. I d already noted that animals are each individuated by a <a name="48"></a>life, itself a process. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_4">Links</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_4"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1259_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_5">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_5"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_6">include</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_6"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1259_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1259_2"></A><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I need a note on Composition. </li><li>It is involved in  but not identical to  issues of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_62.htm">Constitution</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1259_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1259_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1259_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.38 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41.11: (Nihilism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.39: (Temporary Intrinsics)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1254_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1254_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how to explain how the very same thing can have different properties at different times, in seeming contradiction of Leibniz s Law, that identicals must have all their properties in common. </li><li>An example  due to my friend <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Botros (Sophie).htm">Sophie Botros</A>  is of a leaf that is green in the spring and brown in the autumn. </li><li>Currently whatever I have had to say on this topic is (at best) posted to the following Notes:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Leibniz<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Persistence<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Endurantism<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Exdurantism<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Perdurantism</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1254_7">Links</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1254_7"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1254_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1254_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1254_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1254_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1254_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9774.htm">Botterell (Anthony) - Temporal Parts and Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Botterell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6036.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Haslanger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1781.htm">Lewis (David) - The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5354.htm">Sider (Ted) - The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5127.htm">Wasserman (Ryan) - The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Wasserman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6326.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - Growing Individuals and Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Weatherson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1782.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism</A>", Wasserman </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1254_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1254_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1254_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1254_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.40 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41.3: (Exdurantism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.41 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.2: (Parfit)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.42 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.4: (What Matters)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.43 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11: (Logic of Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.44 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11.7: (Occasional Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.45 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12: (Physicalism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.46 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.2: (Dualism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.47 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.8: (Death)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.48 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13: (Survival)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.49: (Life After Death)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This is an umbrella-note for the ways in which post-mortem survival might be actualised, namely:- <ul type="square"><li><a name="48"></a>Resurrection,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Reincarnation, or</li><li><a name="48"></a>Immortality of the <a name="48"></a>Soul. </li></ul></li><li>To this list might be added the collection of hopeful possibilities expected by the <a name="48"></a>Transhumanists. </li><li>It will discuss broad issues rather than the specifics of the particular options. It ought to discuss whether life after death  in the sense of eternal, or at least unending, life is to be desired, though this can mostly be hived off to the <a name="48"></a>Makropulos Case. </li><li>I m not interested in <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_8">cases of resuscitation</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_8"></A>, which are commonplace these days. The paradigm cases are after the total  or near-total  destruction of the body. </li><li>Johnston thinks (in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4033.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death</A>") that there s a <a name="48"></a>forensic need for post-mortem survival of some sort, as otherwise there s no incentive to be good, and hopes to provide it by a radical redefinition of what the person is. But this strikes me as changing the subject. </li><li>I have some other notes on this and related topics as part of <a name="48"></a>Philosophy of Religion and my <a name="48"></a>Blog:- <ul type="square"><li><a name="48"></a>Death and Eternal Life,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Resurrection, and </li><li><a name="48"></a>Resurrection (Metaphysics).</li></ul></li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_15">Links</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_15"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_978_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21456.htm">Almeder (Robert) - Death and Personal Survival: Evidence for Life After Death - Preface</A>", Almeder</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11762.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction: Introduction</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7312.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8366.htm">Blackmore (Susan) - And After Death?</A>", Blackmore</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11718.htm">Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing</A>", Cooper</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6195.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Soul, Body and Survival: Introduction - Soul or Body?</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18137.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Thank Goodness!</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4008.htm">Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death</A>", Feldman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4171.htm">Fenwick (Peter) & Fenwick (Elizabeth) - The Truth in the Light: An Investigation of Over 300 Near-Death Experiences</A>", Fenwick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19029.htm">Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction</A>", Gasser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17041.htm">Graham (George) - Death and Identity</A>", Graham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22232.htm">Graziano (Michael) - Endless fun</A>", Graziano</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21125.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8400.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Arguing for Atheism: Preface / Introduction</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21957.htm">Loose (Jonathan) - Constitution and the Falling Elevator</A>", Loose</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6065.htm">MacKay (Donald) - Computer Software and Life After Death</A>", McKay</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19915.htm">Olson (Eric) - Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12608.htm">Penelhum (Terence) - Immortality: Introduction</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21874.htm">Price (H.H.) - Motives for disbelief in life after death</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21875.htm">Price (H.H.) - Two conceptions of the Next World</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20796.htm">Stewart-Williams (Steve) - On the Origin of Afterlife Beliefs by Means of Memetic Selection</A>", Stewart-Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4064.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Mind and Person in the Philosophy of Religion</A>", Thomas, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16533.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Other arguments for dualism</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16542.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16760.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16008.htm">Vardy (Peter) & Arliss (Julie) - Life after Death</A>", Vardy</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21051.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Can We Survive Our Death?</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7766.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_18">reading list</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_18"></A> (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6379.htm">Almeder (Robert) - Death and Personal Survival: Evidence for Life After Death</A>", Almeder<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21454.htm">Dilley (Frank B.) - Review of Robert Almeder 'Death and Personal Survival: The Evidence for Life after Death'</A>", Dilley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6271.htm">Bacchiocchi (Samuele) - Immortality or Resurrection? A Biblical Study on Human Nature and Destiny</A>", Bacchiocchi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1781.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7296.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Death and the Afterlife</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9532.htm">Baltimore (Joseph A.) - Got to Have Soul</A>", Baltimore</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21955.htm">Bruntrup (Godehard) - Soul, Body and Survival: The Renaissance of Christian Materialism</A>", Bruntrup</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2304.htm">Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate</A>", Cooper</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1383.htm">Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16568.htm">Cosculluela (Victor) - Death and God: The Case of Richard Swinburne</A>", Cosculluela</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16731.htm">Davis (Stephen T.) - Philosophy and Life After Death: The Questions and the Options</A>", Davies</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_573.htm">Edwards (Paul), Ed. - Immortality</A>", Edwards</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5722.htm">Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?</A>", Gasser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4048.htm">Hick (John) - Death and Eternal Life</A>", Hick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4033.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death</A>", Johnston<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15977.htm">Caldwell (Christopher M.) - Review - 'Surviving Death' by Mark Johnston</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_638.htm">Lewis (Hywel David) - Persons and Life After Death</A>", Lewis_H</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6334.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_19">Martin & Augustine</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_19"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6206.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20806.htm">More (Max) & Vita-More (Natasha) - Transhumanism: Engines of Life: Identity and Beyond Death - Introduction</A>", More</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21128.htm">Oderberg (David) - Survivalism, Corruptionism, and Mereology</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20953.htm">Ogilvie (Daniel M.) - A Partial History of Afterlife Beliefs</A>", Ogilvie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2717.htm">Penelhum (Terence), Ed. - Immortality</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4286.htm">Rawlings (Maurice S.) - To Hell and Back: Life after Death - Startling New Evidence</A>", Rawlings</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5302.htm">Rosenberg (Jay) - 'Life After Death' - In Search of the Question</A>", Rosenberg<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20310.htm">Silverstein (Harry) - Review of Thinking Clearly About Death by Jay F. Rosenberg</A>", Silverstein</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19837.htm">Sider (Ted) - Hell and Vagueness</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21950.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Possibility of Life after Death</A>", Swinburne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1403.htm">Tipler (Frank) - The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead</A>", Tipler, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11215.htm">Tipler (Frank) - The Physics of Immortality: Preface</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20341.htm">Tipler (Frank) - Comparison of the Heaven Predicted by Modern Physics With the Afterlife Hoped For by the Great World Religions</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16562.htm">Van Evra (James) - On Death as a Limit</A>", Van Evra</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21951.htm">Vasalou (Sofia) - Personal identity across temporal gaps: an Islamic view of the problem</A>", Vasalou</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21952.htm">Wilson (P. Eddy) - Is Seamless Post-Mortem Existence Necessary for Survival?</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21139.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Personal Identity and the Survival of Death</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_978_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_978_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>For resuscitation, see <BR>&rarr "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4308.htm">Moody (Raymond A.), Morse (Melvin) & Kubler-Ross (Elizabeth) - Life After Life</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4307.htm">Moody (Raymond A.), Perry (Paul) & Greeley (Andrew) - The Light Beyond</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_978_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_978_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_978_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_978_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The categorised reading list includes a lot of material of purely religious interest, the vast bulk of which I ve ignored </li><li>Even so, the reading list is too long. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_978_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve not noted individual papers from this volume, except where I ve read them. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/05/2018 20:03:50<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.50 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14.8: (Christian Materialism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.51 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 38: (Causality)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.52 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.9: (Resurrection)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.53 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11: (Logic of Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.54 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 3.7: (Modality)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.55 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24: (Constitution View)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.56: (Statue and the Clay)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1171_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1171_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This topic arises in the theory of material <a name="48"></a>constitution when we are considering whole objects (rather than their parts) that appear to be co-located because they are (or seem to be) of different kinds, or (seem to) have different persistence conditions. </li><li>This issue was exploited by "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>" (1975) in the cause of <a name="48"></a>contingent identity. </li><li>Supporters of the <a name="48"></a>Constitution View of Personal Identity (are sometimes said to) hold that persons are constituted by their bodies much as statues are constituted by lumps of clay. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1171_5">Links</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1171_5"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1171_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1171_6">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1171_6"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1171_7">include</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1171_7"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6393.htm">Burke (Michael) - Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account</A>", Burke, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5886.htm">Chihara (Charles S.) - The Many Persons Problem</A>", Chihara, 1994</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5244.htm">Cowley (Fraser) - The Identity of a Person and His Body</A>", Cowley, 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2004.htm">Doepke (Frederick) - Spatially Coinciding Objects</A>", Doepke, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20320.htm">Fine (Kit) - Coincidence and Form</A>", Fine, 2008</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6176.htm">Frances (Bryan) - Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks</A>", Frances, 2007</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9761.htm">Francescotti (Robert) - Statues and Their Constituents: Whether Consitution is Identity</A>", Francescotti, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6297.htm">Gallois (Andre) - The Puzzle Cases</A>", Gallois, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6392.htm">Heil (John) - Substantial Identity</A>", Heil, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21106.htm">Hershenov (David) - Merrick's Identification of the Person and Organism</A>", Hershenov, 2001?</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6039.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the  Standard Account </A>", Lowe, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5119.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - No Statues</A>", Merricks, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5997.htm">Moyer (Mark) - Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence?</A>", Moyer, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5398.htm">Perry (John) - The Same F</A>", Perry, 1970</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20710.htm">Sutton (Catherine S.) - Colocated Objects, Tally-Ho: A Solution to the Grounding Problem</A>", Sutton, 2012</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4450.htm">Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - The Statue and the Clay</A>", Thomson, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_422.htm">Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time</A>", Wiggins, 1968</li><li>Also, see <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/puzzles/clay_statue/" TARGET = "_top">Bob Doyle: Statue and the Clay</A> (http://metaphysicist.com/puzzles/clay_statue/). </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1171_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1171_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1171_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1171_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.57 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.3: (Constitution)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.58 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25.2: (Thinking Animal Argument)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.59 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25.11: (Dion and Theon)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.60 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25.10: (Tibbles the Cat)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.61: (Problem of the Many)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1170_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1170_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This problem is to do with objects  whether clouds or human beings  that have vague boundaries. What is wrong with saying that instead of just one object there are many overlapping ones; or, if we hate this idea, what s the solution so that we only have one (as we first thought?</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1170_2">Links</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1170_2"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1170_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1170_3">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1170_3"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1170_4">include</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1170_4"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>It s probably best to take "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4714.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - The Problem of the Many</A>" (2014 revision) as a starting-point, and use its references (except for those on <a name="48"></a>Vagueness) for further reading, though these writers are top of the list:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3626.htm">Hudson (Hud) - The Many Problematic Solutions To the Problem Of the Many</A>" (2001, and the whole of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_109.htm">Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person</A>")<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15880.htm">Carter (William) - 'Partist' Resistance to the Many: Review of 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person' by Hud Hudson</A>" (2004, a critique of the above)<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6621.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Problem of the Many</A>" (1980, <em>fons et origo</em>?)</li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16637.htm">Bennett (Karen) - Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology</A>", Bennett, 2007</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11991.htm">Jones (Nicholas K.) - Too Many Cats: The Problem of the Many and the Metaphysics of Vagueness</A>", Jones, 2010</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1239.htm">Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One</A>", Lewis, 1999 reprint</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12992.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - The Paradox of the 1,001 Cats</A>". Lowe, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6038.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - The Problems of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution</A>". Lowe, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5891.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Brutal Composition</A>", Markosian, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21969.htm">McKinnon (Neil) - Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many</A>", McKinnon, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20362.htm">McKinnon (Neil) - A New Problem of the Many</A>", McKinnon, 2008</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21970.htm">Schiffer (Stephen) - Two Issues of Vagueness</A>", Schiffer, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21971.htm">Williams (J. Robbie G.) - An Argument for the Many</A>", Williams, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6316.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - Epistemicism Parasites and Vague Names</A>", Weatherson, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6317.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - Many Many Problems</A>", Weatherson, 2003</li><li>Also, see <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/puzzles/many/" TARGET = "_top">Bob Doyle: Problem of the Many</A> (http://metaphysicist.com/puzzles/many/). </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1170_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1170_2"></A><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1170_3"></A><B>Footnote 3</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1170_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 01/08/2018 23:42:43<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.62 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41: (Perdurantism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.63 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 32: (Fission)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.64 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23: (Animalism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.65 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.66 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25: (Constitution View - Objections)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.67 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.6: (Self)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.68 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17: (Body)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.69 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.26: (Reduplication Objections)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.70: (Universals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>My research is Personal Identity, so what have Universals to do with this? </li><li>Well, not a lot  except David Lewis introduced them as an example to distinguish <a name="48"></a>perdurance from <a name="48"></a>endurance  Universals being analogous to enduring entities as they are (allegedly) wholly present in each particular that possesses the property covered by the Universal. So, (a particular shade of) redness is (said to be) wholly present in each red object. </li><li>There s also a connection with <a name="48"></a>Natural Kinds. In "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19961.htm">Hawley (Katherine) & Bird (Alexander) - What are Natural Kinds?</A>", the authors suggest that Natural Kinds are  Complex Universals . </li><li>I also  probably heretically  have the view that Universals themselves might have <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions. My example is that of a book.  Pride and Prejudice is a book  but both a Universal that can be variously instantiated in physical books, or (now) eBooks. But it (or a better example) might go through several editions. What makes all these editions  of the same book ? </li><li>I have touched upon Universals in various write-ups:- <ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>": see <a name="48"></a>write-up. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14452.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson</A>": see <a name="48"></a>write-up. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5321.htm">Fine (Kit) - A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis</A>": see <a name="48"></a>write-up. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14449.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity</A>": see <a name="48"></a>write-up. </li></ol></li><li>They also appear in Animadversions on talks at Heythrop by:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Snowdon</li><li><a name="48"></a>Haldane </li></ol></li><li>There is a potential relationship between Universals and <a name="48"></a>Properties  realists contend that properties are Universals, and "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_39.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Universals</A>" attacks the question of universals via that of properties. So, a consideration of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_533.htm">Mellor (D.H.) & Oliver (Alex), Eds. - Properties: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>" might be in order. </li><li>Leading on from this, I might also review my BA-finals essay on the <a name="48"></a>Third Man Argument, which deals with the problems caused by properties and universals. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_14">Links</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_14"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1008_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_69.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Aristotle and the Sea Battle</A>", Anscombe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8740.htm">Armstrong (David) - Introduction to Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 1 (Nominalism and Realism)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8765.htm">Armstrong (David) - In Conclusion (Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8766.htm">Armstrong (David) - The Argument of Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 1 (Nominalism and Realism)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8753.htm">Armstrong (David) - The Argument of Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 2 (A Theory of Universals)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11264.htm">Armstrong (David) - What is a Law of Nature? Conclusions</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16044.htm">Bacon (John), Campbell (Keith) & Reinhardt (Lloyd) - Ontology, Causality and Mind: Preface</A>", Bacon Etc.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14452.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6427.htm">Butchvarov (Panayot) - Being Qua Being: Introduction</A>", Buchvaryov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6761.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Universals and Particulars: Introduction</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8414.htm">Fine (Gail) - Platonic Questions</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_17">Fine</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_17"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5321.htm">Fine (Kit) - A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis</A>", Fine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16706.htm">Hartshorne (Charles) - The Necessarily Existent</A>", Hartshorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12899.htm">Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds (Selections)</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8014.htm">Lewis (David) - Philosophical Papers Volume II: Introduction</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1781.htm">Lewis (David) - The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21722.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - More Kinds of Being: Preface</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14449.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8029.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - The Problem(s) of Universals</A>", Moreland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12010.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? The Question</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1091.htm">Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is</A>", Quine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_685.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - The Problems of Philosophy</A>", Russell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16677.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Necessary Being: the Ontological Argument</A>", van Inwagen</li></ol></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_18">reading list</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_18"></A> (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_275.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_276.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20550.htm">Aune (Bruce) - Universals and Particulars</A>", Aune</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1973.htm">Bealer (George) - Universals and Properties</A>", Bealer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23335.htm">Doyle (Robert O.) - Abstract Entities</A>", Doyle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19956.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - David Lewis on Persistence</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19962.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Mereology, Modality and Magic</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19961.htm">Hawley (Katherine) & Bird (Alexander) - What are Natural Kinds?</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1100.htm">Lewis (David) - New Work for a Theory of Universals</A>", Lewis<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20407.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  New Work for a Theory of Universals </A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4169.htm">Loux (Michael) - The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism</A>", Loux</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4170.htm">Loux (Michael) - The Problem of Universals II: Nominalism</A>", Loux</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4519.htm">MacBride (Fraser) - The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?</A>", MacBride</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_533.htm">Mellor (D.H.) & Oliver (Alex), Eds. - Properties: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_39.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Universals</A>", Moreland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16817.htm">O'Leary-Hawthorne (John) & Cover (J.A.) - A World of Universals</A>", O'Leary-Hawthorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12015.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Bundles</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19855.htm">Sider (Ted) - Sparseness, Immanence, and Naturalness</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_19">Sider</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_19"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_401.htm">Teichman (Jenny) - Three Kinds of Realism About Universals</A>", Teichman</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1008_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1008_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1008_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1008_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1008_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: See also "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8412.htm">Fine (Gail) - On Ideas - Introduction</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_1008_18"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The Categorised readig-list is far too bloated for my interests. </li><li>So I ve included most of what I ve actually read, but have been much more restrictive on unread items </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1008_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: Look into the other papers by Sider in the categorised list if time. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 08/06/2018 19:00:29<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.71 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 40: (Closest Continuer)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.72 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 45: (Teletransportation)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.73 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.11: (Consciousness)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.74 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.9: (Substance)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.75 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18: (Forensic Property)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.76 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 28: (Phase Sortals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.77 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 29.15: (Animal Rights)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.78 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.29: (Animalism - Objections)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.79 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.23: (Corpses)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.80 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.14: (Fetuses)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.81 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14.4: (Mereology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.82 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 32.23: (Brain Transplants)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.83 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.11: (Transplants)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.84: (Brain Criterion)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There will naturally be some overlap on this topic with the topics of <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Brains and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Criteria of Identity. </li><li>The question is whether the brain is the be-all and end-all of the matter of personal identity for <a name="48"></a>human persons. </li><li>It is acknowledged by most that  conceptually at least  there can be <a name="48"></a>persons that are not humans (ie. not members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em>)  whether these persons be non-human animals, computers, God, angels, aliens or whatever. Non-animals presumably have no brains, though aliens presumably have a brain-analogue, so brains cannot be identity-criteria for personhood as such (indeed, we might argue that there <U>are</U> no criteria for persons as <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_6">such</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_6"></A>). But for animal-persons (human or otherwise), the brain seems to occupy a central place, both as the seat of psychology (in the absence of an immaterial <a name="48"></a>soul) and as the regulator of the body. </li><li>So, the story would go, X is the same person as Y <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_8">iff</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_8"></A> X has the same brain as Y. </li><li>The trouble is  even if this claim is along the right lines  we can press matters further, and ask whether the <U>whole</U> brain is strictly necessary. If what impresses us is a brain-based psychological view, when what we imagine is  really the minimal me is the pair of psychology-bearing cerebral hemispheres, then we might imagine (as some philosophers have) a case of <a name="48"></a>fission, where  after equalising the hemispheres in psychological potency, we <a name="48"></a>transplant one into another body lacking both hemispheres. Or, without needing anything so radical, we sever the corpus callosum in a <a name="48"></a>commissurotomy, thereby (on this view) creating two persons in one body. </li><li>However, if we are <a name="48"></a>animalists,<a name="48"></a> wondering what the  minimal animal is, and it s the command-and-control functions of the brain that impress us, then the paring-down process <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_14">might</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_14"></A> be able to do without the cerebral hemispheres (or at least the psychology-bearing parts) altogether. So, brain-based views from different perspectives might come to different conclusions about the importance of the cerebral hemispheres  one view might make them essential, the other irrelevant to questions of identity (if not to  <a name="48"></a>what matters ). It is an empirical question whether the brain-stem can be divided, and hence whether a brain-based animalist approach is also subject to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_16">worries</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_16"></A> about fission. </li><li>Anyway, the appropriateness of the Brain criterion of personal identity depends on <a name="48"></a>what we are in particular whether we are (most fundamentally, or in the sense of numerical identity, which is not the same thing) human animals or persons <a name="48"></a>constituted by them (or various other things). </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_19">Only if</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_19"></A> we believe that we are (identical to) <a name="48"></a>brains will we adopt the brain criterion. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_21">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_21"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_22">include</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_22"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3742.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Criteria of Personal Identity</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_23">Johnston</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_23"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15413.htm">Manninen (Tuomas) - Review of Alva Noe's 'Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain'</A>", Manninen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3583.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21029.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16540.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - The bodily criterion</A>", Thomas</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3602.htm">Noe (Alva) - Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness</A>", Noe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12013.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains</A>", Olson</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_909_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_909_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Hasn t someone said this? Who? <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_109.htm">Wiggins</a>? </li><li>This is not to be confused with there being no criteria for <u>identity</u>, which is due to Merricks (eg. in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3448.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time</A>").</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>And, of course,  X and Y are both persons , to cover the case where the brain is insufficient to support the property of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">personhood</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Much of this discussion has empirical aspects to it, and depends on the capabilities of real brains  though we might get into the choppy waters of more intricate <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TEs</a>, and wonder what might be the case if the biology went differently  but then we would most likely not be talking about <U>our</U> identity criteria, but of some other being. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>These worries about fission are essentially set to rest by adopting a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">perdurantist</a> account of persistence. </li><li>But, some consider the costs (mainly semantic, I think) of adopting this approach are too great. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>But see the Note on Johnston below! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_909_22"></A><B>Footnote 22</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_23"></A><B>Footnote 23</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Johnston thinks we are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">human beings</a>, but  when push comes to shove  we would survive as brains, so the criteria of our identity are  for Johnston  brain based. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 14/03/2018 10:07:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.85 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.2: (Olson)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.86 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17.6: (Brains in Vats)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.87 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 33: (Fusion)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.88 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11.4: (Vague Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.89: (Cyborgs)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Briefly, a Cyborg (Cybernetic Organism) is a human being (or any organic being) with some inorganic parts. See the entry in Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyborg" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyborg)).</li><li>Compare and contrast with <a name="48"></a>Android, which is a humanoid robot. </li><li>See also <a name="48"></a>Siliconisation, the <a name="48"></a>TE wherein we have the gradual replacement of (human) neural tissue with microchips while  allegedly  preserving consciousness. </li><li>And again, connect to <a name="48"></a>Chimeras. <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_6">In this case</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_6"></A>, biological material from other animals is merged with human tissue to provide an enhancement. </li><li>All of the above is beloved of the <a name="48"></a>Transhumanists, who want to enhance the human condition by all means possible, even if this means that humans are no longer  strictly speaking  <a name="48"></a>human beings. </li><li>My interest in Cyborgs stems from the impact of their possibility on the truth of <a name="48"></a>Animalism. </li><li>If we are (human) <a name="48"></a>animals, would we continue to exist if increasingly enhanced by technological implants and extensions. I see no immediate problem  just a bit more along the lines of spectacles & hip replacements. But no doubt there would eventually become a tipping point when we become more inorganic than organic. Our <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions would then be mixed between those of <a name="48"></a>organisms and <a name="48"></a>artefacts. Or is the situation better described by us shrinking (if our parts are replaced) or  if the technological parts are add-ons  remaining unchanged. Currently we re unchanged by our spectacles, but hip replacements become part of us. Is this not so?</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_14">Links</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_14"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_66_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16893.htm">Grossman (Lev) - 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal</A>", Grossman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23360.htm">Hawthorne (John X.) - Are You Ready For The Cyborg Technology Coming In 2018?</A>", Hawthorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22749.htm">Iida (Fumiya) - Could we build a Blade Runner-style  replicant ?</A>", Iida</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17206.htm">Jones (D. Gareth) - A Christian Perspective on Human Enhancement</A>", Jones</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22268.htm">Mayor (Adrienne) - Bio-techne</A>", Mayor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6513.htm">O'Connell (Mark) - To be a Machine</A>", O Connell</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15973.htm">Alexander (Denis) - Enhancing humans or a new creation?</A>", Alexander</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6715.htm">Clark (Andy) - Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence</A>", Clark<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23243.htm">Erickson (Mark) - Review of Andy Clark's 'Natural-Born Cyborgs'</A>", Erickson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4531.htm">Shipley (G.J.) - Review of Andy Clark's 'Natural-Born Cyborgs'</A>", Shipley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20821.htm">Clark (Andy) - Re-Inventing Ourselves: The Plasticity of Embodiment, Sensing, and Mind</A>", Clark</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6464.htm">Clark (Andy) - That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves</A>", Clark</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17207.htm">CSC WG - Human Enhancement  A Discussion Document</A>", CSC WG</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20183.htm">Kaku (Michio) - The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest to Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind (YouTube Lecture)</A>", Kaku</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20839.htm">Miah (Andy) - Justifying Human Enhancement: The Accumulation of Biocultural Capital</A>", Miah</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16565.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Conquest of Death</A>", Puccetti</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_66_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_66_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There are other situations where human tissue is to be harvested from other animals  after genetic modification or other means  for the purpose of implantation. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_66_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_66_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_66_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 04/05/2018 12:25:55<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.90: (Cerebrum)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The cerebrum is the centre for the higher cognitive capacities of the <a name="48"></a>brain, and hence of human and other <a name="48"></a>animal <a name="48"></a>psychology. </li><li>It is (or they are) one option for the choice of  <a name="48"></a>what we are on the part of those who hold the <a name="48"></a>Psychological View of personal identity. </li><li>The two cerebral hemispheres are joined by the commissures, and <a name="48"></a>commissurotomy is a favourite <a name="48"></a>TE, being an alleged case  suitably elaborated  of the <a name="48"></a>fission of the <a name="48"></a>person; which again (allegedly) shows the non-identity of the <a name="48"></a>human person and his <a name="48"></a>animal.</li><li>There is some slackness in the literature where (whole) <a name="48"></a>brain transplants and (double) cerebrum transplants are not distinguished, and where half-brain transplants (whatever these might be in practice) and single-cerebrum transplants are confused. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_14">Links</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_14"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1013_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>This Note overlaps to a great degree with others, some just noted, in particular:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Brain<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Brain Transplants<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Commissurotomy</li><li>In the reading lists, I ve tried to restrict the  outstanding list to those that describe what the cerebrums are and how they function  to place constraints on the <a name="48"></a>TEs. But I ve been <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_19">more liberal</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_19"></A> in the  already read list. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_20">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_20"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_21">include</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_21"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1165.htm">Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) - Neuroscience</A>", Bear et al, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7613.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Biology or Psychology? Human Persons and Personal Identity</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20173.htm">Liao (S. Matthew) - The Organism View Defended</A>", Liao</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5102.htm">Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22018.htm">Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence</A>", Madden</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20079.htm">Murphy (Nancey) - I Cerebrate Myself: Is there a little man inside your brain?</A>", Murphy, 1999</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18372.htm">Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4762.htm">Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5041.htm">Olson (Eric) - Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li> The categorised reading-list below has information on the cerebrum itself muddled together with more philosophical writings. A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3986.htm">Eccles (John) - Global Lesions of the Human Cerebrum</A>", Eccles</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4409.htm">Galin (David) - Implications for Psychiatry of Left and Right Cerebral Specialization: A Neurophysiological Context for Unconscious Processes</A>", Galin, 1974</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21102.htm">Hershenov (David) - Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22074.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Remnant Persons: Animalism's Undoing</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_516.htm">Kinsbourne (Marcel) - Asymmetrical Function of the Brain</A>", Kinsbourne, 1978</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21093.htm">Madden (Rory) - The Persistence of Animate Organisms</A>", Madden</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22064.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12011.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12016.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Souls</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12014.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Temporal Parts</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20709.htm">Parfit (Derek) - We Are Not Human Beings</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2921.htm">Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person</A>", Russell & Murphy et al, 2000 </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1013_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1013_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1013_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: And in the  outstanding list where the usual suspects are concerned. <a name="On-Page_Link_1013_20"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1013_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 20/06/2018 17:16:48<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.91: (Sleep)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1138_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1138_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> I d not intended to address this topic, but it appeared in <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Broks (Paul).htm">Paul Broks</A> s contribution to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21153.htm">Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) - What Does It Mean to Be Me?</A>", in relation to <a name="48"></a>Parfit s <a name="48"></a>Teletransportation <a name="48"></a>TE. </li><li>Therein, the thought is that the  pulling yourself together that the individual does on awaking is very closely analogous to what happens in the  reception pod in teletransportation. If this is right, then either the awakening sleeper is not identical to the one who went to sleep, or the teletransportee is indeed identical to the individual who set off, and teletransportation is indeed a form of travel. I don t believe any of this. </li><li>However I ought to add a few jottings, as it s central to the <a name="48"></a>Psychological View, which says  roughly speaking  that we <a name="48"></a>are most fundamentally mental substances, and there has  since Descartes  been an issue about whether the thinking thing has to be continually thinking, and the dreamless sleep was the classic case of when it appeared not to be.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1138_7">Links</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1138_7"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1138_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1138_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1138_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1138_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1138_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>See the diminutive categorised reading list below, most of which seems relevant:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1138_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1138_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1138_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1138_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 00:18:43<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.92 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 37: (Psychological Continuity - Forward)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.93 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.6: (Brain)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.94 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 22: (Concepts)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.95: (Buddhism)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_943_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_943_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Buddhist teachings are relevant in two ways to personal identity:- <ol type="1"><li>The rejection of the importance of the <a name="48"></a>Self. There are some connections to <a name="48"></a>Parfit s ideas.</li><li>The insistence on <a name="48"></a>Reincarnation.</li></ol></li><li>I have to admit to being mostly ignorant of Buddhist teachings, and unsympathetic towards those I know of (other than the woolly  peace, love and compassion stuff). </li><li>A couple of Websites may be useful, though clearly they don t focus on my research interests:- <ol type="1"><li>The Buddhist eLibrary (<A HREF = "http://www.buddhistelibrary.org/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.buddhistelibrary.org/))</li><li>The Dalai Lama s site (<A HREF = "https://www.dalailama.com/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://www.dalailama.com/))</li></ol></li><li>However, the following brace of books might help:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1559.htm">Yoshinori (Takeuchi), Van Bragt (Jan), Heisig (James), Swanson (Paul) & O'Leary (Joseph), Eds. - Buddhist Spirituality I - Indian, Southeast Asian, Tibetan, Early Chinese</A>", and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1560.htm">Yoshinori (Takeuchi), Heisig (James), O'Leary (Joseph) & Swanson (Paul), Eds. - Buddhist Spirituality II - Later China, Korea, Japan and the Modern World</A>". </li></ol></li><li>So, I'm vaguely interested in Buddhism  though not from the religious angle  where my interests are strictly "Abrahamic" (Christianity, Judaism, Islam). It slightly impinges on my research topic, though in a rather negative way. The Buddhist claim is that the focus on the Self, together with attachments to anything whatever, is the cause of all the world's ills. No doubt there's something in this - but it's illicit or inordinate attachments that are the problem, not attachments as such. Attachments are what gives life meaning, and its selfishness, not selves, that is the problem. Anyway, some philosophers think it would be a "good thing" if the boundaries between one self and another were broken down so that we cared less about <U>who</U> was benefitted from our actions, just that our actions were beneficial - so we wouldn't care whether it was ourselves, or our families or friends, or someone unknown to us who benefitted, just that someone did. Despite the potential benefit to the world s poor, this strikes me <ol type="a"><li>as overly idealistic and </li><li>to ignore our proper responsibilities (ie. we have some greater responsibility - though not an exclusive one - for those close to us, because they are "our job" to look after). </li></ol></li><li>Those philosophers that take a "<a name="48"></a>psychological view" of our <a name="48"></a>persistence conditions - that we're psychological beings whose degree of connectedness to our future selves is exclusively based on psychological factors  some of whom think that we are somehow portable from one body to another  can make some sense of reincarnation. Those that are thoroughgoing materialists (like me) can't. I m sure the Dalai Lama is a very nice man, but his position and authority depends on him being a reincarnation of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_943_7">someone else</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_943_7"></A>, which isn t likely to be true. </li><li>Despite all the "peace and love" stuff, some of the ideas that Buddhism inherited from Hinduism strike me as being rather pernicious. It all stems from Karma and reincarnation - the idea that whatever we do in this life stores up good or ill for us the next time round. Maybe this (despite being based on metaphysical falsehoods) has some tendency to encourage some people to be less wicked than they might otherwise be (just like the threat of the eternal bonfire used to do for Christians), but it also has a tendency (for those who take the doctrine seriously) to encourage the thought that people deserve what they get because of what they did in a past life  so the poor deserve their poverty and the rich their wealth; all very convenient for those in power; though this isn t the Dalai Lama s take on things). No doubt the thought that any living thing might once have been human, or might in some future cycle be human, might lead to "universal compassion", but it's all a complete muddle metaphysically-speaking, and we should found our ethics on truths rather than falsehoods, it seems to me. </li><li>No doubt a Buddhist would have an answer to these concerns, and correct my many confusions.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_943_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_943_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_943_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_943_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6488.htm">Bourgeois (Warren) - Contemporary Philosophers' Views on Persons: Parfit: The Oxford Buddhist</A>", Bourgeois</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15991.htm">Vardy (Peter) & Arliss (Julie) - Evil in Eastern traditions</A>", Vardy</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22054.htm">Goodman (Charles) - Vaibhcika Metaphoricalism</A>", Goodman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2690.htm">Laycock (Stephen) - Consciousness It/Self</A>", Laycock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6378.htm">Sprague (Elmer) - Giving Persons a Hard Time</A>", Sprague</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6125.htm">Velleman (David) - So It Goes</A>", Velleman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11511.htm">Wagner (Rachel) & Flannery-Dailey (Frances) - Wake Up! Worlds of Illusion in Gnosticism, Buddhism, and The Matrix Project</A>", Wagner</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8632.htm">Williams (Paul) - Indian Philosophy</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_943_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_943_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t know whether reincarnations are of themselves, in a previous life. </li><li>See Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Succession_of_the_14th_Dalai_Lama" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Succession_of_the_14th_Dalai_Lama)) for discussion of the succession from 14th to 15th Delai Lama. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_943_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_943_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 03/02/2018 21:27:22<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7: (Ontology)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Ontology is the study of what exists. </li><li>In the context of the philosophy of personal identity, ontological questions ask what <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>2</SUP> really are. </li><li>Maybe it s best first of all to step back, with <a name="48"></a><U>Locke</U><SUP>3</SUP>, and consider the <a name="48"></a><U>sorts</U><SUP>4</SUP> of thing that persist and establish the <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>5</SUP> for these sorts: <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>bodies</U><SUP>6</SUP>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>7</SUP>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>human beings</U><SUP>8</SUP>. </li><li>The ontological question is whether  with Locke  we should add persons to this list. </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Baker</U><SUP>9</SUP> holds the view that when a person comes into existence, so does a new entity, of a new <a name="48"></a><U>kind</U><SUP>10</SUP>. A world without persons would be ontologically impoverished. </li><li>But is this so, or do existing entities simply gain new <a name="48"></a><U>properties</U><SUP>11</SUP>? </li><li>We must even (on certain definitions of PERSON) ask whether there <a name="48"></a><U>are any</U><SUP>12</SUP>, or whether the term can be eliminated. See:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1006.htm">Unger (Peter) - Why There Are No People</A>" and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>". </li><li>Since Unger s <a name="48"></a><U>sorites</U><SUP>13</SUP> arguments eliminate all material entities with <a name="48"></a><U>parts</U><SUP>14</SUP>, not just persons (though the elimination of persons on this account depends on the assumption that they are material entities with parts) I, along with the later Unger, wish to reject such conclusions.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>17</SUP>. Currently, just see the enormously bloated categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_8_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_8_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_8_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18.2: (Locke)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 9: (Sortals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.5 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.5: (Persistence Criteria)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17: (Body)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.7 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 29: (Animals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.16: (Baker)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.6: (Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 16.5: (Properties)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.12 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41.11: (Nihilism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.13 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25.9: (Sorites)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.14 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14.4: (Mereology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.17 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8: (Person)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with? Wiggins claims that the Greeks had no term for  person (I need to re-read the paper by "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7220.htm">Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person</A>" to double-check this). Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to <a name="48"></a><U>human beings</U><SUP>2</SUP> rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons? </li><li>I need to start with some <a name="48"></a><U>conceptual</U><SUP>3</SUP> analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely <a name="48"></a><U>semantic</U><SUP>4</SUP> or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn t a <a name="48"></a><U>natural kind</U><SUP>5</SUP> concept. </li><li>I accept <a name="48"></a><U>Locke</U><SUP>6</SUP> s conceptual distinction between <a name="48"></a><U>Human Beings</U><SUP>7</SUP> ( Men ), Persons and <a name="48"></a><U>Substances</U><SUP>8</SUP>. I accept Locke s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man  the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics. </li><li><BR>Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke s definition of a person as <ol type="1"> <FONT COLOR = "800080">a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places</FONT> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" - Essay II.27.2)</ol>& be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image. </li><li>But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this  qua-ing can lead to <a name="48"></a><U>relative identity</U><SUP>9</SUP>, and shows how difficult it is for me, at least, to maintain the strict <a name="48"></a><U>logic of identity</U><SUP>10</SUP> in these discussions. </li><li>Some further, fairly random, thoughts:-<ul type="square"><li>We must not ignore potential differences between the Person, the <a name="48"></a><U>Self</U><SUP>11</SUP> and the <a name="48"></a><U>Individual</U><SUP>12</SUP>. </li><li>I doubt the truth of the contention that one s Self is the sum of one s projects, one s individual  <a name="48"></a><U>identity</U><SUP>13</SUP> .</li><li>We must also note the potential for <a name="48"></a><U>degrees of personhood</U><SUP>14</SUP>. </li><li>Are persons essentially sentient? Or rational? And is rationality, like the mental generally, overstated by philosophers whose favourite habitat it is? </li><li>What about <a name="48"></a><U>temporal gaps</U><SUP>15</SUP> in sentience & rationality in the life of an individual  does the person pop in and out of existence? </li><li>What about legal persons: not companies, but the comatose, who still have estates (but then so do the <a name="48"></a><U>deceased</U><SUP>16</SUP>)? </li><li>How important is  person , as against  <a name="48"></a><U>sentient being</U><SUP>17</SUP> in my research concerns? The Cartesians denied sentience to <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>18</SUP> and until recently there has been a down-playing of the capacities of animals, particularly their emotional capacities. Consequently, the <a name="48"></a><U>persistence criteria</U><SUP>19</SUP> for sentient non-humans may not have been given the focus they ought. I suspect that many of the <a name="48"></a><U>thought experiments</U><SUP>20</SUP> work just as well if we drop some of the more onerous requirements of personhood in such contexts. Some of the thought experiments play on the thought of  <a name="48"></a><U>being tortured tomorrow</U><SUP>21</SUP> . While animals may not have the concept TOMORROW, I presume the higher animals have some capacity for anticipating future ills about to befall them. I wonder whether my research concerns should be about all beings that care about the future, whether or not they have a clear concept of it as <em>their</em> future.</li></ul></li><li>I will probably start with Dennett s six criteria of personhood (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_545.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood</A>") & <ol type="1"><li>rationality, </li><li>intentionality   predicated of </li><li>intentionality   adopted towards </li><li>reciprocation of the personal stance, </li><li>verbal communication and </li><li>consciousness</li></ol> & in investigating what persons are. See the following <a name="48"></a><U>essay</U><SUP>22</SUP>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_23">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_23"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_24">include</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_24"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>25</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list, which is enormously bloated and needs considerable pruning. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_9_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_9_23"></A><B>Footnote 23</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_9_24"></A><B>Footnote 24</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 22: (Concepts)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 22.5: (Semantics)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.5 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 26: (Natural Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18.2: (Locke)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.7 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.9: (Substance)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11.3: (Relative Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11: (Logic of Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.6: (Self)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.12 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 32.12: (Individual)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.13 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 6.31: (Narrative Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.14 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18.10: (Degrees of Personhood)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.15 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14.3: (Intermittent Objects)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.16 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.8: (Death)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.17 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.11: (Consciousness)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.18 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 29: (Animals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.19 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.5: (Persistence Criteria)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.20 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.21 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17.11: (Future Great Pain Test)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.22: (Daniel Dennett  Conditions of Personhood)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Dennett suggests that the concepts of  person and  human being are not necessarily co-extensive. He also distinguishes the two intertwined notions of personhood  <I>moral</I> and <I>metaphysical</I>. He defends the following 6  themes as necessary conditions of personhood:<ol type="1"><li>Persons are <I>rational beings</I>.</li><li>Persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or to which psychological or mental or <I>intentional predicates</I> are ascribed.</li><li>Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a <I>stance adopted</I> with respect to it. </li><li>The object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable of <I>reciprocating</I> in some way. </li><li>Persons must be capable of <I>verbal communication</I>.</li><li>Persons are distinguishable from other entities by being <I>conscious</I> in some special way: there is a way in which we are conscious in which no other species is conscious. Sometimes this is identified as <I>self</I>-consciousness of one sort or another. </li></ol>Dennett addresses 3 issues to do with these 6 themes:<BR><ol type="1"><li>How (on his interpretation) are these 6 themes dependent on one another?</li><li>Why are they <I>necessary</I> conditions of moral personhood?</li><li>Why is it so hard to say whether they are jointly <I>sufficient</I> conditions for moral personhood? </li></ol>In this essay, rather than address Dennett s 3 issues directly, I wish to address the following 6 questions: <ol type="1"><li>Is Dennett right to <A HREF="#Separate">separate</A> the concepts of  person and  human being ?</li><li>Is Dennett right to distinguish <A HREF="#Moral">moral</A> from metaphysical personhood?</li><li>Has Dennett the right set of <A HREF="#Themes">themes</A>?</li><li>Has Dennett found the right <A HREF="#Interdependencies">interdependencies and priorities</A> amongst his themes. </li><li>What are Dennett s <A HREF="#Reasons">reasons</A> for predicating these conditions of personhood? </li><li>Finally, is Dennett guided by a <A HREF="#NaturalKind">natural kind</A> concept, by social convention or by other factors? </li></ol>I have to admit that this is a first draft and something of a rushed job. My aim at this stage is to generate ideas quickly rather than ensure the argument is fully rigorous. I m afraid I ve used Dennett s paper more as a jumping off point, and have not considered his actual arguments as much as I should. I ve included hyperlinks to topics I ve written before, as a way of airing them and avoiding needless repetition, though the primary aim of this essay is to provide some continuous text for discussion, rather than exemplifying the approach of my research proposal (from where these notes come) which is almost all footnotes. <BR><BR>My aim in reviewing this paper is to get some sort of handle on what a person might be. The aim of my thesis will be to demonstrate that human persons are phase sortals of human animals, and that consequently (given the falsehood of mind/body dualism) that such hoped-for events such as resurrection are metaphysically impossible. I m not arguing for any of this here, just motivating the consideration of this topic. <BR><BR>Page references are to the 1997 Penguin edition of Brainstorms (Chapter 14). <BR><BR><a name="Separate"></a><BR><CENTER><B><U>Persons and Human Beings</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>Dennett claims that while any reader of his essay has to be person, the reader need not be a human being. The reader could be an alien, for instance. However, as far as I can see, to read Dennett s essay with reward, only rationality, language use, phenomenal consciousness and intentional states are strictly required. The moral themes seem irrelevant, as does the consciousness of self (though a reader without this concept might find the essay initially rather dull, though maybe enlightening). <BR><BR>So, the reader might not be a moral person by Dennett s lights. Dennett is probably right, though, that infants,  mental defectives (how sensibilities have moved on since 1978, or whenever this Chapter was drafted) and the appropriately insane, would not get much out of his offering. However, the contemporary candidates of choice for human non-personhood tend these days to be moved closer to the termini of life, being (early) fetuses and those in a persistent vegetative state (though maybe the question is different  in Olson the question is whether  we have psychological states essentially, and the claim is that  we do not since  we existed as fetuses, and may (for all we now know) persist into a PVS). <BR><BR>However, this leads on to our next question. <BR><BR><a name="Moral"></a><BR><CENTER><B><U>Moral and Metaphysical Persons</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>Dennett s distinction between moral and metaphysical persons seems to change the topic of the conversation to one I m less interested in. While it s not always 100% clear (at least to me), the bulk of his essay is addressed to the topic of moral persons rather than metaphysical persons. Because he agrees that Frankfurt s ideas about <a name="48"></a>wantons are fruitful, Dennett excludes many human beings from the category  person that I would prefer to include. <BR><BR>However, the motivation behind this distinction is whether or not the term  person is a  free-floating honorific , like  chic (p. 268). He distinguishes the metaphysical notion of person ( an intelligent, conscious, feeling agent ) from that of the moral notion (one  who is accountable, who has both rights and responsibilities ). He wants to know whether being a metaphysical person is a prerequisite for being a moral person, something a metaphysical person can  grow into , or whether metaphysical persons <U>must be</U> moral persons. He points out that we still in general react to the clinically insane (unless they are very far gone) as though they are <U>metaphysical</U> persons, even though they may not be treated as <U>moral</U> persons. Hence, the two terms are distinct, though being a metaphysical person does seem to be a necessary condition for being a moral person (with the exception of compound persons such as companies). <BR><BR><a name="Themes"></a> <BR><CENTER><B><U>The Right Set of Themes?</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>I can t really do better in defining what I think persons are than does <a name="48"></a>Locke. An entity for which persistence matters; a thinking thing that can consider itself as itself; that is phenomenally conscious, and has a consciousness of self. This is approximately Dennett s metaphysical person, though we mustn t forget that Locke famously considered personhood a <a name="48"></a>forensic concept. <BR><BR>Now on to Dennett s specific themes: <ol type="1"><li><B>Rationality</B>: I m not sure how far rationality should be pressed, despite Dennett considering it  the most obvious (p. 269). I don t think it s essential for a metaphysical person. However, the assumption of rationality is essential in all our dealings with other sentient entities (Dennett s intentional stance won t work otherwise), so it is probably essential for moral personhood. Even then,  predictability might be more relevant than rationality. </li><li><B>Intentional Predication</B>: I m happy with this, as it is a prerequisite for all mindedness (though not a sufficient condition). I m happy that persons are minded beings, even if human beings aren t always. </li><li><B>The object of a stance</B>: this seems to suggest that who is a person is in some sense  up to us . Indeed Dennett says (p. 270) that it s not just a stance taken in response to a metaphysical person, but is as least partly constitutive of a moral person (I paraphrase). This is definitely a predicate for moral persons only. While it might as a matter of fact be the case that certain metaphysical persons are socially ostracised so as to be treated as moral non-persons, this doesn t make them non-persons in either the metaphysical sense or the moral sense (for a moral realist). </li><li><B>Reciprocation</B>: Again, this is necessary only for moral persons. A sociopath or convinced solipsist is still a metaphysical person. </li><li><B>Verbal Communication</B>: Presumably Dennett is not disbarring deaf mutes from personhood, nor Stephen Hawking were someone to tread on his laptop. Even so, the possession of a language of thought (along Fodor s lines) is probably a prerequisite for rationality, but this doesn t address Dennett s themes of communication and reciprocal attitudes. Metaphysical persons incapable of communication might not be moral persons. I expect there are large questions about how a sense of self might arise without language. One would need to consider feral children. This might connect to a question I had in connection with the Language Acquisition Thesis (the claim that  learning a language is instrumental in the development of conceptual faculties in a human subject ). See the following <a name="48"></a>link. </li><li><B>Self-Consciousness</B>: I think this is central to either metaphysical or moral personhood. See below under  Natural Kinds . Dennett takes this form of consciousness (like language) to be the unique preserve of the human species, though I gather that both claims are not controversial (with the teaching of American Sign Language to bonobos, and the question whether passing the mirror test demonstrates a sense of self). </li></ol><BR>I have a question whether the properties Dennett requires of persons are their present properties or capacities, or whether entities that will, in the normal course of events, develop into persons, or which have in the past if not in the present possessed such capacities, count as persons. Is the property of being a person inalienable? Clearly capacities are more important than their present exercise (after all, we are not always rational or self-conscious, or even conscious at all; personhood is a state, not an activity). <BR><BR>This relates to whether human persons are phase <a name="48"></a>sortals,<a name="48"></a> of human beings, or whether they are human beings, period. It looks as though Dennett would deny the latter suggestion, given his insistence on certain properties that not all human beings share. <BR><BR><a name="Interdependencies"></a> <CENTER><B><U>Interdependencies and Priorities amongst the Themes</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>This will mostly have to wait for future elaboration. Dennett (p. 271) claims that the 6 themes are given in the order of their dependence with the proviso that the first 3 are mutually interdependent. Enough to note here that an item I consider essential to metaphysical personhood, namely self-consciousness, appears at the bottom of Dennett s list and so is presumably taken to be reliant on predicates only necessary for moral personhood. I would deny this connection. <BR><BR><a name="Reasons"></a> <CENTER><B><U>Why These Themes?</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>This will also mostly have to be left until a later date. <BR><BR>As I note above, Dennett considers the order of the themes important, and considers that the earlier ones as prerequisites for the later ones. In particular, because we can adopt the intentional stance towards beings such as plants that have no mental states ( it grows that way because it wants to get to the light ), we need to move on to those that have real beliefs and desires. He is worried (p. 273) that we might get the themes in the wrong order by the premature invocation of the conscious knowledge or verbal expressibility of our beliefs to ensure their genuineness, but in any case these conditions are too strong as we have many beliefs that we re either unaware of or cannot express. This is why he brings in his fourth theme, that of reciprocity. While we can adopt the intentional stance towards plants, they cannot return the favour. He also assumes this reciprocity fails for all non-humans, but I suspect he s wrong. Maybe this is a step in the right direction, but adopting Frankfurt s approach (however useful the concept of a wanton is) seems to me to be a step too far in this context (and even in Frankfurt s context). <BR><BR><a name="NaturalKind"></a><BR><CENTER><B><U>What Sort of a Concept is  Person </U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>At the beginning of his essay, Dennett asks whether the concept of a person is incoherent or obsolete. His answer is that it isn t, because we cannot cease to regard others, and in particular ourselves as persons without contradiction (and refers us to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_798.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Mechanism and Responsibility</A>"). I ve not pursued this question, but suspect that the fact that the question can be asked at all indicates that the concept of person isn t a natural kind concept, at least not as the term  moral person is defined by Dennett. There seem to be too many attitudinal issues and those that make certain sorts of societies cohere (even though these may arguably be the best sort). <BR><BR>I don t seem to have written anything sensible on natural <a name="48"></a>kind concepts. Maybe this is a next step. My intuition is that persons, whether metaphysical or moral, aren t natural kind concepts, and that for human persons the appropriate natural kind concept is  human animal (or maybe  human being ). <BR><BR>A critical question, however, is whether the emergence of self-consciousness signals the arrival of a new natural kind (as Lynne Rudder Baker alleges, taking  self-consciousness to be the same as her  first-person perspective ).</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 18/12/2010 19:58:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.25 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9: (Sortals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Using Howard Robinson s terminology ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11924.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)</A>"), the <U>Ultimate Sort</U> of a thing is that <a name="48"></a><U>property</U><SUP>2</SUP> without which the thing ceases to exist. </li><li>However, an individual falling under a <a name="48"></a><U>Phase Sortal</U><SUP>3</SUP> can lose the property that defines the phase without ceasing to exist. </li><li>Ultimate Sorts are presumably the same as <a name="48"></a><U>Baker</U><SUP>4</SUP> s <a name="48"></a><U>Primary Kinds</U><SUP>5</SUP>, though I can t remember if she has an analogue of a Phase Sortal. </li><li>The standard example is of a <a name="48"></a><U>Human Being</U><SUP>6</SUP> (as the Ultimate Sort) and Child (as a Phase Sortal). </li><li>So, is <a name="48"></a><U>personhood</U><SUP>7</SUP> an attribute of a human being, like  childhood , that a human being can either possess or lack, or are persons <a name="48"></a><U>ontologically</U><SUP>8</SUP> separate from  their human beings? </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Wiggins</U><SUP>9</SUP> argues that we can t talk of the <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>10</SUP> of anything until we know what sort it is. </li><li>Olson claims that it s futile to talk of the persistence conditions of persons per se  if human beings, God and angels are all persons  since their persistence conditions (assuming the existence of God and angels, for the sake of the argument) are completely different. This lack of a common set of persistence conditions would indicate that <a name="48"></a><U>Person</U><SUP>11</SUP> is not an Ultimate Sort. </li><li>I (intend to) discuss the sorts that <U>we</U> may fall under in the Note on  <a name="48"></a><U>What are We</U><SUP>12</SUP> .</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_13">Links</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_13"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_10_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5108.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3706.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Sortals</A>", Hirsch</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5144.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Identity and Sortals: Why Relative Identity Is Self-Contradictory</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22818.htm">Baldwin (Thomas) - Reviews: Sameness and Substance by David Wiggins; Objects and Identity by Harold Noonan</A>", Baldwin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4461.htm">Bennett (Daniel) - Essential Properties</A>", Bennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8441.htm">Bennett (Karen) - Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem</A>", Bennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6075.htm">Berglund (Stefan) - Identity and Reduction</A>", Berglund</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23009.htm">Braddon-Mitchell (David) & Miller (Kristie) - Talking about a Universalist World</A>", Braddon-Mitchell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3947.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Stages, Sortals, and Possible Worlds</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7324.htm">Burke (Michael) - Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem</A>", Burke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2011.htm">Burke (Michael) - Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Amongst Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions</A>", Burke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7169.htm">Campbell (John) - Sortals and the Binding Problem</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5885.htm">Carter (William) - On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4948.htm">Cocchiarella (Nino) - On the Logic of Natural Kinds</A>", Cocchiarella</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5500.htm">Feldman (Fred) - Sortal Predicates</A>", Feldman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6250.htm">Griffin (Nicholas) - Sortals</A>", Griffin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5396.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Sheer Coincidence?</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3430.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts</A>", Hughes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6411.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_16">Lowe</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_16"></A>, especially:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21745.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Individuals, Sorts, and Instantiation</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4463.htm">Mackie (Penelope) - Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5039.htm">Oderberg (David) - Coincidence Under a Sortal</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14525.htm">Runggaldier (Edmund) - Sortal Continuity of Material Things</A>", Runggaldier<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14526.htm">Rapp (Christof) - Runggaldier on the Cohabitation of Material Objects</A>", Rapp</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15879.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11355.htm">Stevenson (Leslie) - A formal theory of sortal quantification</A>", Stevenson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19951.htm">Stone (Jim) - Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus's Puzzle</A>", Stone</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9775.htm">Ujvari (Marta) - Cambridge Change and Sortal Essentialism</A>", Ujvari</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_17">Wiggins</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_17"></A>, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3501.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: and the Characteristic Activity or Function or Purpose of their Compliants</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22772.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: A Reply to Xu</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>18</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_10_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_10_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_10_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Maybe no need, therefore, to look at "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_640.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", though I ve read:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20013.htm">Baur (Michael) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20012.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20011.htm">Simons (Peter) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>No need to read Wiggins s earlier work in detail? </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 08/05/2018 00:54:43<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 16.5: (Properties)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 28: (Phase Sortals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.16: (Baker)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.5 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.6: (Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.7 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 7: (Ontology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.18: (Wiggins)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U><FONT COLOR = "800080">Footnote 9.10 (CORRESPONDENT)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> On a view like Olson's, I take it, that:<BR><BR>(a) altho' a human animal can exist when it is not a person, insofar as we have genuine IDENTITY questions, these relate to human animals. (Perhaps Olson thinks 'person' is a phase-sortal, like 'teenager'. We don't raise questions about teenager identity AS SUCH), <BR><BR>(b) if we think angels are persons only because they satisfy some functional definition that we might give of what it takes to be a person, then we don't yet have any reason to think that what it takes for angels to persist has a bearing on what it takes for us to persist. (Again: we've chosen the wrong concept to answer identity questions with respect to.)<FONT COLOR = "000000"></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 21/10/2007 09:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.12 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.6: (What are We?)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.18 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10: (Homo Sapiens)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>If <a name="48"></a><U>animalism</U><SUP>2</SUP> is correct  and we are human animals  then we are members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em>. </li><li>Also relevant is <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Blatti (Stephan).htm">Stephan Blatti</A> s  Animal Ancestors Argument for Animalism (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19926.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - A New Argument for Animalism</A>", etc.). </li><li>Consequently, this page probably ought to say something about species, their reality and their status as <a name="48"></a><U>natural kind</U><SUP>3</SUP> concepts. </li><li>I ought also to investigate human evolution, and just when our hominid ancestors became <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>4</SUP>. As these ancestors are all gone, investigation of the capacities of our nearest neighbours  the great apes  must make do as a proxy. </li><li>I don t think it s a conceptual truth that the only persons are <a name="48"></a><U>human persons</U><SUP>5</SUP>. Consequently, I do not deny personhood to extinct hominids, or (possibly) to the great apes, dolphins, Klingons, machines, gods, angels and such-like. </li><li>However, I do think it s an empirical truth that the only persons whose personhood we reliably <U>know</U> anything about are human persons, members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em> so think we should start there. </li><li>Also, my main <U>interest</U> is in human persons, so this will be my initial focus. </li><li>Since, I will need to consider whether human persons can exist in non-human <a name="48"></a><U>bodies</U><SUP>6</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>(transmigration</U><SUP>7</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>mechanisation</U><SUP>8</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>resurrection</U><SUP>9</SUP> bodies) or even as <a name="48"></a><U>disembodied</U><SUP>10</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>minds</U><SUP>11</SUP>, I will need to move on from this base camp.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15677.htm">Krause (Johannes) - Our Ancestral Cave Gets More Crowded</A>", Krause</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15604.htm">McKie (Robin) - Out of Africa: The Sequel</A>", McKie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4762.htm">Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals</A>", Olson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3673.htm">Berry (R.J.) & Noble (T.A.) - Darwin, Creation and the Fall</A>", Berry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3667.htm">De Waal (Frans) - Our Inner Ape: The Best and Worst of Human Nature</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6531.htm">De Waal (Frans) - Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2441.htm">De Waal (Frans) - The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_204.htm">Eccles (John) - Evolution of the Brain, Creation of the Self</A>", Eccles</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1393.htm">Ghiselin (Michael) - Metaphysics and the Origin of Species</A>", Ghiselin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6699.htm">Harari (Yuval Noah) - Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind</A>", Harari</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1944.htm">Hartl (Daniel L.) - Our Uncertain Heritage: Genetics & Human Diversity</A>", Hartl</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1859.htm">Johanson (Donald) & Shreeve (James) - Lucy's Child: The Discovery of a Human Ancestor</A>", Johanson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5097.htm">Kitcher (Patricia) - Natural Kinds and Unnatural Persons</A>", Kitcher</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7403.htm">LaPorte (Joseph) - Essential Membership</A>", LaPorte</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_817.htm">Lieberman (Philip) - Eve Spoke - Human Language and Human Evolution</A>", Lieberman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4309.htm">Savage-Rumbaugh (E.Sue) & Lewin (Roger) - Kanzi: Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind</A>", Savage-Rumbaugh<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17121.htm">Pearce (E.K. Victor) - Review of 'Kanzi: Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind' by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh & Roger Lewin</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3101.htm">Schick (Kathy D.) & Toth (Nicholas) - Making Silent Stones Speak: Human Evolution and the Dawn of Technology</A>", Schick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6483.htm">Suddendorf (Thomas) - The Gap</A>", Suddendorf</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1870.htm">Tattersall (Ian), Delson (Eric) & Van Couvering (John), Eds. - Encyclopaedia of Human Evolution and Prehistory</A>", Tattersall</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6471.htm">Young (J.Z.) - An Introduction to the Study of Man</A>", Young</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>14</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_11_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_11_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_11_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 28/02/2018 18:40:19<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23: (Animalism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 26: (Natural Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.5: (Human Persons)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_75_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_75_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I can t think I ll have much to say here that s not covered under either <a name="48"></a>human beings or <a name="48"></a>persons. </li><li>See also my Note on <a name="48"></a>Non-human persons. </li><li>Angels and aliens are discussed in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4191.htm">Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)</A>" and the claim is that insofar as we can conceptualise them, they are <a name="48"></a>animals. So they aren t counter-examples to the supposition that all persons are animals (though this doesn t rule out non-human animals being persons). </li><li>Wiggins also discusses robot-persons. If, in order to satisfy the conditions of personhood, these end up as molecule-by-molecule <a name="48"></a>clones of animals, these are animals also. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_75_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_75_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_75_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_75_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4101.htm">Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) - Establishing a Framework For Approaching Human Personhood</A>", Moreland & Rae</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4721.htm">Olson (Eric) - Review of Hud Hudson's 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1442.htm">Petrus (Klaus), Ed. - On Human Persons</A>", Petrus</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5433.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Human Persons</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12306.htm">Selling (Joseph) - The Human Person</A>", Selling</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4191.htm">Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_75_9">reading list</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_75_9"></A> (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1375.htm">Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit</A>", Braine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1383.htm">Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6469.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Human Persons: Numerical Identity and Essence</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13212.htm">Green (Joel B.) - Restoring the Human Person: New Testament Voices for a Wholistic and Social Anthropology</A>", Green</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_109.htm">Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person</A>", Hudson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7590.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Review of Hud Hudson 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person'</A>", Moreland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14536.htm">Quinn (Philip L.) - On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons</A>", Quinn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3394.htm">Smith (Peter) - Human Persons</A>", Smith</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2928.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons: Human and Divine</A>", Van Inwagen & Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22766.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness, Substance, and the Human Person</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_75_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_75_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_75_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_75_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>As noted above, this Note is subordinate to those on Persons and Human Beings, where most of the reading will lie. </li><li>The choice depends mostly on the accident of the use of the term  human person . </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 17/01/2018 18:17:17<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17: (Body)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.7 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 47: (Brain State Transfer)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 46: (Siliconisation)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.9: (Resurrection)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_97_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_97_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This is a sub-topic of <a name="48"></a>Life after death, the others being:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Immortality, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Reincarnation. <BR>To these historical options we can now add the various hopes of:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Transhumanism</li><li>This topic  the subject of the projected <a name="48"></a>11th Chapter of my <a name="48"></a>Thesis  will add interest, though hopefully some of the Islamist topicality will have gone by the time my Thesis is presented. </li><li>As the motivation for this discussion is partly the occasionally pernicious effects of a belief in a resurrection to paradise, the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of beings like us is very important. It is also important to millions of non-explosive Americans. </li><li>The Thesis will aim to prove that resurrection requires substance dualism. </li><li>I will need to ensure I understand just what is believed by intellectually-respectable Christians and Muslims (though the topical believers are not amongst the ranks of the intellectually-respectable). </li><li>Some discussion will be had about the orthodox Christian view being that there is no continuity of matter (the conundrum about the person consumed by cannibals was early recognised), and that the resurrection body is said to be in some sense a  spiritual body.</li><li>A good place to start for an understanding of what resurrection meant to Christians prior to the modern era is "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_569.htm">Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336</A>". </li><li>As for the worries of contemporary Christian philosophers, the best place for evaluating contemporary Christian philosophical views on the metaphysical possibility of resurrection is "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5722.htm">Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?</A>". </li><li>One thing that strikes me is that the resurrection of Christ, taken to be the guarantee of our own resurrection, is no such thing in the sense of  showing it can be done . The physical and metaphysical issues in resurrecting Jesus (or Lazarus, or Jairus s daughter, or any recently-deceased person whose body is substantially intact) are much less than in the case of those whose bodies have been destroyed. Indeed, it might one day be possible to resurrect the recently-deceased by way of microscopic repair; at least this seems conceivable, whereas the resurrection of a human being whose body has become dispersed and whose parts have been recycled doesn t even seem to make sense (on a materialist account of what we human persons are). </li><li>I have some other notes on this and related topics as part of <a name="48"></a>Philosophy of Religion and my <a name="48"></a>Blog:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>1 Corinthians: 15<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Death and Eternal Life,<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Resurrection, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Resurrection (Metaphysics).</li><li>Currently, the categorised reading-list below includes a host of Biblical or theological discussions of resurrection of very variable quality which are irrelevant to my philosophical concerns.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_97_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_97_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_97_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_97_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="1"><li><b>Resurrection - Purely Philosophical</b>: <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7293.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12521.htm">Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity: Preface + Introduction - Seed Images, Ancient and Modern</A>", Bynum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3521.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - After-Life for Materialists</A>", Carruthers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3530.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - After-Life for Physicalists</A>", Carruthers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20800.htm">Chappell (Sophie Grace), Chappell (Tim) - Seeds: On Personal Identity and the Resurrection</A>", Chappell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7765.htm">Day (Allan) & Martin (L. Michael) - Debate: Is It Rational for Christians to Believe in the Resurrection?</A>", Day & Martin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19029.htm">Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction</A>", Gasser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19033.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Multiple Location and Single Location Resurrection</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21957.htm">Loose (Jonathan) - Constitution and the Falling Elevator</A>", Loose</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19915.htm">Olson (Eric) - Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_651.htm">Perry (John) - A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21874.htm">Price (H.H.) - Motives for disbelief in life after death</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21876.htm">Price (H.H.) - The post-Resurrection appearances</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21875.htm">Price (H.H.) - Two conceptions of the Next World</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2800.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - Do We Survive Death?</A>", Russell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20124.htm">Singh (Yii-Jan) - Semen, Philosophy, and Paul</A>", Singh</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16542.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16760.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21051.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Can We Survive Our Death?</A>", Zimmerman<BR></ol></li><li><b> Resurrection - Religio-Philosophical</b>: <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2669.htm">Bullinger (E.W.) - The Resurrection of the Body</A>", Bullinger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5757.htm">Ozanne (Charles) - If there is no resurrection of the dead & What then? An exposition of 1 Corinthians 15</A>", Ozanne<BR></ol></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="1"><li><b>Resurrection - Purely Philosophical</b>: <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19037.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6658.htm">Braude (Stephen) - Personal Identity and Post-Mortem Survival</A>", Braude</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6209.htm">Davis (Stephen T.) - Physicalism and Resurrection</A>", Davis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20678.htm">Drange (Theodore M.) - The Pluralizability Objection to a New-Body Afterlife</A>", Drange</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5722.htm">Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?</A>", Gasser </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5844.htm">Hershenov (David) - Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21123.htm">Hershenov (David) - The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3632.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Nothing But Dust and Ashes</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6334.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death</A>", Martin & Augustine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19077.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - The Resurrection of the Body</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16697.htm">Olding (A.) - Resurrection Bodies and Resurrection Worlds</A>", Olding</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4065.htm">Penelhum (Terence) - Resurrection</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1366.htm">Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality</A>", Perrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13229.htm">Peters (Ted) - Resurrection of the Very Embodied Soul?</A>", Peters</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20197.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - The Conquest of Death</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21961.htm">Strickland (Lloyd) - The doctrine of 'the resurrection of the same body' in early modern thought</A>", Strickland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21950.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Possibility of Life after Death</A>", Swinburne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1403.htm">Tipler (Frank) - The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead</A>", Tippler</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19917.htm">van Dyke (Christina) - Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-Repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection</A>", van Dyke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>", van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21139.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Personal Identity and the Survival of Death</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21140.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The  Falling Elevator Model</A>", Zimmerman<BR></ol></li><li><b> Resurrection - Religio-Philosophical</b>: <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6418.htm">Alter (Michael J.) - The Resurrection: A Critical Inquiry</A>", Alter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21946.htm">Anders (Paul C.) - Material Being and the Survival of Death: A Dilemma for the Religiously Oriented Materialist</A>", Anders</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6271.htm">Bacchiocchi (Samuele) - Immortality or Resurrection? A Biblical Study on Human Nature and Destiny</A>", Bacchiocchi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13234.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - The Meaning of Resurrection, Immortality and Eternal Life</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_569.htm">Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336</A>", Bynum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20794.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - I Believe in the Resurrection of the Body and the Life of the World to Come</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12610.htm">Cullmann (Oscar) - Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?</A>", Cullmann</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2920.htm">Gillman (Neil) - The Death Of Death: Resurrection and Immortality in Jewish Thought</A>", Gillman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16749.htm">Hick (John) - The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body Reconsidered</A>", Hick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6064.htm">Hick (John) - The Recreation of the Psycho-Physical Person</A>", Hick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4245.htm">Ozanne (Charles) - The Life and Soul of Mortal Man: His Composition, Disintegration, and Resurrection</A>", Ozanne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21958.htm">Steinhart (Eric) - The Revision Theory of Resurrection</A>", Steinhart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21951.htm">Vasalou (Sofia) - Personal identity across temporal gaps: an Islamic view of the problem</A>", Vasalou</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17108.htm">Wright (N.T.) - Can a Scientist Believe in the Resurrection?</A>", Wright </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4031.htm">Wright (N.T.) - The Resurrection of the Son of God</A>", Wright</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3815.htm">Wyatt (John) - Matters of Life and Death</A>", Wyatt </ol></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_97_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_97_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_97_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/03/2018 17:54:14<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.10: (Disembodied Existence)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_69_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_69_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>As an <a name="48"></a>Animalist, I don t hold out much hope for disembodied existence for such beings as ourselves. </li><li>It is true that most people, most of the time, seem to have thought it possible  or even certain. Presumably it is closely related to the view that we are  or at least have  immortal <a name="48"></a>souls that survive the death of our bodies. Maybe there are alternative  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_69_4">possibilities</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_69_4"></A> .</li><li>Note that  disembodied is sometimes used for  disembodied brains . Since the brain is part of the body, I cover such possibilities under <a name="48"></a>BIVs. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_69_6">Links</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_69_6"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_69_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_69_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_69_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_69_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_69_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6070.htm">Hospers (John) - Is the Notion of Disembodied Existence Intelligible?</A>", Hospers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20946.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Review of Peter Unger's - 'All the Power in the World'</A>", Lowe</li></ol></li><li>I m not sure this is worth spending much time on, other than as a sub-plot of the investigation that we might be souls in <a name="48"></a>Chapter_02 ( <a name="48"></a>What Are We? ). However, a study-list might include:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9284.htm">Blose (B.L.) - Materialism and Disembodied Minds</A>", Blose</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7329.htm">Carter (William) - Plantinga on Disembodied Existence</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20672.htm">Drange (Theodore M.) - Conceptual Problems Confronting a Totally Disembodied Afterlife</A>", Drange</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12016.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Souls</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_133.htm">Penelhum (Terence) - Survival and Disembodied Existence</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12608.htm">Penelhum (Terence) - Immortality: Introduction</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5832.htm">Perrett (Roy W.) - Disembodied Existence</A>", Perrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20011.htm">Simons (Peter) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", Simons</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4734.htm">Tye (Michael) - On the Possibility of Disembodied Existence</A>", Tye</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11942.htm">Unger (Peter) - Why We May Become Disembodied, But To No Avail</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_69_11">Unger</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_69_11"></A> </li></ol></li><li>This is a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_69_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_69_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>But there are worries whether disembodied existence is even coherent for concrete particulars. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_69_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve not attended to these very seriously. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_69_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_69_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_69_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This may not be worth reading, if Lowe s rubbishing review ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20946.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Review of Peter Unger's - 'All the Power in the World'</A>") is anything to go by. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/04/2018 22:19:12<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.11: (Souls)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There ought to be a division of labour between this Note and the Note on the <a name="48"></a>Soul Criterion of personal identity. </li><li>This parent Note ought to discuss what souls <U>are</U> (supposed to be), and what problems the concept encounters, while that on the Soul Criterion should focus on how souls (are supposed to) help with the problem of personal identity. </li><li>Some of the ground is also covered by the note on <a name="48"></a>Dualism. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_4">Links</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_4"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_100_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_5">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_5"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_6">include</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_6"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>Both Notes <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_7">require</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_7"></A> the following <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_8">books</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_8"></A> to be read:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2664.htm">Brown (Warren), Murphy (Nancey) & Malony (H. Newton), Eds. - Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature</A>", Brown<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2304.htm">Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate</A>", Cooper<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6335.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul</A>", Corcoran<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1383.htm">Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons</A>", Corcoran<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_79.htm">Crabbe (James), Ed. - From Soul to Self</A>", Crabbe<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_127.htm">Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) - Body & Soul - Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics</A>", Moreland+Rae<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2888.htm">Murphy (Nancey) - Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_9">Murphy</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_9"></A><BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2762.htm">Porter (Roy) - Flesh in the Age of Reason - The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul</A>", Porter<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1143.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Evolution of the Soul</A>", Swinburne<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4046.htm">Ward (Keith) - The Battle for the Soul</A>", Ward</li><li>Currently, everything (such as it is  it s just a reading-list) resides under this parent Note. When I ve conducted (or written up) more research, I ll divide the text accordingly. </li><li>In principle, there is a categorised reading-list, but at the moment all reading material resides under this parent Note.</li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_10">might start with</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_10"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20676.htm">Angel (Leonard) - Since Physical Formulas are Not Violated, No Soul Controls the Body</A>", Angel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12815.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Has Mankind One Soul: An Angel Distributed Through Many Bodies?</A>", Anscombe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20670.htm">Augustine (Keith) & Fishman (Yonatan I.) - The Dualist s Dilemma: The High Cost of Reconciling Neuroscience with a Soul</A>", Augustine & Fishman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8313.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - On the Simplicity of the Soul</A>", Chisholm</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16126.htm">Chopra (Deepak) & Hameroff (Stuart) - Can science explain the soul?</A>", Chopra & Hameroff</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21886.htm">Hasker (William) - The Souls of Beasts and Men</A>", Hasker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8314.htm">Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Are Souls Unintelligible?</A>", Hoffman & Rosenkrantz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7455.htm">Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Souls and Bodies</A>", Hoffman & Rosenkrantz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15776.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Arguments for the existence of the soul, Part I</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_100_11">Kagan</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_100_11"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6197.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism</A>", Kim</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20673.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - What Could Pair a Nonphysical Soul to a Physical Body?</A>", Kim</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20941.htm">Ogilvie (Daniel M.) & Hamilton (Leonard W.) - Soul Beliefs: Causes and Consequences</A>", Ogilvie & Hamilton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20675.htm">Papineau (David) - There is No Trace of Any Soul Linked to the Body</A>", Papineau</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16455.htm">Phillips (D.Z.) - Dislocating the Soul</A>", Phillips</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5504.htm">Quinn (Philip L.) - Tiny Selves: Chisholm on the Simplicity of the Soul</A>", Quinn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_534.htm">Quinton (Anthony) - The Soul</A>", Quinton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21949.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - Nature and immortality of the Soul</A>", Swinburne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15986.htm">Turl (John) - Substance Dualism or Body-Soul Duality?</A>", Turl</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20674.htm">Wilson (David L.) - Nonphysical Souls Would Violate Physical Laws</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17107.htm">Wright (N.T.) - Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All - Reflections on Paul s Anthropology in his Complex Contexts</A>", Wright </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_100_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_100_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_100_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_100_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_100_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is becoming a shelf-load, so  require is rather strong! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_100_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>In general, if a book is noted, its Chapters are not. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_100_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>For reviews, see <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21334.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' by Nancey Murphy</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21125.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_100_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There is a risk of this list getting out of hand as this is a very peripheral topic. </li><li>I may prune it in due course. Many items on the categorised reading list have just been ignored. </li><li>Items already pruned (lest they be raised later) include the following classics:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_729.htm">Aristotle, Lawson-Tancred (Hugh) - De Anima (On the Soul)</A>", Aristotle <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1334.htm">Hume (David) - Of the Immortality of the Soul</A>", Hume <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6055.htm">James (William) - The Theory of the Soul</A>", James<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6052.htm">Kant (Immanuel) - Refutation of Mendelssohn's Proof of the Permanence of the Soul</A>", Kant <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_881.htm">Plato, Gallop (David) - Phaedo</A>", Plato <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6050.htm">Voltaire - The Soul, Identity and Immortality</A>", Voltaire</li><li>Also, commentaries thereon:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_14/PaperSummary_14513.htm">Bostock (David) - The Soul and Immortality in Plato's Phaedo</A>" </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_100_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Also, Kagan s follow-on lectures on the existence and immortality of the soul. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> This note is simply a place-holder, the point of which is to use the jump-table facility that appears dynamically at the bottom of this note to keep tabs on the areas of this website (within the above Note-Group) that await the most urgent attention.<BR><BR>If the table  Links to this Page only contains the  Awaiting Attention item, this means that there are no items waiting attention (since the  Awaiting Attention item is the one that only links to pages such as this one).</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 10/11/2007 13:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11: (Logic of Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_12_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_12_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> Identity as a logical concept is  or ought to be  rather uninteresting. </li><li>There s only one type of identity  that which satisfies <a name="48"></a><U>Leibniz s Law</U><SUP>2</SUP> of the Indiscernibility of Identicals and is an equivalence relation. </li><li>While rejecting them, I will still need to consider various deviant  identities for the light they shed on the issues at hand; in particular:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a><U>Relative Identity</U><SUP>3</SUP>, </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Vague Identity</U><SUP>4</SUP>, </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Indeterminate Identity</U><SUP>5</SUP>, </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Contingent Identity</U><SUP>6</SUP>, and </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Occasional Identity</U><SUP>7</SUP>. </li></ol></li><li>Wrong answers to tough questions can be enlightening. </li><li>I intend to cover the bulk of the work under the heads of the notes linked to. </li><li>Currently, standard Identity is covered under <a name="48"></a><U>Leibniz</U><SUP>8</SUP>, though maybe it woud be better parked here. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_12_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_12_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_12_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_12_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3942.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Conditions of Identity: Introduction</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6538.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Identity: Introduction</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_548.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Identification and Externality</A>", Frankfurt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_32.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity</A>", Hirsch, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15898.htm">Hossack (Keith) - Five Lectures on the Logic and Metaphysics of Identity</A>", Hossack</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5837.htm">Jubien (Michael) - The Myth of Identity Conditions</A>", Jubien, 1996</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5978.htm">McGinn (Colin) - Identity</A>", McGinn, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20500.htm">McGinn (Colin) - Prcis of 'Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Prediction, Necessity, Truth'</A>", McGinn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3968.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Identity and Determinacy</A>", Noonan, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_541.htm">Perry (John) - The Importance of Being Identical</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1779.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis</A>", Quine, 1950</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5185.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Review of Milton Munitz's 'Identity and Individuation'</A>", Quine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_540.htm">Rey (Georges) - Survival</A>", Rey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20468.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Individuality</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3900.htm">Williams (Christopher) - Being, Identity and Truth: Preface</A>", Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3562.htm">Williams (Christopher) - What Is Identity?: Introduction and Analytical Table of Contents</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15852.htm">Akiba (Ken) - Identity Is Simple</A>", Akiba, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4420.htm">Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense</A>", Baxter, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15862.htm">Benfield (David) & Erwin (Edward) - Identity, Schmidentity: It's Not All the Same</A>", Benfield+Erwin, 1975</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9287.htm">Bostock (David) - Kripke on Identity and Necessity</A>", Bostock, 1977</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_568.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Conditions of Identity</A>", Brennan, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1386.htm">Brody (Baruch) - Identity and Essence</A>", Brody, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11398.htm">Butchvarov (Panayot) - Identity</A>", Butchvarov, 1977</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20299.htm">Dummett (Michael) - Identity</A>", Dummett, 1981</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1395.htm">Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics: On the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy</A>", Hill, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1413.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity</A>", Hughes, 2004</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6787.htm">Jubien (Michael) - Identity</A>", Jubien, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9785.htm">Monaghan (P.X.) - Property Possession, Identity, and the Nature of an Entity</A>", Monaghan, 2005</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1404.htm">Morris (Thomas) - Understanding Identity Statements</A>", Morris, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1372.htm">Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time</A>", Oderberg, 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5400.htm">Perry (John) - The Two Faces of Identity</A>", Perry, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6146.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Methods of Logic</A>", Quine, 1972 (Section 40  Identity , pp. 221-6)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9500.htm">Salmon (Nathan) - The Fact that x=y</A>", Salmon, 1987</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9502.htm">Salmon (Nathan) - Identity Facts</A>", Salmon, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6662.htm">Wertheimer (Roger) - Identity: Logic, Ontology, Epistemology</A>", Werthheimer, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11613.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity and Supervenience</A>", Wiggins, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1392.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Identity and Identities</A>", Williams, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_661.htm">Williams (Christopher) - What is Identity?</A>", Williams, 1989</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3904.htm">Williams (Christopher) - Selfsame</A>", Williams, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1387.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Identity and Discrimination</A>", Williamson, 2013</li><li>Also, see <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/problems/identity/" TARGET = "_top">Bob Doyle: Identity</A> (http://metaphysicist.com/problems/identity/). </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>11</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_12_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_12_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_12_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 03/02/2018 00:20:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11.2: (Leibniz)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_81_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_81_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I m uncertain whether this Note will cover anything apart from Leibniz s Law(s).</li><li>However, Leibniz s critique of Locke in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_479.htm">Leibniz (Gottfried), Remnant (Peter), Bennett (Jonathan) - New Essays on Human Understanding</A>" may be worth following up, though I suspect life s too short.</li><li>There are two  Laws attributed to Leibniz:- <ol type="i"><li>The Law of the <b>Indiscernibility of Identicals</b>: this just appears to be a law of logic, and is (almost) universally accepted. It states that if  two objects are identical (that is,  they are the same object picked out by two descriptions) then  they have exactly the same properties  both intrinsic and relational. </li><li>The Law of the <b>Identity of Indiscernibles</b>: this is a more contentious  and metaphysical  suggestion, and is that if  two objects share all the same intrinsic and relational properties, they are identical (ie there is only one object, but picked out by different descriptions). </li></ol></li><li>The (apparent) problems with the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_81_2">first</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_81_2"></A> law are (at least) twofold:- <ol type="i"><li>The same object can have different properties at different times. This is the problem of <a name="48"></a>temporary intrinsics, and the <a name="48"></a>logic of identity is tied up with resolving this issue. </li><li>Intensional properties are excluded from consideration  as revealed by the <em>masked man fallacy</em>: the fact that I don t know that the masked man is my father  though I do know that my father is my father  doesn t mean that the masked man isn t my father. </li></ol></li><li>The second Law seems reasonable enough for ordinary macroscopic objects, but <ol type="i"><li>It is allegedly false for quantum objects, and could also be false in a universe consisting of two exactly similar spheres. It is neither a logical nor a necessary truth, if it is true at all. </li><li>However, if it is false, it seems to demand <a name="48"></a>haecceities, where things are distinct just because they are distinct (something empiricists dislike). </li></ol></li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_81_6">Links</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_81_6"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_81_Links.htm">Click here</a>. Because the number of references to Leibniz  mostly irrelevant  was so large, I ran the  updating run for  Leibniz s Law (and cognates) only first, and then ran again  non-updating including  Leibniz . </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_81_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_81_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_81_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_81_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6454.htm">Baylis (Charles A.) - Review Article: The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_81_9">Baylis</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_81_9"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4710.htm">Crane (Tim) - Substance (4-Lecture BA Course)</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6537.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Being: Introduction</A>", Crane & Farkas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6538.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Identity: Introduction</A>", Crane & Farkas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15898.htm">Hossack (Keith) - Five Lectures on the Logic and Metaphysics of Identity</A>", Hossack</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5978.htm">McGinn (Colin) - Identity</A>", McGinn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8029.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - The Problem(s) of Universals</A>", Moreland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3965.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Leibniz, Butler and Reid</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21029.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16532.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Descartes' arguments for dualism</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22763.htm">Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity: Introduction</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3308.htm">Woolhouse (Roger) - Leibniz and Substance</A>", Woolhouse</li></ol></li><li>See the categorised reading list below, which is far too wide; a  starter pack might include:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6082.htm">Ayer (A.J.) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>", Ayer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13019.htm">Barnes (Kenneth) - Aristotle on Identity and Its Problems</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_81_10">Barnes</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_81_10"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1986.htm">Black (Max) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>", Black</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5240.htm">Borowski (E.J.) - Identity and Personal Identity</A>", Borrowski</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22806.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Caught in a Timeless Leibnizian Net</A>", Botros</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13027.htm">Candlish (Stewart) - The Inexplicability of Identity</A>", Candlish</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19821.htm">Casati (Roberto) & Torrengo (Giuliano) - The Identity Of Indiscernibles And The Principle Of No Co-Location</A>", Casati & Torrengo</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6442.htm">Chernoff (Fred) - Leibniz's Principles of the Identity of Indiscernibles</A>", Chernoff</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11497.htm">Curley (Edwin) - Did Leibniz state 'Leibniz' Law'?</A>", Curley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11678.htm">Edgington (Dorothy) - Williamson on Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Edgington</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_438.htm">Forrest (Peter) - The Identity of Indiscernibles</A>", Forrest</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22880.htm">Frances (Bryan) - The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism</A>", Frances</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3899.htm">Leibniz (Gottfried) - What Identity Or Diversity Is</A>", Gut</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19963.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Identity and Indiscernibility</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23421.htm">Gut (Przemyslaw) - Leibniz: Personal Identity and Sameness of Substance</A>", Leibniz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1994.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Endurance and Indiscernibility</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_347.htm">Langford (Simon) & Ramachandran (Murali) - Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Langford & Ramachandran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23264.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Identity & Identities</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7446.htm">Sleigh (R.C.) - Identity of Indiscernibles</A>", Sleigh </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5093.htm">Steinhart (Eric) - Indiscernible Persons</A>", Steinhart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3500.htm">Wiggins (David) - Outline of a Theory of Individuation</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3733.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity: Part 1.2: Leibniz's Law and the Difficulties of Relative Identity</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3409.htm">Williams (Christopher) - Identity and Indiscernibility</A>", Williamson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11611.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Williamson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20440.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>This is a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_81_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_81_2"></A><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>No doubt there s a convention as to which is the  first and which is the  second of Leibniz s Laws, but they are often confusingly combined into one law with two parts. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_81_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_81_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_81_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_81_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The papers reviewed by Bayliss (and the review itself) are all rather old, so I ve not selected for further study all the papers reviewed in this brief article.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_81_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Barnes alleges that the Law is due to Aristotle rather than to Leibniz. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 31/07/2018 22:42:14<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11.3: (Relative Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The orthodox approach to the <a name="48"></a>Logic of Identity is to treat it as a necessary equivalence relation. I follow this approach. </li><li>However, in response to various <a name="48"></a>TEs, deviant <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_4">forms</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_4"></A> of Identity have been devised, and some are still popular. </li><li>However, the logic of identity is so secure that it is sensible to look for other explanations of any TE that appears to bring it in doubt.</li><li>Relative identity is invoked to try to explain the intuition that  following certain exigencies (say, a nasty bang on the head; or the Phineas <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_5">Gage</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_5"></A> situation)  I might be the same [human being]+NN+, but not the same person. </li><li>So, the identity relation is indexed to a <a name="48"></a>sortal. It is said that it makes no sense to say that A is the same individual as B unless we say  the same <u>what</u> . </li><li>My view is that  while it is true that we need to be careful what individual we are to pick out for identity claims  once we have picked out an individual (say in more than one way), it is self-identical whatever description we are using. And necessarily so as Saul Kripke has shown in his Hesperus / Phosphorus / Venus discussion in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_441.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity</A>". </li><li>So, when we are thinking of what we imagine to be a single thing under two descriptions, then if we imagine the thing under one description coming apart from the thing under another, then one or other description doesn t really pick out that thing as a <a name="48"></a>substance, but (say) picks out a property of that substance. </li><li>So, returning to our example, when we say  same person , the term  person is ambiguous. <ol type="i"><li>It can either stand as a proxy for  human being , or </li><li> Same person can mean  has the same <a name="48"></a>personality . </li></ol>When this is understood, in neither case are we tempted into espousing relative identity:- <ol type="i"><li>In this case we have identity, and </li><li>In this case we are comparing a property of a substance, and substances can change their properties over time without <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_9">ceasing</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_9"></A> to be the same substance. </li></ol></li><li>I intend to cover this topic in <a name="48"></a>Chapter 4 along with the other deviant approaches to Identity. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_11">Links</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_11"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_96_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>The study-list for this topic would <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_14">include</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_14"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9286.htm">Borowski (E.J.) - Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity</A>", Borowski</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_439.htm">Deutsch (Harry) - Relative Identity</A>", Deutsch</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5594.htm">Geach (Peter) - Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity</A>", Geach</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1381.htm">Griffin (Nicholas) - Relative Identity</A>", Griffin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_649.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Objects and Identity: An Examination of Relative Identity and its Consequences</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1937.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Relative Identity</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5806.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Borowski on the Relative Identity of Persons</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_96_15">Puccetti</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_96_15"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_53.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5144.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Identity and Sortals: Why Relative Identity Is Self-Contradictory</A>", Wilson </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_96_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_96_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not sure if this is the correct terminology.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_96_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20869.htm">Tobia (Kevin Patrick) - Personal Identity and the Phineas Gage Effect</A>".</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_96_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>So, Phineas Gage continues to be the same substance (human being  or maybe human animal) despite a radical change of personality. </li><li>See my Note on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_92.htm">Personality</a> (eventually!) for the individuation and persistence of  personalities . Just what sort of thing are they? Universals? Tropes? </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_96_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_96_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_96_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_96_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>As this list includes several whole books, it might be a bit much, though this is an important topic. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_96_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I doubt this paper is really about Relative Identity, but more about <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Brain Transplants</a>. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11.4: (Vague Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_106_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_106_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> The orthodox approach to the <a name="48"></a>Logic of Identity is to treat it as a necessary equivalence relation. I follow this approach. </li><li>However, in response to various <a name="48"></a>TEs, deviant <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_106_4">forms</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_106_4"></A> of Identity have been devised, and some are still popular. </li><li>However, the logic of identity is so secure that it is sensible to look for other explanations of any TE that appears to bring it into doubt.</li><li>Two seemingly related suggestions are Vague Identity (VI, this Note) and <a name="48"></a>Indeterminate Identity (II). </li><li>I m not sure of the distinction between VI and II, having studied neither in any detail, but:- <ol type="i"><li>I d have thought that VI is a metaphysical claim alongside the suggestion  allegedly refuted by Evans  that there can be vague objects. </li><li>In contrast to this, II sounds like an epistemological claim  that there are identity claims the truth-values of which we cannot know. </li><li>The above distinction is somewhat moot if the puzzle of <a name="48"></a>Vagueness is seen as at root epistemological, as by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Williamson (Timothy).htm">Timothy Williamson</A>. </li><li>To make matters worse, there are at least two other terms used:- <BR>&rarr;  Indefinite Identity , and<BR>&rarr;  Imperfect Identity <BR>Both these terms sound metaphysical, so I ve assumed (for now) that they are the same as  Vague Identity . </li></ol></li><li>However, a quick look through the abstract of the papers on the reading lists suggests that the two notions are related  in that papers titled as related to one actually seem to relate to the other. Parsons s book below looks like a good study of the whole topic but uses II to mean <u>indeterminacy in the world</u>, which is a metaphysical claim. </li><li>I intend to cover these topics in <a name="48"></a>Chapter 4 along with the other deviant approaches to Identity. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_106_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_106_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_106_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_106_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_443.htm">Evans (Gareth) - Can There Be Vague Objects?</A>", Evans</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3744.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Identity and Vagueness</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7170.htm">Hossack (Keith) - Vagueness and Personal Identity</A>", Hossack</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6987.htm">Olson (Eric) - Imperfect Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_106_10">Olson</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_106_10"></A></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12994.htm">Broome (John) - Indefiniteness in Identity</A>", Broome</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15876.htm">Burgess (J.A.) - Vague Objects and Indefinite Identity</A>", Burgess</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11678.htm">Edgington (Dorothy) - Williamson on Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Edgington</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13007.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Vagueness and Identity</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21933.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13008.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Vague Identity Yet Again</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3550.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Vagueness of Identity</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11611.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Williamson<BR> </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_106_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_106_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not sure if this is the correct terminology. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_106_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_106_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_106_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>It looks like Olson uses  imperfect as an amalgamated metaphysical / epistemological claim. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 17/01/2018 13:43:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11.5: (Indeterminate Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1261_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1261_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> The orthodox approach to the <a name="48"></a>Logic of Identity is to treat it as a necessary equivalence relation. I follow this approach. </li><li>However, in response to various <a name="48"></a>TEs, deviant <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1261_4">forms</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1261_4"></A> of Identity have been devised, and some are still popular. </li><li>However, the logic of identity is so secure that it is sensible to look for other explanations of any TE that appears to bring it into doubt.</li><li>Two seemingly related suggestions are <a name="48"></a>Vague Identity (VI) and Indeterminate Identity (II, this Note). </li><li>I m not sure of the distinction between VI and II, having studied neither in any detail, but:- <ol type="i"><li>I d have thought that VI is a metaphysical claim alongside the suggestion  allegedly refuted by Evans  that there can be vague objects. </li><li>In contrast to this, II sounds like an epistemological claim  that there are identity claims the truth-values of which we cannot know. </li><li>The above distinction is somewhat moot if the puzzle of <a name="48"></a>Vagueness is seen as at root epistemological, as by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Williamson (Timothy).htm">Timothy Williamson</A>. </li><li>To make matters worse, there are at least two other terms used:- <BR>&rarr;  Indefinite Identity , and<BR>&rarr;  Imperfect Identity <BR>Both these terms sound metaphysical, so I ve assumed (for now) that they are the same as  Vague Identity . </li></ol></li><li>However, a quick look through the abstract of the papers on the reading lists suggests that the two notions are related  in that papers titled as related to one actually seem to relate to the other. Parsons s book below looks like a good study of the whole topic but uses II to mean <u>indeterminacy in the world</u>, which is a metaphysical claim. </li><li>I intend to cover these topics in <a name="48"></a>Chapter 4 along with the other deviant approaches to Identity. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1261_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1261_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1261_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1261_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"> <li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6234.htm">Parsons (Terence) - Indeterminate Identity: Analytical Table of Contents</A>", Parsons </li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6704.htm">Cartwright (Helen Morris) - On Two Arguments for the Indeterminacy of Personal Identity</A>", Cartwright</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6181.htm">Heck (Richard) - Is Indeterminate Identity Coherent</A>", Heck</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6987.htm">Olson (Eric) - Imperfect Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1261_10">Olson</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1261_10"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20290.htm">Pinillos (N. ngel) - Counting and Indeterminate Identity</A>", Pinillos</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1377.htm">Parsons (Terence) - Indeterminate Identity</A>", Parsons</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1261_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1261_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not sure if this is the correct terminology. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1261_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1261_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1261_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>It looks like Olson uses  imperfect as an amalgamated metaphysical / epistemological claim. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 17/01/2018 13:43:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11.6: (Contingent Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_63_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_63_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> The orthodox approach to the <a name="48"></a>Logic of Identity is to treat it as a necessary equivalence relation. I follow this approach. </li><li>However, in response to various <a name="48"></a>TEs, deviant <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_63_4">forms</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_63_4"></A> of Identity have been devised, and some are still popular. </li><li>Contingent Identity <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_63_5">arose</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_63_5"></A> in the paper by Alan Gibbard listed below, which considers the TE of the <a name="48"></a>Statue and the Clay. </li><li>The TE relates to the topic of <a name="48"></a>Constitution. We are to consider a statue and the lump of clay of which is constituted. If we arrange things carefully, the two might coincidentally come into and go out of existence at the same time. If so, are they not identical, given that they would seem to have all the same properties? Yet, they might not have been temporally coincident  in the normal case, the lump would be formed first, and only slowly be sculpted into a statue. So, they are only contingently identical, the argument goes. And this TE shows (it is said) that far from being a necessary relation, identity may only contingently hold. </li><li>The logic of identity is so secure that it is sensible to look for other explanations of the TE. Of course, the divination of just what is wrong with the TE are many, which doesn t necessarily mean that the TE is misleading for any of these reasons. </li><li><a name="48"></a>Baker, for instance, has  relation to an art world as one of the properties the Statue has which is not had by the Lump. So, by <a name="48"></a>Leibniz s Law, the two are never identical. </li><li>I m suspicious of any TE involving <a name="48"></a>artefacts. </li><li>See also the Note on <a name="48"></a>modality. </li><li>I intend to cover this topic in <a name="48"></a>Chapter_4 along with the other deviant approaches to Identity.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_63_13">Links</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_63_13"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_63_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on  or related to (maybe only tangentially)  this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_63_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_63_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_63_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_63_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3675.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Very Idea of Constitution</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>", Gibbard</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21125.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_112.htm">Lewis (David) - Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16539.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Criticisms of materialism - is the physical enough?</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15852.htm">Akiba (Ken) - Identity Is Simple</A>", Akiba</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7325.htm">Carter (William) - Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5885.htm">Carter (William) - On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8932.htm">Castaneda (Hector-Neri) - Intensionality and Identity in Human Action and Philosophical Method</A>", Castaneda</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8471.htm">Correia (Fabrice) - Comments on Varzi</A>", Correia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20292.htm">Gallois (Andre) - Rigid Designation and the Contingency of Identity</A>", Gallois</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4727.htm">Hawthorne (John) - Identity</A>", Hawthorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6094.htm">Keefe (Rosanna) - Contingent Identity and Vague Identity</A>", Keefe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1989.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity</A>", Kripke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3475.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Necessity and Identity</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23005.htm">Miller (Kristie) - The Metaphysical Equivalence of Non-Unitary Three- and Four-dimensionalism</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_437.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Identity</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3444.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6113.htm">Ramachandran (Murali) - An Alternative Translation Scheme For Counterpart Theory</A>", Ramachandran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3431.htm">Robinson (Denis) - Re-Identifying Matter</A>", Robinson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7557.htm">Salmon (Nathan) - Principles of Cross-World Identification</A>", Salmon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3456.htm">Stalnaker (Robert) - Counterparts and Identity</A>", Stalnaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4454.htm">Yablo (Stephen) - Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility</A>", Yablo</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_63_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_63_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: I m not sure if this is the correct terminology. <a name="On-Page_Link_63_5"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 5</B>: Or at least was brought to my attention as an undergraduate. <a name="On-Page_Link_63_13"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_63_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_63_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/07/2018 10:36:29<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11.7: (Occasional Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_88_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_88_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The orthodox approach to the <a name="48"></a>Logic of Identity is to treat it as a necessary equivalence relation. I follow this approach. </li><li>However, in response to various <a name="48"></a>TEs, deviant <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_88_4">forms</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_88_4"></A> of Identity have been devised, and some are still popular. </li><li>However, the logic of identity is so secure that it is sensible to look for other explanations of any TE that appears to bring it in doubt.</li><li>Occasional identity is a response to TEs such as the <a name="48"></a>fission of an amoeba into two qualitatively identical ones. We want to say that both are numerically identical to the parent, but the logic of identity forbids this unless we claim that the two daughters are numerically identical to one <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_88_6">another</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_88_6"></A>. So, the claim is that they were once identical (and co-incident), but now are not. </li><li>This makes numerical identity into a temporary (hence  occasional ) matter. </li><li>My preferred answer to this TE is to appeal to <a name="48"></a>perdurance  the daughters were always distinct, but just shared their pre-fission stages. There are other explanations. </li><li>I intend to cover this topic in <a name="48"></a>Chapter 4 along with the other deviant approaches to Identity. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_88_9">Links</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_88_9"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1256_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_88_10">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_88_10"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_88_11">include</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_88_11"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>The study-list for this topic is much shorter than for related topics, as it only includes a whole book and a review thereof:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1389.htm">Gallois (Andre) - Occasions of Identity : a Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness</A>", Gallois</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19853.htm">Sider (Ted) - Review of Andr Gallois, Occasions of Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_88_12">Sider</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_88_12"></A></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_88_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_88_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not sure if this is the correct terminology. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_88_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Even this seemingly-impossible claim has been supported. </li><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20898.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time</A>".</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_88_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_88_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_88_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_88_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Read and analyse this first  it may not be worth bothering with the book, unless it sheds light on the topic as a whole.</li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11.2: (Leibniz)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 11.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12: (Physicalism)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_13_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_13_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Basically, I reject any form of mind-body <a name="48"></a><U>dualism</U><SUP>2</SUP> or immaterialist monism. There are no <a name="48"></a><U>souls</U><SUP>3</SUP>, if a soul is an immaterial substance separable from a <a name="48"></a><U>body</U><SUP>4</SUP>. </li><li>But, I need to investigate <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A> s recent  emergent dualism (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11688.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism'</A>"), despite the fact that his main motivation is a desire to conform to a traditionalist reading of Christian doctrine. </li><li>Given my focus on physicalism, I will need to give some attention to the identity and <a name="48"></a><U>persistence criteria</U><SUP>5</SUP> of material objects as such. </li><li>There are too many versions of physicalism for its endorsement to deliver much without clarification, so I will need to pursue the matter in some detail. </li><li>For the moment, I simply wish to note (or claim) that:<ol type="1"><li> The physical encompasses both body and <a name="48"></a><U>brain</U><SUP>6</SUP> (ie. the <a name="48"></a><U>physical criterion</U><SUP>7</SUP> of personal identity would be satisfied if continuity of brain were essential for the persistence of the person). </li><li>The brain is more important than other physical organs for the persistence of the <a name="48"></a><U>human being</U><SUP>8</SUP> or the <a name="48"></a><U>human person</U><SUP>9</SUP>. </li></ol></li><li>Consequently, I think it worthwhile to conduct a detailed investigation into the functional roles of the various parts of the brain, CNS (Central Nervous System) and PNS (peripheral ...) and how these and the residue of the body are coupled together. Such matters may be relevant to the realism of the various <a name="48"></a><U>thought experiments</U><SUP>10</SUP> about <a name="48"></a><U>brain transplants</U><SUP>11</SUP>, cerebrum transplants and such-like. </li><li>It is, however, debatable how important these details are. For example, debates seem to continue about the possible identity of pain and C-fibre-firing, when it s now acknowledged by all the participants in such debates that the physical realisation of pain-states in mammals requires a lot more than C-fibres. The assumption seems to be that the details don t matter and that similar arguments could be constructed whatever the physical realisation of mental states might be.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_13_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_13_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_13_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_13_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>14</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_13_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_13_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_13_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.2: (Dualism)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_124_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_124_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I have no great interest in dualism as a thesis in the philosophy of mind. I m a card-carrying materialist. Consequently, I ve ignored the great bulk of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_124_2">works on dualism</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_124_2"></A> in the categorised reading-list below with the exception of those that relate it to the topic of Personal Identity. </li><li>That said, it would be worth reading the following:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11924.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6346.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Blackwell)</A>"</li><li>However, this topic is important to my research interests because if mind-body substance dualism is true, then <a name="48"></a>animalism is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_124_4">false</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_124_4"></A>. </li><li>Also, if dualism is false, I argue that <a name="48"></a>resurrection or <a name="48"></a>reincarnation is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_124_7">impossible</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_124_7"></A>. </li><li>If dualism is true, the possibility of <a name="48"></a>teletransportation is even less likely than would be the case were materialism true. How would the immaterial soul make it to the new location and be re-united with its reconstituted or newly-constituted body?</li><li>There would seem to be the risk of an overlap between this Note and two others, which also overlap with one another:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Souls<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Soul Criterion. <BR>I intend to leave anything specific to Souls to one of the above Notes. </li><li>Dualism is unfashionable these days, which makes it a temptation to ignore. Well-known dualists include:- <ol type="i"><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Swinburne (Richard).htm">Richard Swinburne</A>, and </li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A>. </li></ol></li><li>The primary text ought to be<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1792.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory</A>"</li><li>Time was when all Christians were dualists, but now there is a sub-group of <a name="48"></a>Christian Materialists. Here s a skirmish between Baker and Zimmerman & with more from both of them in the general reading list. <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7766.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7300.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Zimmerman s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism'</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7299.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11688.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism'</A>"</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_124_12">Links</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_124_12"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_124_Links.htm">Click here</a>. Unfortunately, far too many to be any use at this stage. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_124_13">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_124_13"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_124_14">include</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_124_14"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7299.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7300.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Zimmerman s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism'</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3516.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - Dualism: Body and Soul</A>", Carruthers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3525.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - Strong Dualism: Body and Soul</A>", Carruthers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9626.htm">Chalmers (David) - How Cartesian Dualism Might Have Been True</A>", Chalmers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20790.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Dualist Views of Human Persons</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15775.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - The nature of persons: dualism versus physicalism</A>", Kagan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11924.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)</A>", Robinson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3299.htm">Rozemond (Marleen) - Descartes' Case for Dualism</A>", Rozemond</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16532.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Descartes' arguments for dualism</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16533.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Other arguments for dualism</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16534.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Criticisms of dualism: is substance dualism tenable?</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3298.htm">Wilson (Margaret) - Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7766.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11688.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism'</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4899.htm">Armstrong (David) - Dualism</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20742.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Dualist?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21330.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'Contemporary Dualism: A Defense' by Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson, Eds</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2404.htm">Foster (John) - The Immaterial Self: Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind</A>", Foster</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6201.htm">Goetz (Stewart) - Modal Dualism: A Critique</A>", Goetz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2086.htm">Hornsby (Jennifer) - Dualism in Action</A>", Hornsby</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6200.htm">Olson (Eric) - A Compound of Two Substances</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_587.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - On Formulating Materialism and Dualism</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6713.htm">Pietroski (Paul) - Personal Dualism</A>", Pietroski</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2412.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Immortality and Dualism</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20743.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Dualism and Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem?</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20479.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Nature of Rational Beings: Dualism and Physicalism</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20480.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Nature of Rational Beings: Dualism and Personal Identity</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21137.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21135.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Materialism,Dualism,and Simple TheoriesofPersonalIdentity</A>", Zimmerman </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_124_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_124_2"></A><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I wrote a pre-submitted essay for my BA Finals  What is Descartes s argument for the  real distinction between mind and body? Is it a good one? (<A HREF = "http://www.theotodman.com/Descartes-Mind+Body.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.theotodman.com/Descartes-Mind+Body.pdf)) which needs converting to Note form. This quoted the following, <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5553.htm">Rozemond (Marleen) - The Real Distinction Argument</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3298.htm">Wilson (Margaret) - Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness</A>"<BR>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3299.htm">Rozemond (Marleen) - Descartes' Case for Dualism</A>" is also relevant. </li><li>Erkenntnis Vol. 65, No. 1, Prospects for Dualism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2006) is relevant to the general topic, including<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15840.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15841.htm">Barrett (Jeffrey A.) - A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind-Body Dualism</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15842.htm">Stapp (Henry P.) - Quantum Interactive Dualism, II: The Libet and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Causal Anomalies</A>". </li><li>It d be nice to find time to look at Chalmers<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9626.htm">Chalmers (David) - How Cartesian Dualism Might Have Been True</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8484.htm">Chalmers (David) - Naturalistic Dualism</A>" </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_124_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may need to think this through a bit more. </li><li>The argument would go  from  Sunday school dualism  that if we have souls, then we can t be animals, as animals don t have souls. </li><li>But, dualism is really only claiming that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical. But if this is true of human beings  whatever they are  then it is true of human animals, and all <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_30.htm">animals</a> with minds. So, the topic might be orthogonal to animalism  the claim that we are animals. </li><li>That said, there is a tradition of treating dualism as more sympathetic to the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">psychological view</a> of personal identity, that our persistence conditions are mental, which animalism claims to be irrelevant to our identity. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_124_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Well, resurrection of (sufficient of) a corpse would be metaphysically possible, but following the total destruction of the body, there is nothing to carry the identity of the individual. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_124_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_124_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_124_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/07/2018 17:41:17<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.11: (Souls)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17: (Body)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.5: (Persistence Criteria)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_91_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_91_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I will cover both persistence <u>criteria</u> and persistence <u>conditions</u> under this head. </li><li>Maybe the former term ( criteria ) focuses on epistemology (how we know something has persisted) and the latter ( conditions ) on metaphysics (what it takes for something to persist). </li><li>I suspect <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Shoemaker (David).htm">David Shoemaker</A>  in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>"  of confusing the two (despite his explicit acknowledgement of the distinction) in his rejection of the soul criterion. </li><li>In brief, the persistence conditions for an object of a particular <a name="48"></a>kind are the necessary and sufficient conditions for it <a name="48"></a>persist, that is, to continue in existence. </li><li>With respect to <a name="48"></a>our persistence criteria, David Shoemaker considers the following possibilities:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Soul Criterion </li><li><a name="48"></a>Body Criterion </li><li><a name="48"></a>Memory Criterion </li><li><a name="48"></a>Brain-based Memory Criterion</li><li><a name="48"></a>Psychological Criterion </li><li><a name="48"></a>Biological Criterion </li></ol></li><li>The first four feature in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>".</li><li>The final two in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>". </li><li>In "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15139.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics - Alternative Approaches</A>" Shoemaker considers two other alternatives:- <ol start = "7" type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Narrative Identity, and</li><li><a name="48"></a>Identity Doesn t Matter. </li></ol></li><li>Most of the work of this Note will probably be undertaken under the guise of pursuing the Notes above. </li><li>This Note will also overlap to some extent with those on:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Criteria of Identity, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Persistence. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_91_15">Links</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_91_15"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_91_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_91_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_91_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_91_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_91_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>Consequently, this Note has no reading list of its own, though it seems to have a categorised reading list containing miscategorised items. </li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_91_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_91_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_91_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_91_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.6: (Brain)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_55_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_55_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There is a view that <a name="48"></a>we are really, most fundamentally, our brains. It seems to promise some good things from both the  <a name="48"></a>psychological criterion and  <a name="48"></a>bodily criterion camps, since the brain is indeed part of the <a name="48"></a>body, and, in the absence of a <a name="48"></a>soul, the source of all our psychological functions. However, we seem to be much more than our brains. After all, who would want to be a <a name="48"></a>BIV (Brain in a Vat)? According to Johnston (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>"), BIVs are  maximally mutilated human beings; which seems to be along the right lines. Note the important distinction between your surviving in a maximally mutilated state (as a brain) and you  really being your brain.</li><li>This is an issue <a name="48"></a>Animalism has to contend with - whether a BIV is an animal. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Snowdon (Paul).htm">Paul Snowdon</A> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_55_9">claims</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_55_9"></A> that no-one seems to think this, a view that Olson shares but on which he may be open to objection. He says that an animal with a prosthetic leg is a smaller animal with something non-animal attached. If this is admitted, don t we end up with a <a name="48"></a>sorites argument, that a BIV is a (very much) smaller animal; though not, I think, with any paradox? </li><li>The big question is whether an animal s brain is just another organ (like its liver) or whether it has some other status. That it is somehow special can be presupposed if we start conceptually with the brain as the core from which other parts are shaved off. Whether this is the right approach depends, I think, on what the brain does for the animal, and where the animal is on the phylogenetic tree. The brain is a much more important organ in some animals than others; in some lower animals it has no psychological functions and (maybe) its regulatory functions <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_55_11">aren t essential</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_55_11"></A>. </li><li>Why is the Woody Allen expostulation that his brain (in Sleeper)  (is) my second favourite organ amusing? Firstly, of course, because of the sexual innuendo and the ultimately strange prioritisation (since you can t enjoy sexual excitement without a brain), but also, I think, because your brain isn t an organ that you  have . Without your brain, there s no  you at all, or at least this is a strong intuition. </li><li>You can obviously (given even today s technology), do without a liver, and it seems that on a life-support machine your body can do without its brain  where the brain is looked upon merely as a regulator. But the reference of  <a name="48"></a>you is a bit slippery in these contexts. There is a sense in which you as an organism can do without a brain  on life support  but  you as an essentially psychological being cannot. The animalists claim that you  being identical to an animal  have no essential psychological predicates; yet it is difficult to resist the intuition that there s a reference of  you that does have essential psychological predicates. This is to you as a <a name="48"></a>person  but the big question is whether this person is a separate substance <a name="48"></a>constituted by the human animal, or is just a way of describing the animal when possessed of the appropriate psychological predicates. Saying that you can t do without your brain is just another way of saying that your psychological predicates are those most important to you (the animal); those without which the other predicates cannot be enjoyed. </li><li>The issue fundamentally concerns the integrity of <a name="48"></a>organisms. It is said that a brain isn t an organism; but does an organism have to be self-supporting (the main reason for denying the status of organisms to disembodied brains)? After all, we seem to be allowing that an organism on life support is correctly described as an organism. We ll discuss this further in its place. </li><li>These issues are especially important when we consider various <a name="48"></a>Thought Experiments, in particular <a name="48"></a>Brain Transplants. <a name="48"></a>Transplantation of all sorts seems to involve <a name="48"></a>fusion, with its <a name="48"></a>logical problems for identity (not just for persons).</li><li>Given that brains are important in lots of contexts related to personal identity, it is important to understand how they work  or at least to have some familiarity with some of what is known about how they work. Consequently, the reading lists below have some books on neuroscience. It is difficult to decide how the lists should be divided between this Note and that on the <a name="48"></a>Brain Criterion. As a first stab, the bulk appear under this Note, though some may be moved as I get further into the topic. </li><li>I ve tried to exclude from the lists items covered in other related notes, in particular:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>BIVs<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Brain Death<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Brain State Transfers<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Brain Transplants<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Commissurotomy<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Consciousness<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Siliconisation</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_55_29">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_55_29"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_55_30">include</A></U><SUB>30</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_55_30"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1165.htm">Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) - Neuroscience</A>", Bear Etc.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22097.htm">Bess (Michael) - Why upgrading your brain could make you less human</A>", Bess</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21059.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - The Brains Behind Morality</A>", Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1340.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy</A>", Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_191.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain</A>", Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21057.htm">Crane (Tim) - The Mental States of Persons and their Brains</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1186.htm">Damasio (Antonio) - Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain</A>", Damasio</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7955.htm">Edwards (Paul) - The Dependence of Consciousness on the Brain</A>", Edwards</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22515.htm">Epstein (Robert) - The empty brain</A>", Epstein</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6352.htm">Genova (Lisa) - Still Alice</A>", Genova</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22177.htm">Graziano (Michael) - Build-a-brain</A>", Graziano</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6284.htm">Kaku (Michio) - The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest To Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind</A>", Kaku</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21721.htm">Lewin (Roger) - Is Your Brain Really Necessary?</A>", Lewin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_503.htm">MacKay (Donald) - Brains, Machines & Persons</A>", MacKay</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6322.htm">Marsh (Henry) - Do No Harm: Stories of Life, Death and Brain Surgery</A>", Marsh</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22524.htm">Miller (Kenneth D.) - Will You Ever Be Able to Upload Your Brain?</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1171.htm">Parkin (Alan) - Explorations in Cognitive Neuropsychology</A>", Parkin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5094.htm">Steinhart (Eric) - Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms</A>", Steinhart</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1169.htm">Andrewes (David) - Neuropsychology: From Theory to Practice</A>", Andrewes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_552.htm">Baker (Peter) - An Explanation of How Brains Think</A>", Baker (Peter)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1163.htm">Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience</A>", Bennett & Hacker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_172.htm">Blakemore (Colin) & Greenfield (Susan), Eds. - Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness</A>", Blakemore & Greenfield</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_68.htm">Borst (C.V.) - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory</A>", Borst</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6616.htm">Changizi (Mark A.) - The Brain from 25,000 Feet</A>", Changizi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6414.htm">Claxton (Guy) - Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than it Thinks</A>", Claxton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1184.htm">Damasio (Antonio), Ed. - The 'Scientific American' Book of the Brain: The Best Writing on Consciousness</A>", Damasio</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1357.htm">DeMyer (William) - Neuroanatomy</A>", DeMyer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_199.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Brainchildren - Essays on Designing Minds</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_204.htm">Eccles (John) - Evolution of the Brain, Creation of the Self</A>", Eccles</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1402.htm">Feinberg (Todd) - Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self</A>", Feinberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1562.htm">Greenfield (Susan) - Soul, Brain and Mind</A>", Greenfield</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_543.htm">Jubak (Jim) - In the Image of the Brain - Breaking the Barrier Between the Human Mind and Intelligent Machines</A>", Jubak</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_516.htm">Kinsbourne (Marcel) - Asymmetrical Function of the Brain</A>", Kinsbourne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6433.htm">Obler (Loraine K.) & Gjerlow (Kris) - Language and the Brain</A>", Obler</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_139.htm">Popper (Karl) & Eccles (John) - The Self and Its Brain</A>", Popper & Eccles</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_653.htm">Restak (Richard) - The Modular Brain</A>", Restak</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19207.htm">Smart (J.C.C.) - The Mind/Brain Identity Theory</A>", Smart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1418.htm">Wilkerson (T.E.) - Minds, Brains and People</A>", Wilkerson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_505.htm">Wills (Christopher) - The Runaway Brain - The Evolution of Human Uniqueness</A>", Wills</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_55_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_55_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">Where</a>?<a name="On-Page_Link_55_11"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I need to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">check</a> this. </li><li>The idea is that in some lower animals, regulation is distributed throughout the body, with the brain playing a less central role. </li><li>This is true of the octopus  a highly intelligent animal  with many neurones distributed throughout its tentacles. </li><li>The same is also true (though to a lesser extent) of human animals  the PNS undertakes various co-ordinating functions, which is why brain-transplant TEs are somewhat simplistic.</li><li>However, maybe I need to distinguish between different neural functions  regulation, coordination, sensation, etc. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_55_29"></A><B>Footnote 29</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_55_30"></A><B>Footnote 30</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/04/2018 00:12:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.7 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14: (Physical Continuity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_74_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_74_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Is there is a  real or formal  difference between <u>human beings</u> and <ol type="i"><li><a name="48"></a>human animals, </li><li>members of the species <a name="48"></a>homo sapiens and </li><li><a name="48"></a>human organisms? </li></ol></li><li>I assume there s a distinction between a human being and a <a name="48"></a>human person, as  <a name="48"></a>person is an honorific and  I claim  human persons are <a name="48"></a>phase sortals of human animals. </li><li>For the primary argument proposing that  we are human beings, see the work of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/J/Author_Johnston (Mark).htm">Mark Johnston</A>, in particular <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4294.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Reasons and Reductionism</A>", and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18375.htm">Johnston (Mark) - 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal</A>". </li></ol></li><li>Johnston s view is that human beings are <a name="48"></a>constituted by <a name="48"></a>human bodies. I have two comments on this:- <ol type="i"><li>This superficially sounds like <a name="48"></a>Baker s <a name="48"></a>Constitution View. However, Johnston doesn t think the human person is separable from the human brain/body as in the case of Baker s reified <a name="48"></a>FPP.</li><li>Despite this, Johnston doesn t think that we are (identical to) human animals. </li></ol></li><li>Johnston tries to tread a middle course between <a name="48"></a>animalism and the <a name="48"></a>psychological view. <ol type="i"><li>He wants to be a naturalist  accepting the modern scientific world-picture and rejecting <a name="48"></a>dualism. </li><li>However, because he thinks that <a name="48"></a>what matters to us is our mental life, he considers us to be a locus of mental life. </li><li>But, this locus is not  inchoate or  bare but has to be provided by our organ of mentation  namely the <a name="48"></a>brain. </li><li>Where he differs from the <a name="48"></a>animalists is in his response to the <a name="48"></a>brain transplant intuition (BTI). </li></ol></li><li>So, for Johnston, a human being is  for usual practical purposes  a human organism, but is only  constituted by one  it is not identical to one, for two reasons:- <ol type="i"><li>He  along with most people  accepts the BTI, so he thinks you can be  pared down to a  mere brain and then transplanted into another human body. That human being would then be you. Also, like <a name="48"></a>Olson, he doesn t think  mere brains are <a name="48"></a>organisms; but  unlike Olson  he doesn t consider the human brain to be  just another organ . </li><li>Further, he thinks a human being is necessarily capable of appropriate mental activity. So, in the case of you falling into a <a name="48"></a>PVS, you  the human being  could be outlived by your human animal. </li></ol></li><li>Thus  for Johnston   human being is a rather odd concept: it is a locus of mentation, naturally embodied and not portable other than by transplanting the organ of mentation. The brain isn t a mere organ, but  if transplanted or a <a name="48"></a>BIV  a maximally mutilated human being. </li><li>At the moment, I still incline towards animalism  that we are human animals; and that we can survive total and irrevocable loss of mentation, though in the process we also lose all that matters to us. </li><li>Also, I think that there s only a difference of emphasis or terminology between  human being ,  human animal and  human organism . </li><li>This (probably) commits me to arguing that a disembodied human brain is a maximally-mutilated human animal. </li><li>In the reading-lists below, I ve included some items on  Human Nature , including Christian takes on the matter, though I don t want to get too diverted into matters of anthropology and evolutionary psychology. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_74_24">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_74_24"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_74_25">include</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_74_25"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11442.htm">Gillett (Grant) - Young Human Beings: Metaphysics and Ethics</A>", Gillett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22018.htm">Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence</A>", Madden</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21054.htm">Madden (Rory) - The Place of The Self in Contemporary Metaphysics</A>", Madden</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7825.htm">Oderberg (David) - Johnston on Human Beings</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21001.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, Ourselves: Introduction</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21029.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity</A>", Snowdon</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20381.htm">Adams (E.M.) - On Being a Human Being</A>", Adams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12816.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Human Essence</A>", Anscombe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12820.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The Dignity of the Human Being</A>", Anscombe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_571.htm">Cockburn (David), Ed. - Human Beings</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_74_26">Cockburn</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_74_26"></A><BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2629.htm">Graham (Gordon) - Review of David Cockburn's 'Human Beings'</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2304.htm">Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate</A>", Cooper</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6335.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21019.htm">Dupre (John) - On Human Nature</A>", Dupre</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6633.htm">Egonsson (Dan) - Dimensions of Dignity: The Moral Importance of Being Human</A>", Egonsson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13212.htm">Green (Joel B.) - Restoring the Human Person: New Testament Voices for a Wholistic and Social Anthropology</A>", Green</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6650.htm">Heyd (David) - Human Nature: An Oxymoron?</A>", Heyd</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18375.htm">Johnston (Mark) - 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22816.htm">Liu (Irene) - Elevating Human Being: Towards a New Sort of Naturalism</A>", Liu</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20709.htm">Parfit (Derek) - We Are Not Human Beings</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20583.htm">Post (John F.) - Metaphysics and Human Being</A>", Post</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18374.htm">Robinson (Denis) - Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival</A>", Robinson</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_74_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_74_24"></A><B>Footnote 24</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_74_25"></A><B>Footnote 25</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_74_26"></A><B>Footnote 26</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve not listed the essays appearing in this collection. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 27/02/2018 23:58:34<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.5: (Human Persons)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.11: (Transplants)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_104_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_104_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>From the standpoint of Personal Identity, the most significant transplants are <a name="48"></a>Brain Transplants, which have their own Note. </li><li>In the context of <a name="48"></a>animalism, however  where it is said (by <a name="48"></a>Olson) that the <a name="48"></a>brain is just another organ  there is less reason for Brain Transplants to receive centre-stage. Some <a name="48"></a>animalists resist the  Transplant Intuition  which is that  we go where our brains go , but I will discuss that in the Note just mentioned.</li><li>But, the animalist must still consider whether an organism can survive the transplant of  lesser organs, and which  if any  transplants it cannot survive. We certainly accept that major-organ transplants  and even a complex of organs such as heart/lungs  preserve the human <a name="48"></a>animal (and <a name="48"></a>person). </li><li>Are there any limits beyond which we cannot go? Do we have to allow for a case of <a name="48"></a>fusion in extreme circumstances? Is there a  core of the animal that preserves identity while peripheral organs are swapped out? </li><li>What about inorganic transplants? Is the human animal preserved, and does it incorporate the transplanted organs, or are they useful appendages (like clothes) that are external to it. Alternatively, do we then have a <a name="48"></a>cyborg? What about implants that affect our <a name="48"></a>mentation?</li><li>While the transplantation of cerebrums and larger brain-parts, including WBTs will be covered elsewhere, this Note should cover TEs involving smaller brain-tissue transplants, which are supposed to transfer psychological elements from one person to another and not identity as such. </li><li>This note will not cover the ethics of transplantation, but only the metaphysics thereof. That said, I ve read, enjoyed and briefly commented on "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1611.htm">Ishiguro (Kazuo) - Never Let Me Go</A>". </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_104_12">Links</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_104_12"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_104_Links.htm">Click here</a>. Unfortunately, almost all of these references relate to the ethics of organ transplantation, wither <em>per se</em>, related to issues to do with  brain death , or to  cannibalisation arguments against consequentialism. So, precious few are itemised in the two lists immediately below. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_104_13">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_104_13"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_104_14">include</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_104_14"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1611.htm">Ishiguro (Kazuo) - Never Let Me Go</A>", Ishiguro</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22004.htm">Bernecker (Sven) - The Nature of Memory Causation</A>", Bernecker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5344.htm">Munzer (Stephen R.) - Transplantation, Chemical Inheritance, and the Identity of Organs</A>", Munzer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20196.htm">Northoff (G.) - Do Brain Tissue Transplants Alter Personal Identity? Inadequacies of Some 'Standard' Arguments</A>", Northoff</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21012.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Strengthening the Rejection of Transplant Arguments</A>", Snowdon</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_104_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_104_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_104_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_104_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 14/05/2018 21:00:00<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 12.14 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 13: (Survival)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_14_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_14_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I need to distinguish two interpretations of <a name="48"></a><U>Parfit</U><SUP>2</SUP> according to whether survival and identity are or are not equated. </li><li>Also, by  survival does Parfit mean the same as other philosophers mean by  <a name="48"></a><U>persistence</U><SUP>3</SUP> ?</li><li>A standard Parfitian claim is that  what matters in survival is not identity . Parfit is right that the issue isn t necessarily  am I (A) identical to B or C , but  will I have what <a name="48"></a><U>matters</U><SUP>4</SUP> in survival if B, or C, or both survive , and that the reason the two questions are elided is that they don t usually come apart. </li><li>However, there s incoherence in an expression such as  will I survive as B , if I m not supposed identical to B, since survival and this use of the personal pronoun seem to imply identity. </li><li>Also in an expression such as  will I have what matters , to what does the  <a name="48"></a><U>I</U><SUP>5</SUP> refer if I m assumed not to persist? To my present self only? I might now see that I might be happy that a certain future state of affairs, not involving me, appertains, but I would then not have what matters, nor indeed have anything at all. </li><li>So, I think we do need to distinguish, with Parfit, identity from what matters in survival. His idea seems to be that we can have what matters in survival without surviving. </li><li>Parfit s concerns are fundamentally ethical, with Buddhist tendencies. He s trying to remove <a name="48"></a><U>self</U><SUP>6</SUP> from ethics and persuade us that we don t need self, and therefore don t need self-identity. </li><li>Parfit s claim, which I believe to be false, is that we don t really care about our persistence as such, but about the survival of our projects, which can as well or better be prosecuted by others. But we are more selfish than that, and in many circumstances justifiably so.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_14_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_14_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_14_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_14_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>9</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_14_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_14_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_14_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 13.2: (Parfit)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_89_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_89_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Derek Parfit is one of the most important contemporary philosophers to have entered the fray to discuss Personal Identity. </li><li>I read "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>" back in 2004/5, but took no notes, so need to read it again. </li><li>Parfit is famous for the dictum  identity is not what matters in survival . <ol type="i"><li>I have a <a name="48"></a>note on this that  again at the time of writing  needs some work! </li><li>I intend to cover this amongst other general metaphysical matters in <a name="48"></a>Chapter 4 of my Thesis. </li><li>My view remains that there must be some confusion in this dictum, in that survival is the same as persistence, and without identity there is no persistence, so identity is a necessary condition for survival and must, therefore,  matter . </li><li>There may well be situations wherein other things matter  either to others or to myself  more than my survival, but this is not the same thing. </li><li>Also, Parfit espouses a <a name="48"></a>psychological view of personal identity, and has many interesting things to say on whether  given the psychological difference between myself now and my future self  I should make provision for someone to whom I am only weakly psychologically <a name="48"></a>connected, and whether others should honour advance directives made by my former self.</li><li>My view on that remains that I m stuck with my <a name="48"></a>FPP, which persists (though it may degrade) through all the changes in my psychology, and that prudence demands that I take this into account. It matters. </li></ol> </li><li>Parfit has invented or refined a number of interesting <a name="48"></a>TEs to do with <a name="48"></a>Fission, <a name="48"></a>Fusion or <a name="48"></a>Teletransportation. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_89_11">Links</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_89_11"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_89_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_89_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_89_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_89_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_89_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>Apart from (sections of) "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>", the works by Parfit I really need to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_89_14">focus</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_89_14"></A> on are:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4760.htm">Brueckner (Anthony) - Parfit On What Matters In Survival</A>", Brueckner</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4718.htm">Cassam (Quassim) - Parfit on Persons</A>", Cassam</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_81.htm">Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. - Reading Parfit</A>", Dancy, especially</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1327.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?</A>", Blackburn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20118.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Review of Derek Parfit's 'On What Matters'</A>", Blackburn</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3745.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Parfit and 'What Matters'</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3971.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Parfit and What Matters in Survival</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6355.htm">Parfit (Derek) - On What Matters: Volume One</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6356.htm">Parfit (Derek) - On What Matters: Volume Two</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5657.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Comments</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_542.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Lewis, Perry, and What Matters</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4761.htm">Parfit (Derek) - The Indeterminacy Of Identity: A Reply To Brueckner</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_559.htm">Parfit (Derek) - The Unimportance of Identity</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_325.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3574.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Why Our Identity is Not What Matters</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5246.htm">Parfit (Derek) - On 'The Importance of Self-Identity'</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4433.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Review of Derek Parfit's 'Reasons and Persons'</A>", Shoemaker</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_89_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_89_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_89_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_89_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_89_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve ignored here those many papers on  what matters that are not specifically related to Parfit.</li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 13.3: (Persistence)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Persistence is the continuing in existence of one thing from one time to another. </li><li>Different <a name="48"></a>kinds of thing have different kinds of <a name="48"></a>persistence criteria. </li><li>My interest is in the persistence of <a name="48"></a>Persons, or at least of beings such as Us; consequently I need to know <a name="48"></a>what kind of thing we are. </li><li>This Note partly acts as an umbrella for three other items that represent different theories or account of persistence, namely <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Endurantism, <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Perdurantism and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Exdurantism. </li><li>See also the Notes on <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Time, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Change. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_11">Links</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_11"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_90_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere  ie. in the Notes above) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6021.htm">Carter (William) & Hestevold (H. Scott) - On Passage and Persistence</A>", Carter & Hestvold, 1994</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4724.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time</A>", Haslanger, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>", Haslanger, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1345.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist</A>", Hawley, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19964.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Persistence and Determination</A>", Hawley, 2008</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3704.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - The Persistence of Objects: Introduction</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_14">Hirsch, 1982</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_14"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3627.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Persistence and the Partist View</A>", Hudson, 2001</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4174.htm">Loux (Michael) - Concrete Particulars II: Persistence Through Time</A>", Loux, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4594.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Persistence and Substance</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_15">Lowe, 2001</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_15"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22018.htm">Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence</A>", Madden, 2016</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4327.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Persistence, Parts and Presentism</A>", Merricks, 1999</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1372.htm">Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time</A>", Oderberg, 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21129.htm">Oderberg (David) - Persistence</A>", Oderberg, 2009</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5211.htm">Olson (Eric) - Relativism and Persistence</A>", Olson, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson, 1999</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20279.htm">Pollock (John L.) - Reasoning about Change and Persistence: A Solution to the Frame Problem</A>", Pollock, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6214.htm">Sider (Ted) - Persistence and Parthood Seminar</A>", Sider, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5355.htm">Sider (Ted) - Recent Work: Identity Over Time</A>", Sider, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_442.htm">Sider (Ted) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence - Bibliography</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_16">Sider+Zimmerman, 2004</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_16"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6215.htm">Sider (Ted) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence Seminar</A>", Sider+Zimmerman, 2004</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9535.htm">Vander Laan (David) - Persistence and Divine Conservation</A>", Vander Laan, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9770.htm">Wasserman (Ryan) - Framing the Debate over Persistence</A>", Wasserman, 2004</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6633.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence and Presentism</A>", Zimmerman, 1996</li><li>Also, see <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/problems/persistence/" TARGET = "_top">Bob Doyle: Persistence</A> (http://metaphysicist.com/problems/persistence/). </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_90_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_90_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_90_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_90_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_90_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: And the rest of Part 1 of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_32.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_90_15"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 15</B>: And other Chapters in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_639.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_90_16"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The Bibliography  and the Seminnar  cover much beyond Persistence as such. </li><li>I need to extract the relevant items to the various sub-topics. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 13.4: (What Matters)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_108_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_108_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This section will cover part of the discussion of <a name="48"></a>Parfit s claims that we can have what matters to us in <a name="48"></a>survival without the need for identity. That is, if the individual who follows on from us experiences good things or fulfils our projects, then provided that individual is sufficiently close to us, or those projects are sufficiently close to ours, we will have what matters to us even if that individual is not  strictly-speaking  us. </li><li>The situation envisaged is where the <a name="48"></a>logic of identity  maybe as a result of fission  means that it is logically impossible that we should survive some vicissitude. In those circumstances it s not mere quibbles over identity that matter to us, but those benefits that are usually concomitant with identity. </li><li>It seems obvious that our survival matters to us, or at least some of the benefits of surviving matter to us. If we don t survive, we can have none of those benefits of survival. Such questions come up in trying to explain why <a name="48"></a>death is bad for the one who dies. </li><li>However, the question has been raised that some people (eg. those contemplating suicide) don t want to <a name="48"></a>persist, so persistence doesn t matter to them. I think it does  persistence matters, though maybe persisting doesn t. What I mean is that whether they persist or not matters to persons, who can anticipate  in a good or bad light, accurately or not  the future. If things get too bad (or are perceived to be that way), it may be important to them that they don t persist. In the normal case, it s important that they do. Either way, persistence matters to them. </li><li>Where I differ from (an interpretation of) Parfit is that it s not just my projects that matter to me. If I had a worthwhile project and I died before completing it  but someone else completed it for me (like Mozart s <em>Requiem</em> or "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_269.htm">Wittgenstein (Ludwig) - Philosophical Investigations</A>")  then  provided it was done competently  that would be a good thing. If this happened to all my outstanding projects, even those I d not started, that would be better. But it would not be as good as  or even the same thing as  my completing them myself. Sometimes the journey is as good as the arrival, and even where it isn t it is often an extra good. I would miss out. </li><li>Doubtless the source of the current debates on this topic, if they are still raging, is (relevant sections of) "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>".</li><li>Parfit s last major work sounds as though it ought to be relevant, and I ve purchased the four volumes, including the volume of interactions, but it has more to do with ethics rather than personal identity, and I suspect life will be too short for me to engage with it:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6355.htm">Parfit (Derek) - On What Matters: Volume One</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6356.htm">Parfit (Derek) - On What Matters: Volume Two</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6551.htm">Singer (Peter), Ed. - Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6550.htm">Parfit (Derek) - On What Matters: Volume Three</A>"</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_108_7">Links</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_108_7"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_108_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_108_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_108_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_108_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_108_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4718.htm">Cassam (Quassim) - Parfit on Persons</A>", Cassam</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3716.htm">Martin (Raymond) - Self Concern: Preface</A>", Martin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23102.htm">Martin (Raymond) - What really matters</A>", Martin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18372.htm">Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3506.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_542.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Lewis, Perry, and What Matters</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3583.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22152.htm">Parfit (Derek) - The Closest Continuer Schema</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3574.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Why Our Identity is Not What Matters</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_553.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Why Our Identity is Not What Matters (Excerpts)</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_540.htm">Rey (Georges) - Survival</A>", Rey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15139.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics - Alternative Approaches</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16542.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20869.htm">Tobia (Kevin Patrick) - Personal Identity and the Phineas Gage Effect</A>", Tobia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3623.htm">Unger (Peter) - Fission and the Focus of One's Life</A>", Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3618.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Psychological Approach To Our Survival</A>", Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3622.htm">Unger (Peter) - What Matters In Our Survival: Distinctions, Compromises and Limits</A>", Unger</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4968.htm">Agar (Nicholas) - Functionalism and Personal Identity</A>", Agar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3804.htm">Baillie (James) - Methodology Matters</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4760.htm">Brueckner (Anthony) - Parfit On What Matters In Survival</A>", Brueckner</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23365.htm">Butkovic (Ana) - Does Identity Really Matter? Parfit vs Lewis</A>", Butkovic</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5100.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Could Your Life Have Been Different?</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5101.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5076.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival?</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9313.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Rapid Psychological Change</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13017.htm">Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) - Reductionism about Persons; And What Matters</A>", Chappell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7578.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4130.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Our Minds and Other Minds</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20872.htm">Duncan-Jones (Austin) - Man's Mortality</A>", Duncan-Jones</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20403.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  Survival and Identity </A>", Funkhouser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4960.htm">Gendler (Tamar Szabo) - Personal Identity and Thought Experiments</A>", Gendler</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20937.htm">Gillett (Grant) - Brain Bisection and Personal Identity</A>", Gillett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9531.htm">Hershenov (David) & Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Personal identity and Purgatory</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4294.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Reasons and Reductionism</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5656.htm">Martin (Raymond) - Memory, Connecting and What Matters In Survival</A>", Martin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23102.htm">Martin (Raymond) - What really matters</A>", Martin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6616.htm">Martin (Raymond), Barresi (John) & Giovannelli (Alessandro) - Fission Examples in 18th and Early 19th century Personal Identity Debate</A>", Martin Etc.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5224.htm">McCall (Catherine) - Parfit's Theory of Personal Identity</A>", McCall</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7322.htm">Measor (Nicholas) - On What Matters in Survival</A>", Measor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20785.htm">Olson (Eric) - Self: Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_559.htm">Parfit (Derek) - The Unimportance of Identity</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5049.htm">Roberts (Melinda) - Lewis's Theory Of Personal Identity</A>", Roberts</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5125.htm">Sider (Ted) - All the World's a Stage</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5164.htm">Stone (Jim) - Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People</A>", Stone</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16819.htm">Stone (Jim) - Why there are still no people</A>", Stone</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11504.htm">Vasiliou (Iakovos) - Reality, What Matters, and The Matrix</A>", Vasiliou</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20873.htm">Velleman (David) - Identification and Identity</A>", Velleman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5174.htm">Wolf (Susan) - Self-Interest and Interest in Selves</A>", Wolf</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_108_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_108_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_108_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_108_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/05/2018 14:16:48<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 13.5: (I)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1179_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1179_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The subject of this note is the reference of  I , and whether linguistic usage and conve