<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Printable Note - Personal Identity - Research - Proposal (Theo Todman's Web Page) </title><link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <P ALIGN="Center"><FONT Size = 3 FACE="Arial"><B><HR>Theo Todman's Web Page<HR><p>For Text Colour-conventions (at end of page): <A HREF="#ColourConventions">Click Here</a></p><U>Personal Identity - Research - Proposal</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The <a name="48"></a><U>topic</U><SUP>1</SUP> I wish to <a name="48"></a><U>research</U><SUP>2</SUP> is  Personal Identity , with the <a name="48"></a><U>focus</U><SUP>3</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>4</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>5</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>6</SUP> on the <a name="48"></a><U>ontology</U><SUP>7</SUP> of, and persistence criteria for, human <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>8</SUP> and related <a name="48"></a><U>sortals</U><SUP>9</SUP>. Since it is a contingent fact that all existents that are universally agreed to be persons are members of the species homo <a name="48"></a><U>sapiens</U><SUP>10</SUP>, we must start with human beings in deciding what persons are. <BR><BR>I will scrutinise certain basic assumptions that I accept. Firstly, that the  identity involved in personal identity is the ordinary logical <a name="48"></a><U>notion</U><SUP>11</SUP>. Secondly, that some form of <a name="48"></a><U>physicalism</U><SUP>12</SUP> in the philosophy of mind is true and central to the topic. Thirdly, while it is analytic that survival involves identity, that what matters in <a name="48"></a><U>survival</U><SUP>13</SUP> is both <a name="48"></a><U>physical</U><SUP>14</SUP> & <a name="48"></a><U>psychological</U><SUP>15</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>continuity</U><SUP>16</SUP>. <BR><BR>In considering what a person is, I will need to consider <a name="48"></a><U>somatic</U><SUP>17</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>forensic</U><SUP>18</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>psychological</U><SUP>19</SUP> issues, and, in particular, focus on <a name="48"></a><U>self-consciousness</U><SUP>20</SUP> and the first-person <a name="48"></a><U>perspective</U><SUP>21</SUP>. I will need to consider semantic and <a name="48"></a><U>conceptual</U><SUP>22</SUP> issues as well as ontological issues. <BR><BR>I will focus on two views, namely <a name="48"></a><U>Animalism</U><SUP>23</SUP> and the Constitution <a name="48"></a><U>View</U><SUP>24</SUP>. I must consider just what Baker and others mean by  constitution , and evaluate the cogency of the supposedly knock-down  too many minds <a name="48"></a><U>argument</U><SUP>25</SUP> that Olson and others have raised against it. <BR><BR>Key questions are whether or not the concept of a person is a natural kind <a name="48"></a><U>concept</U><SUP>26</SUP>, and whether the various views take persons sufficiently <a name="48"></a><U>seriously</U><SUP>27</SUP>. That is, are persons no more than phase <a name="48"></a><U>sortals</U><SUP>28</SUP> of certain <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>29</SUP> or are they ontological novelties, as Baker suggests? <BR><BR>I will consider the usual problem cases, whether obtained from clinical <a name="48"></a><U>observation</U><SUP>30</SUP> or thought <a name="48"></a><U>experiment</U><SUP>31</SUP>, including brain transplant, <a name="48"></a><U>fission</U><SUP>32</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>fusion</U><SUP>33</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>duplication</U><SUP>34</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>replication</U><SUP>35</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>metamorphosis</U><SUP>36</SUP>. In particular, I want to compare <a name="48"></a><U>forward</U><SUP>37</SUP> and backward psychological continuity and the role of normal <a name="48"></a><U>causality</U><SUP>38</SUP> in preserving identity. However, I need to consider whether all talk of first-person perspectives depends on a, presumably non-existent, Cartesian <a name="48"></a><U>Ego</U><SUP>39</SUP>.<BR><BR>Since I m particularly averse to  closest <a name="48"></a><U>continuer </U><SUP>40</SUP> theories, I am tempted by <a name="48"></a><U>four-dimensionalism</U><SUP>41</SUP> and shared person-stages as a solution to some of the paradoxes where, otherwise, awkward choices have to be made. Since there are acknowledged difficulties for the perdurantist in not being able to <a name="48"></a><U>count</U><SUP>42</SUP> tokens of persons and other sortals, I need to address the attempted <a name="48"></a><U>solutions</U><SUP>43</SUP>.<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>44</SUP><BR><BR>I conclude this document (by way of an end-note) by considering the thought experiment of <a name="48"></a><U>teletransportation</U><SUP>45</SUP> to rehearse the key issues. I would need to repeat this exercise for all the favourites, including Unger s <a name="48"></a><U>Siliconisation</U><SUP>46</SUP> and Williams s <a name="48"></a><U>backup/restore</U><SUP>47</SUP>.<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>48</SUP><FONT COLOR = "000000"></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 26/09/2007 20:41:17<BR> </P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1: (Background)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> This study originated as a discussion document for my first (and only) tutorial when I was registered for the MPhilStud in 2005. I ve resurrected it as a research proposal, and added a fair amount of material, but the notes probably attempt too much at this stage. Additionally, I ve forgotten where the references are from, and haven t had time to hunt them out. The first few pages are probably important in the context of my current application. The notes are very much  work in progress . I ve removed all the acknowledgements of muddle that appeared in the immediately previous edition, but they are to be understood passim.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 2: (Research - Internet Technology)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Another of my interests is a metaphilosophical project to use internet technology in the service of philosophy. Already in this little document I have felt the need for many levels of footnoting. I wish to use this course of study as an experiment in implementing some ideas and developing some technology that s easy to use and freely available. It strikes me that any philosophical proposition is embedded in a host of other propositions held dear by its espouser, or depends on reasoning that's difficult to display in print. Cascading hyperlinks, contextual pop-ups and the like come to mind as potential aids to lucidity. Making such functions easy to generate and maintain would be difficult, so I see some prototyping coming along as part of my PhD scratch-work. Maybe the whole idea depends on epistemological foundationalism, but I think it s consistent with coherentism. Either way, it would rather mercilessly expose one's ignorance and biases. I understand that the thesis will have to be written up traditionally.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3: (Research - Focus)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Vastly more will be researched and written up than can be included in a 70,000-word thesis, though maybe some of this surfeit can be included in a book and in the above-mentioned internet site. <BR><BR>The issues in general philosophy that will require investigation in support of this research include:-<BR><ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a><U>Concepts</U><SUP>1</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Causation</U><SUP>2</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Change</U><SUP>3</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Consciousness</U><SUP>4</SUP></li><li>Free <a name="48"></a><U>Will</U><SUP>5</SUP></li><li>Intuition and Thought <a name="48"></a><U>Experiments</U><SUP>6</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Modality</U><SUP>7</SUP></li><li>Natural <a name="48"></a><U>Kinds</U><SUP>8</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Psychopathology</U><SUP>9</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Substance</U><SUP>10</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Time</U><SUP>11</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Vagueness</U><SUP>12</SUP></li><li>Etc & . </li></ul>Additionally, this project overlaps somewhat with a more ambitious one in the Philosophy of <a name="48"></a><U>Religion</U><SUP>13</SUP>.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.1 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 22: (Concepts)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 38: (Causality)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 16.3: (Change)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.11: (Consciousness)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.5: (Free Will)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_120_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_120_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This may be somewhat peripheral to my concerns, unless free-will should prove essential to our concept of a <a name="48"></a><U>PERSON</U><SUP>2</SUP>, as is alleged in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_207.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person</A>". </li><li>Maybe Dennett s views in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_85.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting</A>" will be of interest, following on from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_545.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood</A>". </li><li>The topic of future contingents was covered in my essay on <a name="48"></a><U>Aristotle s Sea Battle</U><SUP>3</SUP>. I ve not repeated the associated literature here. </li><li>Free will also features in discussions of backward <a name="48"></a><U>Time Travel</U><SUP>4</SUP>. </li><li>I cannot cover here the interesting topic of the  Free Will defence in theodicy to the problem of apparent gratuitous suffering, though relevant items will appear in the categorised reading-list below. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_120_5">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_120_5"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_120_6">include</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_120_6"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2368.htm">Ayer (A.J.) - Fatalism</A>", Ayer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22797.htm">Cave (Stephen) - The free-will scale</A>", Cave</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5086.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - Free Will</A>", Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6766.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Freedom and Determinism: Introduction</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22554.htm">Dresser (Sam) - How Camus and Sartre split up over the question of how to be free</A>", Dresser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_173.htm">Dupre (John) - The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will</A>", Dupre</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_205.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility</A>", Frankfurt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_207.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person</A>", Frankfurt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22671.htm">Frith (Christopher D.) - Our illusory sense of agency has a deeply important social purpose</A>", Frith</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12531.htm">Holt (James) - Target Article: Daniel M Wegner: The Illusion of Conscious Will 2002 MIT Press</A>", Holt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_133.htm">Lewis (David) - Are We Free to Break the Laws</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20233.htm">Marshall (Richard) & Churchland (Patricia) - Patricia Churchland: Causal Machines</A>", Marshall & Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3639.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Freedom</A>", Nagel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_182.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Moral Luck</A>", Nagel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_531.htm">Pink (Thomas) - Reason and Agency</A>", Pink</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6831.htm">Schopenhauer (Arthur) - Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will (extract)</A>", Schopenhauer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20447.htm">Smith (Quentin) - Time, Change and Freedom: Introduction</A>", Smith</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_529.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Freedom and Resentment</A>", Strawson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22517.htm">Tessman (Lisa) - Sometimes giving a person a choice is an act of terrible cruelty</A>", Tessman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_528.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7618.htm">Von Wachter (Daniel) - Free Agents as Cause</A>", von Wachter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_420.htm">Watson (Gary) - Free Agency</A>", Watson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2342.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A reading list <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_120_7">might start with</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_120_7"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_85.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_201.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Freedom Evolves</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6462.htm">Doyle (Robert O.) - Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy</A>", Doyle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6628.htm">Earman (John) - A Primer On Determinism</A>", Earman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_402.htm">Honderich (Ted) - How Free are You - The Determinism Problem</A>", Honderich</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_138.htm">Pink (Thomas) - The Psychology of Freedom</A>", Pink</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_405.htm">Rovane (Carol) - The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics</A>", Rovane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6308.htm">Smith (Quentin) & Oaklander (L. Nathan) - Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics</A>", Smith & Oaklander</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_48.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - An Essay on Free Will</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_51.htm">Watson (Gary), Ed. - Free Will: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", Watson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2713.htm">Wegner (Daniel) - The Illusion of Conscious Will</A>", Wegner<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12522.htm">Wegner (Daniel) - Precis and Peer Review of 'The Illusion of Conscious Will'</A>"</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>8</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_120_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_120_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_120_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_120_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve restricted the list almost exclusively to books, and not all of those in the categorised reading list are included! </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 19/02/2018 00:40:19<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.5.3: (Aristotle - Sea Battle)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> What follows is a pre-submitted BA Finals essay written February 2004 in my last year at Birkbeck. I have left the text untouched. <BR><BR> <b>  If it is true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, it is necessary that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow. How does Aristotle escape this consequence? </b><BR><ol type="I"><li>To answer this question we must address Chapter 9 of Aristotle s <em>De Interpretatione</em>. In [18a28-18b25], Aristotle gives the argument for fatalism. He follows this up with the consequences of and objections to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1166_1">fatalism</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1166_1"></A>. Finally [19a23-19b4] he gives his solution to the problem, the  traditional interpretation being that Aristotle denies that future <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1166_2">singulars</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1166_2"></A> have truth-values. </li><li><u><b>The argument for fatalism</b></u><ul type="disc"><li>The argument proceeds as follows: <ol type="1"><li>The past is unalterable. </li><li>Precisely one of the following statements is true: <ul type="square"><li>2.1 There will be a sea-battle tomorrow.</li><li>2.2 There will not be a sea-battle tomorrow. </li></ul></li><li>Whichever of 2.1 or 2.2 is true, it was true in the past. Without loss of generality, we ll assume 2.1.</li><li>Because the past is unalterable, we can now do nothing to make false the statement that was true in the past. </li><li>Hence, 2.1 is necessarily true, and the future is as unalterable as the past. </li></ol> </li><li>What support do we have for this interpretation from the text? Aristotle doesn t explicitly mention the unalterability of the past, but he does make use of arguments involving past truth at two points: <ul type="square"><li> If it is white or is not white, then it <u>was true</u> to say or deny this. [18b1] </li><li> Again, if it is white now it <u>was true</u> to say earlier that it would be white; so that it was <u>always true</u> to say of anything that has happened that it would be so. [18b9-10] </li></ul></li><li>Since the past has happened it was, in retrospect, always true to predict it. The hidden assumption here is that the past is unalterable. If the past could be changed, then a past true statement could be falsified and it would not have been possible to have made <u>necessarily</u> true predictions in the yet more remote past. <ul type="square"><li> It follows that nothing either is or is happening, or will be or will not be, by chance or as chance has it, but everything of necessity. [18b5-6] </li><li> But if it was always true to say that it was so, or would be so, it could not not be so, or not be going to be so & Everything that will be, therefore, happens necessarily. [18b11-12,15] </li></ul></li><li><u>Deliberation</u> about what to do is obviated because someone might in the past have made a true statement about our future, which would then be fixed [18b31-2]. Actual vocalisation of a truth-claim is not required. It s enough that someone <u>might</u> or <u>could</u> have said it [18b36-8]. Aristotle s conclusion [19a1-4] is again that truth-values necessitate states of affairs for the whole of time.</li><li>The question here is <u>why</u> Aristotle deduces the necessity of the future? For Aristotle, the truth-value of a past true statement is a fact about the past, and there s nothing we can do to change it, therefore making its claim about the future <u>necessary</u>. Aristotle sees symmetry between the past and the future. If statements about the future have fixed truth-values, then the future that corresponds to them must be fixed, just as if the past is fixed, the truth-values of more remote past predictions are fixed. </li><li>This covers most of the argument. We might, however, ask whether Aristotle <u>relies</u> on the argument from the fixity of the past, or whether this is merely a <u>supporting</u> consideration. Aristotle on numerous occasions demonstrates the assumption of a <u>correspondence theory of truth</u>  that if a statement is true (or false) the corresponding state of affairs that the statement is about must obtain (or not). This itself seems to imply fatalism on the assumption that future singulars have truth-values. We saw this at [18b11-12], but see <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1166_3">also</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1166_3"></A>: <ul type="square"><li> For if it is true to say that it is white or is not white, it is <u>necessary</u> for it to be white or not white. [18a39-18b1] </li><li> For what anyone has truly said would be the case <u>cannot not</u> happen [19a4-5] </li></ul></li><li>The causative direction is from fact to truth, and not vice-versa: <ul type="square"><li> So, since statements are true according to how the actual things are. [19a32] </li></ul> </li><li>The question is whether these passages introduce a modal fallacy (p &rarr; &#x2610p). While this depends on what strength Aristotle gives here to  necessary , the argument from the fixity of the past means that Aristotle need not rely on the brute assumption of a correspondence theory. </li></ul></li><li><u><b>Objections to fatalism</b></u><ul type="disc"><li>Aristotle, along with most of us, thinks that the future is open: chance and deliberation play a part in what the future will be. Deliberation, and not just action, brings things about [19a7-10]. What has not yet happened has the possibility of happening or not happening. Aristotle s example is of a cloak [19a11-15] that is expected to wear out, but may be prevented from so doing by being cut up first. Because deliberation <u>is</u> useful and the future <u>is</u> open Aristotle argues that it s obvious that there s something wrong with the fatalist s case. </li></ul></li><li><u><b>Aristotle s Solution</b></u><ul type="disc"><li>Since Aristotle seems to support the <u>logic</u> of the fatalist s argument, why does he reject its conclusion? Aristotle denies premise (2) of the argument. To see this, we need to return to the first paragraph of Chapter 9: <ul type="square"><li> [18a28] With regard to what is and what has been it is necessary for the affirmation or the negation to be true or false. [18a29] And with universals taken universally it is always necessary for one to be true and the other false, [18a31] and with particulars too, as we have said; [18a32] but with universals not spoken of universally it is not necessary. [18a33] But with particulars that are going to be it is different. </li></ul></li><li>Future singulars are going to be  different , but to what? The opening paragraph is dealing with the truth-values of contradictory pairs of statements. At this point we need to introduce what Whitaker [1996] calls the RCP (Rule of Contradictory Pairs): that precisely one of a pair of contradictory statements  such as our premise (2)  is true and the other false.</li><li>Ackrill [1963] takes [18a29-32] to be an expansion of [18a28], thereby giving [18a29] a different meaning to [18a28], of which it covers only a part (ie. excluding  universals not spoken of universally ). Consequently, [18a28] should be read as  & necessary that the affirmation (and equally that the negation) should be either true or false  that is, that each of a contradictory pair of statements must have a definite truth-value of truth or falsehood. [18a29], however, says additionally that <u>one</u> statement is true and the <u>other</u> false. Universals not spoken of universally are exceptional because both contradictories can be true, as Aristotle had previously shown in Chapter 7, [17b29-33].</li><li>Whitaker takes [18a28] <u>itself</u> to be a statement of RCP, elliptical for  & it is necessary either for the affirmation to be true and the negation false, or for the affirmation to be false and the negation true . This seems better to explain why Aristotle has  & affirmation <u>or</u> the negation ... , rather than  ... <u>and</u> &  , but otherwise explains [18a29-32] less comfortably.</li><li>However, in the course of the argument, Aristotle rejects the possibilities that both contradictories can be true ([18a38]) and that both can be false ([18b17]), so it doesn t matter which of the two alternative formulations we choose. Aristotle argues that contradictory pairs of future singulars fail to satisfy either PB (Principle of Bivalence)  the claim that every proposition is either true or false  or RCP  the claim that one is true and the other false. </li><li>The Chapter concludes with the rejection of RCP: <ul type="square"><li> Clearly, then, it is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one should be true and the other false. [19a39-19b2] </li></ul></li><li>That Aristotle sees RCP-violation as the problem is evident in: <ul type="square"><li> These and others like them are the absurdities that follow if it is necessary, for every affirmation and negation & that one of the opposites be true and the other false. [18b26-29] </li></ul></li><li>Consequently, we see that part of Aristotle s solution is the claim that, while for a contradictory pair of singulars about the present or the past, one must be true and the other false, this doesn t hold for similar statements about the future. With what does Aristotle replace the RCP? For Aristotle, actual things necessarily are. But they are only necessary once (or when) they happen: <ul type="square"><li> & to say that everything that is, is of necessity, <em>when</em> it is, is not the same as saying <em>unconditionally</em> that it is of necessity. [19a25-26] </li></ul></li><li>& and for chance events: <ul type="square"><li> & it is necessary for one or the other of the contradictories to be true or false  not, however, this one or that one, but as chance has it; or for one to be true <em>rather</em> than the other, yet not <em>already</em> true or false. [19a36-8] </li></ul></li><li>Aristotle concludes that contradictory pairs of statements initially lack, but later acquire, truth-values. </li></ul></li><li><u><b>Responses to Aristotle</b></u> <ul type="disc"><li>Does Aristotle <u>need</u> to conclude this? If we think not, we must either fault the fatalist argument (which Aristotle himself seems to accept, though he rejects its initial premise) or give another response. </li><li>There is a tempting response to fatalism that is incorrect, but instructive. We can view the situation in possible-worlds terminology, a vocabulary admittedly foreign to Aristotle. Just as in counterfactual situations, we consider possible worlds in which statements about the past that are true in the actual world are false, so we can think of possible worlds in which statements about the future that are true in the actual world are false. From this we can see that a true statement about the future is not <u>necessarily</u> true  there are possible worlds in which it is false; just as there are possible worlds in which true statements about the past are false. There is symmetry between past and future, but this doesn t imply fatalism.</li><li>However, this response is mistaken. The fatalist s claim is that now the past is unalterable and he has an argument that if this is so, then the future must be unalterable in just the same way: the future is necessary in the same way as the past. This is compatible with there being other possible worlds in which different things happen in the past, just as there are those in which different things happen in the future. Facts about the past are not logically necessary. </li><li>Aristotle himself recognises this. He mentions necessity 31 times in this Chapter, without being careful to distinguish its various forms. His basic understanding of necessity is given in [18b13-14]. Something is necessary if it is impossible for it not to occur. </li><li>Ackrill [1963] distinguishes three forms: <ol type="1"><li><b>Logical necessity</b>. A proposition may be analytic or the conclusion of a valid argument, cases that are themselves important to distinguish. </li><li><b>Causal necessity</b>. The necessity resulting from the operation of the laws of nature. This form of necessity is not explicitly mentioned in this Chapter. </li><li><b>Temporal necessity</b>. The unalterability of the past. </li></ol></li><li>Aristotle distinguishes  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1166_4">unconditionally necessity</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1166_4"></A>  probably causal  from temporal necessity: <ul type="square"><li> What is, necessarily is, <u>when it is</u>; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as saying <u>unconditionally</u> that it is of necessity. [19a23-5] </li></ul></li><li>Ayer and Lewis flatly reject Aristotle s solution of propositions acquiring truth-values. Both accept the timelessness of truth: <ul type="square"><li> & if something is so, it is so independently of the date at which it occurs. This is an application of the logical truism that if p, then p, no matter what proposition p may <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1166_5">be</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1166_5"></A>. </li></ul></li><li>Sorabji [1975] raises issues with this response, and suggests another possibility, which Ayer and Lewis also support. He argues that I <u>can</u> affect the past in cases such as that whereby I can make my previous birthday my last by committing suicide. I make the past statement  this is my last birthday true by making the facts correspond to it. Truth, like  last , is a relational term. We can make things  past statements  have been true. Sorabji thinks this, rather than showing the absence of power to do other than the past statement prophesies, merely shows the absence of its <u>exercise</u>. So, of a past true statement about the now future, we have the power both to make it have been true, but also the <u>unexercised</u> power to make it have been false. </li><li>We can, in certain circumstances, have backward causation. Present actions cannot cause past events, but present actions can make past statements true. My present action makes its past prediction true, rather than the truth of the past prediction necessitating my present action. If we accept the timelessness of truth, then this prediction was always true, so in what sense am I free not to perform the act? The answer is that I m free in every way that we normally think of as freedom. I have the wherewithal to do it and am uncoerced. I just act; and it s this that makes the past statement true. </li><li>Both Ayer and Lewis accept the symmetry between the past and the future, but deny the adverse consequences that Aristotle sees. Lewis argues that neither the past <u>nor the future</u> can be  changed : <ul type="square"><li>  You cannot change a present or future event from what it was originally to what it is after you change it. What you can do is change the present or the future from the unactualised way they would have been without some action of yours to the way they actually <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1166_6">are</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1166_6"></A> . </li></ul></li><li>According to Lewis, if you do think of unalterability as a kind of necessity, you mustn t think that this conflicts with freedom or contingency. In one sense, the future is unalterable, and so necessary, as is the past, but that doesn t mean that what we do now makes no difference to the future, or the past. We can causally affect both the future and the past, but we can t affect it if this would make it contrary to what it is.</li><li>Of course, if <u>causal determinism</u> is true, there is only one physically realisable world, given its initial conditions. In that case, the future would be physically closed, even though logically open. However, any discussion of causation is completely absent from Aristotle s fatalist argument. He is thinking only of logical and temporal, not causal necessity. </li></ul></li><li><u><b>Conclusion</b></u> <ul type="disc"><li>Aristotle escapes the conclusion that the truth of the statement that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow necessitates there being a sea-battle tomorrow by denying that it makes sense to claim either that there will be or will not be a sea-battle tomorrow. As yet, neither of these statements is true or false. However, Aristotle need not have made this concession, but could have argued that true predictions are made true by the contingent future events they predict. </li></ul></li><li><b><u>Bibliography</u></b> <ul type="disc"><li>Ackrill, J.L. 1963. <em>Aristotle s Categories and De Interpretatione</em>. Clarendon Press, Oxford.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12105.htm">Aristotle - De Interpretatione, Chapter 9</A>".</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_69.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Aristotle and the Sea Battle</A>", 1956.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2368.htm">Ayer (A.J.) - Fatalism</A>", 1973. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5546.htm">Frede (Dorothea) - The Sea-Battle Reconsidered: A Defence of the Traditional Interpretation</A>", 1985. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_58.htm">Lewis (David) - The Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>". 1976. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8884.htm">Sorabji (Richard) - Tomorrow's Sea Battle: An Argument From Past Truth (Int. 9)</A>", 1975. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5542.htm">Whitaker (C.W.A) - Contradictory Pairs</A>", 1996a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5538.htm">Whitaker (C.W.A) - The Third Exception to RCP; Future Singular Assertions</A>", 1996b</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5539.htm">Von Wright (Georg Henrik) - Omne Quod Est Quando Est Necesse Est Esse</A>", 1984. </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1166_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: [18b26-19a6] and [19a7-22]. <a name="On-Page_Link_1166_2"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 2</B>: Assertions (or denials) about a particular future event, such as the sea-battle in our question. <a name="On-Page_Link_1166_3"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 3</B>: And [18a35], [18b3] & [18b22].<a name="On-Page_Link_1166_4"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 4</B>: 2016: presumably this ought to read  unconditional necessity . <a name="On-Page_Link_1166_5"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 5</B>: Ayer [1973, p.238].<a name="On-Page_Link_1166_6"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 6</B>: [1976, p.150].</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 26/02/2004 20:55:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.7: (Modality)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_121_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_121_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Modality  the logic of possibility and necessity  is important to my thesis because discussions of Personal Identity often range over possible  rather than merely actual  events that an individual may encounter and which may call that individual s continued existence into doubt. </li><li>This is particularly the case with the numerous popular <a name="48"></a><U>thought experiments</U><SUP>2</SUP> (TEs), one of which  <a name="48"></a><U>Teletransportation</U><SUP>3</SUP>  has a link to this Note (the bungled duplication case, and what this has to say about the standard singular case).</li><li>Modality also features in the arguments over the <a name="48"></a><U>logic of identity</U><SUP>4</SUP>  in particular the standard view that Identity is a necessary relation, contra the heretical positions. </li><li>I doubt I need to get into Modal Realism <a name="48"></a><U>(Lewis</U><SUP>5</SUP>) or other discussions about what modality reduces to ontologically.</li><li>The same goes for the intricacies of Modal Logic, though a quick read through "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2076.htm">Girle (Rod) - Modal Logics and Philosophy</A>" might be beneficial. </li><li>I need to review my old notes on "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_441.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity</A>". </li><li>The topic found its way into an early note on the <a name="48"></a><U>Focus of my research</U><SUP>6</SUP>, but didn t find its way into <a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 4</U><SUP>7</SUP>, which deals with basic metaphysical issues. Maybe it should be there?</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_577.htm">Sturgeon (Scott) - Zombies and Ghosts</A>" has a useful categorisation of types of modality, and their relation to conceivability and genuine possibility. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_121_8">Links</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_121_8"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_121_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_121_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_121_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_121_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_121_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>There are lots of books and papers in the categorised reading list below, but I suppose the following are the ones to start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1931.htm">Hale (Bob) - Modality</A>", Hale, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5397.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Modality</A>", Hawley, 2004</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_505.htm">Jubien (Michael) - Modality</A>", Jubien, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1427.htm">MacBride (Fraser), Ed. - Identity and Modality</A>", MacBride, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1428.htm">Melia (Joseph) - Modality</A>", Melia, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7663.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking</A>", Williamson, 2005</li></ol></li><li>This is a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>11</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_121_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_121_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_121_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_121_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 26: (Natural Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.22: (Psychopathology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.9: (Substance)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.11: (Time)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I don t think I need to wade too deeply in the topic of time for the purposes of my thesis, but it s clearly central to the topic of diachronic identity, ie. identity over time.</li><li> Aspects of particular interest include:- <ol type="1"><li>The <a name="48"></a><U>endurantism</U><SUP>2</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>exdurantism</U><SUP>3</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>Perdurantism</U><SUP>4</SUP> debate. Perdurantism may solve the identity-related problems of <a name="48"></a><U>fission</U><SUP>5</SUP>, at least according to <a name="48"></a><U>Lewis</U><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Parfit s</U><SUP>7</SUP> contention that we should discount the concern we owe to our future selves proportionate to our likely lack of psychological connection.</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Time Travel</U><SUP>8</SUP>: maybe surprisingly, this alleged possibility appears in various <a name="48"></a><U>TEs</U><SUP>9</SUP> on <a name="48"></a><U>Fission</U><SUP>10</SUP>. I have given it its own Note and Reading List. <BR> </li></ol></li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_11">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_11"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_12">include</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_12"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2814.htm">Bais (Sander) - Very Special Relativity: An Illustrated Guide</A>", Bais</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23297.htm">Crull (Elise) - You thought quantum mechanics was weird: check out entangled time</A>", Crull</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20948.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Time and Space: Preface</A>", Dainton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20945.htm">Dyke (Heather) - Review of Craig Bourne's 'A Future for Presentism'</A>", Dyke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19244.htm">Hawking (Stephen) - Space and Time Warps</A>", Hawking</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7798.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Travels in Four Dimensions: Preface</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7811.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Travels in Four Dimensions: Concluding Thoughts</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1781.htm">Lewis (David) - The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17911.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Time</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_51.htm">McTaggart (J. McT. E.) - Time (The Unreality of Time)</A>", McTaggart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6963.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time: Preface</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6964.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time: Introduction and Summary</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6950.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II: Preface</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6951.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II: Introduction</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23277.htm">Rovelli (Carlo) - Hot black holes and the arrow of time</A>", Rovelli</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13156.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime: Preface for the Paperback Edition</A>", Sklar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17149.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime: Introduction</A>", Sklar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17154.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime: Epilogue</A>", Sklar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23279.htm">Torrengo (Giuliano) & Mariani (Cristian) - Review of James Harrington, 'Time: A Philosophical Introduction'</A>", Torrengo & Mariani</li></ol></li><li>I ve always thought it foolish to expatiate on the philosophy of time while in ignorance of special relativity, but this is a difficult <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_13">sub-sub-topic</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_13"></A>. </li><li>Thereafter, a reading list (where <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_14">not covered elsewhere</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_14"></A>) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20424.htm">Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Actualism and Thisness</A>", Adams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16821.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Temporal Reality</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16168.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Time</A>", Baker </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22623.htm">Besson (Corine) & Hattiangadi (Anandi) - The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion</A>", Besson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5270.htm">Bigelow (John) - Presentism and Properties</A>", Bigelow</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6536.htm">Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: A Philosophical Enquiry</A>", Botros</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6349.htm">Bourne (Craig) - A Future for Presentism</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_15">Bourne</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_15"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4112.htm">Campbell (Joseph Keim), O'Rourke (Michael) & Silverstein (Harry S.) - Time and Identity</A>", Campbell, etc. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22628.htm">Coope (Ursula) - Why Does Aristotle Say That There Is No Time without Change?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_16">Coope</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_16"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6388.htm">Craig (William Lane) - The Tensed Theory of Time</A>", Craig</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6387.htm">Craig (William Lane) - The Tenseless Theory of Time</A>", Craig</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6347.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Time and Space</A>", Dainton<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20906.htm">Oaklander (L. Nathan) - Review of Barry Dainton's 'Time and Space'</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22624.htm">Dyke (Heather) - McTaggart and the Truth about Time</A>", Dyke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22647.htm">Lebens (Samuel) & Goldschmidt (Tyron) - The Promise of a New Past</A>", Lebens & Goldschmidt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1449.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1159.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) & MacBeath (Murray), Eds. - The Philosophy of Time: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", LePoidevin & MacBeath</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6380.htm">Markosian (Ned) - A Defense of Presentism</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4325.htm">Markosian (Ned) - How Fast Does Time Pass?</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5893.htm">Markosian (Ned) - The Open Past</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22626.htm">Markosian (Ned) - The Truth About the Past and the Future</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13102.htm">McTaggart (J. McT. E.) - The Unreality of Time</A>", McTaggart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1420.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_103_17">Mellor</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_103_17"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14455.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Passage of Time</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14446.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Rate of Time s Passage</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22633.htm">Paul (L.A.) - Temporal Experience</A>", Paul</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_706.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - Papers on Time and Tense</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1772.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - Some Free Thinking About Time</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19880.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - Thank Goodness That's over</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1768.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - The Notion of the Present</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1465.htm">Putnam (Hilary) - Time and Physical Geometry</A>", Putnam</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6725.htm">Lizza (John) - Introduction: The Biological Paradigm of Death</A>", Rovelli</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1452.htm">Sattig (Thomas) - The Language and Reality of Time</A>", Sattig</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_54.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Time Without Change</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5013.htm">Sider (Ted) - Against Presentism</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4436.htm">Sider (Ted) - Presentism and Ontological Commitment</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22637.htm">Skow (Bradford) - On the meaning of the question 'How fast does time pass?'</A>", Skow</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22651.htm">Skow (Bradford) -  One Second Per Second </A>", Skow</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4441.htm">Smart (J.C.C.) - The River of Time</A>", Smart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4442.htm">Smart (J.C.C.) - Spatialising Time</A>", Smart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22627.htm">Sullivan (Meghan) - Change We Can Believe In (and Assert)</A>", Sullivan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22645.htm">Sullivan (Meghan) - The minimal A-theory</A>", Sullivan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22643.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Beginning of the Universe</A>", Swinburne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20972.htm">Taylor (Richard) - Space and Time</A>", Taylor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20973.htm">Taylor (Richard) - The Relativity of Time and Space</A>", Taylor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20974.htm">Taylor (Richard) - Temporal Passage</A>", Taylor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4452.htm">Williams (Donald C.) - The Myth of Passage</A>", Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6633.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence and Presentism</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1782.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8467.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and  Taking Tense Seriously </A>", Zimmerman </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>18</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_103_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_103_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_103_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_103_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Books / Chapters to read would include:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6346.htm">Davies (Paul C.W.) - About Time: Einstein's Unfinished Revolution</A>", Davies<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2022.htm">French (A.P.) - Special Relativity</A>", French<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19875.htm">Godfrey-Smith (William) - Special Relativity and the Present</A>", Godfrey-Smith<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22630.htm">Maxwell (Nicholas) - Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?</A>", Maxwell <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22629.htm">Maxwell (Nicholas) - Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible?</A>", Maxwell<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17186.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Special Relativity and Present Truth</A>", Mellor<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2021.htm">Rindler (Wolfgang) - Introduction to Special Relativity</A>", Rindler<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4431.htm">Savitt (Steven) - There's No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime)</A>", Savitt<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2023.htm">Schutz (Bernard) - A First Course in General Relativity</A>", Chapter 1, Schutz<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22634.htm">Skow (Bradford) - Relativity and the Moving Spotlight</A>", Skow<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4448.htm">Stein (Howard) - A Note on Time and Relativity Theory</A>", Stein<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4447.htm">Stein (Howard) - On Einstein-Minkowski Space-Time</A>", Stein<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1145.htm">Taylor (Edwin F.) & Wheeler (John Archibald) - Spacetime Physics - Introduction to Special Relativity</A>", Taylor<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4451.htm">Weingard (Robert) - Relativity and the Reality of Past and Future Events</A>", Weingard</li><li>Plus the occasional item in the  already read list! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_103_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Ie. works cited above, or those related to Persistence or Time travel.</li><li>I have considered all the references in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17911.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Time</A>", acquired what I can, and listed them all one way or another in this Note where they are not pre-emptively relevant to the above topics. </li><li>There appears to be a distressingly large number of books on this list!</li><li>I note a further bunch, which I ll decide on in due course:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21286.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - On the Mind-Dependence of Temporal Becoming</A>", Baker<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21287.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Temporal Becoming: The Argument from Physics</A>", Baker<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21583.htm">Kripke (Saul) - A Puzzle about Time and Thought</A>", Kripke<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19901.htm">Lombard (Lawrence B.) - On the Alleged Incompatibility of Presentism and Temporal Parts</A>", Lombard<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_509.htm">Lucas (J.R.) - The Future - An Essay on God, Temporality and Truth</A>", Lucas<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19903.htm">Markosian (Ned) - On Language and the Passage of Time</A>", Markosian<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19870.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - The Self from Time to Time</A>", Mellor<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2009.htm">Myro (George) - Identity and Time</A>", Myro<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20570.htm">Oaklander (L. Nathan) - Time and Identity</A>", Oaklander<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22048.htm">Over (D.E.) - On a Temporal Slippery Slope Paradox</A>", Over<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19907.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - On the Experience of Time</A>", Russell<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5124.htm">Savitt (Steven) - The Replacement of Time</A>", Savitt<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17200.htm">Schlesinger (George N.) - How Time Flies</A>", Schlesinger<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2887.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime</A>", Sklar<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16159.htm">Stump (Eleonore) & Kretzmann (Norman) - Eternity</A>", Stump<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21820.htm">Torrengo (Giuliano) - Feeling the Passing of Time</A>", Torrengo<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22413.htm">Torrengo (Giuliano) - The Myth of Presentism s Intuitive Appeal</A>", Torrengo<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4086.htm">Trupp (Andreas) - Time</A>", Trupp<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12807.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - Time and the Horizon</A>", Valberg<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20470.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Temporality</A>", Van Inwagen </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_103_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Maybe read "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20943.htm">Bourne (Craig) - A Theory of Presentism</A>" before / instead. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_103_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Also:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4895.htm">Coope (Ursula) - Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14</A>", and<BR>&rarr; <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1166.htm">My essay on Aristotle s future Sea Battle</a> </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_103_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>As this supercedes "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1160.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time</A>", the latter may not be worth reading.</li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 28/07/2018 13:35:02<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.11.8: (Time Travel)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1133_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1133_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>From the perspective of Personal Identity, Time travel enters into various <a name="48"></a>thought experiments. It is sometimes taken as a knock-down argument against <a name="48"></a>Endurantism, because if you travel back in time to talk to your former self, it doesn t look as though you can be wholly present at a particular time, as different  time slices of  you are located in different places at the same time. </li><li><a name="48"></a>Perdurantism isn t worried by this TE, though it would seem to make the topology of the spacetime worms rather complex (and scattered). </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1133_5">Links</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1133_5"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1133_Links.htm">Click here</a>. It s a useful list, but there are too many items to treat all of them. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1133_6">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1133_6"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1133_7">include</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1133_7"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7730.htm">Bricker (Phillip) - Review of LePoidevin's 'Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time'</A>", Bricker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20895.htm">Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel</A>", Ehring </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16619.htm">Flint (Thomas P.) & Freddoso (Alfred J.) - Maximal Power</A>", Flint & Freddoso</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_482.htm">Grey (William) - Troubles with Time Travel</A>", Grey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20907.htm">Harrison (Jonathan) - Analysis Problem No. 18: 'Jocasta's Crime'</A>", Harrison</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17911.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Time</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22888.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Sorry, Time Travellers: You Can't Change the Past</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20904.htm">Richmond (Alasdair) - Philosophy of Time Travel Course Guide 2014/15</A>", Richmond</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19191.htm">Richmond (Alasdair) - Time Travel and Philosophy</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1133_8">Richmond</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1133_8"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7040.htm">Varzi (Achille) - Time-Travel</A>", Varzi</li></ol></li><li>As for a reading-list:- <ol type="i"><li>There are three SEP articles:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19233.htm">Arntzenius (Frank) & Maudlin (Tim) - Time Travel and Modern Physics</A>", Arntzenius & Maudlin<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17912.htm">Earman (John) & Wuthrich (Christian) - Time Machines</A>", Earman & Wuthrich<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22736.htm">Smith (Nicholas J.J.) - Time Travel</A>", Smith</li><li>Next, it may be best to start with an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1133_9">issue of the Monist</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1133_9"></A><BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7049.htm">Horacek (David) - Time Travel In Indeterministic Worlds</A>", Horacek<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7042.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - The Cheshire Cat Problem And Other Spatial Obstacles To Backwards Time Travel</A>", LePoidevin<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7048.htm">Savitt (Steven) - Time Travel And Becoming</A>", Savitt<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7041.htm">Sider (Ted) - Traveling In A- And B- Time</A>", Sider<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7043.htm">Simon (Jonathan) - Is Time Travel A Problem For The Three-Dimensionalist?</A>", Simon<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7044.htm">Slater (Matthew H.) - The Necessity Of Time Travel (On Pain Of Indeterminacy)</A>", Slater<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7046.htm">Smith (Nicholas J.J.) - Why Would Time Travelers Try To Kill Their Younger Selves?</A>", Smith<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7047.htm">Stevenson (Gordon Park) - Time Travel, Agency, And Nomic Constraint</A>", Stevenson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7045.htm">Vranas (Peter B.M.) - Do Cry Over Spilt Milk: Possibly You Can Change The Past</A>", Vranas</li><li>Otherwise, focusing on papers linking time travel to (personal) identity concerns:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20897.htm">Dowe (Phil) - The Case for Time Travel</A>", Dowe<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20896.htm">Dowe (Phil) - The Coincidences of Time Travel</A>", Dowe<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14933.htm">Gilmore (Cody) - Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence</A>", Gilmore<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17190.htm">Horwich (Paul) - On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>", Horwich<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_58.htm">Lewis (David) - The Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>", Lewis<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20916.htm">Meiland (Jack W.) - A Two-Dimensional Passage Model of Time for Time Travel</A>", Meiland<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12398.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Time travel and the Open Future</A>", Miller<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23006.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Travelling in Time</A>", Miller<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20898.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time</A>", Miller<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4964.htm">Sider (Ted) - Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals</A>", Sider<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20914.htm">Smith (Nicholas J.J.) - Bananas Enough for Time Travel?</A>", Smith<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20311.htm">Vihvelin (Kadri) - What Time Travelers Cannot Do</A>", Vihvelin<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20899.htm">Wright (John) - Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel</A>", Wright</li><li>The categorised reading-list below lists even more items (as well as the above). This topic isn t central enough to my concerns for me to pursue them. </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1133_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1133_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1133_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1133_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1133_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: A useful course. <a name="On-Page_Link_1133_9"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Monist, July 2005, Vol. 88 Issue 3. </li><li>Items already read are not in this list, but appear above. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 28/07/2018 12:24:29<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.12: (Vagueness)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Vagueness is a wide and interesting area of enquiry, but I need to be careful to stay on topic, namely restrict most of my investigations to areas relevant to personal identity. So, <BR>&rarr; While there can be clear paradigm cases it may be vague (ie. uncertain, or indeterminate) whether some particular instance is a paradigm case. <BR>&rarr; There can be vague boundaries to the concept <a name="48"></a><U>person</U><SUP>2</SUP>. <BR>&rarr; Also, maybe there can be persons of varying degrees. <BR>&rarr; Maybe some higher mammals possess many of the qualities of persons, but to a reduced degree. </li><li>There will be some overlap between this Note and two others:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Vague Identity</U><SUP>3</SUP>, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Indeterminate Identity</U><SUP>4</SUP>. </li><li>Additionally, there is a link between this Note and yet two others:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Problem of the Many</U><SUP>5</SUP>, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Sorites</U><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_443.htm">Evans (Gareth) - Can There Be Vague Objects?</A>", Evans</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3744.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Identity and Vagueness</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7170.htm">Hossack (Keith) - Vagueness and Personal Identity</A>", Hossack</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23024.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13111.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought</A>", Robinson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22834.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - On vagueness, or, when is a heap of sand not a heap of sand?</A>", Williamson</li></ol></li><li>Given that this topic is slightly tangential to my main topic, and the literature is vast, I need to be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_9">highly selective</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_9"></A>. So, a reading list (where not covered <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_122_10">elsewhere</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_122_10"></A>) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16167.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Metaphysical Vagueness</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4287.htm">Greenough (Patrick) - Vagueness: A Minimal Theory</A>", Greenough</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5395.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Vagueness</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3628.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Vagueness and Composition</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_33.htm">Keefe (Rosanna) & Smith (Peter) - Vagueness: A Reader</A>", Keefe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22035.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Varieties of Vagueness</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23032.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Blocking the path from vagueness to four dimensionalism</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6112.htm">Sainsbury (Mark) - What Is a Vague Object?</A>", Sainsbury</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19830.htm">Sider (Ted) - Against Vague and Unnatural Existence - Reply to Liebesman and Eklund</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20749.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Why Vagueness Is A Mystery</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6290.htm">Varzi (Achille) - Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness</A>", Varzi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3264.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness</A>", Williamson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11611.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Williamson</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>11</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_122_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_122_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>In this case, with some overlap with the notes just noted!</li><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_122_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_122_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>So, I ve selected the standard reader and papers / chapters by my favourite authors that might be included under other topics. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_122_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>In particular, those covered under the Notes on Vague and Indeterminate Identity, or in the  already read list above. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 17/01/2018 13:43:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 3.13: (Religion)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This Note doesn t directly relate to my studies in the Philosophy of Religion, which has its own set of pages on my website, and quarterly <a name="48"></a>Status Report.</li><li>Rather this Note has to do with the  historical and contemporary  ways in which religious questions and commitments have influenced philosophers in their discussions of personal identity. </li><li>I disagree fundamentally with philosophers such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/P/Author_Plantinga (Alvin).htm">Alvin Plantinga</A> that belief in God is  epistemologically basic , but claim that philosophy asks questions that are prior to any others, except <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_3">metaphilosophical questions</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_3"></A>.</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Locke</U><SUP>4</SUP> s thoughts on personal identity were initially motivated by worries about the metaphysics of <a name="48"></a><U>Resurrection</U><SUP>5</SUP>, theodicy and other <a name="48"></a><U>forensic</U><SUP>6</SUP> concerns. </li><li>I ve noted elsewhere contemporary <a name="48"></a><U>Christian Materialist</U><SUP>7</SUP> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_8">Philosophers</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_8"></A> and their thoughts on the topic of personal identity. </li><li>I ve not yet made much of a study of Jewish views where these diverge from Christian views. </li><li>No doubt Muslim philosophers have similar concerns and motivations, but I have not investigated them (yet). </li><li>I have, however, had a brief look at Hindu and <a name="48"></a><U>Buddhist</U><SUP>9</SUP> thought on the topic of <a name="48"></a><U>Reincarnation</U><SUP>10</SUP> and Karma. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_11">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_11"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_118_12">include</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_118_12"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>13</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_118_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_118_3"></A><B>Footnote 3</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Which are also philosophical, so part of philosophy itself. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_118_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The Note on Christian Materialism also references other contemporary philosophers with Christian affiliation, and their thoughts on personal identity. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_118_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_118_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 4: (Research - Distractions)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> While I m admitting to potential distractions, I must mention another, which is to get an MSc in mathematics by the time I m 60. While this wouldn t start until I d completed my PhD, a fair amount of  warming up would be required in parallel. I'd like to do some philosophy of mathematics one day, but my handling of the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos was a complete disaster, so abject that I'm in need of some rehabilitation (on the grounds that those that can t do shouldn t philosophise). I'd been tempted to return to chess and bridge, but these are fundamentally a waste of time, and I'm hopeful that mathematics (pursued at a much more leisurely pace than the cracking one Cambridge required of its unfortunate undergraduates) might press the same buttons. Maybe being good at mathematics (in the "Cambridge" sense), like being able to play the violin in tune, is just a special skill that some people have and others can never acquire; and that if you don't have it, you should just concentrate on the talents you do have. What worries me is that philosophy is much less constrained by the merciless exposure of falsehoods or rewarded by the discovery of certain truths, and that the discipline of mathematics might be a good foil. Yet people who've excelled in both mathematics and philosophy (eg. Pascal, Leibniz, Russell) don t seem to have treated philosophy as a poor relation. The two disciplines involve, however, completely different ways of thinking - from the narrowest to the widest possible focus.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/08/2007 10:17:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5: (Thesis - Method & Form)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u>Form of the Argument</u><ol type="1"><li>The thesis will present an abductive argument (as in my <A HREF="../../../Dissertation - POSA.pdf" TARGET="_top">BA Dissertation</A>  Poverty of Stimulus Arguments for Innate Grammar ), that is, an inference to the best explanation of the data. </li><li>That s why I have to consider so many aspects of the subject, so many thought <a name="48"></a><U>experiments</U><SUP>1</SUP> and so much <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_6_2">clinical</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_6_2"></A> <a name="48"></a><U>data</U><SUP>3</SUP>. Into which story does it all best fit? </li><li>I may have to reject some recalcitrant thought experiments as ill-formed, but I do not wish to ignore anything significant. </li><li>For some time, I have considered Animalism as the most likely account of what human beings are, and I propose this thesis to evaluate the arguments for and against it, using the rival  Constitution View as a foil. </li></ol><BR><u>Method</u> <ul type="disc"><li>Over the years I have read a lot of books and papers on the topic of Personal Identity. <ol type="1"><li>For some, I have made extensive on-line write-ups. </li><li>For others, the write-up is incomplete, or sketchy. </li><li>For yet others, I have (more or less) extensively annotated the margin (in so doing ruining many an expensive volume!). </li><li>Finally, some have simply been read (and probably forgotten). </li></ol></li><li>I have also written numerous Notes on almost every aspect of the subject, though many of them are place-holders awaiting filling-out. These Notes link to the Books and Papers, either explicitly or thematically, and to one another. </li><li>Follow this <a name="48"></a><U>Link</U><SUP>4</SUP> for an explanation of the various Objects in my Research database, though the Note needs updating in the light of changes since 2010. </li><li>All this has resulted in a huge unfocussed cobweb of material, which needs to be subjected to some order and completeness. This has started by outlining the Chapters of the <a name="48"></a><U>Thesis</U><SUP>5</SUP>, and specifying the limited subset of the problem I intend to address in detail. </li><li>For most Chapters, my approach to producing the first draft of the Chapter will be as follows:- <ol type="1"><li>Determine which Notes that I have written are relevant to this Chapter.</li><li>Fill out any Note-place-holders with whatever s in my head!</li><li>Use the reading lists associated with these Notes to establish a limited reading list for the Chapter.</li><li>Review whatever I ve written, in whatever format, on the items in the derived reading lists, and make necessary cosmetic changes in the process of evaluating the items. </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_6_6">Segregate</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_6_6"></A> this reading list into:-<BR>& Higher versus lower priority,<BR>& Read versus unread,<BR>& Annotated (by hand) versus unannotated<BR>& Those with an Abstract or Note Write-up versus those without</li><li>Cull items that are unlikely to be addressed in the next two years and list them as specifically excluded. I may pick up on these at a later stage of the project, but in the short term the culling process will be essential for making across-the-board progress. </li><li>Determine why the residue are important and relevant  if they are  and briefly document the reasons. </li><li>Migrate any Book or Paper Abstracts that I have written (as distinct from copied from elsewhere) to Write-Up Notes. </li><li>If the Book or Paper is important enough, migrate any hand-written annotations to a Write-Up Note, and complete any important incomplete Write-Up Notes. </li><li>Write and maintain a Chapter Summary, motivating and summarising the Chapter. Use this to ensure I don t get side-tracked. </li><li>Incorporate the key points of Write-Up Notes into the Topic Notes. </li><li>Incorporate the highest level thoughts from the Topic Notes into the Main Text of the Chapter. </li></ol></li><li>In principle, these actions should be effected in number sequence, though there will be some iteration, particularly with the last point, which presents my research findings in their most accessible form for outside interested parties.</li><li>There are many important papers that are on the reading lists that I have not read. At this stage, I do not intend to read them until I have processed all those papers that I have read. This will require discipline!</li><li>Most of the  detailed working of the Chapter should be retained in the topic Notes and Write-ups. The Chapter should be fairly high-level at this stage, with hyperlinks to more detailed or supportive work.</li><li>I need to have some method of evidencing how far along this trial I have got for each Chapter, but this can wait until there is some progress to report. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_6_2"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 2</B>: I am unsure how much of this I have actually attended to  but it is important to keep it in mind. <a name="On-Page_Link_6_6"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 6</B>: I need to develop a method for this  one probably variable depending on the length of the list. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 22/07/2014 22:23:31<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.1 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 30: (Clinical Observations)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.4: (Website Generator Documentation - Database Objects)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Most of the papers in this website are made up of hyperlinked Notes, which are small sections of text which themselves link to other Notes, and so on. Such documents are supposed to be viewed on-line, but I recognise that not everyone likes to read in this way. In particular, while this is a good way of chasing up details of an argument, it can be difficult to see the overall picture. It is also difficult to scribble in the margins of a web-page. So, printable versions will be required until technology for marginal annotation improves (but note that you can copy and paste my printable versions into MS Word and annotate those if you want to save trees). <BR><BR>There are several parameters (explained below) that are accounted for in the file-name of the printed Note:- <ol type="1"><li>The depth of scan.</li><li>Whether the Printed Note is archived. </li><li>Whether all inter-Note references are indicated. </li><li>Whether Private Notes are printed. </li><li>Whether Reading Lists are included. </li></ol>There are, in general, hyperlinks to an appropriate selection of printable Notes that satisfy these options. <BR><BR>Within the printable note itself, there are no  inter-Note hyperlinks, though the links to external websites and to Book and Paper summaries within the reading lists work. <BR><BR>A straight print of a frames-based page only prints the first page, which is why most professional sites have printable versions of their pages to allow printing of the full document, and without the other frames interfering. My printable pages do this, of course, but the main difficulty is to print the footnotes (pages hyperlinked to within the site: I don't make any attempt to print the results of linking to external sites). <BR><BR>Printing all the footnotes associated with the main Note precisely once in a sensible sequence is a particular challenge. This is firstly because (intentionally or otherwise) a referential loop may occur. Secondly, we don't want to print the same note more than once if it is referred to on multiple occasions (which is part of the point of having separable notes in the first place). Finally, we don't necessarily want to print Notes when they first appear, but in some sort of sensible sequence.<BR><BR><U><B>Depth of Scan</U></B><BR>To address the first of these problems, I have introduced a depth of scan, so that we don't loop endlessly. This also allows topics to be looked at in greater or lesser depth. Consequently, several printed Notes may appear for the same underlying Note. Also, where a Note in another Notes Group is referenced, I only print the Note itself, not its footnotes. This is to avoid the printed Notes ballooning with irrelevancies.<BR><BR><U><B>Inter-Note Referencing</U></B><BR>Secondly, I only print footnotes once within any particular printed Note. There are two options. In the first, all the footnote indicators appear as in the on-screen version as superscripts (subscripts in the case of private notes which don t appear on the published website), but those that are duplicated refer forward or backward to where the footnote actually appears. Since this can lead to a lot of clutter in certain circumstances, I have an alternative view whereby (for a footnote that's "not printed here") both the subscript / superscript and the  Note forwarding Note are omitted. There are then gaps in the sequencing of the superscripts. I ve decided to leave this in to alert the reader to the existence of the omitted references. The alternative  all footnotes showing view can be consulted it required. <BR><BR>The referencing convention is effectively the Tractatus standard, but with full-stops separating the level of references. So, the 5th footnote on the main form appears as Footnote 5: (Title); the 3rd footnote on that note appears as Footnote 5.3: (Title2); the 7th footnote on that note as Footnote 5.3.7 (Title3); and so on. <BR><BR>Deciding when to print a Note is an art in itself. Currently all I do is print the Note in the place in which it appears as high up the hyperlinking hierarchy as possible. I ought probably to take into account the fact that each Note has encoded a  Natural parent, and print it below that parent where possible; but I ve not done this yet. <BR><BR><U><B>Archived Notes</U></B><BR>The Notes pages are dynamic, but each time a Note is changed, the previous version is archived and can be accessed by a hyperlink at the bottom of the Note. This version crystallises the view at that time (ie. all the Notes linked-to from that archived Note are the currently latest archived versions; to achieve this, a Note is archived as soon as it is entered. The printable versions follow this pattern, and earlier versions archived whenever the main Note is changed (this is still work in progress as I can t store printable versions of all Notes, to any depth, each time anything within range changes. Or at least I don t think so.) <BR><BR><U><B>Private Notes</U></B><BR>There are two  privacy systems in operation. The first allows me to flag a Note as private, in which case a polite message appears on the public site. The second method is to put the Note in a password-protected area. I have a flag that allows printed Notes to include or exclude  flagged as Private Notes. I think a Note in the secure area would print if it were referred to by a Note from a non-Secure area. <BR><BR><U><B>Reading Lists</U></B><BR>Some Notes have associated reading lists. These arise either because the Note (or a referenced Note within the depth of scan) directly references a Book or Paper, or indirectly via the association between the Note Title, and the Sub-Topic of the Books and Papers. A list of papers (together with hyperlinks to the Paper or Book summaries within the website is produced. This element is currently under development, as the lists (in author sequence) are very long. Currently, a reference appears if it is directly cited, or priority 1-3 within the first level of hyperlinking, or priority 1 below that. Consequently, I ve allowed the Notes to be printed with or without reading lists. <BR><BR>Note that all this is an on-going research project.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 13/01/2015 19:07:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.5: (Thesis - Outline)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The Thesis seems to fall naturally into three sections (other than the Introduction and Conclusion); namely, Chapters 2-5 (setting up the problem), chapters 6-9 (Olson and Baker s views contrasted); and Chapters 10-11 (testing the preferred solution). Consequently, I anticipate my Thesis having the following chapters:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 01</U><SUP>1</SUP>: Introduction</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 02</U><SUP>2</SUP>: <a name="48"></a><U>What are We</U><SUP>3</SUP>?</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 03</U><SUP>4</SUP>: What is a Person?</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 04</U><SUP>5</SUP>: Basic Metaphysical Issues</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 05</U><SUP>6</SUP>: Persistence and Time</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 06</U><SUP>7</SUP>: Animalism and Arguments for It</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 07</U><SUP>8</SUP>: The Constitution View and Arguments for It</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 08</U><SUP>9</SUP>: Arguments against Animalism</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 09</U><SUP>10</SUP>: Arguments against the Constitution View</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 10</U><SUP>11</SUP>: Thought Experiments</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 11</U><SUP>12</SUP>: Resurrection</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Chapter 12</U><SUP>13</SUP>: Conclusion</li></ol>I ve started a <a name="48"></a><U>Note</U><SUP>14</SUP> listing  parked future reading. <BR><BR>For convenience, brief abstracts (as currently intended) of the above chapters are given below. I have included hyperlinks in the above list to my initial thoughts on these topics (and to reading lists and plans for further research) by way of further clarification. I ve also included links from the  Thought Experiment abstract below, for the same reason. The reading lists are rather full, and I ll need to whittle them down to those I actually intend to read (and, better, address). <BR><BR><B><U>Chapter abstracts</B></U><BR><ol type="1"><li><B>Introduction</B>: Something like this document, but in narrative form, maybe including a brief historical general survey of Personal Identity. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a><U>What are We</U><SUP>15</SUP>? </B>: The topic  personal identity has historically presupposed that we are (in the sense of  identical to , or  most fundamentally ) persons, whereas I (along with other animalists) claim that we are identical to human animals.  We requires explanation. This chapter will sort out the topic of discussion for the Thesis as a whole. </li><li><B>What is a Person?</B>: This Chapter will canvass the various views and consider how important issues in this area are to my main concern of our identity. </li><li><B>Basic Metaphysical Issues</B>: Substances and sortals are central to the persistence of anything, and in particular to my claim that persons are phase sortals of human animals (the substances). I need to address the concept of a SOUL as souls are the major counter-claim to the persisting entity being an animal; or at least popularly so. The question of Natural Kinds arises in considering whether PERSON is a natural kind concept. </li><li><B>Persistence and Time</B>: A number of thought experiments that feature in the following chapter seem to fail if perdurantism is true (because the reduplication objections fail). Depending on whether any of these are critical to my arguments, I may need to consider the impact of perdurantism. But this complex area may be a step too far within a fairly limited word-count. I m also unsure whether it should feature before or after the account of Thought Experiments. </li><li><B>Animalism and Arguments for it</B>: This Chapter describes what Animalism is, with an excursus on animals and organisms and their persistence. It puts forward the arguments in favour of animalism, those against being reserved for a later Chapter. It focuses on the account of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A>, the primary contemporary exponent of Animalism. </li><li><B>The Constitution View and Arguments for it</B>: This Chapter gives an account of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> s thesis that human persons are not identical to human animals, but are  temporarily at least  constituted by them. </li><li><B>Arguments against Animalism</B>: A discussion of the arguments against animalism, as given by those of anti-animalist persuasion and defended by the principal animalists (with a focus on Olson), with a critique. </li><li><B>Arguments against the Constitution View</B>: A discussion of the arguments against the Constitution View, focusing on the principal animalists, with a critique. In particular, I intend to critique Olson s <a name="48"></a><U> thinking animal argument</U><SUP>16</SUP> against the Constitution View (though I think this argument is unnecessary for Olson to establish the case for Animalism).</li><li><B>Thought Experiments</B>: Any account of personal identity needs to give an account of what is going on in the various thought experiments that have been thought relevant to the topic. It s also the area that s most fun. Indeed, I think that the entire Thesis will be an exercise in inference to the best explanation. It needs to account for our intuitions (if there is a universal response) or explain them away as confused. I will firstly briefly consider the propriety of using thought experiments in this domain of enquiry, and then consider the usual suspects, such as: <ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a><U>Fission</U><SUP>17</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>fusion</U><SUP>18</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>replication</U><SUP>19</SUP> in general</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Commissurotomy</U><SUP>20</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Multiple Personality Disorder</U><SUP>21</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Brain-state Transfer</U><SUP>22</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Brain Transplants</U><SUP>23</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Teletransportation</U><SUP>24</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Siliconisation</U><SUP>25</SUP></li><li>Etc?</li></ul></li><li><B>Resurrection</B>: If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection. Since the body is destroyed at death, it would seem that any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong. Consideration of arguments by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A> in this respect. This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued, and factually correct concerning what is actually believed by intellectually Christians and Muslims (unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion). Maybe I should also cover reincarnation. </li><li><B>Conclusion</B>: Brief summary of the above; <ul type="disc"><li>We are human animals, </li><li>Human persons fall under phase sortals of the concept HUMAN ANIMAL,</li><li>The person is inseparable from the animal, </li><li>The animal is utterly destroyed at death, </li><li>Substance dualism is false, and </li><li>Consequently (given the sort of thing we are) resurrection or any other post-mortem survival is impossible for us. </li></ul></li></ol></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/04/2018 00:12:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.5.1: (Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction))</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><b>Abstract</u></b><ul type="disc"><li>The Thesis seems to fall naturally into three sections (other than this Introduction and the Conclusion); namely, <ol type="1"><li>Setting up the problem (Chapters 2-5), </li><li>Olson and Baker s views contrasted (Chapters 6-9); and </li><li>Testing the preferred solution (Chapters 10-11). </li></ol></li><li>Consequently, I intend my Thesis to have the following chapters:- <ol type="1"><li>Chapter 01: Introduction</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 02: What are We?</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 03: What is a Person?</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 04: Basic Metaphysical Issues</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 05: Persistence and Time</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 06: Animalism and Arguments for It</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 07: The Constitution View and Arguments for It</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 08: Arguments against Animalism</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 09: Arguments against the Constitution View</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 10: Thought Experiments</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 11: Resurrection</li><li><a name="48"></a>Chapter 12: Conclusion</li></ol></li></ul><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Research Methodology</u></b><ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a>Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter. </li><li>The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages. </li><li><a name="48"></a>Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.</li><li>The methodology for this Chapter differs somewhat from most other Chapters in that there is little real work, other than background reading and checking that the Thesis as a whole hangs together. </li><li>However, I do need to record while reading the general surveys anything that needs to go into the Historical Survey or Motivating Statement. </li><li>Another couple of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_14"> clearing up tasks</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_14"></A> specific to this Chapter are:- <ol type="1"><li>To ensure that all the Papers on Identity that I have actually read are referenced <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_15">somewhere</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_15"></A> in this Thesis. </li><li>To ensure that all the Notes on Identity that I have actually produced are referenced <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_16">somewhere</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_16"></A> in this Thesis.</li></ol> </li></ul><BR><hr><BR><b><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_17">Motivating Statement</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_17"></A></b></u> <ol type="1"><li>Why should we care about the topic of personal identity and the possibility of life after death? Put this way, the question hardly needs answering, as it s just about the most important question to be posed by a reflective (if selfish) person. Yet, the question is difficult, and has had many attempted solutions offered  and while some philosophers think there is no problem left to solve, there is no consensus as to the answer. </li><li>My favourite solution  in the sense of the one I think most likely to be correct, rather than necessary the one I d like to be correct  namely Animalism  that we are human animals and that consequently death is the end of us  is only supported by around 17% of philosophers, according to a recent <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_18">poll</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_18"></A> with about twice as many supporting some form of psychological view. </li><li>In one sense it is just obvious that we are  in some sense of that weasel word  human animals. But then the problem cases kick in  whether real-life or thought experiments that may never be real-life possibilities. </li><li>About 36% of the respondents in the aforementioned survey though we could survive teletransportation  though 31% thought that the result would be death. </li><li>Transhumanists think we can be uploaded to computers. </li><li>Further detail <a name="48"></a>to be supplied. </li></ol><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Main Text</u></b><ul type="disc"><li>For convenience, brief abstracts (as currently intended) of the above chapters are given below. I have included on-going hyperlinks from the above links to my initial thoughts on these topics (and to reading lists and plans for further research) by way of further clarification. The reading lists are rather full, and I ll need to whittle them down to those I actually intend to read (and, better, address). </li><li><B>Chapter Abstracts</B><ol type="1"><li><B>Introduction</B>: See above for a motivating statement and below for a brief historical general survey of the topic of Personal Identity. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>What are We</B>: The topic  personal identity has historically presupposed that we are (in the sense of  identical to , or  most fundamentally ) persons, whereas I (along with other animalists) claim that we are identical to human animals.  We requires explanation. This chapter will sort out the topic of discussion for the Thesis as a whole. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>What is a Person?</B>: This chapter will canvass the various views and consider how important issues in this area are to my main concern of our identity. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>Basic Metaphysical Issues</B>: Substances and sortals are central to the persistence of anything, and in particular to my claim that persons are phase sortals of human animals (the substances). I need to address the concept of a SOUL as souls are the major counter-claim to the persisting entity being an animal; or at least popularly so. The question of Natural Kinds arises in considering whether PERSON is a natural kind concept. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>Persistence and Time</B>: A number of thought experiments that feature in Chapter 10 seem to fail if perdurantism is true (because the reduplication objections fail). Depending on whether any of these are critical to my arguments, I may need to consider the impact of perdurantism. But this complex area may be a step too far within a fairly limited word-count. I m also unsure whether it should feature before or after the account of Thought Experiments. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>Animalism and Arguments for it</B>: This Chapter describes what Animalism is, with an excursus on animals and organisms and their persistence. It puts forward the arguments in favour of animalism, those against being reserved for a later Chapter. It focuses on the account of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A>, the primary contemporary exponent of Animalism. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>The Constitution View and Arguments for it</B>: This Chapter gives an account of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> s thesis that human persons are not identical to human animals, but are  temporarily at least  constituted by them. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>Arguments against Animalism</B>: A discussion of the arguments against animalism, as given by those of anti-animalist persuasion and defended by the principal animalists (with a focus on Olson), with a critique. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>Arguments against the Constitution View</B>: A discussion of the arguments against the Constitution View, focusing on the principal animalists, with a critique. In particular, I intend to critique <a name="48"></a>Olson s  thinking animal argument against the Constitution View (though I think this argument is unnecessary for Olson to establish the case for Animalism).</li><li><B><a name="48"></a>Thought Experiments</B>: Any account of personal identity needs to give an account of what is going on in the various thought experiments that have been thought relevant to the topic. It s also the area that s most fun. Indeed, I think that the entire Thesis will be an exercise in inference to the best explanation. It needs to account for our intuitions (if there is a universal response) or explain them away as confused. I will firstly briefly consider the propriety of using thought experiments in this domain of enquiry, and then consider the usual suspects, including the following:- <ul type="square"><li>Fission</li><li>Fusion</li><li>Replication</li><li>Commissurotomy</li><li>Multiple Personality Disorder</li><li>Brain-state Transfer</li><li>Brain Transplants</li><li>Teletransportation</li><li>Siliconisation</li><li>Transhumanism </li></ul></li><li><B><a name="48"></a>Resurrection</B>: If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection. Since the body is destroyed at death, it would seem that any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong. Consideration of arguments by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A> in this respect. This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued, and factually correct concerning what is actually believed by intellectually-aware Christians and Muslims (unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion). Maybe I should also cover reincarnation. </li><li><B><a name="48"></a>Conclusion</B>: <ul type="square"><li>We are human animals, </li><li>Human persons fall under phase sortals of the concept HUMAN ANIMAL,</li><li>The person is inseparable from the animal, </li><li>The animal is utterly destroyed at death, </li><li>Substance dualism is false, and </li><li>Consequently (given the sort of thing we are) resurrection or any other post-mortem survival is impossible for us. </li></ul> </li></ol> </li></ul><BR><hr><BR><b><u>Brief historical general survey of the topic of Personal Identity</b></u> <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>To be supplied. </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_33">Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed</A></U><SUB>33</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_33"></A></u></b><ol type="1"><li>In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.</li><li>The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce and motivate the Thesis. As such, I need to situate it in the history of the topic. This is done in a number of introductory books, General Surveys, or collections of Papers that are standard fodder in courses on Personal Identity. </li><li>Consequently, I will review the various Surveys of Personal Identity that feature in the standard reading lists, both to demonstrate that I ve read them, and to ensure I ve missed nothing major. </li><li>If a Paper in a Collection or Chapter in an Introduction is specific to a later Chapter in this Thesis, its consideration may be reserved until a later Chapter, even if the Book itself is not. These will be noted in due course. </li><li>As the topic of Personal Identity stems primarily from Locke s account, I need a brief statement of what this is. Most of the relevant material will appear in due course in the anthologies, but I few items not anthologised are listed below. </li><li>Other works were considered and either cut or reserved for later, as indicated below. The easiest way to see all the works considered is via the reading list at the end of this Note. </li><li><b>Introductory or General Books</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_564.htm">Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_565.htm">Berglund (Stefan) - Human and Personal Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_34">Berglund</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_34"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_566.htm">Bourgeois (Warren) - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_35">Bourgeois</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_35"></A>.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6305.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_36">Funkhouser</A></U><SUB>36</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_36"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_97.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_126.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons</A>", Merricks </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>", Noonan </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15899.htm">Papineau (David) - Research Seminar on Personal Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_37">Papineau</A></U><SUB>37</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_37"></A> </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3382.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_38">Shoemaker_D</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_38"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4064.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Mind and Person in the Philosophy of Religion</A>", Thomas </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1417.htm">Tye (Michael) - Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity</A>", Tye </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", Unger<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11983.htm">Unger (Peter) - Precis of 'Identity, Consciousness and Value'</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_39">Unger</A></U><SUB>39</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_39"></A></li></ul></li><li><b>Standard Collections</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_576.htm">Harris (Henry) - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_40">Harris</A></U><SUB>40</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_40"></A> </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_636.htm">Kolak (Daniel) & Martin (Raymond), Eds. - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues</A>", Kolak&Martin </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_121.htm">Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. - Personal Identity</A>", Martin&Barresi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_648.htm">Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Personal Identity (Readings)</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1415.htm">Paul (Ellen), Miller (Fred) & Paul (Jeffrey), Eds. - Personal Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_41">Paul&Miller</A></U><SUB>41</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_41"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_137.htm">Perry (John), Ed. - Personal Identity</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_46.htm">Rorty (Amelie), Ed. - The Identities of Persons</A>", Rorty </li></ul> </li><li><b>Locke</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_29.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology)</A>", Part III (Identity), Ayers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5554.htm">Jolley (Nicholas) - Personal Identity</A>", Jolley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>", Locke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3962.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Locke: Identity</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3728.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Identity and Diversity</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3729.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Personal Identity</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3964.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Locke</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_405.htm">Rovane (Carol) - The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics</A>", Rovane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>", Shoemaker_S</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2095.htm">Winkler (Kenneth) - Locke on Personal Identity</A>", Winkler </li></ul></li></ol><BR><hr><BR><u>The Cut</u><ol type="1"><li>Various works were considered for this Chapter, but were either reserved for consideration in other Chapters, or were rejected, at least for the time being.</li><li><b>Priority Works to be read later for other Chapters</b>:- <ul type="disc"><li>For <a name="48"></a>Chapter 03: <ul type="square"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_646.htm">Margolis (Joseph) - Persons and Minds: Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism</A>", Margolis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_650.htm">Peacocke (Arthur) & Gillett (Grant) - Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry</A>", Peacocke+Gillett </li></ul></li><li>For <a name="48"></a>Chapter 04<ul type="square"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_32.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity</A>", Hirsch</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_639.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_640.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1427.htm">MacBride (Fraser), Ed. - Identity and Modality</A>", MacBride</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_647.htm">Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Identity</A>", Noonan </li></ul></li><li>For <a name="48"></a>Chapter 05: <ul type="square"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>", Haslanger&Kurtz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1345.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_31.htm">Heller (Mark) - The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter</A>", Heller</li></ul></li><li>For <a name="48"></a>Chapter 07: <ul type="square"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_45.htm">Rea (Michael), Ed. - Material Constitution - A Reader</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_46">Rea</A></U><SUB>46</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_46"></A> </li></ul></li><li>I have largely ignored the many works by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> and <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> in this Chapter, as they feature heavily later in the Thesis. </li></ul></li><li><b>Secondary Works to be  parked for the time being</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_654.htm">Reuscher (John) - Essays on the Metaphysical Foundations of Personal Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_47">Reuscher</A></U><SUB>47</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_47"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1176.htm">Slors (Marc) - Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_48">Slors</A></U><SUB>48</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_48"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_657.htm">Slors (Marc) - The Diachronic Mind: An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem</A>", Slors</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_659.htm">Trupp (Andreas) - Why We Are Not What We Think We Are: A New Approach to the Nature of Personal Identity and of Time</A>", Trupp</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_660.htm">Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_755_49">Vesey</A></U><SUB>49</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_755_49"></A> </li></ul></li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b>Links to Notes</u></b><ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>General Surveys,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Locke, </li><li>Maybe others (to be supplied). </li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_755_14"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 14</B>: These will be left until all Chapters have completed Task 7. <a name="On-Page_Link_755_15"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This may either be  as utilised or  as ignored . </li><li>Follow <a href="../../../PaperCatalogIdentityRead.htm">this link</a>.</li><li>As of mid-Oct 2014, this task is now complete! </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_755_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This may either be  as utilised or  as ignored . </li><li>Follow <a href="../../Notes_Jump_1.htm">this link</a> . </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_755_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: This will explain why I ve undertaken this research, and encourage the reader to continue.<a name="On-Page_Link_755_18"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li><em>The PhilPapers Surveys</em>, Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D. (2009)  (<A HREF = "https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl)). </li><li>As referenced in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19916.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Nature of People</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_755_33"></A><B>Footnote 33</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.</li><li>The author s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what s going on in the encoded text I work on. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_755_34"></A><B>Footnote 34</B>: As this is a PhD Thesis in my general subject-area, I ought at least to have read it!<a name="On-Page_Link_755_35"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 35</B>: Somewhat elementary, but worth (re-)reading quickly<a name="On-Page_Link_755_36"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 36</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a course of lectures on Metaphysics, at the advanced undergraduate / beginning graduate level. </li><li>All the issues raised  in the discussion of standard papers  many of them covered elsewhere in my Thesis  are useful background. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_755_37"></A><B>Footnote 37</B>: This is a set of papers for discussion in a research seminar. Most are probably covered elsewhere, but in case not & <a name="On-Page_Link_755_38"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 38</B>: For a review, see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15820.htm">Lerner (Berel Dov) - Review of 'Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction' by David Shoemaker</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_755_39"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 39</B>: Decide where to park the various Chapters of this book after reading the prcis. <a name="On-Page_Link_755_40"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 40</B>: Harris is an interesting case, in that it includes three important papers and three that are off-topic, but important in illustrating the divergent usages of the term  identity . <a name="On-Page_Link_755_41"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 41</B>: This is more recent than the others.<a name="On-Page_Link_755_46"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 46</B>: But note that Baker s account of constitution differs from the mereological account assumed in Rea s anthology. <a name="On-Page_Link_755_47"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 47</B>: The works by Reuscher and Trupp are too eccentric to be given any priority. <a name="On-Page_Link_755_48"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 48</B>: The works by Slors may be worth reading as a fairly contemporary defence of the psychological view; just not yet. <a name="On-Page_Link_755_49"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 49</B>: The work by Vesey is too out of date for a priority item. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/04/2018 00:12:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.5.4: (Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?))</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><b>Abstract</u></b><ol type="1">This chapter will canvass the various views of what Persons are and consider how important issues in this area are to my main concern of our identity. </ol><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Research Methodology</u></b><ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a>Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter. </li><li>The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages. </li><li><a name="48"></a>Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks. </li></ul><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Chapter Introduction</u></b><ol type="1"><li>The main philosophical argument about Persons is whether PERSON is a substance-concept in its own right, or whether it is parasitic on other substance-concept(s). </li><li>My own view is that Human Persons are <a name="48"></a>phase sortals of human animals, but other philosophers have more robust views of persons and think of them as substances in their own right. </li><li>Famously, <a name="48"></a>Locke held this view, and <a name="48"></a>Lynne Rudder Baker is a contemporary exponent  her view being that human persons are <a name="48"></a>constituted by, but not identical to, human animals. </li><li>In this thesis, I m only concerned with human persons, and  like most philosophers  allow that there can be non-human persons (God, gods, angels, aliens, robots, etc.)</li><li>All this is predicated on deciding just what PERSONS are, which in turn depends somewhat on whether we take PERSON to be a natural kind concept, or something that is socially constructed and so not something the correct definition of we can discover. </li><li>Further text to be supplied. </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b>Main Text</u></b><ol type="1"><li>To be supplied. </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_7">Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_7"></A></u></b><ol type="1"><li>In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going. <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2364.htm">Ayer (A.J.) - The Concept of a Person</A>", Ayer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5196.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on my 'The Ontological Status of Persons'</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>", especially (in this context), & Baker <ul type="square"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3674.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons in the Material World</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3676.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The First-Person Perspective</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3678.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time</A>", and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3679.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Importance Of Being a Person</A>". </li></ul></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14537.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and the Natural Order</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5503.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons in Metaphysical Perspective</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5194.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Ontological Status of Persons</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6979.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Does a Person Begin?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3952.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Concepts of a Person</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5807.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7438.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Great Apes, Dolphins, and the Concept of Personhood</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_545.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1396.htm">Forrester (Mary) - Persons, Animals, and Fetuses: An Essay in Practical Ethics</A>", Forrester</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_207.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person</A>", Frankfurt</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5198.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Persons</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4940.htm">Goodenough (Jerry) - The Achievement of Personhood</A>", Goodenough</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4233.htm">Hornsby (Jennifer) - Mind, Causation and Explanation - Introduction: Personal and Subpersonal Levels</A>", Hornsby</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4222.htm">Hornsby (Jennifer) - Ontological Questions - Introduction: Persons and Their States, and Events</A>", Hornsby</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_109.htm">Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5661.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Temporal Parts and Moral Personhood</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4922.htm">Ishiguro (Hide) - The Primitiveness of the Concept of a Person</A>", Ishiguro</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3556.htm">JCS - Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Issue 05-06 (2007)</A>", JCS  Dimensions of Personhood </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1397.htm">Leiber (Justin) - Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : A Dialogue</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_8">Leiber</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_8"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11464.htm">Longuenesse (Beatrice) - Kant on the identity of persons</A>", Longuenesse</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6698.htm">Margolis (Joseph) - Persons: Notes on Their Nature, Identity and Rationality</A>", Margolis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_646.htm">Margolis (Joseph) - Persons and Minds: Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism</A>", Margolis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1343.htm">McCall (Catherine) - Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self and Human Being</A>", McCall</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15855.htm">McInerney (Peter K.) - Conceptions of Persons and Persons through Time</A>", McInerney</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6497.htm">Midgley (Mary) - Persons and Non-Persons</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_9">Midgley</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_9"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19916.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Nature of People</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1024.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_10">Parfit</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_10"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_11">Parfit</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_11"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_650.htm">Peacocke (Arthur) & Gillett (Grant) - Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry</A>", Peacocke&Gillett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5403.htm">Perry (John) - Personal Identity and the Concept of a Person</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1442.htm">Petrus (Klaus), Ed. - On Human Persons</A>", Petrus</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6694.htm">Plantinga (Alvin) - Things and Persons</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_12">Plantinga</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_12"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5621.htm">Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: The Physical Basis of Mentality</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1338.htm">Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5118.htm">Poole (Ross) - On Being a Person</A>", Poole</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1349.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Persons: A Study of Possible Moral Agents in the Universe</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2921.htm">Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person</A>", Russell etc</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5256.htm">Sapontzis (S.F.) - A Critique of Personhood</A>", Sapontzis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12306.htm">Selling (Joseph) - The Human Person</A>", Selling</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5146.htm">Shaffer (Jerome) - Persons and Their Bodies</A>", Shaffer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15110.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics - Introduction</A>", Shoemaker_D</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7450.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Personal Identity</A>", Shoemaker_S</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5258.htm">Smart (Brian) - How can Persons be Ascribed M-Predicates?</A>", Smart</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1394.htm">Sprague (Elmer) - Persons and Their Minds: A Philosophical Investigation</A>", Sprague</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5063.htm">Stanley (Jason) - Persons And Their Properties</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_13">Stanley</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_13"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16819.htm">Stone (Jim) - Why there are still no people</A>", Stone</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_164.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_14">Strawson</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_14"></A>, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3888.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Persons</A>", Strawson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_638.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Persons</A>", Strawson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_550.htm">Taylor (Charles) - Responsibility For Self</A>", Taylor_C</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5505.htm">Taylor (Richard), Chisholm (Roderick) - Chisholm's Idea of a Person</A>", Taylor_R</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5193.htm">Teichman (Jenny) - The Definition of Person</A>", Teichman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7220.htm">Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person</A>", Trendelenberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2928.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons: Human and Divine</A>", Van Inwagen&Zimmerman<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14454.htm">Olson (Eric) - Review of 'Persons: Human and Divine'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2661.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1418.htm">Wilkerson (T.E.) - Minds, Brains and People</A>", Wilkerson <ul type="square"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17303.htm">Candlish (Stewart) - Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson</A>", Candlish</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17302.htm">Hinton (J.M.) - Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson</A>", Hinton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17300.htm">McGill (V.J.) - Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson</A>", McGill</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17301.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson</A>", Strawson </li></ul></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3665.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Real People: Preface</A>", Wilkes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_546.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Persons, Character and Morality</A>", Williams_B</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12484.htm">Wilson (Edgar) - Two Incompatible Models of Persons</A>", Wilson </li></ul> </li><li><b>Reductionism</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6666.htm">Belzer (Marvin) - Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction</A>", Belzer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3796.htm">Campbell (John) - The Reductionist View of the Self</A>", Campbell </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3741.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism</A>", Garrett </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5297.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Reductionism</A>", Garrett</li></ul> </li><li>Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters. </li><li>The motivation for these works is as follows:- <ul type="disc"><li>To be supplied. </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><hr><BR><u>The Cut</u> <ol type="1"><li>There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list  the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on  and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I ve heard of that look relevant). </li><li>However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled  at least temporarily  from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I ve not always given a reason as I ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere. </li><li>I m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them. <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_566.htm">Bourgeois (Warren) - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_15">Bourgeois</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_15"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15858.htm">Burge (Tyler) - Memory and Persons</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_16">Burge</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_16"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1432.htm">Carrithers (Michael), Collins (Steven) & Lukes (Steven) - The Category of the Person: Anthropology, philosophy, history</A>", Carrithers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2636.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1015_17">Lowe</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1015_17"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3363.htm">Mitchell (Robert) - Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood</A>", Mitchell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6424.htm">Park (Desiree) - Persons</A>", Park<BR> </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Links to Notes</u></b><ol type="1"><li>The primary Notes are:- <ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a>Person,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Human Persons,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Non-Human Persons,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Reductionism, </li><li><a name="48"></a>Simple View</li><li><a name="48"></a>Taking Persons Seriously,</li><li><a name="48"></a>First-Person Perspective. </li></ul></li><li>No doubt there are others:- <ul type="disc"><li>To be supplied. </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b>Final Remarks</u></b><ol type="1"><li>This is <a name="48"></a>work in progress. </li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1015_7"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.</li><li>The author s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what s going on in the encoded text I work on. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: This is very elementary, but short and maybe entertaining. <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_9"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 9</B>: Read this as an example from the Animal Liberation movement. <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_10"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 10</B>: This is rather introductory to Parfit s ideas, so read it quickly for that purpose. <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_11"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 11</B>: Restrict a close reading to Part 3 (Personal Identity). <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_12"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 12</B>: May be useful both as a take on Strawson, and for Plantinga s own views. <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_13"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 13</B>: Stanley got into a debate with Jen Hornsby, though not on this topic, so it ll be interesting to see how he argues. <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_14"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 14</B>: This is a difficult book with which I expect to have little sympathy, but one that has to be read. <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_15"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 15</B>: This is rather elementary, and ought to have been reviewed in <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_755.htm">Chapter 1</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_16"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 16</B>: This paper may be important, but is too long (and difficult) for a first pass through the literature <a name="On-Page_Link_1015_17"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 17</B>: Too similar to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5200.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Substance and Selfhood</A>", which was read for <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_762.htm">Chapter 2</a>. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 05/04/2016 23:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.5.6: (Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time))</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><b>Abstract</u></b><ul type="disc">A number of thought experiments that feature in <a name="48"></a>Chapter 10 seem to fail if perdurantism is true (because the reduplication objections fail). <li>Depending on whether any of these are critical to my arguments, I may need to consider the impact of perdurantism. </li><li>But this complex area may be a step too far within a fairly limited word-count. </li><li>I m also unsure whether it should feature before or after the account of Thought Experiments. </li></ul><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Research Methodology</u></b><ul type="disc"><li>Follow <a name="48"></a>this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter. </li><li>The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.</li><li>Follow <a name="48"></a>this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks. </li></ul> <BR><hr><BR><u><b>Chapter Introduction</u></b><ol type="1"><li>Any discussion of identity over time  of anything  needs to have some discussion of just what it is for something to persist, and what we take time to be. </li><li>Additionally, as noted in the abstract, depending on our approach to time and persistence, some of the troubling thought experiments that worry us about the persistence of human persons are resolved, though we get nothing for nothing. As is usual in philosophy, a gain here is compensated for by a loss somewhere else. We need to determine these losses, and agree that they are  worth it . </li><li>Further text to be supplied. </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b>Main Text</u></b><ol type="1"><li>To be supplied. </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_4">Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_4"></A></u></b><ol type="1"><li>In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going. </li><li>The references are segregated by sub-topic, as below, but there is much overlap.</li><li><b>Time</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16168.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Time</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4112.htm">Campbell (Joseph Keim), O'Rourke (Michael) & Silverstein (Harry S.) - Time and Identity</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4895.htm">Coope (Ursula) - Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14</A>", Coope</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19958.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Persistence and Time</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1449.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1159.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) & MacBeath (Murray), Eds. - The Philosophy of Time: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20230.htm">Marshall (Richard) & Callender (Craig) - Craig Callender: Time Lord</A>", Marshall&Callender</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17911.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Time</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1160.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1420.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14455.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Passage of Time</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_706.htm">Prior (Arthur N.) - Papers on Time and Tense</A>", Prior</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1452.htm">Sattig (Thomas) - The Language and Reality of Time</A>", Sattig</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2887.htm">Sklar (Lawrence) - Space, Time and Spacetime</A>", Sklar</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8467.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and  Taking Tense Seriously </A>", Zimmerman</li></ul></li><li><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_5">Time Travel</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_5"></A></b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20897.htm">Dowe (Phil) - The Case for Time Travel</A>", Dowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20895.htm">Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel</A>", Ehring</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_482.htm">Grey (William) - Troubles with Time Travel</A>", Grey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17190.htm">Horwich (Paul) - On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>", Horwich</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_58.htm">Lewis (David) - The Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20898.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time</A>", Miller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20904.htm">Richmond (Alasdair) - Philosophy of Time Travel Course Guide 2014/15</A>", Richmond</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7040.htm">Varzi (Achille) - Time-Travel</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_6">Varzi</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_6"></A> </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20899.htm">Wright (John) - Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel</A>", Wright</li></ul></li><li><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_7">Modality / Possible Worlds</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_7"></A></b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_102.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions</A>", Chisholm</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_112.htm">Lewis (David) - Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_637.htm">Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7208.htm">Melia (Joseph) - Introduction to Modality</A>", Melia </li></ul></li><li><b>Persistence</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_445.htm">Armstrong (David) - Identity Through Time</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>", Haslanger&Kurtz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1345.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist</A>", Hawley </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1372.htm">Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_8">Oderberg</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_8"></A> </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6214.htm">Sider (Ted) - Persistence and Parthood Seminar</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_442.htm">Sider (Ted) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence - Bibliography</A>", Sider&Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6215.htm">Sider (Ted) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence Seminar</A>", Sider&Zimmerman</li></ul></li><li><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_9">Survival</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_9"></A></b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3801.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity and Survival</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11406.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Survival</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19032.htm">Bruntrup (Godehard) - 3.5-Dimensionalism and Survival: A Process Ontological Approach</A>", Bruntrup</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1383.htm">Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11403.htm">Ehring (Douglas) - Survival and Trivial Facts</A>", Ehring</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9559.htm">Flew (Anthony) - Three Ways to Survival</A>", Flew</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6031.htm">Matthews (Gareth B.) - Surviving As</A>", Matthews</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_133.htm">Penelhum (Terence) - Survival and Disembodied Existence</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_540.htm">Rey (Georges) - Survival</A>", Rey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4445.htm">Sosa (Ernest) - Surviving Matters</A>", Sosa</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3622.htm">Unger (Peter) - What Matters In Our Survival: Distinctions, Compromises and Limits</A>", Unger</li></ul></li><li><b>Endurantism</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16171.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Three-dimensionalism defended</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5800.htm">Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil) - Endurance is paradoxical</A>", Barker&Dowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11977.htm">Hawthorne (John) - Three-Dimensionalism</A>", Hawthorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2002.htm">Loux (Michael) - Endurantism and Perdurantism</A>", Loux</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5794.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Vagueness and Endurance</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4328.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20149.htm">Rosenkrantz (Gary) - An Epistemic Argument for Enduring Human Persons</A>", Rosenkrantz</li></ul></li><li><b>Perdurantism</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_257.htm">Butterfield (Jeremy) - On the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_10">Butterfield</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_10"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_258.htm">Butterfield (Jeremy) - On the Persistence of Particles</A>", Butterfield </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3432.htm">Butterfield (Jeremy) - Spatial and Temporal Parts</A>", Butterfield </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_31.htm">Heller (Mark) - The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter</A>", Heller</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_109.htm">Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5724.htm">Hudson (Hud) - The Metaphysics of Hyperspace</A>", Hudson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12899.htm">Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds (Selections)</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18378.htm">McGrath (Matthew) - Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_11">McGrath</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_11"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14933.htm">Gilmore (Cody) - Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_12">Gilmore</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_12"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1372.htm">Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_13">Oderberg</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_13"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5228.htm">Sider (Ted) - Precis of Four-Dimensionalism</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6290.htm">Varzi (Achille) - Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness</A>", Varzi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5128.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The Incompatibility of Two Humean Doctrines</A>", Zimmerman</li></ul></li><li><b>Exdurantism</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5095.htm">Braddon-Mitchell (David) & West (Caroline) - Temporal Phase Pluralism</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_14">Braddon-Mitchell</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_14"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19956.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - David Lewis on Persistence</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5393.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Parts and Stages</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5125.htm">Sider (Ted) - All the World's a Stage</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1339.htm">Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time</A>", Sider</li></ul></li><li>Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters. </li><li>The motivation for these works is as follows:- <ul type="disc"><li>To be supplied.<BR> </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><hr><BR><u>The Cut</u> <ol type="1"><li>There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list  the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on  and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I ve heard of that look relevant). </li><li>However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled  at least temporarily  from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I ve not always given a reason as I ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere. </li><li>I m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them. <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9800.htm">Forrest (Peter) - Endurance and Fatalism</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_15">Forrest</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_15"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13024.htm">Harris (John) - The Survival Lottery</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1017_16">Harris</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1017_16"></A> </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Links to Notes</u></b><ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Time,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Time Travel,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Persistence,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Persistence Criteria,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Survival,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Endurantism,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Perdurantism,</li><li><a name="48"></a>Exdurantism.</li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b>Final Remarks</u></b><ol type="1"><li>This is <a name="48"></a>work in progress. </li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1017_4"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.</li><li>The author s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what s going on in the encoded text I work on. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I thought I d written somewhere that this  fun though it might be  is a bridge too far. But it is relevant. </li><li>I ll expand the reading list based on the items already listed. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: And the rest of an interesting 2005 edition of <em>The Monist</em>. <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_7"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is parked here until it finds its final resting place. </li><li>If I do cover possible worlds, I ll need more material than this. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1017_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: This might also be useful for perdurantism, or for the logic of identity. <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_9"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There is some overlap  as far as papers reviewed are concerned  between this Section and the  Does Identity Matter Section in <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1016.htm">Chapter 4</a>.</li><li>This Chapter focuses on the <em>meaning</em> of  Survival , while the previous chapter focuses on its <em>relation to Identity</em>, and the importance of identity for survival.</li><li>But, I think they should probably be covered in the same place, and probably not here. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: These three papers by Butterfield are very specialised, and this one is very long, and may be left to one side for now. <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_11"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 11</B>: This looks like an important paper, which rejects the  proofs of 4D based on the  coincidence TEs. <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_12"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 12</B>: Another important-looking paper, also against perdurantism, along similar lines to the above. <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_13"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 13</B>: Oderberg seems to be arguing that Perdurantism is an unwanted consequence of a common-sense notion of persistence. <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_14"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 14</B>: I m not sure whether this belongs here, but it looks an interesting paper. <a name="On-Page_Link_1017_15"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 15</B>: I don t have the paper!<a name="On-Page_Link_1017_16"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 16</B>: This is an ethical rather than metaphysical discussion. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 05/04/2016 23:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.5.11: (Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments))</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><b>Abstract</u></b><ul type="disc"><li>Any account of personal identity needs to give an account of what is going on in the various thought experiments that have been thought relevant to the topic. It s also the area that s most fun. Indeed, I think that the entire Thesis will be an exercise in inference to the best explanation. It needs to account for our intuitions (if there is a universal response) or explain them away as confused. I will firstly briefly consider the propriety of using thought experiments in this domain of enquiry, and then consider the usual suspects, including the following:- <ol type="1"><li>Fission</li><li>Fusion</li><li>Replication</li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_1">Commissurotomy</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_1"></A></li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_2">Multiple Personality Disorder</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_2"></A></li><li>Brain-state Transfer</li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_3">Brain Transplants</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_3"></A> </li><li>Teletransportation</li><li>Siliconisation</li><li>Transhumanism </li></ol> </li></ul><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Research Methodology</u></b><ul type="disc"><li>Follow <a name="48"></a>this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter. </li><li>The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages. </li><li>Follow <a name="48"></a>this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks. </li></ul> <BR><hr><BR><u><b>Chapter Introduction</u></b><ol type="1"><li>To be supplied. </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b>Main Text</u></b><ol type="1"><li>To be supplied. </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_6">Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_6"></A></u></b><ol type="1"><li>In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going. </li><li>I have segregated the papers by sub-topic, but some would fit into more than one category. </li><li><b>Theory</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3804.htm">Baillie (James) - Methodology Matters</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11400.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Personal Identity and Personal Survival</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5660.htm">Brook (J.A.) - Imagination, Possibility, and Personal Identity</A>", Brook</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20426.htm">Brown (James Robert) & Fehige (Yiftach) - Thought Experiments</A>", Brown</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7617.htm">Cohnitz (Daniel) - Personal Identity and the Methodology of Imaginary Cases</A>", Cohnitz</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5929.htm">Gale (Richard) - On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments</A>", Gale</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1393.htm">Harris (Henry) - An Experimentalist Looks at Identity</A>", Harris</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3014.htm">James (Susan) - Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity</A>", James</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16121.htm">Papineau (David) - The Importance of Philosophical Intuition</A>", Papineau</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1358.htm">Sorensen (Roy) - Thought Experiments</A>", Sorensen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_159.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments</A>", Wilkes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>" (Section 4), Wilson </li></ul></li><li><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_7">Brain State Transfers</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_7"></A></b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4982.htm">Beck (Simon) - Back To The Self And The Future</A>", Beck</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11679.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5145.htm">Long (Douglas) - The Bodies of Persons</A>", Long</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3972.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Self and the Future</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5254.htm">Odegard (Douglas) - Personal and Bodily Identity</A>", Odegard</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5401.htm">Perry (John) - Williams on The Self and the Future</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>", Williams</li></ul></li><li><b>Brain Transplants</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20196.htm">Northoff (G.) - Do Brain Tissue Transplants Alter Personal Identity? Inadequacies of Some 'Standard' Arguments</A>", Northoff</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6092.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Multiple Identity</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6028.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Brain Transplants and Personal Identity</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6029.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Mr. Brennan on Person's Brains</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5975.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Remembering the Past of Another</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2637.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3620.htm">Unger (Peter) - A Physically Based Approach To Our Survival</A>". Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3547.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Brain Transplants</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", Wiggins</li></ul></li><li><b>Commissurotomy</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3806.htm">Baillie (James) - Commissurotomy and the Unity of Mind</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1320.htm">Marks (Charles) - Commissurotomy, Consciousness and Unity of Mind</A>", Marks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_190.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness</A>", Nagel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8052.htm">Parkin (Alan) - The Split Brain</A>", Parkin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5166.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Brain Bisection and Personal Identity</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3687.htm">Sperry (Roger W.) - Hemisphere Deconnection and the Unity in Conscious Awareness</A>", Sperry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6930.htm">Tye (Michael) - Split Brains</A>", Tye</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3548.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Two Problems About Personal Identity: Memory and Commissurotomy</A>", Van Inwagen </li></ul></li><li><b>Fission</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4735.htm">Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3743.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Fission</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_556.htm">Martin (Raymond) - Fission Rejuvenated</A>", Martin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5103.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Fission and Personal Identity Over Time</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1479.htm">Nussbaum (Martha) & Sunstein (Cass), Eds. - Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning</A>", Nussbaum&Sunstein</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_328.htm">Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6534.htm">Roache (Rebecca) - A Defence of Quasi-Memory</A>", Roache</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3434.htm">Robinson (Denis) - Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?</A>", Robinson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4941.htm">Rovane (Carol) - Branching Self-Consciousness</A>", Rovane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3623.htm">Unger (Peter) - Fission and the Focus of One's Life</A>", Unger</li></ul></li><li><b>Fusion</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8899.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts</A>", Hawley</li></ul></li><li><b>Multiple Personality Disorder</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1350.htm">Braude (Stephen) - First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind</A>", Braude</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3690.htm">Braude (Stephen) - Multiple Personality and the Structure of the Self</A>", Braude</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3689.htm">Hilgard (Ernest R.) - Dissociative Phenomena and the Hidden Observer</A>", Hilgard</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4318.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Divided Minds</A>", Hirsch</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_855.htm">Humphrey (Nicholas) & Dennett (Daniel) - Speaking for Our Selves: An Assessment of Multiple Personality</A>", Humpfrey&Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5314.htm">Lizza (John) - Multiple Personality and Personal Identity Revisited</A>", Lizza</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_652.htm">Radden (Jennifer) - Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality</A>", Radden</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3669.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Fugues, Hypnosis, and Multiple Personality</A>", Wilkes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15160.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Multiple Personality and Personal Identity</A>", Wilkes</li></ul></li><li><b>Replication</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3969.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem</A>", Noonan </li></ul></li><li><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_8">Siliconisation</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_8"></A></b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21651.htm">Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity</A>", Cerullo</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8196.htm">Tye (Michael) - Can Anyone Else Feel My Pains?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_9">Tye</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_9"></A> </li></ul></li><li><b>Teletransportation</b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11400.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Personal Identity and Personal Survival</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11406.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Survival</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20323.htm">Elliot (Robert) - How to Travel Faster than Light</A>", Elliot</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9803.htm">Seibt (Johanna) - Fission, Sameness, and Survival: Parfit s Branch Line Argument Revisited</A>", Seibt</li></ul></li><li><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_10">Transhumanism</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_10"></A></b><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6319.htm">Bostrom (Nick) - Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?</A>", Bostrom</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6321.htm">Bostrom (Nick) - The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson</A>", Bostrom</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6322.htm">Bostrom (Nick) - How Long Before Superintelligence?</A>", Bostrom</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21651.htm">Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity</A>", Cerullo</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8477.htm">Chalmers (David) - The Matrix as Metaphysics</A>", Chalmers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6318.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - Are You a Sim?</A>", Weatherson </li></ul></li><li>Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters. </li><li>The motivation for these works is as follows:- <ul type="disc"><li>To be supplied.<BR> </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><hr><BR><u>The Cut</u> <ol type="1"><li>There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list  the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on  and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I ve heard of that look relevant). </li><li>However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled  at least temporarily  from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I ve not always given a reason as I ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere. </li><li>I m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them. <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6284.htm">Kaku (Michio) - The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest To Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_11">Kaku</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_11"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1022_12">Shoemaker</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1022_12"></A> </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><hr><BR><u><b>Links to Notes</u></b><ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a>Propriety of Thought Experiments</li><li>Principal Examples:- <ul type="disc"><li><a name="48"></a>Fission</li><li><a name="48"></a>Fusion </li><li><a name="48"></a>Replication </li><li><a name="48"></a>Commissurotomy</li><li><a name="48"></a>Multiple Personality Disorder</li><li><a name="48"></a>Brain-state Transfers</li><li><a name="48"></a>Brain Transplants</li><li><a name="48"></a>Teletransportation</li><li><a name="48"></a>Siliconisation</li><li><a name="48"></a>Transhumanism. </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><u><b>Final Remarks</u></b><ol type="1"><li>This is <a name="48"></a>work in progress. </li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1022_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: This is more an experiment than a thought-experiment, as commissurotomies are actual. <a name="On-Page_Link_1022_2"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Again, this is  allegedly  an existent pathology rather than a TE.</li><li>Moreover, it might be better situated in Chapter 9 (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1021.htm">Click here for Note</A>) as a critique of the idea of an individuating FPP. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1022_3"></A><B>Footnote 3</B>: We need to distinguish Whole-Brain Transplants (WBTs) from single or double Cerebrum transplants, and these from brain-tissue transplants, which shade off into Brain State Transfers. <a name="On-Page_Link_1022_6"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.</li><li>The author s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what s going on in the encoded text I work on. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1022_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There must be many more papers than the classic one by Williams (and commentaries thereon)  I just haven t got them correctly categorised. </li><li>Under this head should be included references to  Brain Zaps and the like. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1022_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This must be somewhere in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", where it is referred to as  zippering . </li><li>I intend to re-read this book as part of the work for <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_755.htm">Chapter 1</a>, so I will find it then, I hope. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1022_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Tye seems to be discussing brain-partition, with silicon transceivers. But he uses Unger s term  zippering . </li><li>He is indebted to <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zuboff (Arnold).htm">Arnold Zuboff</A>, who may be worth following up. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1022_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is different to the other notions, in which we are and remain organic. </li><li>Here  we  that is, our psychology  is supposed uploaded to a computer. </li><li>Most of the papers in my possession on the subject seem to assume this is possible, and argue whether it is  unbeknownst to us  actual. </li><li>Olson argues against the metaphysical possibility in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20229.htm">Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands</A>", pp. 61-2. </li><li>This is associated with <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_56.htm"> Brains in Vats </a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1022_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: I ve read this book, but it s insufficiently philosophical for its arguments  such as they are  to be worth considering as a priority. <a name="On-Page_Link_1022_12"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 12</B>: Cover in the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1023.htm">next Chapter</a>. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 05/04/2016 23:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.5.13: (Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion))</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> This Chapter will summarise the claims and arguments of the Thesis, namely that:- <ul type="disc"><li>We are human animals, </li><li>Human persons fall under phase sortals of the concept HUMAN ANIMAL,</li><li>The person is inseparable from the animal, </li><li>The animal is utterly destroyed at death, </li><li>Substance dualism is false, and </li><li>Consequently (given the sort of thing we are) resurrection or any other post-mortem survival is impossible for us. </li></ul><BR><BR>This is a <a name="48"></a>place-holder.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 03/03/2016 06:05:46<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 5.5.14: (Thesis - Journals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1026_1">Introduction</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1026_1"></A></u><ol type="1"><li>The reading-list for my Thesis is already too long to manage, and  I have no doubt  new material will always be coming up that I ought to be aware of. </li><li>Nevertheless, I ought also to keep up to date with what s going on in other areas of Analytic Philosophy, not to mention recent work relevant to my thesis. </li><li>As a Cambridge Alumnus, I have access to <A HREF = "http://www.jstor.org/" TARGET = "_top">JSTOR</A> (http://www.jstor.org/) and thereby to most of the philosophical journals. The access to the text is not up-to-date, but I ought to inculcate a discipline to:- <ul type="disc"><li>Check the TOCs of the most recent issues, and mark them for future interrogation, and</li><li>Check the most recent issues with content, and briefly review what s there, downloading where it looks useful. </li></ul></li><li>Cambridge has recently opened up <A HREF = "https://www.cambridge.org/core/" TARGET = "_top">Cambridge Core</A> (https://www.cambridge.org/core/) to alumni:- <ul type="disc"><li>This allows up-to-date access to 17 philosophy journals, including those listed below. </li><li>There are also a great number of books available for download. I need to avoid distraction, but if there s a book by CUP I need, and it s here, then it s a good place to go! Unfortunately, not all philosophy books published by CUP are available for free. </li><li>I need to adopt the same discipline as for JSTOR. </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><u>Relevant <em>Cambridge Core</em> Journals</u> <ol type="1"><li><A HREF = "https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie" TARGET = "_top">Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review</A> (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie)</li><li><A HREF = "https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme" TARGET = "_top">Episteme</A> (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme)</li><li><A HREF = "https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association" TARGET = "_top">Journal of the American Philosophical Association</A> (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association)</li><li><A HREF = "https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy" TARGET = "_top">Philosophy</A> (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy)</li><li><A HREF = "https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements" TARGET = "_top">Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements</A> (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements)</li><li> <A HREF = "https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/think" TARGET = "_top">Think</A> (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/think)</li></ol><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1026_2">Relevant <em>JSTOR</em> Journals</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1026_2"></A></u> <ol type="1"><li>American Philosophical Quarterly (1964-2010)</li><li>Analysis (1933-2008; 2009-2013) </li><li>Behavior and Philosophy (1990-2010)</li><li>The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1950-2006; 2007-2013)</li><li>Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1971-2008)</li><li>Erkenntnis (1975-2010; 2011-2013)</li><li>Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (1998-2010; 2011-2013)</li><li>Human Studies (1978-2010; 2011-2013)</li><li>Hypathia (1986-2008; 2009-2012)</li><li>International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (1970-2010; 2011-2012)</li><li>The Journal of Ethics (1997-2010; 2011-2013)</li><li>Journal of Philosophical Logic 91972-2010; 2011-2013)</li><li>The Journal of Philosophy (1921-2008)</li><li>Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes (1939-2010)</li><li>Mind (1876-2006; 2007-2012)</li><li>The Monist (1890-2008; 2009-2014)</li><li>Nos (1967-2003; 2004-2012)</li><li>Philosophical Issues (1991-1998)</li><li>Philosophical Perspectives (1987-1995)</li><li>The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-2008; 2009-2012)</li><li>The Philosophical Review (1892-2008; 2009-2011)</li><li>Philosophical Studies (1950-2010; 2011-2013)</li><li>Philosophy (1931-2008; 2009-2012)</li><li>Philosophy and Phenomenal Research (1940-2008; 2009-2013)</li><li>Philosophy & Public Affairs (1971-2008; 2009-2013)</li><li>Phronesis (1955-2008; 2009-2013)</li><li>Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (1927-2010)</li><li>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1887-2008; 2009-2013)</li><li>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volumes (1918-2008; 2009-2013)</li><li>Religious Studies (1965-2008; 2009-2013)</li><li>The Review of Metaphysics (1947-2010)</li><li>Synthese (1936-2010; 2011-2013) </li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1026_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This Note used to include a (rather short) list of  interesting papers that I d discovered from the journals below, but missed the cut as far as reading was concerned. </li><li>I ve abandoned this idea as it s too much work for little benefit. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1026_2"></A><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The dates for which I have access to free Text appear in brackets, with a second date-range where appropriate, for papers that can be purchased (or borrowed in hard-copy).</li><li>This list hasn t been updated since January 2015, so there may be new journals of interest, and the dates will have moved on by 3 years. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 05/04/2018 10:48:00<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6: (Thesis - Current Stance)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> The purpose of this Note is to provide a periodic refocusing of what my thoughts and beliefs about the topic of Personal Identity currently are. Previous versions can be found from the list below. This version has links to the various other Notes that expand further on the issues raised, and supply extensive reading lists. While very often these Notes are of the  promissory variety, the links will remind me to improve them as needed. <BR><ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a><U>What are we</U><SUP>1</SUP>? This is one of the most important questions we need to ask ourselves. Just what kind of things are we? The question is closely related to a similar one: just what sort of adventures can individuals such as ourselves survive? This second question sheds light on the first for if there are certain contingencies that we think we would  or would not  survive, when a typical member of that kind would not  or would  survive, then that kind may not represent what we really think we are. Of course, we might be wrong in our estimations, but at least this will raise the question. </li><li>Why is this not a trivial question? If we look at a dog, say, and ask what it is, the answer to such a question is obvious  it s a dog! It may be our pet  with a name  a particular <a name="48"></a><U>individual</U><SUP>2</SUP>, but when we ask what <a name="48"></a><U>kind</U><SUP>3</SUP> of thing it is, it s a member of the species <em>canis lupus</em>. So, when we look at ourselves, the obvious answer is that we are <a name="48"></a><U>human beings</U><SUP>4</SUP>  specifically human animals, members of the species <em><a name="48"></a><U>homo sapiens</U><SUP>5</SUP></em>. That is the answer posited by the <a name="48"></a><U>Animalists</U><SUP>6</SUP>, amongst whose number  broadly speaking  I place myself, who accept the <a name="48"></a><U>biological view</U><SUP>7</SUP> of personal identity. </li><li>If this is true, then our <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>8</SUP>  the necessary and sufficient conditions for us to continue in existence  are the same as those of other <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>9</SUP>  the great apes, say, under which category we fall, biologically speaking. Why is this not the end of the story? Well, this is because  despite being a species of great ape  human beings are special in that we have enhanced cognitive capacities. We are morally accountable. In sum, we are <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>10</SUP>, and have a  <a name="48"></a><U>first person perspective</U><SUP>11</SUP> (FPP) on the world  something most philosophers deny to other animals  and care about our <a name="48"></a><U>futures</U><SUP>12</SUP> and  <a name="48"></a><U>wantons</U><SUP>13</SUP> apart  agonise over our past mistakes. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> claims this perspective makes an <a name="48"></a><U>ontological</U><SUP>14</SUP> difference, rather than being  as I think  a special property of human beings that may or may not be had in particular cases. <a name="48"></a><U>Baker</U><SUP>15</SUP> accuses the animalists of <a name="48"></a><U>not taking persons seriously</U><SUP>16</SUP>. I might just note that there s a facile and confusing answer to <a name="48"></a><U>what we are</U><SUP>17</SUP>, that is  people . You may have noticed that I used the technical term  persons as the plural of  person . Some philosophers annoyingly use the term  people , but this confuses the issue. When we say there are ten people in the room, while it is clear in normal circumstances what we mean  dogs don t count, for instance  but if there happened to be a Klingon and a visiting angel, would they count as people or not? They are  we may suppose  persons, but they are not <a name="48"></a><U>human persons</U><SUP>18</SUP></li><li>Since at least <A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Locke (John).htm">John Locke</A>, this fact of our mental exceptionalism has tempted philosophers to say that it s our <a name="48"></a><U>psychological continuity</U><SUP>19</SUP> that is more important for our identity-preservation than our <a name="48"></a><U>physical continuity</U><SUP>20</SUP>. This view still has its supporters  not only for those such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A> and <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Swinburne (Richard).htm">Richard Swinburne</A> who believe in immaterial <a name="48"></a><U>souls</U><SUP>21</SUP>  but for the many who think that psychological continuity and <a name="48"></a><U>connectedness</U><SUP>22</SUP> is constitutive of the identity of persons. It is also implicit in the ideas of the <a name="48"></a><U>Transhumanists</U><SUP>23</SUP> who think that  come <a name="48"></a><U>the Singularity</U><SUP>24</SUP>  we might be capable of being <a name="48"></a><U>uploaded</U><SUP>25</SUP> to <a name="48"></a><U>computers</U><SUP>26</SUP> and thereby <a name="48"></a><U>live almost forever</U><SUP>27</SUP>. </li><li>Before proceeding further we have to say something brief and sketchy about identity and <a name="48"></a><U>persistence</U><SUP>28</SUP>.  Identity  in the sense of  <a name="48"></a><U>numerical identity</U><SUP>29</SUP>  is a relation a thing holds to itself and to nothing else. A is identical to B if A and B are the very same thing. It is an equivalence relation, being transitive, reflexive and idempotent; and, many of the sticking points in the philosophy of personal identity arise from this fact. <ol type="i"><li>It has nothing to do with  identity as a sociological concept such as national identity, sexual identity or identification with a particular group. </li><li>Also, John may be said  not to be the same person since he took heroin, but he is still John and still the same individual; it s just that his <a name="48"></a><U>personality</U><SUP>30</SUP> has changed. </li><li>It also has nothing to do with  <a name="48"></a><U>narrative identity</U><SUP>31</SUP> which is the story we tell about ourselves in an attempt to make sense of our lives. </li><li>Finally, it has nothing to do with  <a name="48"></a><U>exact similarity</U><SUP>32</SUP> : my television may be  identical to yours, but that doesn t mean I can have yours if mine breaks. They are  or were, when manufactured  exactly similar, but are distinct. </ol></li><li> Persisting is what a thing does in continuing in existence. As we noted above, there are what are called  persistence conditions  specific to a kind of thing  that set out what vicissitudes a thing can survive if it is to remain that very same thing. There are sometimes hard cases, and there can seem sometimes that there is an element of <a name="48"></a><U>convention</U><SUP>33</SUP>: is a particular club still the same clubs after it has lost all its original members, changed its name, and so on? But we can t accept that our own existence is a matter of convention, though this could seem the case with the once-dominant <a name="48"></a><U>psychological view</U><SUP>34</SUP> of personal identity: just how much psychological connection could I lose with my former self  philosophers wondered  and still be me? However, things seem simpler and more objective for organisms, which persist despite exchanging material with the environment and changing many of their <a name="48"></a><U>properties</U><SUP>35</SUP>, provided they are caught up in a complex and hopefully long drawn-out event (or process) known as a  <a name="48"></a><U>life</U><SUP>36</SUP> . </li><li>In the above I have assumed at least three things. <ol type="i"><li>Firstly, that  things  or at least some things  exist. There s a philosophical position known as  <a name="48"></a><U>Process Metaphysics</U><SUP>37</SUP> (or  Naturalised Metaphysics ) that gives the focus to process rather than ontology, particularly in the case of organisms. I m not sure how fatal this is to my approach, since I admit that animals are individuated by their lives, which are processes. </li><li>Secondly, that <u>we</u> exist. This would seem hardly worth mentioning, other than that certain philosophers  <a name="48"></a><U>nihilists</U><SUP>38</SUP>  have argued that we (whatever we are) or  for similar reasons  various common things like hands  don t exist. </li><li>Finally, I assume that things do indeed persist, at least some of the time. </ol>I can t really address these foundational issues here, but will just say a few words on the second issue. There are a lot of interconnected issues to do with the philosophy of time and change, in particular the problem of <a name="48"></a><U>temporary intrinsics</U><SUP>39</SUP>. How can the leaf that was green yesterday be the same leaf if it is brown today? How can the old bald bloke I am today be the same individual as the hirsute teenager all those years ago? <ol type="i"><li>Some philosophers  the <a name="48"></a><U>exdurantists</U><SUP>40</SUP>  say that there s no relation of identity across time, but merely a weaker counterpart relation analogous to that between an individual and its counterpart in another possible world. </li><li>Others  in particular <a name="48"></a><U>Derek Parfit</U><SUP>41</SUP>  have said that even if there <em>is</em> identity across time, it s not <a name="48"></a><U>what matters</U><SUP>42</SUP>. </ol>In what follows, I assume that we exist and that we continue to exist self-identically across time and that this identity relation is important. We could not carry on our lives without these assumptions even if  philosophically-speaking  they were false; but I think they are true: I don t want to distinguish the  strict and philosophical from the  loose and popular senses of identity first raised by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Butler (Joseph).htm">Joseph Butler</A>. I also assume the standard <a name="48"></a><U>logic of identity</U><SUP>43</SUP> and reject all heretical accounts that are invented from time to time as radical solutions to the difficult questions of persistence. In particular, I reject the view  known as <a name="48"></a><U>occasional identity</U><SUP>44</SUP> that  while (say) I am not identical to my younger self  yet I was that person, just not any more. </li><li>Now back to the main thread. Most Anglophone philosophers these days are <a name="48"></a><U>physicalists</U><SUP>45</SUP> (though maybe most non-philosophers are unreflective <a name="48"></a><U>dualists</U><SUP>46</SUP>). This gives physicalist philosophers a problem if they have hopes of <a name="48"></a><U>post-mortem</U><SUP>47</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>survival</U><SUP>48</SUP>. If the human organism is totally destroyed  eg. by cremation, explosion, or eating of worms  just how does the very same individual <a name="48"></a><U>get from this life to the next</U><SUP>49</SUP>? <a name="48"></a><U>Christian Materialists</U><SUP>50</SUP> have had a go at thinking this through, and acknowledge the difficulties. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A> attempted to show that it is at least logically possible by having God snatch away the dying body immediately pre-mortem, replacing it with a simulacrum. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A>  while himself a dualist  has suggested a  falling elevator model to help out his materialist friends, whereby there is immanent <a name="48"></a><U>causation</U><SUP>51</SUP> (by some unknown natural or supernatural process) between the dying body and the <a name="48"></a><U>resurrection</U><SUP>52</SUP> one so that the dying individual escapes in the nick of time to the next world without loss of <a name="48"></a><U>numerical identity</U><SUP>53</SUP>. Others claim that God s omnipotence is sufficient and is sovereign even over the laws of logic, so that problems raised by identity being an equivalence relation can be overcome by brute force. Maybe so, but without the constraints of logical <a name="48"></a><U>possibility</U><SUP>54</SUP>, we have no way of arguing the matter, so let s not bother.</li><li>However, most Christian materialists prefer an alternative. They recognise that getting from here to the next world with temporal or spatial gaps raises difficult questions as to whether the numerical identity of the individual is preserved but adopt an alternative solution  the <a name="48"></a><U>Constitution View</U><SUP>55</SUP>. On this thesis, the person is distinct from the human animal   just as the <a name="48"></a><U>statue</U><SUP>56</SUP> is distinct from its <a name="48"></a><U>constituting</U><SUP>57</SUP> marble  so that the very same person  tagged by the unique  first person perspective noted above  can be constituted first by its earthly body, and subsequently by its heavenly one. </li><li>Some Animalists have what they think of as a knock-down argument against the Constitution View. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> calls it the  <a name="48"></a><U>Thinking Animal</U><SUP>58</SUP> argument. If the person and the animal are distinct things, albeit co-located, there are too many thinkers  because the animal can certainly think, as can the person, so we have two thinkers where we thought we had one  which is one problem; and there s another  how do we know which we are, the person or the animal? I m not impressed by this argument. There are several  multiple occupancy conundrums that have been claimed at one time or another to deny the existence of things we are sure do exist. <a name="48"></a><U>Dion and Theon</U><SUP>59</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>Tib and Tibbles</U><SUP>60</SUP>, the  <a name="48"></a><U>problem of the many</U><SUP>61</SUP> and so on. We just need to sort out our rules for counting. Also, the whole question of three- versus <a name="48"></a><U>four-dimensionalism</U><SUP>62</SUP> (4D)  whether a persisting thing is wholly present at a time  or whether only a temporal part is present, the thing as a whole being a  space-time worm  bears on the question of counting. If different things can share stages  say the person and the human animal, or the statue and the clay  then we have to be careful how we count. In the case of a future <a name="48"></a><U>fission</U><SUP>63</SUP>  whereby two space-time worms share their past stages, but will ultimately diverge  we might not know how many to count at a time, but this will often not matter for practical purposes. </li><li>I think the idea of a first-person perspective is important. It is this that provides the pull against <a name="48"></a><U>animalism</U><SUP>64</SUP> when linked to various <a name="48"></a><U>thought experiments</U><SUP>65</SUP> (TEs) that we ll come on to presently. However, I still <a name="48"></a><U>don t like the Constitution View</U><SUP>66</SUP>. My objection is that the FPP is a property of something else  like a smile  in this case of a human animal, though the smile might belong to a cat. You can t take the very same smile from one cat and place on another (it would be at best an exactly similar smile)  let alone have a disembodied smile like that of the Cheshire Cat. Similarly, you can t take the very same FPP from one body and plop it onto another. True, it might be a qualitatively exactly similar FPP, but not the same one. What s to stop that FPP being plopped on several resurrection bodies? Which would be numerically identical to me, given that they can t all be, in the absence of 4D? </li><li>What are the temptations for not sticking with the animalist approach  which ought these days to be the default position in the absence of anything more compelling? As noted, the apparent lack of rational expectation of an afterlife is one incentive to look elsewhere, so  elsewhere is a favourite for those who can t bear the thought of their <a name="48"></a><U>selves</U><SUP>67</SUP> expiring with their <a name="48"></a><U>bodies</U><SUP>68</SUP>. We ve noted the Christian dualists and materialists, but what about the Transhumanists? There s the relatively metaphysically uninteresting case of cryoscopy followed by repair and resuscitation; there we have material continuity, and no possibility of <a name="48"></a><U>reduplication</U><SUP>69</SUP>, though some might claim there is too much outside interference for identity to be preserved. But, what about the  hope of  you being uploaded to a computer? There seems to be an idea about that  we are really software (or data), when we are clearly material beings. If we are software, it is said, then we might  run on different hardware. I have two issues with this, apart from the immense technical obstacles to be overcome both in  scanning the  real you and providing a computer of sufficient power to run your program and the virtual world for you to experience, Matrix-like. <ol type="i"><li>Firstly, what sort of thing is a program? It s an interesting question whether a program has persistence conditions. Is Windows 10 the same program as Windows 0? Whatever the answer to this question is, a program would seem to be a kind of <a name="48"></a><U>universal</U><SUP>70</SUP> rather than a particular, and  we are particulars. </li><li>This leads to the second issue  a reduplication objection. Say we developed a sophisticated program that could run on an open-ended number of exactly similar robots. No two of these would be numerically identical to one another  they would be distinct, though exactly similar. So, were the program to be a simulation of your brain, it could run  presumably  on an open-ended number of computers  and these computers (or computer partitions) would not be identical to one another, so none of them could be you, as you could only be one of them, and there s <a name="48"></a><U>no principled way</U><SUP>71</SUP> of saying which. The same objection prevents Star Trek-like <a name="48"></a><U>teletransportation</U><SUP>72</SUP>  were it possible  being identity-preserving. I might also add that no  program is  in itself  <a name="48"></a><U>conscious</U><SUP>73</SUP>, though a machine that runs it might conceivably be. Mind you, there are arguments here as well  originated by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Searle (John).htm">John Searle</A>  at least for digital computers. </ol>Incidentally, the transhumanists seem to imagine unending computer life as a secular heaven, but it could just as easily be a secular hell. </li><li>So, I remain wedded to my view that we are human animals with the persistence conditions of such.  Person is not a <a name="48"></a><U>substance</U><SUP>74</SUP> term, but an honorific that refers to some substance during some periods of its existence when it has the requisite mental and <a name="48"></a><U>moral properties</U><SUP>75</SUP> to qualify.  Person is a <a name="48"></a><U>Phase Sortal</U><SUP>76</SUP> (like  teacher ) that  in the case of  person  applies to most humans most of the time, but need not apply to all humans all the time. There are ethical consequences for this view, but they are not as dramatic as is sometimes urged. Non-persons don t have moral responsibilities, as is already recognised for demented or infant humans, and all non-human animals. The obverse  that persons allegedly have <a name="48"></a><U>no moral obligations towards non-persons</U><SUP>77</SUP>  or that non-persons have no rights  is the sticking point, and ought to be reflected in a more humane treatment of all non-persons rather than that we might contemplate sending human non-persons as well as non-human non-persons to the slaughter-house. </li><li>So, what are the <a name="48"></a><U>problems for animalists</U><SUP>78</SUP>? There are several. Some  like the so-called  <a name="48"></a><U>corpse problem</U><SUP>79</SUP> (is my corpse me  only dead  if not, where does it come from? It doesn t have the persistence conditions of an organism) are probably relatively easy to overcome. Recently, I ve discovered that animalists  like (but for different reasons) those who think we are essentially persons  allegedly have a  <a name="48"></a><U>fetus problem</U><SUP>80</SUP> . Animalists  saying that we are essentially animals  have (it seems) to say that we were once foetuses  which appears to be what our animal once was. But was this fetus once a <a name="48"></a><U>proper part</U><SUP>81</SUP> of its mother? There s work currently going on to suggest that this is so  and if so, just when did the new human animal come into existence? However, I don t think any of this seriously threatens animalism. Maybe animalists should have considered the problem more than they have, but animals do come into existence sometime  presumably by the time of birth at the latest  and that s enough for an animalist. </li><li>The real problems for animalism stem from the force of thought experiments such as the  <a name="48"></a><U>brain transplant</U><SUP>82</SUP> intuition . An animalist seems forced to say that I would <em>not</em>  go with my brain in the circumstance where my brain is <a name="48"></a><U>transplanted</U><SUP>83</SUP> into another body, when it seems to most people that I <em>would</em>. The alleged reason for this is that at least some animalists consider the brain to be  just another organ that we might lose like we might lose a kidney, provided the animal is kept alive. Doubts about this have led some to think that we are not  really whole human animals but proper parts thereof, maybe not <a name="48"></a><U>brains</U><SUP>84</SUP> as such, but brains and a few other bits. This does seem comical. Just how large am I  would I fit into a hat-box, as <a name="48"></a><U>Olson</U><SUP>85</SUP> asks? </li><li>My view is as follows. I am currently (thankfully) a whole human animal. My wife worked in the NHS with amputees, and I think it is right to say that they also are whole human animals, though they lack parts that most of us have. No doubt they could lose more parts  and some diabetics sadly do. So, we might view a  <a name="48"></a><U>brain in a vat</U><SUP>86</SUP>  one ready for transplant  as a  maximally mutilated human animal. Maybe  in the case of a brain transplant  a prior animal has fissioned (divided into two) when the brain is extracted and we now have a case of the <a name="48"></a><U>fusion</U><SUP>87</SUP> of two animals (the brain from one fusing with the body of the other). It might be argued that our identity-logic <a name="48"></a><U>isn t quite up to deciding</U><SUP>88</SUP> who is who in such circumstances, but the stakes seem high enough to demand an answer, for which read on. </li><li>I doubt whether the transhumanist hopes of augmenting our physical or mental attributes by effectively converting us into <a name="48"></a><U>cyborgs</U><SUP>89</SUP> is much of a threat to animalism. We don t worry about our spectacles or our mobiles phones making us any less mammalian. Closer integration with AI applications is only the next step for the extended mind. </li><li>So, is there any purchase in thought experiments that putatively have my first person perspective persisting in cases where there is no identity preservation. Could it be the case that  it seems to me that I have survived some vicissitude  a <a name="48"></a><U>cerebrum</U><SUP>90</SUP> transplant, say  but I am mistaken? Some philosophers argue that this happens every night  I <a name="48"></a><U>go to sleep</U><SUP>91</SUP>, and when I wake up I just assume that I am identical to the individual who got into bed, but how do I know? I might be intellectually convinced by third parties  those other than the sleeper and the waker  one way or another, but how would this affect how it seems to me? Take the teletranportation case. Because of the reduplication objection (unless we are 4-dimensionalists), we should say that numerical identity is not preserved. But  if the technology works, and I am the teletransportee  the individual (or 77 duplicates) would (all) wake up convinced they were me, yet they must be deceived. Thankfully, reduplication is not a problem for whole-brain transplants, but it is for idempotent half-brain transplants, though I think the identity problem there occurs during the fissioning process rather than when the half-brains are implanted. </li><li>I continue to think that there is a distinction to be made between <a name="48"></a><U>forward and backward psychological continuity</U><SUP>92</SUP>, though I don t see how third parties  or even first or second parties  could tell the difference. It makes all the difference to me if I go to sleep and <em>someone else</em> wakes up thinking they are me  as against the normal case where I go to sleep and <em>I</em> wake up. In the former case  for me  there s just an endless nothingness, of which I know nothing, while in the latter case my experiential life carries on. However, backward psychological continuity  what it feels like looking back  is the same for a survivor and one who only thinks he s survived. </li><li>In the case of the split brain transplant, however, how is it all supposed to work, experientially? Neurosurgery is  even today  carried out on substantially conscious patients, as that way there s a quick feedback loop to tell the surgeon whether he s destroying any important areas of cognitive function. What would it be like to  fission ? Maybe I lack the imagination, but it seems to me that my First Person Perspective would go along with whatever was the dominant hemisphere, assuming this  seat of consciousness is initially located in one hemisphere or the other. If it is not, then it would presumably be destroyed and two new ones would be created in this miracle operation. Either way, this would sit comfortably with the logic of identity which would not be violated, as at most one of the recipients would be me. I can imagine being ripped apart psychologically, but I can t imagine going two ways. </li><li>Of course, there are physical and metaphysical issues with the whole idea of brain transplants  the physical structure of the <a name="48"></a><U>brain</U><SUP>93</SUP> reflects  its body, and mental faculties are not fully localised, so it s not just the immensely complex task of  wiring up the brain to its new body that presents a challenge. Half-brain transplants are even more problematical as in the TEs the brain stem is not split, but only the cerebra are supposed to be transplanted. It s not clear to me whether there is pervasive confusion here and that these thought experiments are underspecified to the degree of incoherence. Some philosophers  eg. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wilkes (Kathleen).htm">Kathleen Wilkes</A>  think TEs are unhelpful in the philosophy of personal identity, and that our concepts are not up to being probed in this way. I m not so sure  the TEs are about <em>us</em>, not our <a name="48"></a><U>concepts</U><SUP>94</SUP>. </li><li>There is finally the question whether there is any such thing as  the Self , which is what is supposed to have this FPP. Some contemporary philosophers argue that the Self is an illusion that the brain generates. Others  such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Hume (David).htm">David Hume</A>  have argued; and others  such as <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Strawson (Galen).htm">Galen Strawson</A>  do argue that when they introspect they find no evidence of a persisting Self. I don t know where they are coming from, as I can t think of anything more certain. But a <a name="48"></a><U>Buddhist-inspired</U><SUP>95</SUP>  no-self view makes the animalist s task easier, if maybe less interesting. </li></ol></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 06/07/2018 18:56:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.1 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.6: (What are We?)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 32.12: (Individual)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.6: (Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.5 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10: (Homo Sapiens)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.4: (Animalists)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.7: (Biological View)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The Biological View is that <a name="48"></a><U>we are</U><SUP>2</SUP> biological <a name="48"></a><U>organisms</U><SUP>3</SUP>, and  in particular  have the <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>4</SUP> of biological organisms. Since the organisms we are are obviously human <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>5</SUP>, this view is effectively just <a name="48"></a><U>Animalism</U><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li>The BV is to be distinguished from older physicalist variants  in particular the  <a name="48"></a><U>Body View</U><SUP>7</SUP> .</li><li>The primary work addressing this topic is"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>", though its focus is on what the persistence criteria of organisms are, rather on whether or not we are organisms.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_8">Links</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_8"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_53_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_9">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_9"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_10">include</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_10"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21327.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - EmbryosandStemCellResearch</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4282.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?</A>", Baker<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4426.htm">Olson (Eric) - Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20713.htm">Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - What Do Philosophers Believe?</A>", Bourget&Chalmers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4303.htm">Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1385.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics</A>", DeGrazia, 2005 <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21119.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of David DeGrazia s Human Identity and Bioethics</A>", Hershenov, 2008</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_11">Olson</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_11"></A><BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4739.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?</A>", Olson </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3382.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction</A>", Shoemaker, 2009 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start as below. It is somewhat arbitrary as to which works fall under this topic, and which under the <a name="48"></a><U>Biological Criterion</U><SUP>12</SUP> or <a name="48"></a><U>Animalism</U><SUP>13</SUP>. I ve tended to have a rather full list of those items above that I ve read, but the  outstanding list is minimalist. <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21651.htm">Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_53_14">Cerullo</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_53_14"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6471.htm">Young (J.Z.) - An Introduction to the Study of Man</A>", Young</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>15</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_53_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_53_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_53_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_53_10"></A><B>Footnote 10</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_53_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson is one of the primary exponents of the Biological View, so almost anything by him might be cited. </li><li>I ve restricted the list to those items that  in the text or comments I ve incorporated on-line  explicitly use the term. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_53_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Very tangentially relevant, but <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">Uploading</a> and the BV are antithetical theories of PID. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 12/06/2018 20:44:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.5: (Persistence Criteria)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 29: (Animals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 21: (First-Person Perspective)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.12 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17.11: (Future Great Pain Test)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.13 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18.3: (Wantons)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.14 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 7: (Ontology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.15 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.16: (Baker)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.16 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 27: (Taking Persons Seriously)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.17 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.6: (What are We?)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.18 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.5: (Human Persons)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.19 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15: (Psychological Continuity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.20 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14: (Physical Continuity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.21 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.11: (Souls)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.22 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.2: (Connectedness vs Continuity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.23 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 47.11: (Transhumanism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.24: (The Singularity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> This Note discusses in detail the somewhat extravagant thoughts in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16893.htm">Grossman (Lev) - 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal</A>". The footnotes in the Abstract for the paper link to the sections in this <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_972_1">Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_972_1"></A>. It is currently very much work in progress. <ol type="1"><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Kurzweil"></a><B>Kurzweil</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See <BR>&rarr; Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Kurzweil" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Kurzweil)), <BR>&rarr; Kurzweil s website (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/)), <BR>and much else besides. </li><li>I seem to have one of Kurzweil s books  "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4136.htm">Kurzweil (Ray) - The Age of Spiritual Machines</A>". </li><li>This book has been criticised by Searle  see <A HREF = "http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/04/08/i-married-a-computer/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/04/08/i-married-a-computer/). Unfortunately, only the opening section is available for free. But &rarr;</li><li>Kurzweil s site (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/chapter-2-i-married-a-computer" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/chapter-2-i-married-a-computer)) seems to hold an updated version. </li><li>Moreovever, there s an ensuing debate between Searle and Kurzweil, that is fully available on-line at <em>New York Review of Books</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/05/20/i-married-a-computer-an-exchange/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1999/05/20/i-married-a-computer-an-exchange/)). And see my transcripts &rarr;<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17002.htm">Kurzweil (Ray) -  I Married a Computer : An Exchange (between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle)</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17003.htm">Searle (John) -  I Married a Computer : An Exchange (between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle)</A>". </li><li>In fact, Kurtzweil s site has a bunch of free e-books, ie:-<BR>&rarr; Ray Kurtzweil (Editor)  <em>Are We Spiritual Machines? </em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/are-we-spiritual-machines" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/are-we-spiritual-machines)). This contains (as Chapter 2) the critique by Searle noted above. <BR>&rarr; Eric Drexler  <em>Engines of Creation 2.0  The Coming Era of Nanotechnology</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/engines-of-creation-book-excerpts-features" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/engines-of-creation-book-excerpts-features))<BR>&rarr; Ray Kurtzweil  <em>The Age of Intelligent Machines</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the-age-of-intelligent-machines" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the-age-of-intelligent-machines))<BR>&rarr; Ray Kurtzweil  <em>The Age of Spiritual Machines</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the-age-of-spiritual-machines" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the-age-of-spiritual-machines))<BR>&rarr; Neil Gershenfeld  <em>When Things Start to Think</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/when-things-start-to-think" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/when-things-start-to-think)) </li><li>I dare say that the substance of the <em>Time</em> article is already well worked-over in <em>Are We Spiritual Machines? </em> </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Creativity"></a><B>Creativity</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There s presumably a distinction between rules-based creativity, which is what (presumably) computers can do, and creativity of a less constrained sort, that we don t know how to get computers to do (yet)? </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Self"></a><B>Self</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>And  self-expression  facon de parler, in this context? Musical composition seems more a skill than a matter of self-expression (as would be a literary composition). I can t see why a sense of self would be necessary for creative composition in either music or the graphic arts. Certain <em>Idiot Savants</em> are no doubt adept in these areas, despite autistic tendencies, that mitigate against a sense of self.</li><li>What I have to say on Selves should be under <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Self, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>Self-Consciousness,<BR>Though I don t seem to have said anything yet. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Intelligence"></a><B>Intelligence and Consciousness</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There s a sharp distinction between intelligence and consciousness. </li><li>As far as we know, consciousness is the preserve of organic intelligence. </li><li>We can presume that lots of rather dim animals are phenomenally conscious (even if not self-conscious &rarr; this distinction is important) so, there s no link between getting smarter and smarter and then (as a result) getting phenomenally conscious. </li><li>I m not sure of the link between intelligence and self-consciousness. </li><li>There s an old <em>Time</em> article  Can Machines Think?  stimulated by the Kasparov vs Deep Blue chess match (at <A HREF = "http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,984304,00.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,984304,00.html)). </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Imminence"></a><B>Imminence of the  Singularity </B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is predicated on the assumption of continued exponential growth. It s a standard principle in scientific practice to be suspicious of exponentials, at least when they are unprincipled  ie. where there is no underlying theory that would lead us to expect them. </li><li>Also, as noted elsewhere in this discussion, the occurrence of the Singularity relies on the achievement of numerous conceptual and technological breakthroughs that we have no warrant for assuming will happen any time soon. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Civilization"></a><B>Human Civilization</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>So far, computers have only enhanced human civilisation. </li><li> Ending human civilisation ( as we know it ) depends on delivering (in an uncontrolled manner) the various promissory-notes of the <em>Time</em> article. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Faster"></a><B>Faster <em>Faster</em></B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Is this really the case that the rate of improvement in computing power is accelerating, and will it really continue to accelerate indefinitely, if it is so doing currently? </li><li>Note that Kurzweil's graph muddles together speed and cost. See the comments below. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Emulation"></a><B>Emulation</B>: Two points here. <ul type="disc"><li>Firstly, emulation isn t the real thing. Models of hurricanes aren t wet and windy, so why should emulations of consciousness be conscious? </li><li>Secondly, digital computers are serial devices in which the components are (now) very quick, and brains are massively parallel devices whose components are very slow. Why should simulating one by the other produce the same (phenomenal) effect, and even be possible at all? </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Intelligent_Actions"></a><B>Intelligent Actions</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The items on the list ( driving cars, writing books, making ethical decisions, appreciating fancy paintings, making witty observations at cocktail parties ) can all (presumably) be rules-based and situation-driven. No doubt this is true of human intelligence as well (ultimately) but modelling it is not straightforward, as we don t know how the brain does it. The issue isn t really (in this case) to do with  whether , but  when , as there are lots of major breakthroughs required before the promissory note can be delivered on. Also, all these functions can be delivered unconsciously (if they can be delivered at all). </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Smart_people"></a><B>Smart people</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Does it matter how smart they are? Lots of equally smart people don t share the optimism of the futurologists. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Computer_Power"></a><B>Increasingly Powerful Computers</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Are there really no reasons to doubt that their onward exponential growth is really never going to end? Miniaturisation of components has to stop soon due to QM effects. So, a radically-new technology is needed. Some ideas are there, but we might get  stuck on their delivery, as has been the case for controlled nuclear fusion (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#Current_status" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#Current_status)), which in the 1950s was expected soon, in the 1970s by 2000 and in 2006  not within 100 years . </li><li>There s no doubt that computers will continue to get more powerful, as hardware and software continues to improve, as it always will. The issue is really over the rate of change (can exponential growth continue indefinitely) and can certain conceptual breakthroughs be made?</li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Bootstrapping"></a><B>Bootstrapped Development</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is certainly an important point, as we certainly use computers to help manufacture computers. But the extrapolation to development may involve the solution of the real  machine creativity problem. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Prediction"></a><B>Prediction</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Is this true? It would be true if machines became  smarter than humans in every dimension of  smartness . But  unpredictability (ie. non-rules-based) is one of the aspects of machine-intelligence yet to be delivered by AI. </li><li>Also, this argument sounds a bit like the  you can t know the mind of God (at all) arguments, which may or may not be sound. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Cyborgs"></a><B>Cyborgs</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This sounds a more promising approach than simulation, and it d relieve computers from having to realise consciousness. But any cognitive interlinking would still require a fuller understanding of how the brain works than is currently on the horizon. </li><li>See <a name="48"></a>Cyborgs for my thoughts on the matter. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Integration"></a><B>Integration</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>We don t  integrate with cars and planes any more than we integrate with computers. They are just tools. Prosthetics are the nearest analogues, but there s a long way from that to true integration. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Nanotechnology"></a><B>Nanotechnology</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>At this stage of the argument, it s not clear how intelligent machines will help repair our bodies and brains (especially  indefinitely ). Usually nanotechnology is invoked at this stage (see <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanotechnology" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanotechnology) for an overview). Now, it s true that intelligent machines would be needed to manufacture, and probably program, these myriads of tiny, very specialised machines, but the possibilities are very schematic. There s no evidence that anything workable is around the corner. </li><li>It looks like the free eBook by Eric Drexler <em>Engines of Creation 2.0  The Coming Era of Nanotechnology</em> (<A HREF = "http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/engines-of-creation-book-excerpts-features" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/engines-of-creation-book-excerpts-features)) might prove useful. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Consciousness"></a><B>Consciousnesses</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Just what is meant here? Is this just loose speaking? A thing (an animal) is conscious, and the animal can t be scanned and downloaded anywhere. No-one really knows (at the theoretical level) what phenomenal consciousness is, though there are many theories. What s probably intended here is that  the contents of our brains would be read and uploaded to some device that can simulate our brains. This, of course, assumes that mind-body substance dualism is false (as it probably is), but even so  and admitting that whatever runs the downloaded software is at best a copy of the original, there s a long way to go before this sort of thing becomes even a worked-out theoretical possibility. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Software"></a><B>Software</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Well, philosophically-speaking, this is an outrageous idea. It depends on <a name="48"></a>what we are, and we re almost certainly not software, though software is important to us. And there are issues of identity  since software is easy to copy, and copies aren t identical, what reason would an individual have for thinking any particular installed copy was (identical to) him? </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Annihilation"></a><B>Annihilation</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Well, this is certainly something to watch out for, but I dare say it s a way off. It s more of a worry in genetic engineering or (if it gets going in the futurist mini-robot sense) nanotechnology. </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Singularity"></a><B>The Singularity</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This term is defined later, but see <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity) and <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Singularity_Is_Near" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Singularity_Is_Near) <BR>(amongst much else). </li></ul></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Moore's_Law"></a><B>Moore's Law</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_law" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_law)). </li><li>The Wikipedia article mentions Kurzweil and other futurologists, and the possible breakdown of Moore s Law within the next 5 years or so (ie. well before 2045). It also notes that Moore s Law is a self-fulfilling prophesy, in that the industry has taken it as a paradigm for R&D aims. Also, that the R&D costs of keeping up with Moore s Law are also increasing exponentially. </li></ul><IMG ALIGN=RIGHT ALT="Kurzweil's Graph" WIDTH=412 HEIGHT=293 SRC="../../../Photos/Notes/Kurzweil_Graph.jpg"></li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_Kurzweil's_Graph"></a><B>Kurzweil's Graph</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This graph intentionally muddles together speed and cost, but so-doing can lead others to draw the wrong conclusions from it. </li><li>Currently, while there continue to be improvements in computing power, the current driver behind the continuing exponential growth of Kurzweil s graph is economic  ie. computer hardware is being delivered <U>cheaper</U>, faster, not <U>faster</U> faster. </li><li>Even if Kurzweil s graph did continue for ever, it might still not lead to the singularity, in that the (infinitely cheap) computer hardware might still not deliver what Kurzweil needs. It might still be too slow. </li></ul> </li><li><a name="Off-Page_Link_xxx"></a><B>Dummy Section</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Details to be supplied later! </li></ul></li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_972_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: Currently the links are one-way. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 20/04/2018 23:25:26<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.25 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 21.13: (Uploading)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.26: (Computers)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This Note is restricted to the role Computers play in the philosophy of Mind and Personal Identity. While I am an <a name="48"></a><U>animalist</U><SUP>2</SUP>, the <a name="48"></a><U>mind</U><SUP>3</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>brain</U><SUP>4</SUP> are important topics in alternative accounts  in particular the <a name="48"></a><U>Psychological View</U><SUP>5</SUP> and the <a name="48"></a><U>Constitution View</U><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li>The  Computer Model of the mind seems to be the dominant paradigm in neuroscience. This is the view that the brain operates like a digital computer. This is disputed by (eg.) "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22515.htm">Epstein (Robert) - The empty brain</A>". </li><li>There s a cross-over in much of the above topic with <a name="48"></a><U>Functionalism</U><SUP>7</SUP>. </li><li>Where this gets exciting is in the <a name="48"></a><U>Transhumanist</U><SUP>8</SUP> hope of uploading <a name="48"></a><U>(you</U><SUP>9</SUP>, or your mind) to a computer. This will be dealt with under the head of <a name="48"></a><U>Uploading</U><SUP>10</SUP>. </li><li>A related issue  also currently noted under Transhumanism  is whether we are (most probably) living in a computer simulations, whether or not we might have been uploaded there. </li><li>Also, there s the whole question of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_11">Artificial Intelligence</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_11"></A>, and in particular whether computers  or maybe even computer programs  might ever become <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>12</SUP>. </li><li>This topic might get caught up in the  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_13">Connectionism</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_13"></A> debate, and whether connectionism  which seeks to adopt the neural connectionist architecture of the brain  can account for the  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_14">systematicity of cognition</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_14"></A> . I don t want to stray too far down this interesting path. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_15">Links</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_15"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1244_Links.htm">Click here</a>. Unfortunately, there are so many links that I ve not been able to make use of them as yet. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21910.htm">Ball (Philip) - We might live in a computer program, but it may not matter</A>", Ball</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6319.htm">Bostrom (Nick) - Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?</A>", Bostrom</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6322.htm">Bostrom (Nick) - How Long Before Superintelligence?</A>", Bostrom</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5744.htm">Christian (Brian) - The Most Human Human: A Defence of Humanity in the Age of the Computer</A>", Christian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21149.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue</A>", Dainton</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_18">Dennett</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_18"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22515.htm">Epstein (Robert) - The empty brain</A>", Epstein</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22232.htm">Graziano (Michael) - Endless fun</A>", Graziano</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19188.htm">Lavelle (Suilin) - Minds, Brains and Computers</A>", Lavelle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6065.htm">MacKay (Donald) - Computer Software and Life After Death</A>", MacKay</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_732.htm">Maxwell (Grover) - Intentionality: Hardware, not software</A>", Maxwell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23280.htm">Price (Huw), Cave (Stephen), Iida (Fumiya), Etc. - Preparing for the future: artificial intelligence and us: Part 1</A>", Price Etc</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23286.htm">Price (Huw), Cave (Stephen), Iida (Fumiya), Etc. - Preparing for the future: artificial intelligence and us: Part 2</A>", Price Etc</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1336.htm">Searle (John) - Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures</A>", Searle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_678.htm">Searle (John) - Minds, Brains, and Programs</A>", Searle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21053.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Philosophy and the Mind/Body Problem</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4531.htm">Shipley (G.J.) - Review of Andy Clark's 'Natural-Born Cyborgs'</A>", Shipley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3672.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Models of Mind</A>", Wilkes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman </li></ol></li><li>There is currently no categorised reading-list for this topic. A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_19">might start with</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_19"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21284.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Why Computers Can't Act</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12568.htm">Barberousse (Anouk), Francescelli (Sara) & Imbert (Cyrille) - Computer Simulations as Experiments</A>", Barberousse</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13215.htm">Barbour (Ian) - Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical Reflections</A>", Barbour</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_402.htm">Block (Ned) - The Mind as the Software of the Brain</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_20">Block</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_20"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11406.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Survival</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15968.htm">Bynum (Terrell Ward) - Two Philosophers of the Information Age</A>", Bynum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5099.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Persons and Substances</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5867.htm">Churchland (Paul) & Churchland (Patricia) - Could a Machine Think?</A>", Churchland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6703.htm">Cole (David) - Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity</A>", Cole</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21627.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Artifactual Selves: a Response to Lynne Rudder Baker</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21635.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - When Hal Kills, Who's to Blame? Computer Ethics</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_797.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12378.htm">Fetzer (James) - Computers and Cognition</A>", Fetzer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12570.htm">Frigg (Roman) & Reiss (Julian) - The Philosophy of Simulation: Hot New Issues or Same Old Stew?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_21">Frigg</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_21"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_471.htm">Gelernter (David) - The Muse in the Machine - Computers and Creative Thought</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_22">Gelernter</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_22"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20822.htm">Goertzel (Ben) - Artificial General Intelligence and the Future of Humanity</A>", Goertzel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17044.htm">Graham (George) - Mind and Belief in Computers</A>", Graham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19210.htm">Hauser (Larry) - Artificial Intelligence</A>", Hauser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15889.htm">Hofstadter (Douglas) - Who Shoves Whom around inside the Careenium? Or What Is the Meaning of the Word 'I'?</A>", Hofstadter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22062.htm">Kaess (Genevieve) - Could Consciousness Emerge from a Machine Language?</A>", Kaess</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_750.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - Mind as a Computer: Machine Functionalism</A>", Kim</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6789.htm">Leiber (Justin) - Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : Introduction, Setting, Notes & Reading List</A>", Leiber</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1578.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Searle: Why We Are Not Computers</A>", Nagel</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7350.htm">Olson (Eric) - Computer-Generated Life</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12564.htm">Parker (Wendy) - Does Matter Really Matter? Computer Simulations, Experiments, and Materiality</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_23">Parker</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_23"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1338.htm">Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20277.htm">Pollock (John L.) - What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21673.htm">Sandberg (Anders) & Bostrom (Nick) - Whole Brain Emulation: A Roadmap</A>", Sandberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4916.htm">Searle (John) - Can Computers Think?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_24">Searle</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_24"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21940.htm">Searle (John) - Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1244_25">Searle</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1244_25"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17003.htm">Searle (John) -  I Married a Computer : An Exchange (between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle)</A>", Searle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_148.htm">Searle (John) - The Rediscovery of the Mind</A>", Searle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_550.htm">Simons (Geoff) - Are Computers Alive? Evolution and New Life Forms</A>", Simons</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15890.htm">Steele (Guy L.) - Comments on Hofstadter's 'Who Shoves Whom around inside the Careenium?'</A>", Steele</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_745.htm">Wilensky (Robert) - Computers, cognition and philosophy</A>", Wilensky</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>26</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: I can t get into this in any detail. <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_13"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have the following items on Connectionism (amongst many others):-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_696.htm">Bechtel (William) - The Case For Connectionism</A>", Bechtel<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7700.htm">Davies (Martin) - Connectionism, Modularity, and Tacit Knowledge</A>", Davis<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_764.htm">Garson (James) - Connectionism</A>", Garson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5740.htm">MacDonald (Cynthia) & MacDonald (Graham), Eds. - Connectionism: Debates in Psychological Explanation - Vol. 2</A>", MacDonald (many useful papers)<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_847.htm">Smolensky (Paul) - Connectionist Modelling; Neural Computation / Mental Connections</A>", Smolenski </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I was interested in this debate during my undergraduate days, and have the following interesting items on the topic:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8177.htm">Blackmon (James), Byrd (David), Cummins (Robert), Poirier (Pierre), Schwarz (Georg) & Roth (Martin) - Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains</A>", Blackmon<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8181.htm">Cummins (Robert) - Systematicity</A>", Cummins<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3152.htm">Fodor (Jerry) - Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work</A>", Fodor<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4729.htm">Matthews (Robert) - Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity?</A>", Matthews </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_985.htm">Sanford (David H.) - Where Was I?</A>" for a follow-up (with a commentary by Dennett). </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1244_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The list is rather long, and will need pruning when I get down to this topic. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_20"></A><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1965.htm">Block (Ned) - The Computer Model of the Mind</A>" for a shorter version.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This paper no doubt considers the use of computers for simulating situations other than minds, so might not be directly relevant.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_22"></A><B>Footnote 22</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_842.htm">Gelernter (David) - Mirror Worlds</A>" is more a prediction of the internet, and is probably (even) less relevant.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_23"></A><B>Footnote 23</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This seems somewhat tangential, as it s not focused on simulating persons, but it might be useful background. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_24"></A><B>Footnote 24</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There s quite a lot by Searle that is relevant, but it s important not to get dragged in too far into his  outlier perspective  unless, of course, he s right! </li><li>It may be best to start with the whole of the book from which this paper is taken, ie. "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1336.htm">Searle (John) - Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1244_25"></A><B>Footnote 25</B>: See also "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21941.htm">Searle (John) - Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program? MIT Comments</A>". </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 27/06/2018 09:24:29<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.27: (Immortality)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This is a sub-topic of <a name="48"></a><U>Life after death</U><SUP>2</SUP>, the others being:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Resurrection</U><SUP>3</SUP>, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Reincarnation</U><SUP>4</SUP>. <BR>To these historical options we can now add the various hopes of:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Transhumanism</U><SUP>5</SUP></li><li>In the Biblical Christian tradition, God is the only being with natural immortality (see 1 Timothy 6:16  God & who alone is immortal , NIV), but Plato (and his Platonising Christian followers) had it that the (human) <a name="48"></a><U>soul</U><SUP>6</SUP> is also naturally immortal. So, the Biblical view is rather that God gives or denies immortality to whoever he wishes (and there is consequently no need to eternally roast the immortal souls of the wicked). </li><li>St, Paul has it that  the perishable must clothe itself with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality (1 Corinthians 15:53, NIV). This is in the context of the resurrection of the just at the return of Christ. </li><li>In the context of identity theory, it is doubtful whether the very same thing can at one time be perishable and at another time immortal, because a thing s <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>7</SUP> are taken to be essential properties of the <a name="48"></a><U>sort</U><SUP>8</SUP> it is, and a single thing cannot change sort. </li><li>As such, (as "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4033.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death</A>" notes), natural immortality of the soul is the only hope for post-mortem survival. But this hope is itself dashed by the lack of empirical evidence for the existence of the substantial soul, immortal or otherwise. </li><li>It does seem incongruous to talk about post-mortem immortality  how can something that has died be immortal? The idea, no doubt, is that it is the body that the soul occupied that was mortal. Hence, the soul needs a new immortal body to be clothed with. That seems to be the Pauline picture, though debated by the  Conditional Immortality people. </li><li>The <a name="48"></a><U>Transhumanists</U><SUP>9</SUP> hope that <a name="48"></a><U>Uploading</U><SUP>10</SUP> to a computer might lead to indefinitely extended life, though this is hardly immortality. Indefinite dentity-preserving life extensions might be possible using repair-microbots. </li><li>In all this, I m talking about the persistence of the <a name="48"></a><U>individual</U><SUP>11</SUP>. I m not talking about  immortality in the sense of  undying fame . As Woody Allen <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_12">quipped</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_12"></A>   <FONT COLOR = "800080">I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality through not dying. I don't want to live on in the hearts of my countrymen; I want to live on in my apartment</FONT> . </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2425.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality</A>" argues that we wouldn t even want immortality, but I m not convinced. However, a bad immortality  uploading to an evil computer, for instance  would be worse than no immortality, though <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_13">some</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_13"></A> are not even convinced of that. Reading associated with this topic is covered under:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Makropulos Case</U><SUP>14</SUP></li><li>Of course, if <a name="48"></a><U>animalism</U><SUP>15</SUP> is the correct account of personal identity, immortality is not on offer, though if the <a name="48"></a><U>transhumanists</U><SUP>16</SUP> succeed, an indefinite extension of life might be possible. </li><li>I have some other notes on this and related topics as part of <a name="48"></a>Philosophy of Religion and my <a name="48"></a>Blog, including:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Death and Eternal Life</U><SUP>19</SUP>,</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_20">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_20"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_21">include</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_21"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11762.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction: Introduction</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22798.htm">Cave (Stephen) - Everlasting glory</A>", Cave</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22800.htm">Cave (Stephen) - Remember Herostratus</A>", Cave</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7949.htm">Edwards (Paul) - Dr. Kubler-Ross, Dr. Moody, and the New Immortality Movement</A>", Edwards</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16893.htm">Grossman (Lev) - 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal</A>", Grossman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15780.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Plato, Part II: Arguments for the immortality of the soul</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15781.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Plato, Part III: Arguments for the immortality of the soul (cont.)</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15782.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Plato, Part IV: Arguments for the immortality of the soul (cont.)</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15791.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - The badness of death, Part III; Immortality, Part I</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15792.htm">Kagan (Shelly) - Immortality Part II; The value of life, Part I</A>", Shelley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_651.htm">Perry (John) - A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Perry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2425.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_979_22">reading list</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_979_22"></A> (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1781.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1582.htm">Barr (James) - The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality</A>", Barr</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_14/PaperSummary_14513.htm">Bostock (David) - The Soul and Immortality in Plato's Phaedo</A>", Bostock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12610.htm">Cullmann (Oscar) - Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?</A>", Cullmann</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_573.htm">Edwards (Paul), Ed. - Immortality</A>", Edwards</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1477.htm">Flew (Anthony) - Merely Mortal?</A>", Flew</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14539.htm">Forrest (Peter) - The Tree of Life: Agency and Immortality in a Metaphysics Inspired by Quantum Theory</A>", Forrest</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2920.htm">Gillman (Neil) - The Death Of Death: Resurrection and Immortality in Jewish Thought</A>", Gillman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4048.htm">Hick (John) - Death and Eternal Life</A>", Hick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4033.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6334.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death</A>", Martin & Augustine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6206.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12852.htm">Murray (Michael J.) & Rea (Michael) - Mind, body, and immortality</A>", Murray & Rea</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20217.htm">Nussbaum (Martha) - Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature</A>", Nussbaum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2717.htm">Penelhum (Terence), Ed. - Immortality</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4765.htm">Penny (Michael) - Immortality! When?</A>", Penny</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5826.htm">Tolkein (J.R.R.) - The Lord of the Rings: Part I - The Fellowship of the Ring</A>", Perrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20216.htm">Perrett (Roy W.) - Regarding Immortality</A>", Perrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4036.htm">Phillips (D.Z.) - Death and Immortality</A>", Phillips</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2412.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Immortality and Dualism</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16563.htm">Sutherland (Stewart R.) - Immortality and Resurrection</A>", Sutherland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1403.htm">Tipler (Frank) - The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead</A>", Tipler</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>23</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_979_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_979_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not sure where this is from, but see <A HREF = "https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1066-i-don-t-want-to-achieve-immortality-through-my-work-i" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1066-i-don-t-want-to-achieve-immortality-through-my-work-i). </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_979_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Eg. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/U/Author_Unamuno (Miguel De).htm">Miguel De Unamuno</A>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_979_20"></A><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_979_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_979_22"></A><B>Footnote 22</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The categorised reading-list requires some pruning in order to fit to identity-related issues only. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 01/03/2018 23:49:55<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.27.14: (Makropulos Case)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1014_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1014_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This Note will investigate the controversy started in 1973 by "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2425.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality</A>". </li><li>It is slightly off-topic, in that the focus isn t on whether there is, in fact, any such thing as <a name="48"></a>immortality (for <a name="48"></a>human beings).</li><li>Rather, it is whether immortality  again for embodied human beings  would be desirable (or, indeed, tolerable). </li><li>Williams s conclusion  needless to say  is that it is not, though his reasoning is rather subtle. </li><li>Thoughts on the value  or disvalue  of immortality tie in with the evil  or lack of evil  of <a name="48"></a>death. Some of the items below mention the Makropulos Case in that regard. </li><li>All discussion of the evils of death will fall under this Note. </li><li>Since <a name="48"></a>animalism strongly implies that  death is the end of us , this may be important. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1014_6">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1014_6"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1014_7">include</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1014_7"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2425.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality</A>"</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6167.htm">Bradley (Ben) - How Bad Is Death?</A>", Bradley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20207.htm">Burley (Mikel) - Atheism and the gift of death</A>", Burley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20204.htm">Burley (Mikel) - Immortality and Boredom: A Response to Wisnewski</A>", Burley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20203.htm">Burley (Mikel) - Immortality and Meaning: Reflections on the Makropulos Debate</A>", Burley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2435.htm">Feldman (Fred) - Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death</A>", Feldman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5904.htm">Kaufman (Frederik) - Pre-Vital and Post-Mortem Non-Existence</A>", Kaufman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20213.htm">Levine (Michael P.) - What Does Death Have to Do with the Meaning of Life?</A>", Levine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2433.htm">Luper-Foy (Steven) - Annihilation</A>", Luper-Foy</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7340.htm">Moore (Adrian W.) - Williams, Nietzsche, and the Meaninglessness of Immortality</A>", Moore</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20217.htm">Nussbaum (Martha) - Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature</A>", Nussbaum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20216.htm">Perrett (Roy W.) - Regarding Immortality</A>", Perrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20211.htm">Preston (Ted M.) & Dixon (Scott) - Who Wants to Live Forever? Immortality, Authenticity, and Living Forever in the Present</A>", Preston & Dixon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22388.htm">Rosati (Connie S.) - The Makropulos Case Revisited: Reflections on Immortality and Agency</A>", Rosati</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2426.htm">Silverstein (Harry) - The Evil of Death</A>", Silverstein</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20206.htm">Sorensen (Roy) - A Sance with an Immortal</A>", Sorensen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20209.htm">Sorensen (Roy) - The Cheated God: Death and Personal Time</A>", Sorensen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20210.htm">Steele (Hunter) - Could Body-bound Immortality be Liveable?</A>", Steele</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20215.htm">Strauss (Jonathan) - After Death</A>", Strauss</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20214.htm">Suits (David B.) - Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Died</A>", Suits</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20212.htm">Wetzel (James) - Infinite Return: Two Ways of Wagering with Pascal</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1014_8">Wetzel</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1014_8"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20205.htm">Wisnewski (J. Jeremy) - Is the Immortal Life Worth Living?</A>", Wisnewski</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1014_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1014_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1014_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1014_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The discussion of Pascal s Wager is a tangent on a tangent, but an interesting one nonetheless. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 01/03/2018 18:53:17<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.28 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.3: (Persistence)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.29 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41.12: (Numerical Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.30 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 44.14: (Personality)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.31: (Narrative Identity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_905_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_905_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Narrative identity isn t really an account of numerical identity, but is dependent on it. It is analogous to the <a name="48"></a><U>PV</U><SUP>2</SUP>, but is closer to what most non-philosophers usually mean by  personal identity ; saying someone is  no longer the same person implies such a change in personality that their life no longer fits into a single narrative. </li><li>The most convenient introduction is probably in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11993.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics</A>", section 2.3 (<A HREF = "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/#NarCri" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/#NarCri)). </li><li>To quote:- <ul type="square"><FONT COLOR = "800080"><li>what makes some feature mine may actually be making reference to a non-numerical type of identity, a type of identity we are thinking of when addressing the familiar question of an identity crisis:  Who am I really? This is the question of identity as proper attributability, as providing an account of one's true self and the various attributes genuinely belonging to it. </li><li>the <em>Narrative Criterion of Personal Identity</em>: what makes an action, experience, or psychological characteristic properly attributable to some person (and thus a proper part of his or her true identity) is its correct incorporation into the self-told story of his or her life. & Narrative identity is thus really about a kind of psychological unity, but not just an artless or random unity. </li><li>for that subject of experiences to be a person, a genuine moral agent, those experiences must be actively unified, must be gathered together into the life of one narrative ego by virtue of a story the subject tells that weaves them together, giving them a kind of coherence and intelligibility they wouldn't otherwise have had. This is how the various experiences and events come to have any real meaning at all  rather than being merely isolated events  by being part of a larger story that relates them to one another within the context of one life </li><li>What explains my special sort of concern for myself is that I'm in fact an extended narrative ego  not some time-slice concerned about the well-being of some future time-slice  and I'm constantly extending that narrative into the future, so my concern is <em>global</em>, a concern for the whole self I'm creating via this story, the whole self whose various parts are mine.</li><li>what makes some past action mine (for which I'm eligible for praise or blame) is that it flowed from my central values, beliefs, and experiences, that there's a coherent story I may tell uniting it to the other elements of my life. </li></ul></FONT> </li><li>Shoemaker sees a problem:- <ul type="square"><FONT COLOR = "800080"><li>What matters to us with respect to all of our practical concerns is that we ourselves continue to exist: it's a necessary presupposition of my rational anticipation, self-concern, possibilities for compensation, and so on that I myself persist, but this is an issue of numerical identity. Another way to put this is that one can't be a person, on the narrative view, unless one gathers up the various experiences one has as a subject of experiences into a coherent narrative, but then the identity of that subject of experiences must be preserved across time for its experiences to be so gathered up. </FONT></li><li>If narrative identity depends on numerical identity, then it is as subject to <a name="48"></a><U>fission-problems</U><SUP>3</SUP> as accounts of numerical identity. </li></ul> </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_905_4">Links</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_905_4"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_905_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_905_5">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_905_5"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_905_6">include</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_905_6"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A fairly full reading list might be:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6120.htm">Alexander (Ronald) - The Self and Narrative Identity</A>", Alexander</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6470.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Human Persons: Narrative Identity and Self-Creation</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5444.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Narrative Self-Constitution View</A>", Schechtman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15139.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics - Alternative Approaches</A>", Shoemaker_David</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5003.htm">Teichert (Dieter) - Narrative, Identity and the Self</A>", Teichert </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2561.htm">Thomas (Laurence) - Group Autonomy and Narrative Identity: Blacks and Jews</A>", Thomas </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>7</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_905_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_905_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_905_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_905_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.32 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 45.4: (Similarity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.33 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 40.5: (Convention)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.34 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.25: (Psychological View)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.35 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 16.5: (Properties)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.36: (Life)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_942_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_942_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There are (at least) two sub-topics that fall under this topic:- <ul type="square"><li><b>Lives</b>: Life as an (extended) event  the career of an individual. </li><li><b>Life</b>: Life as a biological process. </li></ul></li><li>I assume that lives can be had by individuals that do not have (biological) life, but think it unhelpful to talk of non-biological individuals as  alive , except in a figurative sense. </li><li>Life  and its correlate, <a name="48"></a><U>death</U><SUP>2</SUP>  is a biological process, on which the word of the biologist (maybe as clarified by the philosopher) is final. </li><li>So, interesting philosophical questions about <b>Life</b> include:- <ul type="square"><li>Just what is (biological) life? </li><li>When does biological life begin? This is presumably an empirical question, the answer to which will vary from species to species. </li><li>Are there borderline cases of life?</li><li>When does life cease? Again, the answer to this question will be species-dependent. </li><li>Can life <a name="48"></a><U>intermit</U><SUP>3</SUP>? Does it make sense to say that so-and-so died (on the operating table, say) and then revived? </li></ul> </li><li>Interesting philosophical questions about <b>Lives</b> include:- <ul type="square"><li>How are lives individuated? </li><li>What sort of things can have lives? </li><li>How closely coupled is the life of a human <a name="48"></a><U>organism</U><SUP>4</SUP> with the life of a human <a name="48"></a><U>person</U><SUP>5</SUP>?</li><li>Can a life lived courtesy of a human organism be continued after the death of that organism? </li></ul></li><li>A starting point for <b>Life</b> is "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1337.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities</A>".</li><li>Similarly, for <b>Lives</b>: "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4876.htm">Wollheim (Richard) - Living</A>", from "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_270.htm">Wollheim (Richard) - The Thread of Life</A>". </li><li>For a discussion of the possibility of Life after Death, see this <a name="48"></a><U>Note</U><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_942_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_942_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_942_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_942_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>9</SUP>. Currently, mainly see the rather bloated reading list below. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_942_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_942_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_942_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.37: (Process Metaphysics)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>A foundation-stone of my  and most philosophers  account of identity is that  things  or at least <u>some</u>  things  exist. Without things to persist, there can be no persistence and no diachronic identity. </li><li>There has been much discussion about just which things exist, and which things make up  or <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_2">compose</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_2"></A>  other things  see, for instance:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3628.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Vagueness and Composition</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5891.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Brutal Composition</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23021.htm">Miller (Kristie) - The Existential Quantifier, Composition and Contingency</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5333.htm">Parsons (Josh) - Conceptual Conservatism and Contingent Composition</A>"<BR>And especially & <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3534.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Special Composition Question</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5620.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - When are Objects Parts?</A>"</li><li>However, some recent papers I ve seen on Aeon cast doubt on the existence of things, and prefer to focus on processes  in particular, biological ones. This is  process metaphysics , or  naturalistic metaphysics . See:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22814.htm">Vieira (Celso) - Which is more fundamental: processes or things?</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22899.htm">Dupre (John) - Metaphysics of metamorphosis</A>"<BR>The above two papers are all I ve read on the subject thus far. </li><li>Relevant books include:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6556.htm">Rescher (Nicholas) - Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4890.htm">Ladyman (James), Ross (Don), Spurrett (David) & Collier (John) - Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized</A>"</li><li>Books by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Whitehead (Alfred North).htm">Alfred North Whitehead</A>  while historically important  are not a priority in this context. Nor are those on Process Theology. Back in the previous century, around 1993, I used to attend the meetings of  The Society for Process Thought , and corresponded frequently with its chairman, Patrick Lewin. A quick Google didn t reveal anything about the Society, or Patrick, so maybe both are extinct. I did find an old Newsletter that mentioned both: <A HREF = "https://conwayhall.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ETHICAL-RECORD-DECEMBER-1993.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://conwayhall.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ETHICAL-RECORD-DECEMBER-1993.pdf), on the Conway Hall Website (<A HREF = "https://conwayhall.org.uk/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://conwayhall.org.uk/)). </li><li>I m not sure how much of an impact this stance has on my research. I d already noted that animals are each individuated by a <a name="48"></a><U>life</U><SUP>3</SUP>, itself a process. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_4">Links</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_4"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1259_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_5">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_5"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1259_6">include</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1259_6"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>7</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1259_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1259_2"></A><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I need a note on Composition. </li><li>It is involved in  but not identical to  issues of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_62.htm">Constitution</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1259_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1259_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1259_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.38 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41.11: (Nihilism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.39: (Temporary Intrinsics)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1254_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1254_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how to explain how the very same thing can have different properties at different times, in seeming contradiction of Leibniz s Law, that identicals must have all their properties in common. </li><li>An example  due to my friend <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Botros (Sophie).htm">Sophie Botros</A>  is of a leaf that is green in the spring and brown in the autumn. </li><li>Currently whatever I have had to say on this topic is (at best) posted to the following Notes:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Leibniz</U><SUP>2</SUP><BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Persistence</U><SUP>3</SUP><BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Endurantism</U><SUP>4</SUP><BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Exdurantism</U><SUP>5</SUP><BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Perdurantism</U><SUP>6</SUP></li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1254_7">Links</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1254_7"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1254_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1254_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1254_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1254_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1254_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9774.htm">Botterell (Anthony) - Temporal Parts and Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Botterell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6036.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Haslanger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1781.htm">Lewis (David) - The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5354.htm">Sider (Ted) - The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5127.htm">Wasserman (Ryan) - The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Wasserman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6326.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - Growing Individuals and Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Weatherson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1782.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism</A>", Wasserman </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>10</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1254_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1254_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1254_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1254_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.40 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41.3: (Exdurantism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.41 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.2: (Parfit)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.42 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.4: (What Matters)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.43 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11: (Logic of Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.44 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11.7: (Occasional Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.45 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12: (Physicalism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.46 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.2: (Dualism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.47 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.8: (Death)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.48 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13: (Survival)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.49: (Life After Death)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This is an umbrella-note for the ways in which post-mortem survival might be actualised, namely:- <ul type="square"><li><a name="48"></a><U>Resurrection</U><SUP>2</SUP>,</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Reincarnation</U><SUP>3</SUP>, or</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Immortality</U><SUP>4</SUP> of the <a name="48"></a><U>Soul</U><SUP>5</SUP>. </li></ul></li><li>To this list might be added the collection of hopeful possibilities expected by the <a name="48"></a><U>Transhumanists</U><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li>It will discuss broad issues rather than the specifics of the particular options. It ought to discuss whether life after death  in the sense of eternal, or at least unending, life is to be desired, though this can mostly be hived off to the <a name="48"></a><U>Makropulos Case</U><SUP>7</SUP>. </li><li>I m not interested in <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_8">cases of resuscitation</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_8"></A>, which are commonplace these days. The paradigm cases are after the total  or near-total  destruction of the body. </li><li>Johnston thinks (in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4033.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death</A>") that there s a <a name="48"></a><U>forensic</U><SUP>9</SUP> need for post-mortem survival of some sort, as otherwise there s no incentive to be good, and hopes to provide it by a radical redefinition of what the person is. But this strikes me as changing the subject. </li><li>I have some other notes on this and related topics as part of <a name="48"></a><U>Philosophy of Religion</U><SUP>10</SUP> and my <a name="48"></a>Blog:- <ul type="square"><li><a name="48"></a><U>Death and Eternal Life</U><SUP>12</SUP>,</li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Resurrection</U><SUP>13</SUP>, and </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Resurrection (Metaphysics)</U><SUP>14</SUP>.</li></ul></li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_15">Links</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_15"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_978_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21456.htm">Almeder (Robert) - Death and Personal Survival: Evidence for Life After Death - Preface</A>", Almeder</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11762.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction: Introduction</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7312.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8366.htm">Blackmore (Susan) - And After Death?</A>", Blackmore</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11718.htm">Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing</A>", Cooper</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6195.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Soul, Body and Survival: Introduction - Soul or Body?</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18137.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Thank Goodness!</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4008.htm">Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death</A>", Feldman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4171.htm">Fenwick (Peter) & Fenwick (Elizabeth) - The Truth in the Light: An Investigation of Over 300 Near-Death Experiences</A>", Fenwick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19029.htm">Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: Introduction</A>", Gasser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17041.htm">Graham (George) - Death and Identity</A>", Graham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22232.htm">Graziano (Michael) - Endless fun</A>", Graziano</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21125.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8400.htm">LePoidevin (Robin) - Arguing for Atheism: Preface / Introduction</A>", LePoidevin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21957.htm">Loose (Jonathan) - Constitution and the Falling Elevator</A>", Loose</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6065.htm">MacKay (Donald) - Computer Software and Life After Death</A>", McKay</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19915.htm">Olson (Eric) - Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12608.htm">Penelhum (Terence) - Immortality: Introduction</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21874.htm">Price (H.H.) - Motives for disbelief in life after death</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21875.htm">Price (H.H.) - Two conceptions of the Next World</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15141.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20796.htm">Stewart-Williams (Steve) - On the Origin of Afterlife Beliefs by Means of Memetic Selection</A>", Stewart-Williams</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4064.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Mind and Person in the Philosophy of Religion</A>", Thomas, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16533.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Other arguments for dualism</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16542.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16760.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16008.htm">Vardy (Peter) & Arliss (Julie) - Life after Death</A>", Vardy</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21051.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Can We Survive Our Death?</A>", Zimmerman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7766.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_18">reading list</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_18"></A> (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6379.htm">Almeder (Robert) - Death and Personal Survival: Evidence for Life After Death</A>", Almeder<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21454.htm">Dilley (Frank B.) - Review of Robert Almeder 'Death and Personal Survival: The Evidence for Life after Death'</A>", Dilley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6271.htm">Bacchiocchi (Samuele) - Immortality or Resurrection? A Biblical Study on Human Nature and Destiny</A>", Bacchiocchi</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1781.htm">Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction</A>", Badham</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7296.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Death and the Afterlife</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9532.htm">Baltimore (Joseph A.) - Got to Have Soul</A>", Baltimore</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21955.htm">Bruntrup (Godehard) - Soul, Body and Survival: The Renaissance of Christian Materialism</A>", Bruntrup</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2304.htm">Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate</A>", Cooper</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1383.htm">Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16568.htm">Cosculluela (Victor) - Death and God: The Case of Richard Swinburne</A>", Cosculluela</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16731.htm">Davis (Stephen T.) - Philosophy and Life After Death: The Questions and the Options</A>", Davies</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_573.htm">Edwards (Paul), Ed. - Immortality</A>", Edwards</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5722.htm">Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?</A>", Gasser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4048.htm">Hick (John) - Death and Eternal Life</A>", Hick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4033.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death</A>", Johnston<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15977.htm">Caldwell (Christopher M.) - Review - 'Surviving Death' by Mark Johnston</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_638.htm">Lewis (Hywel David) - Persons and Life After Death</A>", Lewis_H</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6334.htm">Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_978_19">Martin & Augustine</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_978_19"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6206.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20806.htm">More (Max) & Vita-More (Natasha) - Transhumanism: Engines of Life: Identity and Beyond Death - Introduction</A>", More</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21128.htm">Oderberg (David) - Survivalism, Corruptionism, and Mereology</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20953.htm">Ogilvie (Daniel M.) - A Partial History of Afterlife Beliefs</A>", Ogilvie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2717.htm">Penelhum (Terence), Ed. - Immortality</A>", Penelhum</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4286.htm">Rawlings (Maurice S.) - To Hell and Back: Life after Death - Startling New Evidence</A>", Rawlings</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5302.htm">Rosenberg (Jay) - 'Life After Death' - In Search of the Question</A>", Rosenberg<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20310.htm">Silverstein (Harry) - Review of Thinking Clearly About Death by Jay F. Rosenberg</A>", Silverstein</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19837.htm">Sider (Ted) - Hell and Vagueness</A>", Sider</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21950.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Possibility of Life after Death</A>", Swinburne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1403.htm">Tipler (Frank) - The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead</A>", Tipler, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11215.htm">Tipler (Frank) - The Physics of Immortality: Preface</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20341.htm">Tipler (Frank) - Comparison of the Heaven Predicted by Modern Physics With the Afterlife Hoped For by the Great World Religions</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16562.htm">Van Evra (James) - On Death as a Limit</A>", Van Evra</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21951.htm">Vasalou (Sofia) - Personal identity across temporal gaps: an Islamic view of the problem</A>", Vasalou</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21952.htm">Wilson (P. Eddy) - Is Seamless Post-Mortem Existence Necessary for Survival?</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21139.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Personal Identity and the Survival of Death</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>20</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_978_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_978_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>For resuscitation, see <BR>&rarr "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4308.htm">Moody (Raymond A.), Morse (Melvin) & Kubler-Ross (Elizabeth) - Life After Life</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4307.htm">Moody (Raymond A.), Perry (Paul) & Greeley (Andrew) - The Light Beyond</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_978_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_978_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_978_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_978_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The categorised reading list includes a lot of material of purely religious interest, the vast bulk of which I ve ignored </li><li>Even so, the reading list is too long. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_978_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve not noted individual papers from this volume, except where I ve read them. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/05/2018 20:03:50<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.49.10: (Status: Philosophy of Religion (2018 - June))</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <B><U>Rationale for this Project</B></U><ul type="disc"><li>See my <a name="48"></a>Christian page and onward links from there for an explanation of how I got in to and out of evangelical Christianity. This is still a live issue for me, and the reason I originally undertook formal philosophical training. </li><li>The connection to my current philosophical researches arises from the standard religious hope that resurrection  or some other form of post-mortem survival  is possible. This is a cornerstone of religious claims and expectations, at least in the Abrahamic religions, from those of suicide bombers to those of more pacific persons. I wish to go back to the considerations that originally motivated Locke and research the metaphysical possibility of resurrection for beings such as us. My current opinion is that resurrection for human beings is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_519_2">metaphysically impossible</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_519_2"></A>, given that substance dualism is false. </li><li>In late September 2010 I took the <B><a name="48"></a>Philosophy of Religion</B> Module of a 2-year part time MA in <em>Philosophy and Religion</em> at Heythrop College (<A HREF = "http://www.heythrop.ac.uk/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.heythrop.ac.uk/)), University of London. Follow the links for my <a name="48"></a>Personal Statement, <a name="48"></a>Interview Write-up, and <a name="48"></a>Course Outline. I decided not to proceed with the MA but <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_519_7">do intend to follow up on</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_519_7"></A> the many issues raised.</li><li>During 2016 I assisted with the Appendices of my friend s PhD Thesis on the Narrative Structure of the Acts of the Apostles, building a website. See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21759.htm">Mansell (Peter) - Bottom Up Reading of Acts</A>". </li><li>In August 2017 I was asked by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/A/Author_Alter (Michael J.).htm">Michael J. Alter</A> to review pre-publication his book on the theology of the Resurrection. Unfortunately it turned out to be too much work, and I only commented on the first section. </li></ul><BR><!-- FUNCTOR_ID=08 --> <B><U>Summary of Progress during April - June 2018</B></U><ol type="1"><li>I spent 31 hours in 2Q18 on this Project, or related work (108 hours YTD, where for "YTD" - Year to Date - I mean the (academic) year that commenced in October 2017). That's 119% of the planned effort (69% YTD). Overall, 6% of my Project effort in the Quarter was directed towards this project (making 6% YTD) - as against 4% planned (8% YTD).<!-- FUNCTOR_END --></li><li>The highlights of the quarter were:- <ul type="disc"><li>Read & commented on "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23368.htm">Ungar-Sargon (Batya) - Undercover atheists</A>", found on <em>Aeon</em>. </li><li>The above referenced "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6719.htm">Dershowitz (Alan M.) - Genesis Of Justice</A>", which I read with interest, though haven t had time to comment on, nor will I most likely.</li><li>Discovered "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23299.htm">Hart (David Bentley) - Everything you know about the Gospel of Paul is likely wrong</A>", again via <em>Aeon</em>; it seemed poorly argued but raised interesting questions about translation which are pursued in, amongst much else:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23355.htm">Lindgren (Caleb) - Translating the N. T. Wright and David Bentley Hart Tussle</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23354.htm">Hart (David Bentley) - A Reply to N. T. Wright</A>"</li><li>Started reading "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6716.htm">Finkelstein (Israel) & Silberman (Neil Asher) - The Bible Unearthed</A>"</li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_519_8">Attended</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_519_8"></A> the OBT Conference  How to Read the Bible with Greater Confidence (<A HREF = "http://www.obt.org.uk/events?product_id=716" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.obt.org.uk/events?product_id=716)).</li></ul></li><li>Further details of activity in the last quarter are given below:- </li></ol><!-- FUNCTOR_ID=01 --> <b><u>Religion</u></b> (Total Hours = 20.75)<ol type="I"><li><b>Religion - Reading / Writing</b> (Total Hours = 16.25)<ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6719.htm">Dershowitz (Alan M.) - Genesis Of Justice</A>" (Read / Write, 4.25 hours)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6716.htm">Finkelstein (Israel) & Silberman (Neil Asher) - The Bible Unearthed</A>" (Read / Write, 4.5 hours)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23354.htm">Hart (David Bentley) - A Reply to N. T. Wright</A>" (Read / Write, 1.75 hours)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23299.htm">Hart (David Bentley) - Everything you know about the Gospel of Paul is likely wrong</A>" (Read / Write, 1 hour)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23355.htm">Lindgren (Caleb) - Translating the N. T. Wright and David Bentley Hart Tussle</A>" (Read / Write, 1.25 hours)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23296.htm">Lum (Kathryn Gin) - Hell-bent</A>" (Read, 0.25 hours)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23368.htm">Ungar-Sargon (Batya) - Undercover atheists</A>" (Read / Write, 3.25 hours)</li></ul></li><li><b>Religion - General Research</b> (Total Hours = 0.5)<ul type="disc"><li>Bibleworks: Preparation for Bibleworks "demise" (0.25 hours)</li><li>Bibleworks: Review of Resources & Background Material (0.25 hours)<br>&rarr; See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21759.htm">Mansell (Peter) - Bottom Up Reading of Acts</A>"</li></ul></li><li><b>Religion - Seminars</b><ul type="disc"><li>OBT Conference (4 hours)<br>&rarr; See "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12467.htm">Interaction - Discussions with Pete</A>"</li></ul></li></ol><br><b><u>Religion Background</u></b> (Total Hours = 10.5)<ol type="I"><li><b>Religion Background - Admin</b> (Total Hours = 1.25)<ul type="disc"><li>18Q1 Status Reports (1 hour)</li><li>Barnabas Fund - Religious Tolerance (0.25 hours)<br>&rarr; See "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15405.htm">Admin - Religion - Admin</A>"</li></ul></li><li><b>Religion Background - Discussions</b> (Total Hours = 9.25)<ul type="disc"><li>Interaction - Discussions with Mike & Sylvia (4.75 hours)</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12467.htm">Interaction - Discussions with Pete</A>" (1.5 hours)</li><li>Interaction - Discussions with Pete & Caro; Mike & Sylvia; Julie (3 hours)</li></ul></li></ol><br><!-- FUNCTOR_END --><BR><U><B>Plans for the Near Future</B></U> <ul type="disc"><li>In order to balance the books  and retain focus on my Thesis and Web-tools projects  and accommodate the distraction of house repairs  I ve further reduced the planned effort to a single hour a week. </li><li>The items in the list below are those I d like to address if time allows, which it most likely won t!<BR><!-- FUNCTOR_ID=09 --> <ol type="I"><li><b>Philosophy of Religion</b>: <ol type="i"><li>Continue reading "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6294.htm">Antony (Louise M.) - Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life</A>",</li><li>Review "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_23/PaperSummary_23285.htm">Oppy (Graham) - An Argument for Atheism From Naturalism</A>". </li><li>Continue reading the Blog "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6599.htm">Ferguson (Matthew) - </A>".</li></ol></li><li><B>Resurrection</B>: Read "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6600.htm">Knohl (Israel) - Messiahs and Resurrection in 'The Gabriel Revelation'</A>" and associated papers.</li><li><b>Background</b>: <ol type="i"><li>Read appropriate items from <em><a name="48"></a>Aeon</em>. </li><li>Continue reviewing "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23299.htm">Hart (David Bentley) - Everything you know about the Gospel of Paul is likely wrong</A>" and parallels.</li><li>Contiue reading "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6716.htm">Finkelstein (Israel) & Silberman (Neil Asher) - The Bible Unearthed</A>". </li></ol></li></ol><!-- FUNCTOR_END --></li></ul><BR><B><U>Summary of Progress to Date</B></U><BR><BR>I ve hived off the history to a separate <a name="48"></a>document, which still requires a major update.<BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_519_2"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Or if not strictly impossible  rather unlikely, as the candidates for enabling some sort of physical continuity  from luz bones to  corpse swapping  have multiple problems. </li><li>However, there are some interesting ideas by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Z/Author_Zimmerman (Dean).htm">Dean Zimmerman</A>, most recently in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", that argue the contrary. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_519_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>This pious hope has been sitting unactioned for over 7 years now! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_519_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>In Reading, but we had to escape early as the lock on our back door in Billericay had broken and Nat couldn t get in. </li><li>So, I ll be attending the repeat performance in Billericay on 3rd November 2018, all being well. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 06/07/2018 18:56:10<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.50 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14.8: (Christian Materialism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.51 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 38: (Causality)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.52 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.9: (Resurrection)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.53 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11: (Logic of Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.54 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 3.7: (Modality)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.55 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24: (Constitution View)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.56: (Statue and the Clay)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1171_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1171_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This topic arises in the theory of material <a name="48"></a><U>constitution</U><SUP>2</SUP> when we are considering whole objects (rather than their parts) that appear to be co-located because they are (or seem to be) of different kinds, or (seem to) have different persistence conditions. </li><li>This issue was exploited by "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>" (1975) in the cause of <a name="48"></a><U>contingent identity</U><SUP>3</SUP>. </li><li>Supporters of the <a name="48"></a><U>Constitution View</U><SUP>4</SUP> of Personal Identity (are sometimes said to) hold that persons are constituted by their bodies much as statues are constituted by lumps of clay. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1171_5">Links</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1171_5"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1171_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1171_6">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1171_6"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1171_7">include</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1171_7"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6393.htm">Burke (Michael) - Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account</A>", Burke, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5886.htm">Chihara (Charles S.) - The Many Persons Problem</A>", Chihara, 1994</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5244.htm">Cowley (Fraser) - The Identity of a Person and His Body</A>", Cowley, 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2004.htm">Doepke (Frederick) - Spatially Coinciding Objects</A>", Doepke, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20320.htm">Fine (Kit) - Coincidence and Form</A>", Fine, 2008</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6176.htm">Frances (Bryan) - Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks</A>", Frances, 2007</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9761.htm">Francescotti (Robert) - Statues and Their Constituents: Whether Consitution is Identity</A>", Francescotti, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6297.htm">Gallois (Andre) - The Puzzle Cases</A>", Gallois, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6392.htm">Heil (John) - Substantial Identity</A>", Heil, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21106.htm">Hershenov (David) - Merrick's Identification of the Person and Organism</A>", Hershenov, 2001?</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6039.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the  Standard Account </A>", Lowe, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5119.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - No Statues</A>", Merricks, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5997.htm">Moyer (Mark) - Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence?</A>", Moyer, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5398.htm">Perry (John) - The Same F</A>", Perry, 1970</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20710.htm">Sutton (Catherine S.) - Colocated Objects, Tally-Ho: A Solution to the Grounding Problem</A>", Sutton, 2012</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4450.htm">Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - The Statue and the Clay</A>", Thomson, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_422.htm">Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time</A>", Wiggins, 1968</li><li>Also, see <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/puzzles/clay_statue/" TARGET = "_top">Bob Doyle: Statue and the Clay</A> (http://metaphysicist.com/puzzles/clay_statue/). </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>8</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1171_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1171_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1171_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1171_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 15:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.57 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.3: (Constitution)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.58 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25.2: (Thinking Animal Argument)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.59 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25.11: (Dion and Theon)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.60 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25.10: (Tibbles the Cat)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.61: (Problem of the Many)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1170_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1170_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This problem is to do with objects  whether clouds or human beings  that have vague boundaries. What is wrong with saying that instead of just one object there are many overlapping ones; or, if we hate this idea, what s the solution so that we only have one (as we first thought?</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1170_2">Links</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1170_2"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1170_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1170_3">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1170_3"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1170_4">include</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1170_4"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>It s probably best to take "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4714.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - The Problem of the Many</A>" (2014 revision) as a starting-point, and use its references (except for those on <a name="48"></a><U>Vagueness</U><SUP>5</SUP>) for further reading, though these writers are top of the list:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3626.htm">Hudson (Hud) - The Many Problematic Solutions To the Problem Of the Many</A>" (2001, and the whole of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_109.htm">Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person</A>")<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15880.htm">Carter (William) - 'Partist' Resistance to the Many: Review of 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person' by Hud Hudson</A>" (2004, a critique of the above)<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6621.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Problem of the Many</A>" (1980, <em>fons et origo</em>?)</li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16637.htm">Bennett (Karen) - Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology</A>", Bennett, 2007</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11991.htm">Jones (Nicholas K.) - Too Many Cats: The Problem of the Many and the Metaphysics of Vagueness</A>", Jones, 2010</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1239.htm">Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One</A>", Lewis, 1999 reprint</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12992.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - The Paradox of the 1,001 Cats</A>". Lowe, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6038.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - The Problems of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution</A>". Lowe, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5891.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Brutal Composition</A>", Markosian, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21969.htm">McKinnon (Neil) - Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many</A>", McKinnon, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20362.htm">McKinnon (Neil) - A New Problem of the Many</A>", McKinnon, 2008</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21970.htm">Schiffer (Stephen) - Two Issues of Vagueness</A>", Schiffer, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21971.htm">Williams (J. Robbie G.) - An Argument for the Many</A>", Williams, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6316.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - Epistemicism Parasites and Vague Names</A>", Weatherson, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6317.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - Many Many Problems</A>", Weatherson, 2003</li><li>Also, see <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/puzzles/many/" TARGET = "_top">Bob Doyle: Problem of the Many</A> (http://metaphysicist.com/puzzles/many/). </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>6</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1170_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1170_2"></A><B>Footnote 2</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1170_3"></A><B>Footnote 3</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1170_4"></A><B>Footnote 4</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 01/08/2018 23:42:43<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.62 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41: (Perdurantism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.63 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 32: (Fission)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.64 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23: (Animalism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.65 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.66 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25: (Constitution View - Objections)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.67 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.6: (Self)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.68 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17: (Body)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.69 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.26: (Reduplication Objections)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.70: (Universals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>My research is Personal Identity, so what have Universals to do with this? </li><li>Well, not a lot  except David Lewis introduced them as an example to distinguish <a name="48"></a><U>perdurance</U><SUP>2</SUP> from <a name="48"></a><U>endurance</U><SUP>3</SUP>  Universals being analogous to enduring entities as they are (allegedly) wholly present in each particular that possesses the property covered by the Universal. So, (a particular shade of) redness is (said to be) wholly present in each red object. </li><li>There s also a connection with <a name="48"></a><U>Natural Kinds</U><SUP>4</SUP>. In "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19961.htm">Hawley (Katherine) & Bird (Alexander) - What are Natural Kinds?</A>", the authors suggest that Natural Kinds are  Complex Universals . </li><li>I also  probably heretically  have the view that Universals themselves might have <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>5</SUP>. My example is that of a book.  Pride and Prejudice is a book  but both a Universal that can be variously instantiated in physical books, or (now) eBooks. But it (or a better example) might go through several editions. What makes all these editions  of the same book ? </li><li>I have touched upon Universals in various write-ups:- <ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>": see <a name="48"></a><U>write-up</U><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14452.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson</A>": see <a name="48"></a><U>write-up</U><SUP>7</SUP>. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5321.htm">Fine (Kit) - A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis</A>": see <a name="48"></a><U>write-up</U><SUP>8</SUP>. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14449.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity</A>": see <a name="48"></a><U>write-up</U><SUP>9</SUP>. </li></ol></li><li>They also appear in Animadversions on talks at Heythrop by:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="48"></a><U>Snowdon</U><SUP>10</SUP></li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Haldane</U><SUP>11</SUP> </li></ol></li><li>There is a potential relationship between Universals and <a name="48"></a><U>Properties</U><SUP>12</SUP>  realists contend that properties are Universals, and "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_39.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Universals</A>" attacks the question of universals via that of properties. So, a consideration of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_533.htm">Mellor (D.H.) & Oliver (Alex), Eds. - Properties: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>" might be in order. </li><li>Leading on from this, I might also review my BA-finals essay on the <a name="48"></a><U>Third Man Argument</U><SUP>13</SUP>, which deals with the problems caused by properties and universals. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_14">Links</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_14"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1008_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_69.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Aristotle and the Sea Battle</A>", Anscombe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8740.htm">Armstrong (David) - Introduction to Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 1 (Nominalism and Realism)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8765.htm">Armstrong (David) - In Conclusion (Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8766.htm">Armstrong (David) - The Argument of Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 1 (Nominalism and Realism)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8753.htm">Armstrong (David) - The Argument of Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 2 (A Theory of Universals)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11264.htm">Armstrong (David) - What is a Law of Nature? Conclusions</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16044.htm">Bacon (John), Campbell (Keith) & Reinhardt (Lloyd) - Ontology, Causality and Mind: Preface</A>", Bacon Etc.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14452.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6427.htm">Butchvarov (Panayot) - Being Qua Being: Introduction</A>", Buchvaryov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6761.htm">Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) - Universals and Particulars: Introduction</A>", Crane</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8414.htm">Fine (Gail) - Platonic Questions</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_17">Fine</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_17"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5321.htm">Fine (Kit) - A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis</A>", Fine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16706.htm">Hartshorne (Charles) - The Necessarily Existent</A>", Hartshorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12899.htm">Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds (Selections)</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8014.htm">Lewis (David) - Philosophical Papers Volume II: Introduction</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1781.htm">Lewis (David) - The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics</A>", Lewis</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21722.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - More Kinds of Being: Preface</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14449.htm">Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity</A>", Markosian</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8029.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - The Problem(s) of Universals</A>", Moreland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12010.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? The Question</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1091.htm">Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is</A>", Quine</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_685.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - The Problems of Philosophy</A>", Russell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16677.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Necessary Being: the Ontological Argument</A>", van Inwagen</li></ol></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_18">reading list</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_18"></A> (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_275.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_276.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals)</A>", Armstrong</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20550.htm">Aune (Bruce) - Universals and Particulars</A>", Aune</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1973.htm">Bealer (George) - Universals and Properties</A>", Bealer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23335.htm">Doyle (Robert O.) - Abstract Entities</A>", Doyle</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19956.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - David Lewis on Persistence</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19962.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Mereology, Modality and Magic</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19961.htm">Hawley (Katherine) & Bird (Alexander) - What are Natural Kinds?</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1100.htm">Lewis (David) - New Work for a Theory of Universals</A>", Lewis<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20407.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  New Work for a Theory of Universals </A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4169.htm">Loux (Michael) - The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism</A>", Loux</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4170.htm">Loux (Michael) - The Problem of Universals II: Nominalism</A>", Loux</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4519.htm">MacBride (Fraser) - The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?</A>", MacBride</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_533.htm">Mellor (D.H.) & Oliver (Alex), Eds. - Properties: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", Mellor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_39.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Universals</A>", Moreland</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16817.htm">O'Leary-Hawthorne (John) & Cover (J.A.) - A World of Universals</A>", O'Leary-Hawthorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12015.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Bundles</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19855.htm">Sider (Ted) - Sparseness, Immanence, and Naturalness</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1008_19">Sider</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1008_19"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_401.htm">Teichman (Jenny) - Three Kinds of Realism About Universals</A>", Teichman</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>20</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1008_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1008_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1008_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1008_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1008_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: See also "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8412.htm">Fine (Gail) - On Ideas - Introduction</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_1008_18"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The Categorised readig-list is far too bloated for my interests. </li><li>So I ve included most of what I ve actually read, but have been much more restrictive on unread items </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1008_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: Look into the other papers by Sider in the categorised list if time. </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 08/06/2018 19:00:29<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.70.7: (Baker - The Human Animal: Response to Olson)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <ul type="disc"><li>This paper is a review of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14452.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson</A>", which is itself a response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14451.htm">Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman</A>". </li><li>Baker has two objections to Olson s <a name="48"></a>reply to her <a name="48"></a>objections to Animalism: <ol type="1"><li>That Olson accused her of mis-describing her own view, and </li><li>That Olson accused her of making a simple logical error. </li></ol></li><li>She raises two technical points, both related to her Constitution View (CV) that she had not had time to elaborate on during her initial response to Olson:- <ol type="1"><li>The  Key Distinction : between having properties derivatively and non-derivatively.</li><li>Not all properties can be had derivatively. </li></ol></li><li>According to Baker, properties are had derivatively if they are had in virtue of the individual being constituted by something else that has them non-derivatively. The derivative and non-derivative having of properties is exhaustive. This is the Key Distinction (KD). </li><li>She says that the KD <U>shows</U> that some Fs have their persistence conditions (PCs) in virtue of being Fs while others do not. She notes that persistence conditions only apply to primary-kind properties (introduced without definition). If F <U>is</U> a primary-kind property, then all and only <U>non</U>-derivative F s have their PCs in virtue of being Fs. <ul type="square"><li>PCs are sortal-related, and  what it is to be an F is what it is to (continue to) be . If F is the property that defines the Sort, you can t have an F that doesn t have PCs in virtue of being an F. I presume that SORT and PRIMARY KIND are synonyms. However, TEACHER is not a Sort (or Primary Kind), so no teacher has her PCs in virtue of being a teacher, but in virtue of being a human being (pace Baker). Teachers as such don t have PCs. The big issue here is whether PERSON is like TEACHER, in not being a Sort. It s not clear that we need the concept of constitution or the KD to explain these differences in PCs. What is Baker s view of teachers  are they constituted by human animals too  or just properties of human animals (or maybe persons)?</li><li>Baker doesn t mention <U>substances</U> - but are they pre-supposed by talk of Kinds, or are these orthogonal concepts? Are the major accounts of persistence <a name="48"></a>(endurantism, <a name="48"></a>perdurantism, <a name="48"></a>exdurantism) orthogonal to ideas about substances  ie. does endurantism presuppose substances, and perdurantism deny them?</li><li>If substances are the key to this debate, is it the case that PERSON is not a substance-term, but only a property of a substance? In that case, it is the <U>human animal</U> that has the FPP, and it is this that qualifies it to be a person. So, the person s PCs are the PCs of an appropriate animal (one capable at some time of having a FPP). </li><li>We might ask about the persistence of a personality, but it s not clear what a personality is. Personalities seem to be able to develop, but they seem rather abstract. Are they collections of properties? They can t really be universals, as universals are timeless and changeless. </li></ul></li><li>As an example  and application  Baker says that her <U>body</U> is an animal non-derivatively, and has its PCs in virtue of being an animal. There s lots to say here:- <ol type="1"><li>Olson (and I) would disagree bodies are animals in any sense. Olson probably denies that (living) bodies exist, though he probably agrees that corpses exist, and organisms certainly exist. I m not impressed by co-location arguments, though I m not quite sure what the relation of an animal to its body is  presumably some form of constitution. </li><li>My difference with Baker is not with constitution per se, but with ontological priorities. Baker has it that there are two substances involved (the person and the animal, or the statue and the clay) and that one is temporarily constituted by the other. But in my view one is not a substance  the statue cannot exist apart from the clay, and the person cannot exist apart from the animal. The ontological priority is that x constitutes y, for <U>periods</U> of x s existence, but for the <U>whole</U> of y s existence. </li><li>The PCs of a <U>body</U> differ from those of an <U>animal</U>  at least if the body is taken to persist as a corpse, as is often said. </li></ol></li><li>As a second example, Baker says that she is an animal derivatively, and does not have her PCs in virtue of being an animal. This is just Baker s main thesis, and doesn t require any further comment here. </li><li>As for Baker s second technical point, she gives three examples of properties that cannot be had derivatively:- <ol type="1"><li>Those expressed by  constitutes .</li><li>Those expressed by  is identical with .</li><li>Those rooted outside the time that they are had  such as  started out as an embryo . </li></ol></li><li>I couldn t see any explicit reference to this point in the subsequent discussion. However, they do have applications to the case in hand. If the second example were allowed, then Baker might be identical to a human animal derivatively, and consequently have the PCs of a human animal, which she denies. And if the third were allowed, then only being an animal derivatively would not protect her from having been a fetus, or about to be in a PVS. I couldn t quite get my head around the first example. If it were allowed, then Baker might be self-constituting. I need to <a name="48"></a>follow-up on this. </li><li>She then applies (the first of) these distinctions to Olson s response. She looks at what is wrong with the apparently valid:- <ol type="1"><li>I am an animal</li><li>Every animal started out as an embryo<BR>Therefore,</li><li>I started out as an embryo</li></ol></li><li>Baker s response is that the argument, as it stands, is ambiguous, and doesn t work however it is disambiguated. The problem is with premise (2). If it claims that <U>all</U> animals, derivative or otherwise, started out as embryos, then it is (by Baker s lights) false, as she (being a person essentially, and only an animal derivatively) did not start out as an embryo. She couldn t have, because embryos aren t persons, and she is essentially a person (she says). The alternative, making both the premises true, leads to an invalid argument:- <ol type="1"><li>I am an animal derivatively</li><li>Everything that is an animal non-derivatively started out as an embryo<BR>Therefore,</li><li>I started out as an embryo</li></ol></li><li>I presume that the same repair has to be made for all sorts of (human) substitutes for  I & student, professor, bus-inspector, but that it gets a bit wobbly is we get less intellectual  toddler, baby, neonate, chimpanzee, individual in a PVS, and so on. </li><li>Baker makes further application of the KD, claiming that it:- <ol type="1"><li>Answers Olson s worries about  separate existence , </li><li>Defeats Olson s claim that if x constitutes y at t, then x and y are numerically different, and</li><li>Answers Olson s  epistemological question about how someone non-identical to an organism can know this alleged fact. </li></ol></li><li>My immediate responses to these claims are as follows:- :- <ol type="1"><li><B>Separate existence</B>: What was this worry? Presumably that (according to Olson s view of Baker s ontology) we have two things rather than one. If so, it s the same worry is Baker answers in the next point. </li><li><B>Constitution and Numerical Difference</B>: this is really awkward, it seems to me. Baker is claiming that the person and the human organism are not  numerically different . But what is  numerical difference . Normally we d say that two things are  numerically the same if they are identical, but Baker denies this  one thing is not identical to the thing that constitutes it (because it might have been constituted by something else, yet identity is a necessary relation, and the existences may not be coterminous  so we d have a failure of Leibniz s Law). </li><li><B>Epistemological Questions</B>: Maybe the KD does answer this worry, but Baker doesn t explain how here. Presumably the knowledge isn t immediate, but is a metaphysical deduction. </li></ol></li><li>Baker sees a single thread of misunderstanding in Olson s response to her. Indeed, he doesn t so much <U>refute</U> her arguments as <U>ignore</U> them, a complaint I think can be sustained. She says a whole Section of a Chapter of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>" is devoted to this topic. Presumably this is part of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3675.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Very Idea of Constitution</A>", though it could be part of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3677.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Constitution View of Human Persons</A>", or "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3680.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution</A>", or "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3681.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons</A>". I need to <a name="48"></a>follow-up on this when reviewing these chapters. </li><li>Baker agrees that Identity is a <U>necessary</U> relation, but thinks there are <U>two</U> ways non-identical x, y can be related at time t:- <ol type="1"><li>By being <I>constitutionally related</I>, and </li><li>By having <I>separate existence</I>.</li></ol></li><li>These two ideas are  explicitly defined in familiar terms (presumably in the aforementioned Section). The idea, presumably, is that where we don t have identity we can either have completely separate things (apples and pears, or apple1 and apple2) or two things that nevertheless are not  separate existences . This would be impossible on a perdurantist view (as the temporal worms are clearly distinct when not coterminous), but on an endurantist view (where a thing is  wholly present at each time, is not obviously false. </li><li>Baker has another rant about Olson and whether she might have misunderstood him. While acknowledging that he believes that there are persons (though we should note that Olson avoids this term, preferring <I>people</I>), he ignores what s distinctive about them.  On Olson s view, being a person is no more fundamental to <a name="48"></a>what we are than is being a fancier of fast cars . </li><li>She makes a closing assertion that it is <U>not</U> her view that <U>all</U> value or matters of significance to us have ontological significance. However, she doesn t explain where the boundaries lie. </li></ul></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 17/04/2018 21:04:19<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.70.8: (Fine - A Counter-Example to Locke's Thesis)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> This essay is a review of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5321.htm">Fine (Kit) - A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis</A>". <BR><BR><B>Author s Abstract</B>: Locke's thesis states that no two things of the same sort can be in the same place at the same time. The thesis has recently received extensive discussion, with some philosophers attempting to find arguments in its favour and others attempting to provide counter-examples. However, neither the arguments nor the counter-examples have been especially convincing; and it is my aim, in this short note, to present what I believe is a more convincing counter-example to the thesis.<BR><BR>Fine notes that those who disagree with Locke s thesis include:- <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5881.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - Same-kind coincidence and the ship of Theseus</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5883.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - An Incredible Coincidence?</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12877.htm">Shorter (J.M.) - On Coinciding in Space and Time</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8923.htm">Simons (Peter) - Coincidence of Things of a Kind</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1378.htm">Simons (Peter) - Parts: A Study in Ontology</A>" and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5882.htm">Simons (Peter) - On Being the Same Ship(s) - or Electron(s): Reply to Hughes</A>".</li></ul><BR>& while those that support it include:- <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_422.htm">Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_54.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance</A>" and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5039.htm">Oderberg (David) - Coincidence Under a Sortal</A>".</li></ul><BR><B><U>Discussion</B></U><ol type="1"> <li>Why do I care about this paper? Would I be more comfortable, metaphysically speaking, if its conclusions were true or false? This paper was referenced in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4286.htm">Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter</A>", which I was <a name="48"></a>reviewing, and which argues that a physical thing and its matter are distinct, yet co-located. Fine, in a footnote, claims that bolder assertions are also true  namely that physical things of the same sort can be co-located, even necessarily so. I was hoping that this short paper would shed light on Fine s commitments that might make the longer and more difficult paper easier to understand and assess. It is disappointing in this respect, because Fine doesn t consider the linguistic arguments in favour of <I>monism</I> that are addressed at length in the later paper. It is, however, interesting in its own right. Ultimately, my concerns are to do with personal identity, and at the end of this discussion I consider some of the possible consequences the paper has for this area of research. </li><li>In the paper presently under discussion, Fine wants to show that it is possible for two physical things of the same sort to be co-located. His example is of a pair of letters  epistles, not alphabetic characters  sent between a husband and wife. The outgoing letter is written on one side of the paper and the returning letter on the other. </li><li>For some reason not explained, the writing is effected by scorch-marks rather than by pen and ink. Presumably the intent is not to modify the paper by the addition of extraneous matter  ink  that might lead to the quibble that as a result the returning letter was not the same physical thing as the outgoing letter. Alternatively, the complaint might be that the husband s letter consists in the paper and <U>his</U> ink, while the wife s consists in the paper and <U>her</U> ink (or, maybe, the husband s ink is already part of the wife s letter s infrastructure by this stage  though this asymmetrical view is harder to maintain), and consequently that the two letters are non-coincident and non-identical. Using scorching may be an attempt to finesse this issue, and while scorching <U>does</U> modify the paper  by oxidising it  it is less obvious that any writer s letter  exclusively owns the additional oxygen bound to its side. So, while the physical thing <U>changes</U> following each inscripturation, it s not so obviously arguable in the case of scorching that there are two partially overlapping but non-identical physical things at the end of the process. </li><li>The critic could dig his heels in and say <U>firstly</U> that inscripturation necessarily modifies the physical structure of the paper, and <U>secondly</U> that a letter necessarily consists in the piece of paper plus or minus whatever matter has been added (in the normal case) or subtracted (in the case of incised writing) in the process of writing the letter. </li><li>The <U>first</U> claim is probably true, and is important because we are talking about physical things. However, <ul type="disc"><li>Modifying the physical structure does not necessarily involve adding or subtracting matter  it could involve a simple rearrangement (as is suggested later in this paper). </li><li>Moreover, we might argue that we might still say something despite no change whatsoever to either the matter or the structure of the original letter, to the effect that  I have nothing to say ,  it s over or an open-ended set of possibilities based on past history. This would arise in case the husband s letter is simply returned. The meaning of a letter is dependent on many factors external to it, and to the manner and context of its sending. What is <U>not</U> said can be as significant as what <U>is</U> said. </li><li>Finally, it might even be possible to send a null (physical) letter. In <I>The Poisoner</I> (a French-language film set in post-war France  see <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marie_Besnard" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marie_Besnard) for the real-life background) the accused, acquitted and now demised Madame Besnard bequeaths to Simone (a reporter) a letter that Simone hopes will explain all. Yet the envelope is empty, heightening the uncertainty about her guilt. This null letter conveys information  though whether it is a tacit admission of guilt (in that the final opportunity for self-exculpation has been let slip), or simple playfulness remains unclear and might depend on a tacit understanding between Madame Besnard and Simone. Note that while in this example it might claimed that the envelope is part of the letter, and thus that the letter is not null, the <U>text</U> is null. </li></ul> </li><li>The <U>second</U> claim is not implausible, but does not apply in the case of inscripturation by rearrangement. But even if it <U>is</U> correct, there may be better objections to Fine s example, based either on an alleged confusion of a letter as a physical thing and as a kind of universal, or on the notion of constitution. We will come back to these possibilities later. </li><li>Fine s first example therefore purports to show that we can have two distinct physical things of the same sort  the husband s letter and the wife s letter  that occupy the same place at the same time. He gives the obvious reasons why this is the case for all four aspects of the claim. These are:- <ul type="disc"><li>The two objects <U>are</U> of the same sort.</li><li>They <U>are</U> coincident  at least at certain times. </li><li>They <U>are</U> distinct. </li><li>They <U>are</U> physical things.</li></ul></li><li>Drawing parallels with the distinctions between extreme, moderate and mild monists made in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4286.htm">Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter</A>", this example is analogous to a counter-example to the position exemplified by the <I>extreme monist</I>, who identifies  two things if  they coincide at <U>any</U> time or times (but does not insist that they have to do so at <U>all</U> times). </li><li>Note, however, that <I>monism</I> is a view about a thing and its matter, not about co-located items of the same sort. Even so, the three-fold analogy is worth pursuing. </li><li>Fine next considers a second case analogous to that rejected by the <I>moderate monist</I> who only makes the identification if the coincidence occurs at all times within a world, and where both exist in that world at all times where either does. This case is set up by two people simultaneously scorching their messages on different sides of a piece of parchment stopping a hole in a wall. </li><li>Finally, Fine considers a third case analogous to those rejected by the <I>mild monist</I>, who only makes the identification if the coincidence occurs at all times within all possible worlds. This case involves writing two letters simultaneously in two languages (Prittle and Prattle) that happen to coincide as far as their written text is concerned (in this short letter) but diverge as far as their meaning is concerned. So, while there is only one act of writing, and only one written text, two letters with different meanings are written. Fine claims that at all times in all possible worlds we have two distinct physical objects of the same sort occupying the same place at all times at which either exists. </li><li>So, what, if anything, is wrong with these examples? The extreme and moderate forms are essentially analogous, while the mild case requires additional special treatment. </li><li><B>Problems with the extreme and moderate examples</B>: we need to consider the four  pillars of the argument  I don t think there are any other points at which we might cavil. <ul type="disc"><li><B>Same Sort</B>: no problems that I can see. They are letters and LETTER is a sort. </li><li><B>Coincidence</B>: I think we can get round any of the problems alluded to above. We might, for instance, build our letters out of micro-Lego so that writing the letter just involves rearranging some surface pieces. </li><li><B>Distinctness</B>: here, we have to be clear on just what things are distinct, if they are indeed distinct. Qua physical object, we might argue that only one thing is present. Qua universal, there are two things present. While universals aren t actually physically located anywhere, tokens of them can be. So, we might claim that a single physical thing is a token of two different universals. While there are two universals tokened, there is only one physical thing that tokens both. This explanation seems especially attractive in the <I>mild monist</I> example and leads on to the discussion in the following bullet. Alternatively, we might say that there is one physical thing present, which admittedly changes over time as physical things do, but that it <U>constitutes</U> first one letter, and then two letters. We might leave it open whether the letter that is constituted is itself a physical thing, but the usual position (eg. that of Lynne Rudder Baker) would be that it <U>is</U> a physical thing, and a distinct physical thing (though not of the same sort), but not something so distinct from the thing that constitutes it that we have to count two things. </li><li><B>Physical things</B>: a letter, and what counts as the <U>same</U> letter, is subject to ambiguity. Letters are both particulars and universals. Take St. Paul s <I>Epistle to the Romans</I>. This was once a physical letter written on papyrus. The original physical letter has long-since ceased to exist, but many copies (or copies of copies of ... copies) of it still exist. All of these are imperfect copies, no doubt. Some of the copies are now on computer disks and some very imperfect ones will be in peoples memories. To what does the term  St. Paul s <I>Epistle to the Romans</I> (or, for that matter,  Shakespeare s <I>Hamlet</I> ) presently refer? Not, I would suggest, to some long-lost manuscript, or some particular copy of a definitive published edition, but to a virtual text, the precise contents of which is a bit fuzzy. Maybe there s (at any time) a true text  in the light of the best current scholarship , so that the logical letter can evolve over time (as the  standard text changes), just as  though in a different way  the physical letter can evolve over time (by having another letter written on the back, by being used as a palimpsest, or simply by becoming tatty). </li></ul></li><li>Is this particular / universal distinction really relevant here? To demonstrate that we have two physical things in the same place at the same time, Fine asks to what would we point when asked where the first letter is, and where the second letter, and it would indeed be to the same physical thing. But if asked of a computer image, or a photograph, whether this is the first letter, we would have to agree (provided it was a true representation). Now, is this a right analogy? Is it the letter, or an image of the letter, or a copy of the letter that we point out when we point to some physical thing other than the physical thing on to which the author s definitive text was first splurged out? That is, on seeing a true photocopy, and being asked whether it is the letter <I>I</I> wrote, should I reply yes or no? Does the question relate to the text or the thing?</li><li>Consider letters written by famous people. What the collector is after here is the autograph  that particular physical thing that the famous hand wrote on, together with the marks actually made. Different tokens in the author s hand might be equally valuable, but a mere photocopy would not be. Alternatively, take Leibniz s personal annotated copy of Locke s <I>Essay</I>. The particular value of that physical book lies in it having Leibniz s actual scribblings on it. A photocopy would not count, however interesting. </li><li>So, objections based on type / token distinctions probably fail but, alternatively, could we say that a letter is a phase sortal of a piece of paper? Or, more accurately, that a token of a letter is a phase sortal of whatever physical medium expresses it? In that case, the one continuant physical thing is the piece of paper (or parchment, or assembly of micro-Lego), which undergoes various changes consistent with it remaining a piece of paper (or whatever) but which for periods of its existence has the property of being a letter or letters. </li><li><B>Additional problems with the mild example</B>: this is interesting, and whether we re convinced by it depends on our modal intuitions. The example is convincing (subject to the above concerns about the metaphysical status of letters) just in case the closest worlds are those in which Prattle and Prattle stay divergent (as far as the text-string in the letters is concerned). What we want is that any world that contains the letter written in Prittle also contains the letter written in Prattle co-located. But why should the vocabulary and grammar of Prittle stay constant across these worlds? Or do we just say that those worlds in which Prittle and Prattle diverge from their real-world exemplars are worlds in which the original letters don t exist. But then can t we suggest a counterfactual like,  if the grammar of Prattle had been different, the Prattle-interpretation of this Prittle-letter wouldn t have been so amusing . In any case, Fine should have given some more justification for his claim. </li><li>In the above, we must focus, as Fine does, on the <U>necessary</U> divergence. Fine doesn t consider variations in Prittle and Prattle, but only considers the act of writing. He assumes that the four pillars of his general argument remain sound, namely sameness of sort, coincidence, distinctness and physicality, and that the only issues are to do with the necessary truth of these pillars. This is right, but which of the pillars is most at risk of modal divergence? He doesn t discuss the first and fourth, as these don t differ from the earlier examples. He focuses on the second  necessary <U>coincidence</U>. It is to be noted, though unremarked by Fine, that he gives up on scorching and allows ink to be used  presumably because there are now no available quibbles on the  coincidence front due to ink-ownership claims since  as there is only one act of writing  both letters are necessarily written simultaneously using the same materials. He does discuss distinctness  they are distinct because they are in different languages  but he doesn t discuss <U>necessary</U> distinctness. What would be a counter-example? I think this is where the argument breaks down. Can t there be worlds in which Prittle and Prattle coincide (at least as far as the text of the letter is concerned) and consequently there s only one letter? </li><li>Could we modify the <I>mild monist</I> example in any way to improve it? This is not easy. Say we tried to do away with the possible divergent or convergent languages, for instance having the same English text that means different things to different people, in some indexical manner? For example,  Do what I told you to do last Friday , where the action may be different. But is the meaning the same, and if it is the same, do we have distinct letters? I think we could argue that they are distinct, Yet even so, how would this state of affairs vary across possible worlds? The actions would not necessarily be different, so maybe this example doesn t work either. But if the letters are different if their intended recipients are different (even if the instruction is the same), does the example stand up? But are the recipients necessarily different?</li><li>What lessons can be learnt or parallels drawn from all this? I m really interested in people, and personal identity, so what applications can be made? Here are some very brief pointers. <ul type="disc"><li>Firstly, some views of persons effectively consider them as some form of <B>tokened universal</B>. This seems to be the view of those who think I would survive teletransportation where only information is transmitted. This view is probably consistent with the thought that I am an essentially physical being, and does not rely on substance dualism (indeed, it probably denies it); this is probably what the psychological view reduces to for the physicalist. Again, it is often said that I am defined by my psychology, and that anything appropriately psychologically continuous with me, or psychologically connected to me, <U>is</U> (identical to) me. This runs up against reduplication objections that cannot always be resolved by arbitrary  closest continuer choices. The consequence of this may be that I am viewed as some sort of universal that may be multiply tokened, or maybe tokened to various degrees. Yet some tokens (like the autograph letter) are more important than others  in particular, the token (if any) in which my first-person perspective  my actual window on the world, not some qualitatively exactly similar one  persists. </li><li>Secondly, persons may be considered as <B>phase sortals</B> of other things, such as human animals. On this view, in contrast to Baker s Constitution View, there are not two substances overlapping  a person and a human animal  but one substance that possesses especially interesting properties at certain times, and is consequently worthy of special treatment, and at other times is a less interesting  mere human animal for which (maybe) such special treatment is purely sentimental. The human being might qualify as a person only during phases of its existence, when it possesses the right psychology. In the case of the letters, there is one substance  the physical bit of paper (singed or not, variously inky, incised or rearranged) that for phases of its existence has the property of being a letter, and at some times has the property of being two letters simultaneously. Yet there is only one physical thing and not two coincident physical things. Can there be co-located persons? This is the view of those who believe Multiple Personality Disorder indicates two persons rather than a divided personality. We can see how this overlapping might take place for less significant phase sortals than PERSON  STUDENT for instance. A student might also be considered as a phase sortal of a human being. The Cambridge student might overlap temporally with the Birkbeck student. Yet there is only one substance  the human being, and not two or three overlapping substances. In particular, the Birkbeck student and the Cambridge student are not two distinct co-located physical things. </li><li>Thirdly, <B>Constitution</B>. If the letter is constituted by the physical thing that  is it, then that physical thing can constitute two letters simultaneously, yet without any co-location of multiple physical things. If the letter is thought of as being something over and above the thing that (presently constitutes it), maybe we have a parallel to Lynne Rudder Baker s view of the constitution of human persons by their bodies. But Baker doesn t think of persons as universals, but as essentially physical beings. Also, she wouldn t allow for multiple realisation or multiple tokening. There can only be <U>one</U> physical thing (at a time) with my first person perspective (it is claimed; though how this is so, and how determined, is left unclear). Additionally, she has persons as ontologically distinct from the human animals that constitute them. Is this true of letters, or is a letter constituted by its paper and ink in a different way from that in which a person is said to be constituted by her body? Probably. What if the same letter can be constituted by different physical structures. For example (a) St. Paul s Epistle to the Romans or (b) if the scorching set fire to the letter in Fine s original example  is any replacement letter the same letter or a different one? There are obvious parallels in the case of personal identity with the claim that originally exercised Locke  that resurrection should make sense. </li><li>Finally, <B><U>necessary</U> distinctness</B>. Are there any parallels in the field of personal identity research to Fine s necessary co-location of physical objects of the same sort? Indeed, we haven t really considered whether there are any <U>contingent</U> co-locations for persons. Presumably this is the case on the psychological view of personal identity where we have multiple personality disorder. In that case, there are two persons physically co-located, though maybe they are only intermingled, depending on how their psychology is physically realised. I cannot see that such a case could ever be necessary. </li></ul></li><li><B>Conclusion</B>: Do I think Fine s examples stand up, and do I really care? I think I must reject the idea that two physical things of the same sort can be co-located. My rejection isn t because I have any particular axe to grind, but because there are other ways of describing the situation that are more appealing. <ul type="disc"><li>This is partly an aesthetic judgement, but is a response to a rather odd claim. If multiple things of the same sort can be co-located, then some of our usual mass-term notions go wrong, though maybe the count-term notions are unaffected. </li><li>So, while we can carefully inspect the sheet of paper and determine that there are two letters present (just as we d have to do when inspecting 5 sheets  there might be one or more letters present; we can only tell by careful inspection), if we ask how much the two letters weigh, and whether when we put both letters on the scales they weigh as much as the combined weight of each of the two letters weighed separately, we run into trouble. </li><li>We should do everything we can in describing the situation to avoid such conundrums. So, we should choose one of the alternative descriptions  that we have one physical thing present, but that this one thing either <B>tokens</B> two other things, or <B>constitutes</B> two other things, or that these other things are <B>phase sortals</B> of that one physical thing. </li><li>We then have to answer various questions about the metaphysical status of these other things. It is for this reason that I prefer the phase sortal approach, because there s no temptation to think that we have multiple co-located substances, as in Baker s Constitution View, or of confounding universals and particulars (on the token view). </li><li>The examples that Fine gives are probably generalisable in some way to other artefacts whose identities are dependent on external factors. Statues are the usual favourite. It might be that a statue that had some iconic status in a culture is extracted from that culture and receives a completely different one in another. In that case, we have multiple co-located statues. We should take this case further  are statues tokened? Is Discobolos a universal, multiply tokened, or are all the statues (including the ancient Roman ones) mere copies of the Greek original. </li><li>Or, take the case of <B>symbols</B>  maybe this is just the ultimately miniaturised version of Fine s final example  for example, the use of the swastika in modern European and Indian cultures. How many physical symbols are present when I see, and hurriedly remove, a swastika from an Indian gift? We have only one physical thing, but that thing tokens two ideas, or constitutes two symbols. Alternatively, we can adopt the phase sortal approach. For certain periods of its existence it has certain interesting properties or relations that make us want to describe it in a special way, and maybe in multiple ways, even of the same category, at the same time. </li></ul> </li></ol></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 18/12/2010 19:58:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.70.10: (Snowdon - Naturalism and Metaphysics)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <ol type="1"><li>Paul Snowdon provided no hand-out, so this is all we ve got ... any footnotes are my own comments. </li><li>Is the naturalistic worldview OK? The assumption  a  natural one  is that naturalism excludes religion  that they are in opposition. </li><li>So, what is naturalism? <ul type="disc"><li>It s an  ism . There are lots of  Ism s in philosophy. It s useful to have a name, but we need a shared understanding.</li><li><I>Platonism</I> appeared last  and the most despised  on Snowdon s list of  isms .</li><li>Naturalism (according to the  motivating blurb ) involves:- <BR>1). Rejection of the supernatural, <BR>2). Rejection of the spooky, <BR>3). The over-extension of the scope of science, going beyond science s proper place. </li></ul></li><li><B>Spookiness</B>: doesn't help. Many aspects of the physical world are spooky. Matthew Platt - it's a queer world. Mackie s <I>argument from queerness</I> (against ethical realism; see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4768.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - The Subjectivity of Values</A>") fails because the world is queer. Naturalism picks out all the things there are and doesn t rule out spooky things. Supernaturalism isn t necessarily spooky, so the rejection of spookiness isn t part of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_914_1">naturalism</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_914_1"></A>.</li><li><B>Science</B>: Is human activity aiming at the truth of certain things. It is not the only way of pursuing truth  alternatives are observation, history, mathematics, philosophy, ... So, we can t say that science is the measure of all things. The <U>method</U> of science is secondary  it has to start from data obtained prior to science, so is not independent. There s no reason to think that all truth is discoverable by science  hence other disciplines exist. </li><li>So, does naturalism imply that all that exists is available for scientific investigation? This is probably correct, and there is no reason to claim that this is an over-extension <U>in advance</U>; this turns on there exist objects that science cannot investigate. </li><li>While it s true that naturalism opposes the supernatural, this is tautological and doesn t help explain naturailism. </li><li>Another irrelevance is the opposition between the natural and the artificial. Computers exist!</li><li>Snowdon mentioned <B>Snowdon (Peter) - <I>Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties</I></B>, though I don't know with what <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_914_2">intent</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_914_2"></A>. </li><li>Human beings have a nature, but this is too narrow for use here. </li><li>So, <B>Naturalism</B> (<B> T-Naturalism</B>; the <B> T-World</B>: where  T stands for  Traditional ) is Space, Time and the things in Space and Time. This is an ontological / metaphysical thesis: this is all that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_914_3">exists</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_914_3"></A>. </li><li> But, this doesn t tell you what things <U>are</U> in Space and Time  this is a matter for investigation. Nor does it mean that we know the nature of Space and Time  this is also for investigation, though we need <U>an</U> understanding. Space and Time are <B>Natural Kind</B> categories (just as Gold and Water are Natural Kind categories, whose natures are to be investigated). </li><li><B>Worries</B>: T-Naturalism doesn t need to be the best account of naturalism. If arguments don t work against T-Naturalism, they can be set aside. Arguments against T-Naturalism are all metaphysical. </li><li>There is an <U>Epistemological Asymmetry</U>. There is <U>no</U> problem about the existence of the T-Natural world  it s an epistemological  given . If you want to extend whatever exists <U>beyond</U> the T-Natural world, you need <U>arguments</U> - so, the onus is on those who want to go beyond T-Naturalism. It is not up to T-Naturalism to prove that there is  nothing else . </li><li>This isn t a verificationist intelligibility claim. Snowdon is happy that (some) things that go beyond T-Naturalism can be understood. Not that everything makes sense, but there s no prohibition about going beyond T-Naturalism. </li><li><B>Arguments against T-Naturalism</B>: aren t there elements of human discourse that commit us to going beyond T-Naturalism? Values, numbers, necessities ..? Those raising such difficulties have to block avoidance manoeuvres on the part of the T-Naturalist along the lines of  suppose it <U>is</U> true that such discourse is unacceptable without going beyond T-Naturalism, then so much the worse for such discourse . We might decide that or commitment to T-Naturalism exceeds that to the discourse, so abandon the discourse (about values, numbers, & ).</li><li>The <B>response</B> of the T-Naturalist  other than abandoning the discourse, is to try to locate the truth-makers, or grounds, of this discourse in the natural world. This leads to ethical, modal or mathematical Naturalism. </li><li>Re-interpretative & looks as if it has ontological / truth and & morality etc.  expressivists . Religious people can adopt this approach & it undermines the naturalist / supernaturalist distinction & a pre-emptive <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_914_4">strike</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_914_4"></A>! </li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_914_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: This seems a bit quick. Presumably what s intended by  spookiness is things like  well  spooks, which are paradigmatically supernatural. But they aren t part of classical theism. Nothing could be less spooky than the traditional concept of an omnipotent, good deity & though some aspects (omniscience and omnipresence might seem a bit spooky)<a name="On-Page_Link_914_2"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 2</B>: Here are the first couple of paragraphs of that brief book (sample pages filched from the web):- <ul type="disc"><li><I>The term "naturalism" is elastic in its use. The fact that it has been applied to the work of philosophers having as little in common as Hume and Spinoza is enough to suggest that there is a distinction to be drawn between varieties of naturalism. In later chapters, I shall myself draw a distinction between two main varieties, within which there are sub-varieties. Of the two main varieties, one might be called <I>strict</I> or </I>reductive<I> naturalism (or, perhaps, </I>hard<I> naturalism). The other might be called </I>catholic<I> or </I>liberal<I> naturalism (or, perhaps, </I>soft<I> naturalism). & </li><li>Each of these two general varieties of naturalism will be seen by its critics as liable to lead its adherents into intellectual aberration. The exponent of some sub-varieties of strict or reductive naturalism is liable to be accused of what is pejoratively known as scientism, and of denying evident truths and realities. The soft or catholic naturalist, on the other hand, is liable to be accused of fostering illusions or propagating </I>myths<I>. I do not want to suggest that a kind of intellectual cold war between the two is inevitable. There is, perhaps, a possibility of compromise or dtente, even of reconciliation. The soft or catholic naturalist, as his name suggests, will be the readier with proposals for peaceful coexistence</I></li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_914_3"></A><B>Footnote 3</B>: But, what about Universals, Numbers, etc.? Snowdon isn t a Platonist, so where are they? He comes on to this later<a name="On-Page_Link_914_4"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 4</B>: I seem to have missed the point at issue here, and my notes are defective</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 18/12/2010 19:58:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.70.11: (Haldane - Naturalism and the Mind)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <ol type="1"><li>Haldane had an extensive hand-out ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15932.htm">Haldane (John) - Naturalism and Mind</A>") but didn t stick to it, being deflected by the (rather unsurprising) things <a name="48"></a>Papineau had to say (in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15931.htm">Papineau (David) - The Argument for Naturalism about the Mind</A>"). </li><li>Papineau s arguments belong to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_2">family</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_2"></A> (from Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and so on). Mind makes a difference, but both cause and effect are physical. Haldane thinks that the argument is less straightforward than it might seem.</li><li>Scientific Explanation is a  privileged route to knowledge.</li><li>The  integral unity of substances . Effects flow from the <U>nature</U> of things  which are not just lumps of stuff. </li><li>The rejection of the supernatural  but <U>another</U> Haldane  an atheist  claimed that the world is stranger than we <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_3">can</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_3"></A> think. </li><li>In contemporary usage <I>supernatural</I> is really <I><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_4">praeternatural</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_4"></A></I>  the miraculous  ie. beyond the ordinary powers of substances. Strictly, <I>supernatural</I> is the operation of grace. </li><li>If we depart from physicalism, does this mean that we need to view the mind in praeternaturalist terms? <U>No</U>.</li><li>There are three views of metaphysics:- <ul type="disc"><li>Metaphysics as <U>science</U> - Quine  scientism. </li><li>Metaphysics as a priori etc. This view is deflationary about ontology. Does whatever we talk about in a regulated and well-ordered manner exist? If so, then what we <U>mean</U> by saying that numbers exist is that there exists a well-ordered discourse that involves them. For realism about minds, we need more than just <U>talk</U> about them  we need them to make a difference. </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_5">Third</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_5"></A> option  not discussed? </li></ul></li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_6">Arguments</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_6"></A> against physicalism in the philosophy of mind:- <ul type="disc"><li>a. <B>Sensibility</B>: Eg. consciousness. <U>Not</U> persuasive. </li><li>b. <B>Intelligibility</B>: Modality, etc. </li></ul></li><li>Substances (eg. water) are identified by their causal powers  whether active (abilities) or passive (liabilities). Eg. Acid has the ability to dissolve. </li><li>Haldane is not impressed by the arguments from consciousness (as arguments against physicalism). It s not obvious that consciousness isn t part of the physical world. It s  isomorphic to the physical world  can turn up the volume. Consciousness is just a mode of receptivity to the physical. </li><li><B>Aquinas</B>: unpack. We have powers of categorisation into kinds. <U>Universals</U> are not material. There s no such thing as the organ of thought. Deliberation is not over particulars (= actuals) but over possibles. </li><li>To be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_917_7">continued</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_917_7"></A>?</li></ol><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_917_2"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 2</B>: Track down the references in these philosophers.<a name="On-Page_Link_917_3"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 3</B>: According to Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Arthur_Eddington" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Arthur_Eddington)),  Though sometimes attributed to Eddington without citation, this seems to be derived from a statement by J. B. S. Haldane (<A HREF = "https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/J._B._S._Haldane" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/J._B._S._Haldane)) in <I>Possible Worlds and Other Papers</I> (1927), p. 286: <B>The Universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose</B>. <a name="On-Page_Link_917_4"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 4</B>: See, for instance, <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preternatural" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preternatural). <a name="On-Page_Link_917_5"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 5</B>: The hand-out has:- <ol type="1"><li>Metaphysics as science</li><li>Metaphysics as prior to and independent of empirical knowledge </li><li>Metaphysics as interpretative of empirical and other knowledge. </li></ol><a name="On-Page_Link_917_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: Haldane had a (non-distributed!) hand-out with 20 arguments against physicalism. <a name="On-Page_Link_917_7"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 7</B>: My notes run out at this point, but don t indicate that there was more said  they run straight on to the Q&As. I ve no idea what the point of Haldane s talk was.</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 18/12/2010 19:58:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.70.13: (Third Man)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <ul type="disc"><li>My second pre-submitted BA Finals essay on Greek Philosophy, which asks whether the Third Man Argument refutes Plato's Theory of Forms. I have to admit that, but for the course, I wouldn't have looked into this subject, and those reading the essay should have a bottle of paracetamol to hand.</li><li>Currently, this Essay is only available as a PDF: <a href="../../../PlatoThirdMan.pdf" TARGET = "_top"> Click here</a>. It is my intention to convert this to Note format in due course. </li></ul></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 01/08/2017 00:11:31<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.71 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 40: (Closest Continuer)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.72 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 45: (Teletransportation)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.73 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.11: (Consciousness)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.74 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.9: (Substance)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.75 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18: (Forensic Property)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.76 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 28: (Phase Sortals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.77 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 29.15: (Animal Rights)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.78 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.29: (Animalism - Objections)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.79 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.23: (Corpses)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.80 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.14: (Fetuses)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.81 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14.4: (Mereology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.82 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 32.23: (Brain Transplants)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.83 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.11: (Transplants)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.84: (Brain Criterion)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>There will naturally be some overlap on this topic with the topics of <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Brains</U><SUP>2</SUP> and <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Criteria of Identity</U><SUP>3</SUP>. </li><li>The question is whether the brain is the be-all and end-all of the matter of personal identity for <a name="48"></a><U>human persons</U><SUP>4</SUP>. </li><li>It is acknowledged by most that  conceptually at least  there can be <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>5</SUP> that are not humans (ie. not members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em>)  whether these persons be non-human animals, computers, God, angels, aliens or whatever. Non-animals presumably have no brains, though aliens presumably have a brain-analogue, so brains cannot be identity-criteria for personhood as such (indeed, we might argue that there <U>are</U> no criteria for persons as <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_6">such</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_6"></A>). But for animal-persons (human or otherwise), the brain seems to occupy a central place, both as the seat of psychology (in the absence of an immaterial <a name="48"></a><U>soul</U><SUP>7</SUP>) and as the regulator of the body. </li><li>So, the story would go, X is the same person as Y <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_8">iff</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_8"></A> X has the same brain as Y. </li><li>The trouble is  even if this claim is along the right lines  we can press matters further, and ask whether the <U>whole</U> brain is strictly necessary. If what impresses us is a brain-based psychological view, when what we imagine is  really the minimal me is the pair of psychology-bearing cerebral hemispheres, then we might imagine (as some philosophers have) a case of <a name="48"></a><U>fission</U><SUP>9</SUP>, where  after equalising the hemispheres in psychological potency, we <a name="48"></a><U>transplant</U><SUP>10</SUP> one into another body lacking both hemispheres. Or, without needing anything so radical, we sever the corpus callosum in a <a name="48"></a><U>commissurotomy</U><SUP>11</SUP>, thereby (on this view) creating two persons in one body. </li><li>However, if we are <a name="48"></a><U>animalists</U><SUP>12</SUP>,<a name="48"></a><U></U><SUP>13</SUP> wondering what the  minimal animal is, and it s the command-and-control functions of the brain that impress us, then the paring-down process <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_14">might</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_14"></A> be able to do without the cerebral hemispheres (or at least the psychology-bearing parts) altogether. So, brain-based views from different perspectives might come to different conclusions about the importance of the cerebral hemispheres  one view might make them essential, the other irrelevant to questions of identity (if not to  <a name="48"></a><U>what matters</U><SUP>15</SUP> ). It is an empirical question whether the brain-stem can be divided, and hence whether a brain-based animalist approach is also subject to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_16">worries</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_16"></A> about fission. </li><li>Anyway, the appropriateness of the Brain criterion of personal identity depends on <a name="48"></a><U>what we are</U><SUP>17</SUP> in particular whether we are (most fundamentally, or in the sense of numerical identity, which is not the same thing) human animals or persons <a name="48"></a><U>constituted by</U><SUP>18</SUP> them (or various other things). </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_19">Only if</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_19"></A> we believe that we are (identical to) <a name="48"></a><U>brains</U><SUP>20</SUP> will we adopt the brain criterion. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_21">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_21"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_22">include</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_22"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3742.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Criteria of Personal Identity</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_909_23">Johnston</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_909_23"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15413.htm">Manninen (Tuomas) - Review of Alva Noe's 'Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain'</A>", Manninen</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3583.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21029.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity</A>", Snowdon</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16540.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - The bodily criterion</A>", Thomas</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3602.htm">Noe (Alva) - Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness</A>", Noe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12013.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains</A>", Olson</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>24</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_909_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_909_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Hasn t someone said this? Who? <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_109.htm">Wiggins</a>? </li><li>This is not to be confused with there being no criteria for <u>identity</u>, which is due to Merricks (eg. in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3448.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time</A>").</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>And, of course,  X and Y are both persons , to cover the case where the brain is insufficient to support the property of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">personhood</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Much of this discussion has empirical aspects to it, and depends on the capabilities of real brains  though we might get into the choppy waters of more intricate <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TEs</a>, and wonder what might be the case if the biology went differently  but then we would most likely not be talking about <U>our</U> identity criteria, but of some other being. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>These worries about fission are essentially set to rest by adopting a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">perdurantist</a> account of persistence. </li><li>But, some consider the costs (mainly semantic, I think) of adopting this approach are too great. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>But see the Note on Johnston below! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_909_22"></A><B>Footnote 22</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_909_23"></A><B>Footnote 23</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Johnston thinks we are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">human beings</a>, but  when push comes to shove  we would survive as brains, so the criteria of our identity are  for Johnston  brain based. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 14/03/2018 10:07:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.85 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.2: (Olson)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.86 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17.6: (Brains in Vats)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.87 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 33: (Fusion)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.88 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11.4: (Vague Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.89: (Cyborgs)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Briefly, a Cyborg (Cybernetic Organism) is a human being (or any organic being) with some inorganic parts. See the entry in Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyborg" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyborg)).</li><li>Compare and contrast with <a name="48"></a><U>Android</U><SUP>2</SUP>, which is a humanoid robot. </li><li>See also <a name="48"></a><U>Siliconisation</U><SUP>3</SUP>, the <a name="48"></a><U>TE</U><SUP>4</SUP> wherein we have the gradual replacement of (human) neural tissue with microchips while  allegedly  preserving consciousness. </li><li>And again, connect to <a name="48"></a><U>Chimeras</U><SUP>5</SUP>. <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_6">In this case</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_6"></A>, biological material from other animals is merged with human tissue to provide an enhancement. </li><li>All of the above is beloved of the <a name="48"></a><U>Transhumanists</U><SUP>7</SUP>, who want to enhance the human condition by all means possible, even if this means that humans are no longer  strictly speaking  <a name="48"></a><U>human beings</U><SUP>8</SUP>. </li><li>My interest in Cyborgs stems from the impact of their possibility on the truth of <a name="48"></a><U>Animalism</U><SUP>9</SUP>. </li><li>If we are (human) <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>10</SUP>, would we continue to exist if increasingly enhanced by technological implants and extensions. I see no immediate problem  just a bit more along the lines of spectacles & hip replacements. But no doubt there would eventually become a tipping point when we become more inorganic than organic. Our <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>11</SUP> would then be mixed between those of <a name="48"></a><U>organisms</U><SUP>12</SUP> and <a name="48"></a><U>artefacts</U><SUP>13</SUP>. Or is the situation better described by us shrinking (if our parts are replaced) or  if the technological parts are add-ons  remaining unchanged. Currently we re unchanged by our spectacles, but hip replacements become part of us. Is this not so?</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_14">Links</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_14"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_66_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_66_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_66_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16893.htm">Grossman (Lev) - 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal</A>", Grossman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23360.htm">Hawthorne (John X.) - Are You Ready For The Cyborg Technology Coming In 2018?</A>", Hawthorne</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22749.htm">Iida (Fumiya) - Could we build a Blade Runner-style  replicant ?</A>", Iida</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17206.htm">Jones (D. Gareth) - A Christian Perspective on Human Enhancement</A>", Jones</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22268.htm">Mayor (Adrienne) - Bio-techne</A>", Mayor</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6513.htm">O'Connell (Mark) - To be a Machine</A>", O Connell</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15973.htm">Alexander (Denis) - Enhancing humans or a new creation?</A>", Alexander</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6715.htm">Clark (Andy) - Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence</A>", Clark<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23243.htm">Erickson (Mark) - Review of Andy Clark's 'Natural-Born Cyborgs'</A>", Erickson<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4531.htm">Shipley (G.J.) - Review of Andy Clark's 'Natural-Born Cyborgs'</A>", Shipley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20821.htm">Clark (Andy) - Re-Inventing Ourselves: The Plasticity of Embodiment, Sensing, and Mind</A>", Clark</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6464.htm">Clark (Andy) - That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves</A>", Clark</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17207.htm">CSC WG - Human Enhancement  A Discussion Document</A>", CSC WG</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20183.htm">Kaku (Michio) - The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest to Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind (YouTube Lecture)</A>", Kaku</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20839.htm">Miah (Andy) - Justifying Human Enhancement: The Accumulation of Biocultural Capital</A>", Miah</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16565.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Conquest of Death</A>", Puccetti</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>17</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_66_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_66_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>There are other situations where human tissue is to be harvested from other animals  after genetic modification or other means  for the purpose of implantation. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_66_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_66_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_66_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 04/05/2018 12:25:55<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.90: (Cerebrum)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The cerebrum is the centre for the higher cognitive capacities of the <a name="48"></a><U>brain</U><SUP>2</SUP>, and hence of human and other <a name="48"></a><U>animal</U><SUP>3</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>psychology</U><SUP>4</SUP>. </li><li>It is (or they are) one option for the choice of  <a name="48"></a><U>what we are</U><SUP>5</SUP> on the part of those who hold the <a name="48"></a><U>Psychological View</U><SUP>6</SUP> of personal identity. </li><li>The two cerebral hemispheres are joined by the commissures, and <a name="48"></a><U>commissurotomy</U><SUP>7</SUP> is a favourite <a name="48"></a><U>TE</U><SUP>8</SUP>, being an alleged case  suitably elaborated  of the <a name="48"></a><U>fission</U><SUP>9</SUP> of the <a name="48"></a><U>person</U><SUP>10</SUP>; which again (allegedly) shows the non-identity of the <a name="48"></a><U>human person</U><SUP>11</SUP> and his <a name="48"></a><U>animal</U><SUP>12</SUP>.</li><li>There is some slackness in the literature where (whole) <a name="48"></a><U>brain transplants</U><SUP>13</SUP> and (double) cerebrum transplants are not distinguished, and where half-brain transplants (whatever these might be in practice) and single-cerebrum transplants are confused. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_14">Links</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_14"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1013_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>This Note overlaps to a great degree with others, some just noted, in particular:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Brain</U><SUP>15</SUP><BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Brain Transplants</U><SUP>16</SUP><BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>Commissurotomy</U><SUP>17</SUP></li><li>In the reading lists, I ve tried to restrict the  outstanding list to those that describe what the cerebrums are and how they function  to place constraints on the <a name="48"></a><U>TEs</U><SUP>18</SUP>. But I ve been <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_19">more liberal</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_19"></A> in the  already read list. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_20">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_20"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1013_21">include</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1013_21"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1165.htm">Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) - Neuroscience</A>", Bear et al, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7613.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Biology or Psychology? Human Persons and Personal Identity</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20173.htm">Liao (S. Matthew) - The Organism View Defended</A>", Liao</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5102.htm">Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22018.htm">Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence</A>", Madden</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20079.htm">Murphy (Nancey) - I Cerebrate Myself: Is there a little man inside your brain?</A>", Murphy, 1999</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18372.htm">Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4762.htm">Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5041.htm">Olson (Eric) - Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19031.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li> The categorised reading-list below has information on the cerebrum itself muddled together with more philosophical writings. A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3986.htm">Eccles (John) - Global Lesions of the Human Cerebrum</A>", Eccles</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4409.htm">Galin (David) - Implications for Psychiatry of Left and Right Cerebral Specialization: A Neurophysiological Context for Unconscious Processes</A>", Galin, 1974</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21102.htm">Hershenov (David) - Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22074.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Remnant Persons: Animalism's Undoing</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_516.htm">Kinsbourne (Marcel) - Asymmetrical Function of the Brain</A>", Kinsbourne, 1978</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21093.htm">Madden (Rory) - The Persistence of Animate Organisms</A>", Madden</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22064.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12011.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12016.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Souls</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12014.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Temporal Parts</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20709.htm">Parfit (Derek) - We Are Not Human Beings</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2921.htm">Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person</A>", Russell & Murphy et al, 2000 </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>22</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1013_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1013_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1013_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: And in the  outstanding list where the usual suspects are concerned. <a name="On-Page_Link_1013_20"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 20</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1013_21"></A><B>Footnote 21</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 20/06/2018 17:16:48<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.91: (Sleep)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1138_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1138_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> I d not intended to address this topic, but it appeared in <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Broks (Paul).htm">Paul Broks</A> s contribution to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21153.htm">Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) - What Does It Mean to Be Me?</A>", in relation to <a name="48"></a><U>Parfit s</U><SUP>2</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>Teletransportation</U><SUP>3</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>TE</U><SUP>4</SUP>. </li><li>Therein, the thought is that the  pulling yourself together that the individual does on awaking is very closely analogous to what happens in the  reception pod in teletransportation. If this is right, then either the awakening sleeper is not identical to the one who went to sleep, or the teletransportee is indeed identical to the individual who set off, and teletransportation is indeed a form of travel. I don t believe any of this. </li><li>However I ought to add a few jottings, as it s central to the <a name="48"></a><U>Psychological View</U><SUP>5</SUP>, which says  roughly speaking  that we <a name="48"></a><U>are</U><SUP>6</SUP> most fundamentally mental substances, and there has  since Descartes  been an issue about whether the thinking thing has to be continually thinking, and the dreamless sleep was the classic case of when it appeared not to be.</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1138_7">Links</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1138_7"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_1138_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1138_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1138_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_1138_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_1138_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>See the diminutive categorised reading list below, most of which seems relevant:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>10</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_1138_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1138_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_1138_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_1138_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 02/08/2018 00:18:43<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.92 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 37: (Psychological Continuity - Forward)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.93 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.6: (Brain)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.94 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 22: (Concepts)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 6.95: (Buddhism)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_943_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_943_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Buddhist teachings are relevant in two ways to personal identity:- <ol type="1"><li>The rejection of the importance of the <a name="48"></a><U>Self</U><SUP>2</SUP>. There are some connections to <a name="48"></a><U>Parfit s</U><SUP>3</SUP> ideas.</li><li>The insistence on <a name="48"></a><U>Reincarnation</U><SUP>4</SUP>.</li></ol></li><li>I have to admit to being mostly ignorant of Buddhist teachings, and unsympathetic towards those I know of (other than the woolly  peace, love and compassion stuff). </li><li>A couple of Websites may be useful, though clearly they don t focus on my research interests:- <ol type="1"><li>The Buddhist eLibrary (<A HREF = "http://www.buddhistelibrary.org/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (http://www.buddhistelibrary.org/))</li><li>The Dalai Lama s site (<A HREF = "https://www.dalailama.com/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://www.dalailama.com/))</li></ol></li><li>However, the following brace of books might help:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1559.htm">Yoshinori (Takeuchi), Van Bragt (Jan), Heisig (James), Swanson (Paul) & O'Leary (Joseph), Eds. - Buddhist Spirituality I - Indian, Southeast Asian, Tibetan, Early Chinese</A>", and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1560.htm">Yoshinori (Takeuchi), Heisig (James), O'Leary (Joseph) & Swanson (Paul), Eds. - Buddhist Spirituality II - Later China, Korea, Japan and the Modern World</A>". </li></ol></li><li>So, I'm vaguely interested in Buddhism  though not from the religious angle  where my interests are strictly "Abrahamic" (Christianity, Judaism, Islam). It slightly impinges on my research topic, though in a rather negative way. The Buddhist claim is that the focus on the Self, together with attachments to anything whatever, is the cause of all the world's ills. No doubt there's something in this - but it's illicit or inordinate attachments that are the problem, not attachments as such. Attachments are what gives life meaning, and its selfishness, not selves, that is the problem. Anyway, some philosophers think it would be a "good thing" if the boundaries between one self and another were broken down so that we cared less about <U>who</U> was benefitted from our actions, just that our actions were beneficial - so we wouldn't care whether it was ourselves, or our families or friends, or someone unknown to us who benefitted, just that someone did. Despite the potential benefit to the world s poor, this strikes me <ol type="a"><li>as overly idealistic and </li><li>to ignore our proper responsibilities (ie. we have some greater responsibility - though not an exclusive one - for those close to us, because they are "our job" to look after). </li></ol></li><li>Those philosophers that take a "<a name="48"></a><U>psychological view</U><SUP>5</SUP>" of our <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>6</SUP> - that we're psychological beings whose degree of connectedness to our future selves is exclusively based on psychological factors  some of whom think that we are somehow portable from one body to another  can make some sense of reincarnation. Those that are thoroughgoing materialists (like me) can't. I m sure the Dalai Lama is a very nice man, but his position and authority depends on him being a reincarnation of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_943_7">someone else</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_943_7"></A>, which isn t likely to be true. </li><li>Despite all the "peace and love" stuff, some of the ideas that Buddhism inherited from Hinduism strike me as being rather pernicious. It all stems from Karma and reincarnation - the idea that whatever we do in this life stores up good or ill for us the next time round. Maybe this (despite being based on metaphysical falsehoods) has some tendency to encourage some people to be less wicked than they might otherwise be (just like the threat of the eternal bonfire used to do for Christians), but it also has a tendency (for those who take the doctrine seriously) to encourage the thought that people deserve what they get because of what they did in a past life  so the poor deserve their poverty and the rich their wealth; all very convenient for those in power; though this isn t the Dalai Lama s take on things). No doubt the thought that any living thing might once have been human, or might in some future cycle be human, might lead to "universal compassion", but it's all a complete muddle metaphysically-speaking, and we should found our ethics on truths rather than falsehoods, it seems to me. </li><li>No doubt a Buddhist would have an answer to these concerns, and correct my many confusions.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_943_8">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_943_8"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_943_9">include</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_943_9"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6488.htm">Bourgeois (Warren) - Contemporary Philosophers' Views on Persons: Parfit: The Oxford Buddhist</A>", Bourgeois</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15991.htm">Vardy (Peter) & Arliss (Julie) - Evil in Eastern traditions</A>", Vardy</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22054.htm">Goodman (Charles) - Vaibhcika Metaphoricalism</A>", Goodman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2690.htm">Laycock (Stephen) - Consciousness It/Self</A>", Laycock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6378.htm">Sprague (Elmer) - Giving Persons a Hard Time</A>", Sprague</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6125.htm">Velleman (David) - So It Goes</A>", Velleman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11511.htm">Wagner (Rachel) & Flannery-Dailey (Frances) - Wake Up! Worlds of Illusion in Gnosticism, Buddhism, and The Matrix Project</A>", Wagner</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8632.htm">Williams (Paul) - Indian Philosophy</A>", Williams</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>10</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_943_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_943_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t know whether reincarnations are of themselves, in a previous life. </li><li>See Wikipedia (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Succession_of_the_14th_Dalai_Lama" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Succession_of_the_14th_Dalai_Lama)) for discussion of the succession from 14th to 15th Delai Lama. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_943_8"></A><B>Footnote 8</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_943_9"></A><B>Footnote 9</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 03/02/2018 21:27:22<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7: (Ontology)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Ontology is the study of what exists. </li><li>In the context of the philosophy of personal identity, ontological questions ask what <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>2</SUP> really are. </li><li>Maybe it s best first of all to step back, with <a name="48"></a><U>Locke</U><SUP>3</SUP>, and consider the <a name="48"></a><U>sorts</U><SUP>4</SUP> of thing that persist and establish the <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>5</SUP> for these sorts: <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>bodies</U><SUP>6</SUP>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>7</SUP>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a><U>human beings</U><SUP>8</SUP>. </li><li>The ontological question is whether  with Locke  we should add persons to this list. </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Baker</U><SUP>9</SUP> holds the view that when a person comes into existence, so does a new entity, of a new <a name="48"></a><U>kind</U><SUP>10</SUP>. A world without persons would be ontologically impoverished. </li><li>But is this so, or do existing entities simply gain new <a name="48"></a><U>properties</U><SUP>11</SUP>? </li><li>We must even (on certain definitions of PERSON) ask whether there <a name="48"></a><U>are any</U><SUP>12</SUP>, or whether the term can be eliminated. See:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1006.htm">Unger (Peter) - Why There Are No People</A>" and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>". </li><li>Since Unger s <a name="48"></a><U>sorites</U><SUP>13</SUP> arguments eliminate all material entities with <a name="48"></a><U>parts</U><SUP>14</SUP>, not just persons (though the elimination of persons on this account depends on the assumption that they are material entities with parts) I, along with the later Unger, wish to reject such conclusions.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_15">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_15"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_8_16">include</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_8_16"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>17</SUP>. Currently, just see the enormously bloated categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_8_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_8_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_8_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18.2: (Locke)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 9: (Sortals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.5 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.5: (Persistence Criteria)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17: (Body)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.7 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 29: (Animals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.16: (Baker)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.6: (Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 16.5: (Properties)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.12 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 41.11: (Nihilism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.13 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 25.9: (Sorites)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.14 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14.4: (Mereology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 7.17 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8: (Person)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with? Wiggins claims that the Greeks had no term for  person (I need to re-read the paper by "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7220.htm">Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person</A>" to double-check this). Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to <a name="48"></a><U>human beings</U><SUP>2</SUP> rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons? </li><li>I need to start with some <a name="48"></a><U>conceptual</U><SUP>3</SUP> analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely <a name="48"></a><U>semantic</U><SUP>4</SUP> or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn t a <a name="48"></a><U>natural kind</U><SUP>5</SUP> concept. </li><li>I accept <a name="48"></a><U>Locke</U><SUP>6</SUP> s conceptual distinction between <a name="48"></a><U>Human Beings</U><SUP>7</SUP> ( Men ), Persons and <a name="48"></a><U>Substances</U><SUP>8</SUP>. I accept Locke s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man  the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics. </li><li><BR>Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke s definition of a person as <ol type="1"> <FONT COLOR = "800080">a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places</FONT> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" - Essay II.27.2)</ol>& be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image. </li><li>But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this  qua-ing can lead to <a name="48"></a><U>relative identity</U><SUP>9</SUP>, and shows how difficult it is for me, at least, to maintain the strict <a name="48"></a><U>logic of identity</U><SUP>10</SUP> in these discussions. </li><li>Some further, fairly random, thoughts:-<ul type="square"><li>We must not ignore potential differences between the Person, the <a name="48"></a><U>Self</U><SUP>11</SUP> and the <a name="48"></a><U>Individual</U><SUP>12</SUP>. </li><li>I doubt the truth of the contention that one s Self is the sum of one s projects, one s individual  <a name="48"></a><U>identity</U><SUP>13</SUP> .</li><li>We must also note the potential for <a name="48"></a><U>degrees of personhood</U><SUP>14</SUP>. </li><li>Are persons essentially sentient? Or rational? And is rationality, like the mental generally, overstated by philosophers whose favourite habitat it is? </li><li>What about <a name="48"></a><U>temporal gaps</U><SUP>15</SUP> in sentience & rationality in the life of an individual  does the person pop in and out of existence? </li><li>What about legal persons: not companies, but the comatose, who still have estates (but then so do the <a name="48"></a><U>deceased</U><SUP>16</SUP>)? </li><li>How important is  person , as against  <a name="48"></a><U>sentient being</U><SUP>17</SUP> in my research concerns? The Cartesians denied sentience to <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>18</SUP> and until recently there has been a down-playing of the capacities of animals, particularly their emotional capacities. Consequently, the <a name="48"></a><U>persistence criteria</U><SUP>19</SUP> for sentient non-humans may not have been given the focus they ought. I suspect that many of the <a name="48"></a><U>thought experiments</U><SUP>20</SUP> work just as well if we drop some of the more onerous requirements of personhood in such contexts. Some of the thought experiments play on the thought of  <a name="48"></a><U>being tortured tomorrow</U><SUP>21</SUP> . While animals may not have the concept TOMORROW, I presume the higher animals have some capacity for anticipating future ills about to befall them. I wonder whether my research concerns should be about all beings that care about the future, whether or not they have a clear concept of it as <em>their</em> future.</li></ul></li><li>I will probably start with Dennett s six criteria of personhood (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_545.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood</A>") & <ol type="1"><li>rationality, </li><li>intentionality   predicated of </li><li>intentionality   adopted towards </li><li>reciprocation of the personal stance, </li><li>verbal communication and </li><li>consciousness</li></ol> & in investigating what persons are. See the following <a name="48"></a><U>essay</U><SUP>22</SUP>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_23">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_23"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_24">include</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_24"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>25</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list, which is enormously bloated and needs considerable pruning. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_9_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_9_23"></A><B>Footnote 23</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_9_24"></A><B>Footnote 24</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 22: (Concepts)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 22.5: (Semantics)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.5 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 26: (Natural Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18.2: (Locke)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.7 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.9: (Substance)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11.3: (Relative Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.10 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 11: (Logic of Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 13.6: (Self)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.12 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 32.12: (Individual)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.13 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 6.31: (Narrative Identity)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.14 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 18.10: (Degrees of Personhood)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.15 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 14.3: (Intermittent Objects)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.16 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.8: (Death)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.17 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 20.11: (Consciousness)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.18 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 29: (Animals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.19 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.5: (Persistence Criteria)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.20 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 31: (Thought Experiments)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.21 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 17.11: (Future Great Pain Test)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.22: (Daniel Dennett  Conditions of Personhood)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Dennett suggests that the concepts of  person and  human being are not necessarily co-extensive. He also distinguishes the two intertwined notions of personhood  <I>moral</I> and <I>metaphysical</I>. He defends the following 6  themes as necessary conditions of personhood:<ol type="1"><li>Persons are <I>rational beings</I>.</li><li>Persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or to which psychological or mental or <I>intentional predicates</I> are ascribed.</li><li>Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a <I>stance adopted</I> with respect to it. </li><li>The object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable of <I>reciprocating</I> in some way. </li><li>Persons must be capable of <I>verbal communication</I>.</li><li>Persons are distinguishable from other entities by being <I>conscious</I> in some special way: there is a way in which we are conscious in which no other species is conscious. Sometimes this is identified as <I>self</I>-consciousness of one sort or another. </li></ol>Dennett addresses 3 issues to do with these 6 themes:<BR><ol type="1"><li>How (on his interpretation) are these 6 themes dependent on one another?</li><li>Why are they <I>necessary</I> conditions of moral personhood?</li><li>Why is it so hard to say whether they are jointly <I>sufficient</I> conditions for moral personhood? </li></ol>In this essay, rather than address Dennett s 3 issues directly, I wish to address the following 6 questions: <ol type="1"><li>Is Dennett right to <A HREF="#Separate">separate</A> the concepts of  person and  human being ?</li><li>Is Dennett right to distinguish <A HREF="#Moral">moral</A> from metaphysical personhood?</li><li>Has Dennett the right set of <A HREF="#Themes">themes</A>?</li><li>Has Dennett found the right <A HREF="#Interdependencies">interdependencies and priorities</A> amongst his themes. </li><li>What are Dennett s <A HREF="#Reasons">reasons</A> for predicating these conditions of personhood? </li><li>Finally, is Dennett guided by a <A HREF="#NaturalKind">natural kind</A> concept, by social convention or by other factors? </li></ol>I have to admit that this is a first draft and something of a rushed job. My aim at this stage is to generate ideas quickly rather than ensure the argument is fully rigorous. I m afraid I ve used Dennett s paper more as a jumping off point, and have not considered his actual arguments as much as I should. I ve included hyperlinks to topics I ve written before, as a way of airing them and avoiding needless repetition, though the primary aim of this essay is to provide some continuous text for discussion, rather than exemplifying the approach of my research proposal (from where these notes come) which is almost all footnotes. <BR><BR>My aim in reviewing this paper is to get some sort of handle on what a person might be. The aim of my thesis will be to demonstrate that human persons are phase sortals of human animals, and that consequently (given the falsehood of mind/body dualism) that such hoped-for events such as resurrection are metaphysically impossible. I m not arguing for any of this here, just motivating the consideration of this topic. <BR><BR>Page references are to the 1997 Penguin edition of Brainstorms (Chapter 14). <BR><BR><a name="Separate"></a><BR><CENTER><B><U>Persons and Human Beings</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>Dennett claims that while any reader of his essay has to be person, the reader need not be a human being. The reader could be an alien, for instance. However, as far as I can see, to read Dennett s essay with reward, only rationality, language use, phenomenal consciousness and intentional states are strictly required. The moral themes seem irrelevant, as does the consciousness of self (though a reader without this concept might find the essay initially rather dull, though maybe enlightening). <BR><BR>So, the reader might not be a moral person by Dennett s lights. Dennett is probably right, though, that infants,  mental defectives (how sensibilities have moved on since 1978, or whenever this Chapter was drafted) and the appropriately insane, would not get much out of his offering. However, the contemporary candidates of choice for human non-personhood tend these days to be moved closer to the termini of life, being (early) fetuses and those in a persistent vegetative state (though maybe the question is different  in Olson the question is whether  we have psychological states essentially, and the claim is that  we do not since  we existed as fetuses, and may (for all we now know) persist into a PVS). <BR><BR>However, this leads on to our next question. <BR><BR><a name="Moral"></a><BR><CENTER><B><U>Moral and Metaphysical Persons</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>Dennett s distinction between moral and metaphysical persons seems to change the topic of the conversation to one I m less interested in. While it s not always 100% clear (at least to me), the bulk of his essay is addressed to the topic of moral persons rather than metaphysical persons. Because he agrees that Frankfurt s ideas about <a name="48"></a>wantons are fruitful, Dennett excludes many human beings from the category  person that I would prefer to include. <BR><BR>However, the motivation behind this distinction is whether or not the term  person is a  free-floating honorific , like  chic (p. 268). He distinguishes the metaphysical notion of person ( an intelligent, conscious, feeling agent ) from that of the moral notion (one  who is accountable, who has both rights and responsibilities ). He wants to know whether being a metaphysical person is a prerequisite for being a moral person, something a metaphysical person can  grow into , or whether metaphysical persons <U>must be</U> moral persons. He points out that we still in general react to the clinically insane (unless they are very far gone) as though they are <U>metaphysical</U> persons, even though they may not be treated as <U>moral</U> persons. Hence, the two terms are distinct, though being a metaphysical person does seem to be a necessary condition for being a moral person (with the exception of compound persons such as companies). <BR><BR><a name="Themes"></a> <BR><CENTER><B><U>The Right Set of Themes?</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>I can t really do better in defining what I think persons are than does <a name="48"></a>Locke. An entity for which persistence matters; a thinking thing that can consider itself as itself; that is phenomenally conscious, and has a consciousness of self. This is approximately Dennett s metaphysical person, though we mustn t forget that Locke famously considered personhood a <a name="48"></a>forensic concept. <BR><BR>Now on to Dennett s specific themes: <ol type="1"><li><B>Rationality</B>: I m not sure how far rationality should be pressed, despite Dennett considering it  the most obvious (p. 269). I don t think it s essential for a metaphysical person. However, the assumption of rationality is essential in all our dealings with other sentient entities (Dennett s intentional stance won t work otherwise), so it is probably essential for moral personhood. Even then,  predictability might be more relevant than rationality. </li><li><B>Intentional Predication</B>: I m happy with this, as it is a prerequisite for all mindedness (though not a sufficient condition). I m happy that persons are minded beings, even if human beings aren t always. </li><li><B>The object of a stance</B>: this seems to suggest that who is a person is in some sense  up to us . Indeed Dennett says (p. 270) that it s not just a stance taken in response to a metaphysical person, but is as least partly constitutive of a moral person (I paraphrase). This is definitely a predicate for moral persons only. While it might as a matter of fact be the case that certain metaphysical persons are socially ostracised so as to be treated as moral non-persons, this doesn t make them non-persons in either the metaphysical sense or the moral sense (for a moral realist). </li><li><B>Reciprocation</B>: Again, this is necessary only for moral persons. A sociopath or convinced solipsist is still a metaphysical person. </li><li><B>Verbal Communication</B>: Presumably Dennett is not disbarring deaf mutes from personhood, nor Stephen Hawking were someone to tread on his laptop. Even so, the possession of a language of thought (along Fodor s lines) is probably a prerequisite for rationality, but this doesn t address Dennett s themes of communication and reciprocal attitudes. Metaphysical persons incapable of communication might not be moral persons. I expect there are large questions about how a sense of self might arise without language. One would need to consider feral children. This might connect to a question I had in connection with the Language Acquisition Thesis (the claim that  learning a language is instrumental in the development of conceptual faculties in a human subject ). See the following <a name="48"></a>link. </li><li><B>Self-Consciousness</B>: I think this is central to either metaphysical or moral personhood. See below under  Natural Kinds . Dennett takes this form of consciousness (like language) to be the unique preserve of the human species, though I gather that both claims are not controversial (with the teaching of American Sign Language to bonobos, and the question whether passing the mirror test demonstrates a sense of self). </li></ol><BR>I have a question whether the properties Dennett requires of persons are their present properties or capacities, or whether entities that will, in the normal course of events, develop into persons, or which have in the past if not in the present possessed such capacities, count as persons. Is the property of being a person inalienable? Clearly capacities are more important than their present exercise (after all, we are not always rational or self-conscious, or even conscious at all; personhood is a state, not an activity). <BR><BR>This relates to whether human persons are phase <a name="48"></a>sortals,<a name="48"></a> of human beings, or whether they are human beings, period. It looks as though Dennett would deny the latter suggestion, given his insistence on certain properties that not all human beings share. <BR><BR><a name="Interdependencies"></a> <CENTER><B><U>Interdependencies and Priorities amongst the Themes</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>This will mostly have to wait for future elaboration. Dennett (p. 271) claims that the 6 themes are given in the order of their dependence with the proviso that the first 3 are mutually interdependent. Enough to note here that an item I consider essential to metaphysical personhood, namely self-consciousness, appears at the bottom of Dennett s list and so is presumably taken to be reliant on predicates only necessary for moral personhood. I would deny this connection. <BR><BR><a name="Reasons"></a> <CENTER><B><U>Why These Themes?</U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>This will also mostly have to be left until a later date. <BR><BR>As I note above, Dennett considers the order of the themes important, and considers that the earlier ones as prerequisites for the later ones. In particular, because we can adopt the intentional stance towards beings such as plants that have no mental states ( it grows that way because it wants to get to the light ), we need to move on to those that have real beliefs and desires. He is worried (p. 273) that we might get the themes in the wrong order by the premature invocation of the conscious knowledge or verbal expressibility of our beliefs to ensure their genuineness, but in any case these conditions are too strong as we have many beliefs that we re either unaware of or cannot express. This is why he brings in his fourth theme, that of reciprocity. While we can adopt the intentional stance towards plants, they cannot return the favour. He also assumes this reciprocity fails for all non-humans, but I suspect he s wrong. Maybe this is a step in the right direction, but adopting Frankfurt s approach (however useful the concept of a wanton is) seems to me to be a step too far in this context (and even in Frankfurt s context). <BR><BR><a name="NaturalKind"></a><BR><CENTER><B><U>What Sort of a Concept is  Person </U></CENTER></B><BR><BR>At the beginning of his essay, Dennett asks whether the concept of a person is incoherent or obsolete. His answer is that it isn t, because we cannot cease to regard others, and in particular ourselves as persons without contradiction (and refers us to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_798.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Mechanism and Responsibility</A>"). I ve not pursued this question, but suspect that the fact that the question can be asked at all indicates that the concept of person isn t a natural kind concept, at least not as the term  moral person is defined by Dennett. There seem to be too many attitudinal issues and those that make certain sorts of societies cohere (even though these may arguably be the best sort). <BR><BR>I don t seem to have written anything sensible on natural <a name="48"></a>kind concepts. Maybe this is a next step. My intuition is that persons, whether metaphysical or moral, aren t natural kind concepts, and that for human persons the appropriate natural kind concept is  human animal (or maybe  human being ). <BR><BR>A critical question, however, is whether the emergence of self-consciousness signals the arrival of a new natural kind (as Lynne Rudder Baker alleges, taking  self-consciousness to be the same as her  first-person perspective ).</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 18/12/2010 19:58:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 8.25 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9: (Sortals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Using Howard Robinson s terminology ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11924.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)</A>"), the <U>Ultimate Sort</U> of a thing is that <a name="48"></a><U>property</U><SUP>2</SUP> without which the thing ceases to exist. </li><li>However, an individual falling under a <a name="48"></a><U>Phase Sortal</U><SUP>3</SUP> can lose the property that defines the phase without ceasing to exist. </li><li>Ultimate Sorts are presumably the same as <a name="48"></a><U>Baker</U><SUP>4</SUP> s <a name="48"></a><U>Primary Kinds</U><SUP>5</SUP>, though I can t remember if she has an analogue of a Phase Sortal. </li><li>The standard example is of a <a name="48"></a><U>Human Being</U><SUP>6</SUP> (as the Ultimate Sort) and Child (as a Phase Sortal). </li><li>So, is <a name="48"></a><U>personhood</U><SUP>7</SUP> an attribute of a human being, like  childhood , that a human being can either possess or lack, or are persons <a name="48"></a><U>ontologically</U><SUP>8</SUP> separate from  their human beings? </li><li><a name="48"></a><U>Wiggins</U><SUP>9</SUP> argues that we can t talk of the <a name="48"></a><U>persistence conditions</U><SUP>10</SUP> of anything until we know what sort it is. </li><li>Olson claims that it s futile to talk of the persistence conditions of persons per se  if human beings, God and angels are all persons  since their persistence conditions (assuming the existence of God and angels, for the sake of the argument) are completely different. This lack of a common set of persistence conditions would indicate that <a name="48"></a><U>Person</U><SUP>11</SUP> is not an Ultimate Sort. </li><li>I (intend to) discuss the sorts that <U>we</U> may fall under in the Note on  <a name="48"></a><U>What are We</U><SUP>12</SUP> .</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_13">Links</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_13"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_10_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5108.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3706.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Sortals</A>", Hirsch</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5144.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Identity and Sortals: Why Relative Identity Is Self-Contradictory</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22818.htm">Baldwin (Thomas) - Reviews: Sameness and Substance by David Wiggins; Objects and Identity by Harold Noonan</A>", Baldwin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4461.htm">Bennett (Daniel) - Essential Properties</A>", Bennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8441.htm">Bennett (Karen) - Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem</A>", Bennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6075.htm">Berglund (Stefan) - Identity and Reduction</A>", Berglund</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23009.htm">Braddon-Mitchell (David) & Miller (Kristie) - Talking about a Universalist World</A>", Braddon-Mitchell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3947.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Stages, Sortals, and Possible Worlds</A>", Brennan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7324.htm">Burke (Michael) - Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem</A>", Burke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2011.htm">Burke (Michael) - Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Amongst Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions</A>", Burke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7169.htm">Campbell (John) - Sortals and the Binding Problem</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5885.htm">Carter (William) - On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms</A>", Carter</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4948.htm">Cocchiarella (Nino) - On the Logic of Natural Kinds</A>", Cocchiarella</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5500.htm">Feldman (Fred) - Sortal Predicates</A>", Feldman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6250.htm">Griffin (Nicholas) - Sortals</A>", Griffin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5396.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Sheer Coincidence?</A>", Hawley</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3430.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts</A>", Hughes</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6411.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_16">Lowe</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_16"></A>, especially:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21745.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Individuals, Sorts, and Instantiation</A>", Lowe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4463.htm">Mackie (Penelope) - Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5039.htm">Oderberg (David) - Coincidence Under a Sortal</A>", Oderberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14525.htm">Runggaldier (Edmund) - Sortal Continuity of Material Things</A>", Runggaldier<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14526.htm">Rapp (Christof) - Runggaldier on the Cohabitation of Material Objects</A>", Rapp</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15879.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11355.htm">Stevenson (Leslie) - A formal theory of sortal quantification</A>", Stevenson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19951.htm">Stone (Jim) - Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus's Puzzle</A>", Stone</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9775.htm">Ujvari (Marta) - Cambridge Change and Sortal Essentialism</A>", Ujvari</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_10_17">Wiggins</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_10_17"></A>, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3501.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: and the Characteristic Activity or Function or Purpose of their Compliants</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22772.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: A Reply to Xu</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>18</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_10_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_10_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_10_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Maybe no need, therefore, to look at "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_640.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", though I ve read:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20013.htm">Baur (Michael) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20012.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20011.htm">Simons (Peter) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_10_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>No need to read Wiggins s earlier work in detail? </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 08/05/2018 00:54:43<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 16.5: (Properties)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 28: (Phase Sortals)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.16: (Baker)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.5 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 24.6: (Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.6 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 12.8: (Human Beings)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.7 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.8 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 7: (Ontology)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.9 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23.18: (Wiggins)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U><FONT COLOR = "800080">Footnote 9.10 (CORRESPONDENT)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> On a view like Olson's, I take it, that:<BR><BR>(a) altho' a human animal can exist when it is not a person, insofar as we have genuine IDENTITY questions, these relate to human animals. (Perhaps Olson thinks 'person' is a phase-sortal, like 'teenager'. We don't raise questions about teenager identity AS SUCH), <BR><BR>(b) if we think angels are persons only because they satisfy some functional definition that we might give of what it takes to be a person, then we don't yet have any reason to think that what it takes for angels to persist has a bearing on what it takes for us to persist. (Again: we've chosen the wrong concept to answer identity questions with respect to.)<FONT COLOR = "000000"></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 21/10/2007 09:48:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.11 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.12 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 15.6: (What are We?)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 9.18 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 10.14: (Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity))</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10: (Homo Sapiens)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>If <a name="48"></a><U>animalism</U><SUP>2</SUP> is correct  and we are human animals  then we are members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em>. </li><li>Also relevant is <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Blatti (Stephan).htm">Stephan Blatti</A> s  Animal Ancestors Argument for Animalism (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19926.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - A New Argument for Animalism</A>", etc.). </li><li>Consequently, this page probably ought to say something about species, their reality and their status as <a name="48"></a><U>natural kind</U><SUP>3</SUP> concepts. </li><li>I ought also to investigate human evolution, and just when our hominid ancestors became <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>4</SUP>. As these ancestors are all gone, investigation of the capacities of our nearest neighbours  the great apes  must make do as a proxy. </li><li>I don t think it s a conceptual truth that the only persons are <a name="48"></a><U>human persons</U><SUP>5</SUP>. Consequently, I do not deny personhood to extinct hominids, or (possibly) to the great apes, dolphins, Klingons, machines, gods, angels and such-like. </li><li>However, I do think it s an empirical truth that the only persons whose personhood we reliably <U>know</U> anything about are human persons, members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em> so think we should start there. </li><li>Also, my main <U>interest</U> is in human persons, so this will be my initial focus. </li><li>Since, I will need to consider whether human persons can exist in non-human <a name="48"></a><U>bodies</U><SUP>6</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>(transmigration</U><SUP>7</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>mechanisation</U><SUP>8</SUP>, <a name="48"></a><U>resurrection</U><SUP>9</SUP> bodies) or even as <a name="48"></a><U>disembodied</U><SUP>10</SUP> <a name="48"></a><U>minds</U><SUP>11</SUP>, I will need to move on from this base camp.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_11_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_11_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15677.htm">Krause (Johannes) - Our Ancestral Cave Gets More Crowded</A>", Krause</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15604.htm">McKie (Robin) - Out of Africa: The Sequel</A>", McKie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4762.htm">Olson (Eric) - Human People Or Human Animals</A>", Olson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3673.htm">Berry (R.J.) & Noble (T.A.) - Darwin, Creation and the Fall</A>", Berry</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3667.htm">De Waal (Frans) - Our Inner Ape: The Best and Worst of Human Nature</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6531.htm">De Waal (Frans) - Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2441.htm">De Waal (Frans) - The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist</A>", De Waal</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_204.htm">Eccles (John) - Evolution of the Brain, Creation of the Self</A>", Eccles</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1393.htm">Ghiselin (Michael) - Metaphysics and the Origin of Species</A>", Ghiselin</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6699.htm">Harari (Yuval Noah) - Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind</A>", Harari</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1944.htm">Hartl (Daniel L.) - Our Uncertain Heritage: Genetics & Human Diversity</A>", Hartl</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1859.htm">Johanson (Donald) & Shreeve (James) - Lucy's Child: The Discovery of a Human Ancestor</A>", Johanson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5097.htm">Kitcher (Patricia) - Natural Kinds and Unnatural Persons</A>", Kitcher</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7403.htm">LaPorte (Joseph) - Essential Membership</A>", LaPorte</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_817.htm">Lieberman (Philip) - Eve Spoke - Human Language and Human Evolution</A>", Lieberman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4309.htm">Savage-Rumbaugh (E.Sue) & Lewin (Roger) - Kanzi: Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind</A>", Savage-Rumbaugh<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17121.htm">Pearce (E.K. Victor) - Review of 'Kanzi: Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind' by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh & Roger Lewin</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3101.htm">Schick (Kathy D.) & Toth (Nicholas) - Making Silent Stones Speak: Human Evolution and the Dawn of Technology</A>", Schick</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6483.htm">Suddendorf (Thomas) - The Gap</A>", Suddendorf</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1870.htm">Tattersall (Ian), Delson (Eric) & Van Couvering (John), Eds. - Encyclopaedia of Human Evolution and Prehistory</A>", Tattersall</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6471.htm">Young (J.Z.) - An Introduction to the Study of Man</A>", Young</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="48"></a><U>place-holder</U><SUP>14</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_11_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_11_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_11_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 28/02/2018 18:40:19<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.2 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 23: (Animalism)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.3 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 26: (Natural Kinds)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.4 Repeated</B></U>. See Footnote 8: (Person)</P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 10.5: (Human Persons)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_75_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_75_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I can t think I ll have much to say here that s not covered under either <a name="48"></a><U>human beings</U><SUP>2</SUP> or <a name="48"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>3</SUP>. </li><li>See also my Note on <a name="48"></a><U>Non-human persons</U><SUP>4</SUP>. </li><li>Angels and aliens are discussed in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4191.htm">Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)</A>" and the claim is that insofar as we can conceptualise them, they are <a name="48"></a><U>animals</U><SUP>5</SUP>. So they aren t counter-examples to the supposition that all persons are animals (though this doesn t rule out non-human animals being persons). </li><li>Wiggins also discusses robot-persons. If, in order to satisfy the conditions of personhood, these end up as molecule-by-molecule <a name="48"></a><U>clones</U><SUP>6</SUP> of animals, these are animals also. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_75_7">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_75_7"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_75_8">include</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_75_8"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4101.htm">Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) - Establishing a Framework For Approaching Human Personhood</A>", Moreland & Rae</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4721.htm">Olson (Eric) - Review of Hud Hudson's 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person'</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1442.htm">Petrus (Klaus), Ed. - On Human Persons</A>", Petrus</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5433.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Human Persons</A>", Puccetti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12306.htm">Selling (Joseph) - The Human Person</A>", Selling</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4191.htm">Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>A <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_75_9">reading list</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_75_9"></A> (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <