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Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

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Abstract



Research Methodology

Chapter Introduction3
  1. This Chapter should have a fairly straightforward structure.
  2. Firstly, we need to consider just what a Person4 is. In particular, is it a Substance concept (assuming a Substance rather than Process metaphysics) or is it a Property of a Substance?
  3. Then we need to consider what Properties qualify an individual to be a Person. Additionally, when does the individual become a person, and having become a person, can that individual later cease to be a person?
  4. The properties usually taken as being essential for persons include several on which I have individual Notes.
    • A person has a First Person Perspective5, the person’s window on the world, and reflexively on itself.
    • Persons have Free Will6, at least to the degree that Free Will is possible in the world in which we live.
    • A Person is an Intelligent7 being (though not all such qualify as Persons).
    • A person has Language (or at least a Language of Thought8).
    • Finally, there are – for human persons at any rate (and presumably for the Persons supposedly forming the Holy Trinity) – Social9 aspects to personhood.
  5. We need to distinguish Persons from their Personalities10. When people say that so-and-so is no longer the same person, they usually mean that the individual has had a radical change of personality.
  6. Having decided what a Person is, we need to decide what kind of being is a Person. We need to canvass the usual list of candidates other than ourselves – Human Persons11 – which are covered in my Note on Non-Human Persons12.
  7. It is often assumed that being a Person is an all or nothing affair, with persons having infinite moral value, and non-Persons having negligible value: is – or should – this be so? Can there be Degrees of Personhood13? My Note on Wantons14 is also relevant in this context.
  8. Given the variety of potential Persons, we might doubt whether there are persistence criteria for Persons as such. This gives rise to the choice between Reductionists15, who hold that the persistence of Persons is governed by those of the sort of entities that constitute them, and holders of the Simple View16, which denies this.
  9. We also need to ask how well integrated Persons are, as discussed in my Note on The Unity of the Person17. How do we Count Persons18? Is there a 1-1 match with the entities that constitute them? Can there be such entities as Personites19?
  10. Finally, do the various theories of Personhood Take Persons Seriously20, or at least sufficiently so?


Note Hierarchy
  1. Qualities of Personhood
    1. Person21
    2. First-Person Perspective22. Excluded23
    3. Free Will24
    4. Intelligence25
    5. Language of Thought26
    6. Social27
  2. Personality28
  3. Who is a Person?
    1. Human Persons29
    2. Non-Human Persons30
    3. Degrees of Personhood31
    4. Wantons32
  4. The Persistence of Persons
    1. Reductionism33
    2. The Simple View34
  5. Unity of the Person35
    1. Counting Persons36
    2. Personites37
  6. Taking Persons Seriously38


Main Text
  1. Introduction
    1. The main philosophical argument about Persons is whether PERSON is a substance39-concept in its own right, or whether it is parasitic on other substance-concept(s).
    2. My own view is that Human Persons are phase sortals40 of human animals, but other philosophers have more robust views of persons and think of them as substances in their own right.
    3. Famously, Locke41 held this view, and Lynne Rudder Baker42 was a contemporary exponent – her view being that human persons are constituted by43, but are not identical to, human animals44.
    4. In this thesis, I’m only concerned with human persons, and – like most philosophers – allow that there can be non-human persons45 (God, gods, angels, aliens, robots, etc.)
    5. All this is predicated on deciding just what PERSONS are, which in turn depends somewhat on whether we take PERSON to be a natural kind46 concept, or something that is socially constructed and so not something the correct definition of which we can discover.
    6. I defer discussion of the important topic of the First-Person Perspective47 until Chapter 748.
  2. Qualities of Personhood
    1. Person49
      1. We must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with. See "Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person" for the usage prior to the 20th century. Wiggins claims that the Greeks had no term for “person”. Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to human beings50 rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons?
      2. We need to start with some conceptual51 analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely semantic52 or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn’t a natural kind53 concept.
      3. I accept Locke54’s conceptual distinction between Human Beings55 (“Men”), Persons and Substances56. I accept Locke’s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man – the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics.
      4. Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke’s definition of a person as
          “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places” ("Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity" - Essay II.27.2)
        be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image.
      5. But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this “qua-ing” can lead to relative identity57, and shows how difficult it is to maintain the strict logic of identity58 in these discussions.
      6. Some further thoughts:-
        • We must not ignore potential differences between the Person, the Self59 and the Individual60.
        • I doubt the truth of the contention that one’s Self is the sum of one’s projects, one’s individual “identity61”.
        • We must also note the potential for degrees of personhood62.
        • Are persons essentially sentient? Or rational? And is rationality, like the mental generally, overstated by philosophers whose favourite habitat it is?
        • What about temporal gaps63 in sentience & rationality in the life of an individual – does the person pop in and out of existence?
        • What about legal persons: not companies, but the comatose, who still have estates (but then so do the deceased64)?
        • How important is “person”, as against “sentient being65” in my research concerns? The Cartesians denied sentience to animals66 and until recently there has been a down-playing of the capacities of animals, particularly their emotional capacities. Consequently, the persistence criteria67 for sentient non-humans may not have been given the focus they ought. I suspect that many of the thought experiments68 work just as well if we drop some of the more onerous requirements of personhood in such contexts. Some of the thought experiments play on the thought of “being tortured tomorrow69”. While animals may not have the concept TOMORROW, I presume the higher animals have some capacity for anticipating future goods or ills about to befall them – that’s how dog-training works70. I wonder whether my research concerns should be about all beings that care about the future, whether or not they have a clear concept of it as their future.
      7. To aid in investigating just what persons are I will start with Dennett’s six criteria of personhood (see "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood", on which I have written an essay71):-
        1. Rationality,
        2. Intentionality – “predicated of”
        3. Intentionality – “adopted towards”
        4. Reciprocation of the personal stance,
        5. Verbal communication and
        6. Consciousness
    2. Free Will72
      1. Free-will may prove essential to our concept of a Person73, as is alleged in "Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person".
      2. This idea stems initially from Locke’s view that personhood is a forensic property74 of the individual that allows for praise or blame. Without free will, praise or blame is said to be out of place.
      3. Dennett’s views in
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Freedom Evolves" and
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting"
        will be of interest, following on from
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood".
      4. See also the Aeon discussion in "Dennett (Daniel) & Caruso (Gregg D.) - Just deserts".
      5. Gregg D. Caruso has written extensively in this area claiming – contra Dennett – that none of us has free will because all we do is down to luck: either constitutive luck – from our genes and initial family situation – or present luck – from our environment. Consequently, Caruso claims that – rather than blame – criminals need therapy75.
      6. Free will also features in discussions of backward Time Travel76.
      7. I’ve covered the topic of future contingents in my essay on Aristotle’s Sea Battle77. I’ve not repeated the associated literature here.
    3. Intelligence78
      1. Intelligence is a very wide-ranging term, and there’s a tendency to focus on what are really fairly minor differences in human aptitudes; namely, in the discussion of IQ.
      2. The intention of this Note is to consider intelligence as a pre-requisite for personhood79.
      3. Clearly, many non-persons (including the higher non-human animals) are intelligent to some degree or other, so is there a qualifying level – or type – of intelligence needed for personhood?
      4. Could intelligence tie in with the possibility of degrees of personhood80? This would seem to be the case if the Great Apes and other appropriate higher mammals are included in the category of Non-human Persons81.
      5. Also, there’s the issue of Superintelligence – that of (future, putative) machines that exceed humans in intelligence, whatever that means. This is “The Singularity”. Will they also be Non-human Persons82, of a superior kind? That is, is intelligence sufficient for this accolade of personhood? I assume not and that sentience is needed as well as sapience.
    4. Language of Thought83
      1. According to "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood", Linguistic competence is one of the six essential features of personhood. It seems there are two reasons for this:-
        1. One is communication, as the formation of and participation in societies are essential to the flourishing of persons84.
        2. The other is that the sort of self-reflection needed for personhood allegedly requires language.
      2. In response:-
        1. I believe there can be non-verbal communication between higher animals – especially those that are candidates for personhood (maybe of reduced degree85) – indeed, this must be the case for social beings.
        2. Also, cogitation doesn’t require the ability to verbalise if there’s such a thing as a language of Thought. Our conscious thoughts do seem to involve internalised spoken language, but maybe our unconscious ones don’t.
      3. So, the relevance of Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought (LOT) hypothesis within the sphere of personal identity arises because of the alleged essentiality of language for personhood. As such, all non-human animals86 would be ruled out because even if certain Great Apes can be taught sign-language, this is not natural to them in the way language is to human beings.
      4. It is also often alleged (eg. by Donald Davidson) that animals cannot even think in the absence of language, because thinking requires concepts87, and concepts are only expressed in language.
      5. These (to me) unwanted conclusions might disappear if all animals whose minds appear to have intensional states should have a language of thought.
      6. I don’t know whether Fodor cares about animals in this context, or whether his theory was designed strictly with human beings88 in mind.
      7. I like the idea that a LOT – which initially only helps an individual – might explain how spoken language arose amongst human beings – given that a spoken language requires a pair of speakers before it becomes useful (even if grunts and other vocalisations don’t). If a language of thought spilled out into vocalisation, even though individual vocalisations might be initially mutually-unintelligible, a conventional speech (constrained only by universal grammar) might naturally arise with the co-operative behaviour germane to social animals.
      8. See "Rescorla (Michael) - The Language of Thought Hypothesis" for an overview.
    5. Social89
      1. It seems that the social aspects of personhood are deemed to be the most important – indeed the defining – aspects of what it is to be a person by some contemporary philosophers.
      2. I have in mind Anne Sophie Meincke in this regard, but no doubt there are others.
      3. I have my doubts as it seems to encourage the widening of the net of personhood to include social animals – including ants and bees – that are clearly not persons unless personhood loses any appropriate sense of being a forensic property90, or else the moral community is expanded to a degree that makes its current norms unworkable.
      4. Such suggestions need to be compared with other assessments of what it is to be a person91, as in my discussion of Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood92. The social aspect is assumed rather than explicitly mentioned.
      5. There are also issues about our “identities” – in the sense of Narrative Identities93 or our sexual identities – being defined or constrained by the society in which we live.
  3. Personality94
    1. “She’s not the same person”, means she’s undergone a change of personality. It does not mean that she’s a numerically-different individual. Such is agreed by all but the most extreme (or maybe most consistent) adherents of the psychological view95 of personal identity.
    2. What are personalities? Are personalities a loose collection of properties and predispositions? Do personalities have persistence conditions, so that saying that someone has or has not changed their personality even makes sense?
    3. Consider an analogy with weight. It makes sense to ask whether individual x has the same weight at time t1 as at t2. That makes sense because weight is a well-defined property. Of course, for “weight” to be a useful practical concept in this context, there is a tolerance; differences of a few grams don’t count, though those of a few kilograms do. However, “personality” is a much less well-defined concept96, and similar97 ones may count as the same.
    4. We do allow for our personalities to “evolve” as we mature, so – presumably – we think of them as having persistence conditions of some sort. Too radical a change is shocking to us, leading to the opening quote in this Note.
    5. I have a separate Note that discusses Multiple Personality Disorder98, some interpretations of which claim that multiple persons inhabit the same human being (as is reflected by the new term “Dissociative Identity Disorder”, though some don’t treat it as a “disorder” at all) while others – more traditionally – think of it as a fragmented personality.
  4. Who is a Person?
    1. Human Persons99
      1. Human persons are the only persons we have direct knowledge of – in the sense of both knowing that they are (or can be) persons100, and what it is like to be such a person.
      2. It is probably only a matter of semantics whether human beings101 are persons throughout their lives. That is, if the term is only applied to individuals with the relevant properties at the time of application, or whether it applies to ‘once and future’ persons, or to all who belong to the species homo sapiens102.
      3. As Person103 is a forensic property104, this matter of semantics has ethical and legal consequences. I think these questions get very muddled.
      4. There’s a question whether Neanderthals and other extinct hominins ought to be categorised as human or non-human persons105, that is if they can be known to have been persons at all (rather likely in the case of the Neanderthals).
    2. Non-Human Persons106
      1. Amongst philosophers, if not amongst the general populace, it is usually taken for granted that there can be persons who are not human beings107. The usual candidates are:-
        1. Extinct Hominids, where these are not categorised as “human” (see the Note on Homo Sapiens108 for a discussion of Neanderthals; there’s a question whether Neanderthals ought to be categorised as human persons109or non-human persons).
        2. The higher Non-human Animals110, especially the Great Apes,
        3. Aliens,
        4. Angels,
        5. God,
        6. gods,
        7. Androids111 (or appropriately-configured Robots),
        8. Cyborgs112, at least those with silicon113 (or other inorganic) brains114 (those with human brains will, naturally, be human persons115).
        9. Computers116 – or computer programs – or the combination thereof – of appropriate structure and complexity.
      2. See also Transhumanism117, and Uploading118 for further discussion of various of the above
      3. Angels and aliens are discussed in "Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)" and the claim is that insofar as we can conceptualise them, they are animals119. Wiggins also discusses robot-persons120. If, in order to satisfy the conditions of personhood, these end up as molecule-by-molecule clones121 of animals, these are animals also. So – with the possible exception of God and gods – Wiggins doesn’t think there are counter-examples to the supposition that all persons are animals.
      4. The question is whether these candidates can be persons, and what – if they can – this fact tells us about what persons are.
    3. Degrees of Personhood122
      1. That personhood may come in degrees – rather than being “all or nothing” – is rather a dangerous thought, at least if applied to human persons123.
      2. However, if we are inclined to extend the boundaries of personhood to include some higher non-human animals124 (or – in the future – artificial intelligences125) – but don’t want them to be on a par with human beings, for instance in moral accountability – we might have to allow the thought “person – 2nd class”, or something like that.
      3. It seems clear that the qualities that qualify an individual to be a person126, come in degrees.
      4. The key point at issue is probably whether personhood is an honorific (a property of substances) rather than a substance127-term itself. If it is not a substance-term, as I believe it is not, then we have the option to provide – say – legal protection to the underlying substance – say human animal128 or human being129, and then denying the epithet “person” to some human beings need not have the genocidal overtones that are usually suspected whenever such a thought is expressed. But, it still might be better to avoid refusing the term altogether.
      5. So, maybe some persons are “more” persons than others and persons do indeed come in degrees. But maybe they are just better persons according to some criteria – whether ethical or metaphysical – and these criteria need to be sharply distinguished.
      6. For instance Frankfurt – in "Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" – claimed that wantons130 are not persons, but maybe we should say that (from an ethical perspective) they are poor exemplars of the concept PERSON.
      7. We can think of an analogy with animals. Some animals (eg. human beings – or, lest we be considered a special case - chimpanzees) are, according to many evaluative criteria, superior to other animals (worms). Yet all are animals. Now ethically and practically, some animals deserve greater consideration than others – it would appear that chimpanzees have a greater capacity for suffering than worms, for instance. So too, presumably, do exemplars of the same species, though not to the same degree except in severely pathological cases.
      8. The issue is thus highlighted by the possibility that some of the higher mammals are persons, nearly persons, or persons of reduced degree. If all persons are just persons, period, and all persons have to be treated equally (if that is our ethical outlook), then we might be stuck with duties that seem counter-intuitive (to some, at least). Alternatively, an “all or nothing” stance may be used by us to avoid giving certain sentient beings the care they deserve.
    4. Wantons131
      1. “Wanton” is a term of art introduced in "Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", of which I’ve written a Review132.
      2. According to Frankfurt, wantons are human beings133 who aren’t moral persons, because they lack second order desires (they don’t want to want to do x or be morally like y).
      3. Most human beings (the persons134) care what their moral likes and dislikes are, and want to reform or improve their moral sensibilities and characters. They care about their moral state. Wantons don’t; they are happy as they are (and not because they are moral saints).
      4. While the term “wanton” is a useful one, I think excluding wantons from falling under the concept135 “person” is making that concept too narrow. Frankfurt may have hijacked the term wanton, but he has left no important semantic gap in so doing (he has probably done no more than perform a service by clarifying the term).
      5. However, in restricting the term “person” to non-wantons, he is (I would claim) invoking a semantic shift that would then require a new term, PERSON-Minus, to cover those wanton human beings who enjoy the non-moral properties that Frankfurt-persons enjoy. Maybe they would be persons of reduced degree136?
  5. The Persistence of Persons
    1. Reductionism137
      1. Reductionism in the field of Personal Identity has much the same meaning as elsewhere in philosophy, namely:-
        1. Explanatory Reduction: explaining PID in terms of simpler concepts138, or
        2. Ontological Reduction: saying that persons139 are “really” other things, or are made up of or constituted by140 other things.
      2. This contrasts with the Simple View141, which denies either of these options.
      3. Currently, my thoughts on the matter are derived from:-
        1. "Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Reductionism", and
        2. "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism",
          but I will add to the topic further over time.
      4. From my perspective, the interesting element is Garrett’s consideration of Phase Sortals142.
      5. "Cassam (Quassim) - Parfit on Persons" claims that Animalism143 is a non-reductionist account of PID – indeed, the best one!
      6. Derek Parfit is credited with introducing the term “Reductionism” into the field of Personal Identity from elsewhere in philosophy.
    2. The Simple View144
      1. Most theories of personal identity assume that PI is reducible to something else, so is to be analysed in terms of physical or psychological continuities, or to be explained by our being human animals.
      2. The simple view is just the contrary of the above:-
        1. "Olson (Eric) - In Search of the Simple View" denies that the distinction is coherent.
        2. "Gasser (Georg) & Stefan (Matthias), Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?" (in which the above paper appears) discusses various arguments pro and con.
        3. See "Coliva (Annalisa) - Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?" for a review of the above.
        4. It’s probably best to start with "Gasser (Georg) & Stefan (Matthias) - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Introduction".
      3. It seems that Baker’s Constitution View145 is a form of the Simple View: see "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity: A Not-So-Simple Simple View".
  6. Unity of the Person146
    1. There’s a presumption in the philosophy of personal identity that the person147 is a single well-defined individual. This is probably a hang-over from the days of Cartesian148 Dualism149 or when it was assumed that each of us had an indivisible Soul150. Nevertheless, this, depending on what the referent of person151 is supposed to be, can seem (and maybe is) quite sensible.
    2. However this unity has been disputed – for instance in the different interpretations of Multiple Personality Disorder (PMD152):-
      1. Supporters of the Psychological View153 argue that cases of MPD154 show that there can be multiple persons sharing the same body. This assumes that a person is some sort of well-integrated personality, no part of which is shut off from the rest (as is allegedly – though doubtfully – the case in MPD155). So – on this view – each of the multiple personalities156 is deemed to be a separate person157, and so (it is said) the person cannot be identical to the human being158 that houses it. Of course, any idea of integration ought to have gone out when Freud came in.
      2. However, animalists159 (and others) would argue that this is all a mis-description, and that all we have is a fragmented self160 (as is implied – maybe – in the current terminology – Dissociative Identity Disorder), or some other cognitive disorder161 within a single human animal162 (to which the title “person” is properly addressed, they say, though only in the sense of a phase sortal163).
    3. Lynne Rudder Baker164 – a proponent of the Constitution View165 – (CV) claims (fairly plausibly) that each of us166 is individuated by a First Person Perspective167 (FPP). According to the CV, we – the persons – are separate from our bodies, but form a unity with them. In the case of your fission168, she thinks (implausibly) that there would be a fact of the matter (somehow), as to which of the two fission products received your FPP169. You would just know. Well, you wouldn’t, unless there was continuity of consciousness170 throughout the process of fission, as I argue under the topic of the Reduplication Objections171.
    4. This intuition that the person is a unity is referred to as the Unity Reaction in "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?" and some other works.
    5. I suppose there could be some discussion of the doctrine of Divine Unity within a Trinitarian framework, but I’ll treat this as out of scope, and probably incoherent.
    1. Counting Persons172
      1. What are the adverse consequences of David Lewis’s perdurantist173 approach to fission174 in personal identity?
      2. According to this theory, there were always coincident stages of the two space-time worms prior to fission. So, there were two persons there all along; yet we counted only one, being ignorant of175 the future fission.
      3. What are the consequences of miscounting? No doubt this depends on what function (or more likely functions) our concept176 of PERSON177 performs.
      4. We might ask whether it is just persons who are miscounted, or are human beings178 also miscounted? This will obviously depend on the TE179, which would need spelling out.
      5. Take the case of a half-brain180 transplant181. In this TE, a person’s psychology is supposed to be duplicated182 within two idempotent half-brains, one of which stays in the donor’s head, the other being transplanted into the empty skull of a recipient. In this TE, the psychological view183 of personal identity is assumed. We start off with one locus of psychology, and end up with two. This is the standard problem of fission184 – which successor is identical to the original person? We seem to want both to be, but – in the absence of perdurantism185 – the logic of identity186 forbids it. Perdurantism187 helps us out, at the cost of there being more pre-fission persons than we thought.
      6. What about other fall-out? Are the earlier stages of the “recipient” patient – viewed as an animal – spatially distributed – so is such a distributed188 thing a human being at all?
      7. What is the core of humanness – is this always the brain189, so that the human goes along with the half-brain, and the body190 is just like any other transplant, only bigger?
      8. Problems with counting persons also allegedly arises in the context of:-
        → Multiple Personality Disorder191, and
        → Commissurotomy192
        While the latter is a precursor for the half-brain transplant described above, both are at least actual situations that are less open to the charge of under-description often alleged against TEs.
      9. Finally, for now at least, and maybe most importantly – the issue of counting arises in Eric Olson’s Thinking Animal Argument193, and the various conundrums involving (partly) coincident objects194.
    2. Personites195
      1. PERSONITE is a term of art related to that of Person196 recently coined by Mark Johnston, though Eric Olson much earlier used the term “subperson” for the same concept. Olson also considers “cross-persons” – which are aggregates of temporal parts of different persons. He is simply adding the temporal dimension to the plenary ontology that allows any gerrymandered aggregate – my nose and the Eifel Tower – to be a “thing”.
      2. Anyway, a Personite is a temporal part of a person. If personites exist, and have moral status, then ethical problems arise as – for example – one personite gets the punishment for the misdeeds of another.
      3. Olson – without saying so explicitly – thinks that there are the same sort of problems arising for personites as arise for the Constitution View197. He also distinguishes Linguistic from Moral persons; the former are the references of personal pronouns according to our linguistic conventions, the latter are the appropriate recipients of our moral concerns. He can’t see how we can guarantee these coincide if we allow the existence of personites.
      4. Personites are also a consequence of Parfit198’s Relation R as a criterion for what matters in persistence, given that its application is vague.
      5. I doubt there are any more problems with personites than with appear in the problems:-
        → Dion and Theon199,
        → Tibbles the Cat200,
        → The Problem of the Many201,
        and the like. It just adds a temporal dimension.
  7. Taking Persons Seriously202
    1. Lynne Rudder Baker203 accused animalists204 of “not taking persons seriously”. But, how seriously should they be taken (in metaphysics)?
    2. Probably what really matters ontologically205 is the possession of a conscious206 perspective (though not necessarily – I would claim – a self-conscious207 or first-person208NP perspective). This is what we must take seriously.
    3. Baker would argue that there exists an ontological difference at this stage too … but, why is the first-person perspective209 so very important – all that worrying about death?
    4. Buddhists210 are trying to lose this sense of self211. Do all cultures have this sense?
    5. See "Wong (David) - Relativism" for the traditional Chinese view, which takes the community more seriously than the individual.
    6. Whether we ought to take moral or rational beings extra seriously is the point at issue. Clearly we should. But this doesn’t necessarily have any ontological212 implications (as Baker claims). Certain animals – including (most) humans – just have an extra property that demands they be given extra moral consideration.


Concluding Remarks
  1. In our next Chapter213, now that we have determined what we are – and what persons are – we consider various metaphysical issues that bear on the arguments for and against the various positions on Personal Identity.
  2. This is work in progress214.

Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed215
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read218, include the following:-
  1. Qualities of Personhood
    1. Person219
    2. Free Will235
    3. Intelligence243
    4. Language of Thought246
    5. Social249
  2. Personality251
  3. Who is a Person?
    1. Human Persons253
    2. Non-Human Persons255
    3. Degrees of Personhood257
    4. Wantons259
  4. The Persistence of Persons
    1. Reductionism264
    2. The Simple View267
  5. Unity of the Person
    1. Unity of the Person268
    2. Counting Persons272
    3. Personites273
  6. Taking Persons Seriously274

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Qualities of Personhood
    1. Person281
    2. Free Will290
    3. Intelligence291
    4. Language of Thought293
    5. Social294
  2. Personality295
  3. Who is a Person?
    1. Human Persons296
    2. Non-Human Persons297
    3. Degrees of Personhood299
    4. Wantons300
  4. The Persistence of Persons
    1. Reductionism301
    2. The Simple View302
  5. Unity of the Person
    1. Unity of the Person304
    2. Counting Persons308
    3. Personites309
  6. Taking Persons Seriously310


In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 3: Footnote 23: Footnote 70:
  1. This is – of course – a tricky area, given the long behaviorist tradition of training pigeons.
Footnote 75:
  1. There is no doubt some truth in this.
  2. However, not all wrong-doers had bad starts in life, and I suspect that many who did would prefer to take the punishment if the alternative is the real loss of freedom in a rehabilitation programme.
  3. Compare the Soviet view that dissidents are insane and need curing.
Footnote 126:
  1. See in Dennett, and also my main Note on Persons.
Footnote 175:
  1. No doubt if this fanciful event could be planned or anticipated we would count differently.
Footnote 215: Footnote 224: Footnote 229: Footnote 234: Footnote 245: Footnote 248: Footnote 252: Footnote 260: Footnote 271: Footnote 282: Footnote 283: Footnotes 284, 292, 298: Footnote 285: Footnote 286: Footnote 287: Footnote 288: Footnote 289: Footnote 303: Footnote 306: Footnote 307:

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal Androids Animalism Animalists Animals
Aristotle - Sea Battle Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Baker Baker - In Favour Of the Constitution View Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Garrett
Baker - Persons in the Material World Baker - The Constitution View of Human Persons Baker - The Importance Of Being a Person Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Body
Brain Brain Transplants Brandom - Toward a Normative Pragmatics (Introduction) Buddhism Cartesian Ego
Clones Coincidence Commissurotomy Computers Concepts
Consciousness Constitution View Counting Persons Crane - Interaction Between Mind and Body Cyborgs
Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood Death DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons? Degrees of Personhood Dion and Theon
Dualism Duplication First-Person Perspective Fission Forensic Property
Frankfurt - Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility Frankfurt - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Free Will Future Great Pain Test Garrett - Personal Identity and Reductionism
Garrett - Persons and Bodies - Response Homo Sapiens Human Animals Human Beings Human Persons
Individual Intelligence Intermittent Objects Language of Thought Locke
Locke on Personal Identity Logic of Identity Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Establishing a Framework For Approaching Human Personhood Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Human Persons as Substances or Property-Things Multiple Personality Disorder
Narrative Identity Natural Kinds Non-Human Persons Noonan - Persons and Bodies - Response Olson - Persons and Bodies - Response
Olson - Review of 'Persons: Human and Divine' Ontology Parfit Perdurantism Persistence Criteria
Person Personality Personite Phase Sortals Pink - Reason and Agency
Problem of the Many Psychological Continuity - Forward Psychological View Psychopathology Reductionism
Reduplication Objections Relative Identity Scattered Objects Schopenhauer - Freedom of the Will Self
Self-Consciousness Semantics Siliconisation Similarity Simple View
Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity Society Souls Status: Thesis Dashboard (2023: August) Substance
Taking Persons Seriously Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) Thesis - Method & Form
Thinking Animal Argument Thought Experiments Tibbles the Cat Time Travel Transhumanism
Transplants Unity of the Person Uploading Van Inwagen - Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism Wantons
What are We? Williams - Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame Wong - Relativism Works Read - Explanation  

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2 Status: Thesis Dashboard (2023: August), 2 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4, 5 Thesis - Introduction Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
What are We?        

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Abelson (Raziel) Person and Self Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Abelson - Persons: a Study In Philosophical Psychology, 1977 No
Abelson (Raziel) Persons: a Study In Philosophical Psychology Book - Cited Abelson (Raziel) - Persons: a Study In Philosophical Psychology No
Ayer (A.J.) Fatalism Paper - Cited Ayer - The Concept of a Person & Other Essays Yes
Ayer (A.J.) The Concept of a Person & Other Essays Book - Cited Ayer (A.J.) - The Concept of a Person & Other Essays 1%
Baggini (Julian) How to think about free will Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 11 May 2022 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on my 'The Ontological Status of Persons' Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, September 2002, pp. 394-395 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Personal Identity: A Not-So-Simple Simple View Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Gasser (Georg) & Stefan (Matthias), Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? 2012 8%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons in the Material World Paper - Cited Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 1 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Constitution View of Human Persons Paper - Cited Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 4 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Importance Of Being a Person Paper - Cited Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 6 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Ontological Status of Persons Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, September 2002, pp. 370-388 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) When Do Persons Begin and End? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' Yes
Ball (Philip) Too Many Worlds Paper - Cited Aeon, 17 February, 2015 Yes
Bee (Helen) The Developing Child Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Bee (Helen) - The Developing Child No
Belshaw (Christopher) Review of Paul Snowdon's 'Persons, Animals, Ourselves' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Times Higher Education Website, January 8, 2015 Yes
Benton (Ted) Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights & Social Justice Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Benton (Ted) - Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights & Social Justice No
Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds. The Body and the Self Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 4%
Birhane (Abeba) Descartes was wrong: ‘a person is a person through other persons’ Paper - Cited Aeon, 07 April, 2017 Yes
Blackburn (Simon) Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dancy - Reading Parfit, 1997, Chapter 9 78%
Blackburn (Simon) What Do We Really Know?: The Big Questions in Philosophy Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blackburn (Simon) - What Do We Really Know?: The Big Questions in Philosophy Yes
Blakemore (Colin) & Greenfield (Susan), Eds. Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Blakemore (Colin) & Greenfield (Susan), Eds. - Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness 0%
Boden (Margaret) Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Boden (Margaret) - Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man 1%
Boden (Margaret) Artificial Intelligence in Psychology: Interdisciplinary Essays Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Boden (Margaret) - Artificial Intelligence in Psychology: Interdisciplinary Essays Yes
Boden (Margaret), Ed. The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Boden (Margaret), Ed. - The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence No
Borges (Jorge Luis) Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 3%
Bostrom (Nick) Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bostrom (Nick) - Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies 4%
Bourgeois (Warren) Ancient Philosophers' Views on Persons: Persons in Ancient Greece and Rome Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Chapter 3 Yes
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Bourgeois (Warren) Modern Philosophers' Views on Persons: More Moderns Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Chapter 6 Yes
Bourgeois (Warren) Modern Philosophers' Views on Persons: The Renaissance and the Early Moderns Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Chapter 5 Yes
Bourgeois (Warren) Persons - Philosophical Background: So Who Cares? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Chapter 2 Yes
Bourgeois (Warren) Persons - Philosophical Background: The Nature of Persons Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Chapter 1 Yes
Bourgeois (Warren) Persons: Introduction: Where I am Coming From Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Introduction Yes
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Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies: Vol. 170, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 465-500 Yes
Braine (David) The Human Person: Animal and Spirit Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit 1%
Brehm (Sharon S.), Kassin (Saul M.) & Fein (Steven) Social Psychology Book - Cited Brehm (Sharon S.), Kassin (Saul M.) & Fein (Steven) - Social Psychology No
Brierley (John) The Thinking Machine: Genes, Brain, Endocrines, and Human Nature Book - Cited Brierley (John) - The Thinking Machine: Genes, Brain, Endocrines, and Human Nature No
Brody (Baruch) Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative Patient Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb. - Mar., 1988), pp. 33-37 Yes
Burke (Michael) Is My Head a Person? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003 Yes
Butcher (Harold John) Human Intelligence: Its Nature and Assessment Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Butcher (Harold John) - Human Intelligence: Its Nature and Assessment No
Calvin (William H.) The Ascent of Mind: Ice Age Climates and the Evolution of Intelligence Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Calvin (William H.) - The Ascent of Mind: Ice Age Climates and the Evolution of Intelligence 1%
Camporesi (Silvia) Who is a sportswoman? Paper - Cited Aeon, 27 February, 2017 Yes
Candlish (Stewart) Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Mind, Vol. 85, No. 337 (Jan., 1976), pp. 145-149 Yes
Carrithers (Michael), Collins (Steven) & Lukes (Steven) The Category of the Person: Anthropology, philosophy, history Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carrithers (Michael), Collins (Steven) & Lukes (Steven) - The Category of the Person: Anthropology, philosophy, history No
Carruthers (Peter) Boundaries of Persons Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carruthers - Introducing Persons, 1986, Chapter 8 (pp. 220 - 249) Yes
Carruthers (Peter) Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Carruthers (Peter) Language, Thought and Consciousness Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carruthers (Peter) - Language, Thought and Consciousness No
Carruthers (Peter) & Boucher (Jill) Language and Thought Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carruthers (Peter) & Boucher (Jill) - Language and Thought No
Cassam (Quassim) Parfit on Persons Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 17-37, 1992 Yes
Catterson (Troy), Ed. Synthese Special Issue on Personal Identity Book - Cited Catterson (Troy), Ed. - Synthese Special Issue on Personal Identity 3%
Cave (Stephen) The free-will scale Paper - Cited Aeon, 19 October, 2015 Yes
Centore (F.F.) Persons, a comparative account of the six possible theories Book - Cited Centore (F.F.) - Persons, a comparative account of the six possible theories No
Chisholm (Roderick) Person and Object Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Chisholm (Roderick) - Person and Object 1%
Churchland (Patricia) Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Churchland (Patricia) Free Will Paper - Cited Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy, Chapter 5 Yes
Clark (Andy) Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Clark (Andy) - Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence 1%
Claxton (Guy) Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind: How Intelligence Increases When You Think Less Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Claxton (Guy) - Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind: How Intelligence Increases When You Think Less 1%
Claxton (Guy) Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than it Thinks Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Claxton (Guy) - Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than it Thinks 18%
Cockburn (David) Human Beings: Introduction Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Cockburn - Human Beings Yes
Cockburn (David), Ed. Human Beings Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 7%
Coliva (Annalisa) Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Yes
Copeland (B. Jack) Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Copeland (B. Jack) - Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction 1%
Cottingham (John) Why we are not 'persons' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Eidos: A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 1:3 (2018), pp. 5-16 Yes
Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) Freedom and Determinism: Introduction Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Crane and Farkas - Metaphysics - a guide and anthology, 2004, pp. 665-672 Yes
Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. Reading Parfit Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 17%
De Sousa (Ronald) Rational Homunculi Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Rorty (Amelie) - The Identities of Persons, 1976 Yes
DeGrazia (David) Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Forum; Winter2002, Vol. 33 Issue 1, p101, 20p Yes
DeGrazia (David) Great Apes, Dolphins, and the Concept of Personhood Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Southern Journal of Philosophy Fall 97; 35(3): 301-320 Yes
Dennett (Daniel) Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 43%
Dennett (Daniel) Conditions of Personhood Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Dennett - Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Chapter 14, 1976 Yes
Dennett (Daniel) Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dennett (Daniel) - Elbow Room - The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting 2%
Dennett (Daniel) Freedom Evolves Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Dennett (Daniel) - Freedom Evolves 3%
Dennett (Daniel) Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dennett (Daniel) - Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking 4%
Dennett (Daniel) & Caruso (Gregg D.) Just deserts Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Aeon, 04 October, 2018 Yes
Devji (Faisal) Age of sincerity Paper - Cited Aeon, 17 April, 2017 Yes
Devlin (Bernie), Fienberg (Stephen E.), Resnick (Daniel P.) & Roeder (Kathryn) Intelligence, Genes & Success - Scientists Respond to The Bell Curve Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Devlin (Bernie), Fienberg (Stephen E.), Resnick (Daniel P.) & Roeder (Kathryn) - Intelligence, Genes & Success - Scientists Respond to The Bell Curve 3%
Doyle (Robert O.) Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Doyle (Robert O.) - Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy 1%
Dresser (Sam) How Camus and Sartre split up over the question of how to be free Paper - Cited Aeon, 27 January, 2017 Yes
Dupre (John) The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will Paper - Cited Philosophical Papers 10, Metaphysics, 1996, pp. 385-402 Yes
Earman (John) A Primer On Determinism Book - Cited Earman (John) - A Primer On Determinism No
Ellis (George F.R.), Etc From Chaos to Free Will Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Aeon, 09 June, 2020 Yes
Ellis (George F.R.), Etc From Chaos to Free Will: Further Comments & Responses Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Aeon, 09 - 17 June, 2020 Yes
Estep (Myrna) A Theory of Immediate Awareness: Self-Organization and Adaptation in Natural Intelligence Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Estep (Myrna) - A Theory of Immediate Awareness: Self-Organization and Adaptation in Natural Intelligence No
Evans (Peter) & Deehan (Geoff) The Descent of Mind - The Nature and Purpose of Intelligence Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Evans (Peter) & Deehan (Geoff) - The Descent of Mind - The Nature and Purpose of Intelligence Yes
Evnine (Simon J.) Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Evnine (Simon J.) - Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood 0%
Fancher (Raymond) The Intelligence Men - Makers of the IQ Controversy Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fancher (Raymond) - The Intelligence Men - Makers of the IQ Controversy 1%
Ferris (Timothy) The Mind's Sky: Human Intelligence in a Cosmic Context Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ferris (Timothy) - The Mind's Sky: Human Intelligence in a Cosmic Context No
Fetzer (James) The Evolution of Intelligence: Are Humans the Only Animals with Minds? Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fetzer (James) - The Evolution of Intelligence: Are Humans the Only Animals with Minds? 3%
Fine (Cordelia) Testosterone Rex: Myths of Sex, Science, and Society Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fine (Cordelia) - Testosterone Rex: Myths of Sex, Science, and Society 2%
Flynn (James R.) What is Intelligence? Beyond the Flynn Effect Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Flynn (James R.) - What is Intelligence? Beyond the Flynn Effect 3%
Fodor (Jerry) Psychosemantics Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Fodor (Jerry) - Psychosemantics Yes
Fodor (Jerry) The Language of Thought Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fodor (Jerry) - The Language of Thought 2%
Forrester (Mary) Persons, Animals, and Fetuses: An Essay in Practical Ethics Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Forrester (Mary) - Persons, Animals, and Fetuses: An Essay in Practical Ethics 4%
Fouts (Roger) & Mills (Stephen) Next of Kin - What my Conversations with Chimpanzees have Taught Me About Intelligence, Compassion and Being Human Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fouts (Roger) & Mills (Stephen) - Next of Kin - What my Conversations with Chimpanzees have Taught Me About Intelligence, Compassion and Being Human No
Francione (Gary) Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation 7%
Frankfurt (Harry) Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy, 4 Dec 1969; 66: 829-839 Yes
Frankfurt (Harry) Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind Yes
Frith (Christopher D.) Our illusory sense of agency has a deeply important social purpose Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 22 September, 2017 Yes
Gardner (Howard) Frames of Mind - The Theory of Multiple Intelligences Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Gardner (Howard) - Frames of Mind - The Theory of Multiple Intelligences 1%
Garrett (Brian) Animalism and Reductionism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 2 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Personal Identity and Reductionism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51, No. 2, Jun., 1991, pp. 361-373 Yes
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Garrett (Brian) Persons Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Garrett, Brian (1998). Persons. Yes
Garrett (Brian) The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" Yes
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Gill (Christopher) The Person and the Human Mind: issues in ancient and modern philosophy Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Gill (Christopher) - The Person and the Human Mind: issues in ancient and modern philosophy 3%
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