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• See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.

• See Draft Write-up, Review Comments.
• Baker often expresses indebtedness to Roderick Chisholm, who is reviewed on that account.

• It looks like Olson uses “imperfect” as an amalgamated metaphysical / epistemological claim.

• Baker claims that the Constitution View solves problems that “temporal identity”, etc, are supposed to address.

• When considering duplication issues with double-hemispherectomy & transplant, “closest continuer” resolutions to the problem (amongst other suggestions) are rejected.

• The “closest continuer” theory as a solution to the “split brain” fission puzzle is considered in Sections 3 & 4.

• The PI abstract of "Carruthers (Peter) - Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind" notes that the book provides “a new defence of Parfitian views on personal identity”; presumably in this chapter.

• Johansson seems to have Parfit down as an Animalist, but …
• Parfit himself in "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?", and everything else I’ve read, seems to deny this.

• See the above footnote on "Johansson (Jens) - What is Animalism?".
• Mackie says that Parfit – in “unpublished work” – claims that the neo-Lockean might be an animalist.

• Restrict a close reading to Part 3 (Personal Identity).

• Paul Broks: The discussion is – allegedly – on Parfit’s take on Teletransportation.

• This paper – inter alia – confirms my “take” on the Cheshire Cat’s smile.
• See Draft Note, Review Comments.

• See also "Fine (Gail) - On Ideas - Introduction".

• This looks of tangential interest, but as I’ve gone to considerable trouble to analyse the paper, I might as well include it!

• See Draft Note.
• Review Comments:–
  → First Half,
  → Second Half.

• This is a useful case-study about the distinction between ‘veridical’ and ‘fictional’ accounts of the past.
• In cases where the truth about the past cannot be known, there is still a valid distinction between probable and fantastic readings.

• Why did Goodman put ‘Fiction’ in the title?

• This paper is about interpretation.

• Modality is important in my thesis, because modal questions come into persistence criteria.
• That said, the last two essays in the book – by Hossack and Olson – are the most important, though of these two only that by Hossack really belongs to this Chapter.

• Oderberg seems to be arguing that Perdurantism is an unwanted consequence of a common-sense notion of persistence. This might therefore also be useful for perdurantism.

• See Section 5.8 (Stage View), paragraphs 6 & 8 for a discussion of 'loose and popular' persistence.

• Section 40 “Identity”, pp. 221-6.

• Read and analyse this first – it may not be worth bothering with the book, unless it sheds light on the topic as a whole.

• I doubt this paper is really about Relative Identity, but more about Brain Transplants.

• There are a few more papers by Varzi that I’ve not included.

• Description and elaboration of Nozick’s “closest continuer” theory, followed by …
• Its application to duplication puzzle-cases.

• This is the relevant extract from "Nozick (Robert) - The Identity of the Self: Introduction".

• The “closest continuer” theory is discussed in Section 4.

• Looks like this is the first part of "Velleman (David) - Persons in Prospect (Revised)".

• I doubt this has much to do with Kinds as such – despite the book’s title – but is more to do with Doepke’s ideas on PID.

• This supercedes "Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms", which is useful for reference only

• This may be an interesting comparison of two novellas, both germane to my thesis.

• This is a difficult book with which I expect to have little sympathy, but one that has to be read.

• The three papers by Butterfield are very specialised, and this one is very long, and may be left to one side for now.

• This might be an ideal place to start, but it’s too expensive, so I’ve not bought a copy!

• I don’t have this book, as it’s very expensive (£180), but quite a lot of the text is visible on Amazon.

• The two items by Swinburne may be useful as they bring in Swinburne’s “Soul View”.

• Looks like I’ve made two attempts to read this book, but it’s the dullest I’ve ever come across!

• Look into the other papers by Ted Sider in the categorised list if time.

• If Toner thinks he can defend Transubstantiation there must be something about his theory of Substance.

• As I’ve written up the chapters on Leibniz and Spinoza, I ought at least to read the one on Descartes!

• Not a ‘Philosophy of Religion’ paper, despite the introduction.

• “Hume’s claim that identity is a fiction”.

• Probably move this to Modality in due course.

• Despite the title, this is mostly about probabilistic – and especially Bayesian – reasoning.

• I have not itemised the papers in this book.

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