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Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

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Abstract



Research Methodology

Chapter Introduction3
  1. We start off with a discussion of Change4. In this context we need to consider Causality5, because this is implicated in which changes are identity-preserving and which not.
  2. Change is usually understood as differing Properties6 enjoyed by Substances from one time to another. This leads to the problem of Temporary Intrinsics7, how having inconsistent properties at different times doesn’t violate Leibniz’s Law. However, there’s an alternative account – Haecceity8 – which claims that substances persist irrespective of change of properties.
  3. Before we can discuss Persistence9 as such, we need to have a view of the temporal ‘medium’ in which change takes place. The philosophy of Time10 is highly complex, and I need only touch on it insofar as it affects my choice of theory of Persistence. It appears, however, that the possibility of Time Travel11 – assuming there is such a possibility – has some implications for our theories of Personal Identity.
  4. When we consider the circumstances under which a Person, Human Animal, or anything else can be said to persist, we need to consider not just actual cases – situations which the individual has undergone – but possible cases, ones that it might undergo. This brings in Modality12, especially when we get on to the more exotic Thought Experiments, when the various sorts of Possibility need to be taken into account.
  5. Now we get to the meat of the Chapter as we consider just what Persistence Criteria13 are, and review what alternatives have been suggested.
  6. Whatever else Persistence Criteria involve, we know that Continuity14 of some sort is key. We covered Psychological Continuity in Chapter 1. In the context of Animalism, Physical Continuity15 is of more relevance. We need to distinguish Continuity from Connectedness16, as there’s a tension between the two.
  7. However – in the case of Artifacts at least – Continuity and Connectedness are, superficially at least, not required in the case of disassembly and reassembly. Can this Intermittent Existence17 apply to Human Animals to allow for Resurrection? Does Intermittent Existence make sense?
  8. We now need to consider whether the standard view of Persistence – Endurantism18 – where the individual is considered to be wholly present at a time – is correct, or whether we should consider a space-time worm view – either Perdurantism19 or Exdurantism20.
  9. The above is relevant because, depending on our approach to time and persistence, some of the troubling thought experiments that worry us about the persistence of human persons that feature in Chapter 10 are resolved, because the reduplication objections fail. However, we get nothing for nothing. As is usual in philosophy, a gain here is compensated for by a loss somewhere else. We need to determine these losses and agree that they are “worth it”.
  10. Finally, we will consider whether matters of Identity really matter. Derek Parfit claims that “Identity is not what matters in survival”. In making this claim, he introduces the term Survival21, which – as far as I can tell – is not the same as Persistence, since the latter necessarily involves Identity, whereas the former does not. Parfit had a rather impersonal view on What Matters22, which was more prescriptive than descriptive: we should be happy if our pet projects carry on, even if not with us at the helm.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Change23
    1. Causality24
    2. Properties25
    3. Thisness (Haecceity)27
  2. Time28
    1. Time Travel29
  3. Modality30
  4. Persistence31
    1. Persistence Criteria32
    2. Continuity33
    3. Theories
  5. Does Identity Matter?
    1. Parfit40. Excluded41
    2. Survival42
    3. What Matters43


Main Text
  1. Change44
    1. Change is one of the central problems that questions of identity address. Just what changes can an object undergo while remaining the same thing?
    2. If an individual thing45 is to Persist46, this is in the face of Change – either (in the absence of Essentialism47) to its Parts48 – by losing or gaining some – or to its Properties49, the problem of Temporary Intrinsics50.
    3. As is indicated above, the changes that can affect the persistence of an Individual are intrinsic to it. Extrinsic (relational) property changes do not affect persistence, being ‘mere Cambridge Changes’. Or so is the orthodox position, but might have been disputed by Lynne Rudder Baker51. For example, if the art-world changes its mind about a urinal being a work of art, is there an ontological52 change?
    4. Just two further things for now.
      1. Firstly, if I understand things aright, change is something that happens to substances53, and the question of identity is whether or not that substance remains the same substance after some change. Change is not relevant (or at least persistence through change isn’t relevant) under (at least) a couple of philosophical positions:-
        1. If we adopt a mereological54 essentialist55 position, whereby the things that exist are regions of space-time and their contents. This turn of phrase may sound too much like the “generous ontology56”, which answers the question “what exists” as “any region of spacetime, and whatever is in it”, which includes all sorts of spatio-temporally gerrymandered objects. Here, I refer only to objects as are ordinarily taken to exist, like dogs and tennis balls, but with the restriction that they have all their parts essentially, and cease to exist when they lose a part. Then, a thing just is a collection of particles, and if one of these is lost or destroyed, then so is the thing. This leads to the denial that there are any ordinary things, like chairs or animals, as they are always losing and gaining parts, and so only exist as the same thing momentarily.
        2. If we adopt a perdurantist57 account of persistence, the things that exist are space-time worms. A thing is not wholly present at a time, only its temporal stage is. The thing as a whole exists timelessly. Does the thing therefore change? Maybe not, but questions of persistence still apply, though maybe only pragmatically. Just what aggregate of stages are usefully described as a persisting thing? A four-dimensional naturalist might insist that exemplars of natural kinds – particularly organisms – have a greater claim to existence than arbitrary assemblages of stages.
      2. A second important matter is that (on many accounts) it is the rate of change that is critical. Everyone seems to agree that you cannot just swap out all the parts of a thing at the same time and claim that you have the same thing, whereas the assumption is that a thing can persist through change (pace the views in the bullet above) provided the changes occur slowly enough and piecemeal enough. After all, organisms58 replace all their parts over time (it is said) yet remain the same organism (ditto). It strikes me that there’s a degree of vagueness59 about how quickly the changes can take place without violating the persistence conditions of the object. Also, in the case of organisms, historically it has been supposed that the changes would take place naturally, but transplant60 surgery allows unnatural change. The transplanted organ will either by assimilated or rejected by the organism. If it is assimilated, especially if it’s hidden from view, we don’t feel any qualms about saying that is has become part of the organism, which has persisted through the change. I suppose we’d also get used to the successful transplantation of visible parts, like limbs. Things get difficult with heads, in deciding what has been transplanted onto what – the head or the body – and therefore what has persisted through the change. Maybe it’s a case of Fusion61.
    1. Causality62
      1. Causality (or Causation) is important in determining which changes63 are identity-preserving and which aren’t. There has – it is said – to be the right kind of causal connection between A and B for A=B. This is sometimes given as an objection to Teletransportation64 TEs65 – the causal connection between the pre- and post-teletransportation individuals isn’t of the right kind for identity-preservation.
      2. Similar objections are sometimes raised in response to tinkering with organisms – for instance siliconisation66, brain transplants67 and such like. The causal connection between successive states of the supposed same organism isn’t sufficient to preserve identity.
      3. Also, memories68 sometimes feature. Fiddling with or implanting memories doesn’t have the right causal connection between the events they are supposed to be of – on the one hand – and me – on the other – to make them my memories, even though they might seem so to me.
      4. In all cases, we need to consider just what it is that preserving the right sort of causality effects. An important idea in this regard is internal change versus externally-imposed change, and why some externally-imposed changes preserve the individual, while others don’t. See in particular "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death".
    2. Properties69
      1. Properties are relevant to the topic of Personal Identity because it is the possession of incompatible properties at different times that is the explanation of change70. And, the key question in Personal Identity – other than what we are71 – is what changes we can undergo and still persist72.
      2. Consequently, the problem of Temporary Intrinsics73, which are intrinsic (ie. non-relational) properties that are “just had” by a persisting object at some time(s) but not others, is central to the explanation of change, and to the decision whether Endurantism74, Perdurantism75 or Exdurantism76 is the better account of persistence.
      3. This topic also relates to that of Universals77, which is what realists claim properties to be.
      4. Properties are usually said to be had by substances78, so seem to depend on a substance metaphysics. Presumably they can be had by processes in a process metaphysics79?
      5. Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View80 makes a great play on her distinction between having properties derivatively and having them essentially; the constituted81 thing can have some properties derived from the constituting object, and others on its own account.
      6. So, says Baker82, a person’s weight is derived from the weight of her body while her status as “employed” is had essentially. Maybe another example is clearer, as it doesn’t involve the contentious claim that persons are separable from human animals: a statue has its value essentially but its weight derivatively. The value of the constituting matter will usually differ from – and be less than – that of the statue.
      7. Note that there’s a distinction between two contrasts – between Intrinsic and Extrinsic properties and those held Derivatively and Essentially. The two contrasts don’t map onto one another. Value may be essential, but it is not intrinsic – unlike mass – as it depends on evaluation by an art-world. Awkwardly, weight – rather than mass – is an extrinsic property, depending as it does on the local presence of a massive gravitating body.
      • Temporary Intrinsics83
        1. A “temporary intrinsic” is an intrinsic – non-relational – property84 had by an individual85 or object at one time but not at others. This situation is constitutive of change86.
        2. The “problem of temporary intrinsics” is the problem of how to explain that the very same thing can have different properties at different times, in seeming contradiction of Leibniz’s Law87, that identicals must have all their properties88 in common.
        3. An example – due to my friend Sophie Botros – is of a leaf that is green in the spring and brown in the autumn. She points out the tension, and claims that identity is an “atemporal relation”, but in so doing has to give up on the common-sense intuition that some things persist89 through some changes without leading to a logical contradiction.
        4. "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?" is a good place to start on this topic. Kurtz points out the tensions that arise when the three “non-negotiable theses” alluded to above are held simultaneously, namely Non-contradiction, Change90 and Persistence91.
        5. This topic is entwined with those linked to above and listed below.
    3. Thisness (Haecceity)92
      1. Haecceity – or Primitive Thisness – is an idea in the logic of identity93 that allows for an individual thing to be that thing irrespective of its properties. It’s the ultimate expression of the “pin cushion” model of substances94 (with the pins being properties95).
      2. It’s in tension with Leibniz’s96 rather dubious “law of the identity of indiscernibles”. I think it arises in the “universe with only two spheres” TE97, which have all the same properties – both intrinsic and relational – yet are intuitively distinct. Haecceity explains why (it may be said).
      3. If haecceity is allowed, then there are no essential properties, and certain dubious forms of metamorphosis98 – for instance – are allowed.
      4. So, while animalism99 says that we are essentially human animals, haecceity would (I presume) allow us to be transformed (if gradually) into transhumans100, via cyborgisation101 - or maybe even to be converted into androids102. It would also allow the replacement of our brains103 by siliconisation104 to be identity-preserving (both our identity, and that of our brains).
      5. I’m dubious about both claims, but a strict animalist would accept the former – as my brain is “just another organ”, replacing it with another – but functionally equivalent – organ with which it is non-identical would not affect the identity of the animal any more than an artificial heart would.
  2. Time105
    1. I don’t think I need to wade too deeply in the topic of time for the purposes of my thesis, dealing as it does with the dispute between Animalism106 and the Constitution View107 and the possibilities of Transhumanism108 and post-mortem survival109, but it’s clearly central to the topic of diachronic identity, ie. identity over time. It’s also an interesting and important topic in its own right, one on which every metaphysician needs to have a worked-out position.
    2. Aspects of particular interest include:-
      1. The Endurantism110, Exdurantism111, Perdurantism112 debate. Perdurantism may solve the identity-related problems of fission113, at least according to Lewis114.
      2. The claim that Presentist theories of time seem to undermine non-endurantist theories of persistence, though this is disputed.
      3. Parfit115’s contention that we should discount the concern we owe to our future selves proportionate to our likely lack of psychological connection.
      4. Time Travel116: maybe surprisingly, this alleged possibility appears in various TEs117 on Fission118.
    3. Theories of Time: This is not yet the place to expatiate on these. Enough to note what they are:-
      1. Presentism:
      2. Eternalism:
      3. Growing Block:
      4. Moving Spotlight:
    4. Red Lines: There are certain things required of any theory of time, and certain boundaries that cannot be crossed:-
      1. Science: Any philosophical theory of time must take account of the best science of the day119.
      2. The past is fixed: While it may be possible retrospectively to change the truth-value of statements made in the past, or the importance of actions in the light of the then future, it is not possible to change what actually happened. Also, what happened in the past is not dependant on our present evidence.
    5. A Rant!120
      1. While – as I asserted above - any philosophy of time needs to be informed by the best science of the day121, there are issues with tying it too closely to physics, in that there is not currently – and may never be – a complete and unified physical theory of the universe. Any theory only seeks to model part of reality and there are conflicts at the edges between these theories and much current disagreement about the unification of the various partial theories into a Grand Unified Theory.
      2. There are doubts about the metaphysical implications of any partial theory, since it is only an approximation to the truth that makes accurate predictions in a wider or narrower – but not universal – domain.
      3. But again, that said, ignoring physics entirely and relying on common sense is also a mistake. Often “common sense” is just the physics of the past and is based on theories even more partial than the current ones.
      4. I suspect that the common-sense idea of “the present” is that which Newton relied on in his dynamical theories, where a single universal time is posited. Newtonian dynamics is very useful and is good enough in the everyday scenarios, as everyone knows, but falls short for speeds approaching that of light, or close to massive gravitating bodies, both of which can slow the passage of time.
      5. Much of modern physics deals with domains where common sense is not only of little use, but is a hindrance. It’s not really possible to make “common sense” of quantum indeterminacy or the distortion of spacetime by gravitating bodies. So, I have my doubts about any philosophy of time based on armchair thoughts about people walking across rooms.
      6. However, there’s no simple answer to the metaphysics of time. There are philosophers who are well informed of modern physics who are presentists. However, one must be careful not to cherry-pick those philosopher-scientist that can be taken to agree with you, such as Lee Smolin, while ignoring the consensus, if there is one.
      7. I’m aware that there’s a suggestion that disagreements about time are purely verbal. If the past (or the future) exists, it doesn’t exist in the same way as the present, in that it is inaccessible. However, it’s a travesty to say that the past – if it still exists – is “still happening” somewhere. No doubt the idea is that – viewed in some sort of hypertime – it could be “re-played” on request.
      8. What concerns us all, I submit, is that the past – in the sense of what has happened – ought to be immutable. The import of what has happened, and the truth-value of certain statements122 – may be changed by future events, but not the happening itself. Now this is common sense, and maybe some future physics will undermine it, but some of the “paradoxes” of time travel seem to be contradictions.
      9. What I don’t think we should do is confound epistemology with metaphysics. The Logical Positivists – like Hume123 earlier – had many sensible things to say about consigning armchair metaphysics to the flames. Anything that relies neither on “quantity” or experience is highly suspect if it makes claims about the world. But, there can be truths that we can never know. There is – I submit – a fact of the matter about what if anything Caesar had for breakfast on the Ides of March, though we can most likely never know what it was. I’m not sure there’s any support for “unknowable truths” from quantum mechanics, however. There are pairs of quantities that cannot both be known exactly, but it’s not clear that there’s a fact of the matter of which we’re necessarily ignorant, or whether there’s no fact of the matter at all. Common sense doesn’t help here.
      10. There’s a distinction between what it is rational to believe, and what is true. It’s rational, and maybe obligatory, for non-physicists to go along with the consensus of whatever is said by mainstream physics, even though this is suspected of being incomplete and many claims may turn out to be false. But the statements when true aren’t made true by the fact that consensus physics makes them.
      11. By analogy, it’s rational, though maybe less obligatory, to go along with the consensus account of historical events, though maybe not as obligatory as history is more generally accessible than physics, and detailed assessment of the evidence and historical reconstruction is less difficult for the non-specialist.
      12. However, there’s a contrast between what makes statements about the current world true and those of the past. The present world is open to inspection, so – roughly – the truth-makers are those of empirical investigation. With respect to the past, some truth-makers will be empirically-derived theory (if we can wind the laws of physics backwards, we can know what must have happened in the past), but what if there is no such relevant theory?
      13. In such a case, the evidence that justifies rational belief in statements about the past may indeed well be the theories and evidences of the best-qualified historians – given that as a matter of empirical fact, modern historians – at least in the liberal West – are an honest and conscientious bunch. But their conscientiousness and evidence is not what makes their statements true – only making it rational for us to believe them. What makes them true is whether they happened as described (subject to interpretive caveats).
      14. What we need to know is what would be the case if – as in the dystopia of 1984 – the job of the Ministry of Truth is to destroy the evidence down the memory holes. Orwell presumably believes that this is a reductio ad absurdum of the view that the truth-makers of statements about the past are restricted to present evidence. Winston Smith knows that there’s a concerted attempt to destroy evidence because it’s his job to do it, but the reason he’s concerned is that his memories tell him that the attempt fails to actually change the past, and he doesn’t accept double-think as a way out.
      15. So, I think we end up with the truth-makers of true statements about the past – in default of anything else – being the past itself. If this requires that the past exists in some sense, then I suppose it does, but it’s open to metaphysicians to think up some other scheme. But relying on “present evidence” as a truth-maker is absurd, as the availability or quality of evidence is open to malign influence, or to simple chance events.
      16. Getting back to Caesar’s breakfast, while we may never know, there’s a fact of the matter, just as there’s a fact of the matter about what I had for breakfast 3 years ago today, though I’ve no evidence or memory of what it was. To deny this is to deny a very strong intuition124.
    1. Time Travel125
      1. From the perspective of Personal Identity, Time Travel enters into various Thought Experiments126.
      2. Time Travel is sometimes taken as a knock-down argument against Endurantism127, because if you travel back in time to talk to your former self, it doesn’t look as though you can be wholly present at a particular time, as different “time slices” of “you” are located in different places at the same time.
      3. Perdurantism128 isn’t worried by this TE, though it would seem to make the topology of the spacetime worms rather complex (and scattered).
  3. Modality129
    1. Modality – the logic of possibility and necessity – is important to my thesis because discussions of Personal Identity often range over merely possible – rather than actual – events that an individual130 might encounter and which might call that individual’s continued existence into doubt.
    2. This is particularly the case with the numerous popular thought experiments131 (TEs), one of which – Teletransportation132 – has a reference to this topic (the bungled duplication133 case and what this has to say about the standard singular case).
    3. Modality also features in the arguments over the logic of identity134 – in particular the standard view that Identity is a necessary relation, contra the heretical positions.
    4. "Sturgeon (Scott) - Zombies and Ghosts" has a useful categorisation of types of modality, and their relation to conceivability and genuine possibility.
  4. Persistence135
    1. Persistence is the continuing in existence of one thing from one time to another.
    2. Different kinds136 of thing have different kinds of persistence criteria137.
    3. My interest is in the persistence of Persons138, or at least of beings such as Us; consequently I need to know what kind of thing we are139.
    4. Whatever I have to say is covered by the topics below.
    1. Persistence Criteria140
      1. There’s a distinction between persistence criteria and persistence conditions, both of which topics will – eventually – be covered here.
      2. Maybe the former term (“criteria”) focuses on epistemology (how we know that something has persisted) and the latter (“conditions”) on metaphysics (what it takes for something to persist).
      3. I suspect David Shoemaker – in "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality" – of confusing the two (despite his explicit acknowledgement of the distinction) in his rejection of the soul criterion.
      4. In brief, the persistence conditions for an object of a particular kind141 are the necessary and sufficient conditions for it persist142, that is, to continue in existence143.
      5. With respect to our144 persistence criteria, David Shoemaker considers the following possibilities:-
        1. Soul Criterion145
        2. Body Criterion146
        3. Memory Criterion147
        4. Brain148-based Memory Criterion
        5. Psychological Criterion149
        6. Biological Criterion150
      6. In this regard,
        1. The first four feature in "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality".
        2. The final two in "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern".
      7. In "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Self-Regarding Ethics - Alternative Approaches" Shoemaker considers two other alternatives:-
        1. Narrative Identity151, and
        2. Identity Doesn’t Matter152.
      8. Most of my work on the topic of persistence conditions and criteria will be undertaken under the guise of pursuing the topics above.
    2. Continuity153
      1. Continuity is one of the principle factors taken into account when determining or deciding whether an object of whatever sort154 has survived155 some change156.
      2. “Spatio-temporal” continuity is usually what is intended, though this might be deemed to beg the question against certain forms of the Psychological View157 of Personal Identity where the continuity required is psychological: while this continuity is temporal, it’s not obviously spatial unless psychology is dependent on something physical (the brain158), something denied by substance dualists159.
      3. To be identity-preserving, the change must not be too radical or too swift: both of these break the continuity requirement.
      4. In particular, it is usually held that
        1. An object cannot survive the loss of one of its essential properties160. If this loss involves continuous change, we may encounter a sorites161 paradox.
        2. Nor can the object change too many of its parts at once, though some things may change all of their parts over time provided change is gradual.
        3. Nor can it change sortal162, which makes radical metamorphosis163 impossible.
      5. In all of the above cases there is deemed to be insufficient continuity between successive stages of a thing to allow for its persistence164.
      6. I don’t think in the above that “gradual” means “slowly”, though this will usually be the case. What is needed is for there to be many intermediate steps to allow continuity. Each change involved in each of the steps has to be “minor”. All this is somewhat vague165.
      • Physical Continuity166
        1. In addition to considering just what causal167 conditions a physical object needs to satisfy in order to persist168, I need to consider continuity and contiguity requirements.
          1. It is not normally supposed that a physical object can continue to exist if it ceases to be a contiguous whole – if its parts become spatially scattered.
          2. Nor does it persist if there is no continuous spacetime path between the location of the object at one time and the location of its supposed continuant at another.
        2. These requirements raise a couple of issues:
          1. Intermittent Objects169: can things go in and out of existence? Does the disassembled bicycle still exist170 in a dispersed state?
          2. Mereology171: is the content of any region of spacetime – whether spatially or temporally contiguous or disconnected – a thing?
        3. What do decisions here have to say about the possibility of resurrection or reincarnation? Is a physicalist172 able, even in principle, to allow the possibility of disembodied existence173, resurrection174 or reincarnation175, given the need for a continuing physical substance176 to which the individual is identical? This is an especially pressing issue for animalists177.
        4. Some Christians are physicalists178, and Peter Van Inwagen has (as a wild speculation - see "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection") God miraculously swapping out and preserving our corpses so he can resurrect the same individuals in due course.
        5. Failure of physical contiguity for an individual arises in cases such as that imagined in "Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?".
        6. Another case in point is that of Teletransportation179.
        7. I need to consider (but expect to reject) such suggestions that beings such as we180 can survive such radical physical discontinuity.
      • Connectedness vs Continuity181
        1. When defining persistence conditions182, we need to distinguish between connectedness and continuity.
          1. Continuity is a transitive relation that relates adjacent stages.
          2. Connectedness is intransitive and requires enough of the properties of interest to be maintained over time.
        2. At root, this is just the message of the Old Soldier, raised against Locke183, and answered by Ancestrals of the “remembers” relation.
        3. Indeed, "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings" describes Continuity as the ancestral of Connectedness.
        4. Persons184 – like animals185 – develop and “grow” (not necessarily physically – that would be begging the question as to what persons are). We can admit that we have the same animal from fetus186 to corpse187 (with some arguments about the termini). However, do we have the same person?
        5. I’d contend that whatever physical and psychological discontinuities188 the human animal undergoes, we do have the same person where we have a person at all, provided a single First Person Perspective189 (FPP) is maintained.
        6. If one’s character changes radically over time, do you remain the same person? Yes, if we want the child and the adult to be the same person (as we do), or the convert to be the same person as the unbeliever.
        7. The relevance of this to the present debate is that it is continuity that is relevant to personal identity, and not connectedness. This applies whatever view of Personal Identity we hold.
        8. Derek Parfit – who doesn’t think identity is what matters190 – holds a different view; that it is connectedness that matters, and so we need have no concern for future selves191 that are psychologically unconnected to our current selves. I think this view is mistaken, as we are locked in to a First Person Perspective192 and will have to experience the fate of that future self, however unconnected.
      • Intermittent Objects193
        1. Artifacts194
          • Are the classic cases of possibly intermediate objects, in that the same object can be disassembled and then reassembled, and it is usually thought that the reassembled object is numerically identical to the original.
          • But it is not clear whether the watch (say) ceases to exist when disassembled for cleaning, or whether it continues to exist in a scattered195 state. The recipient of a bag of watch-parts would still consider they had received their watch back, even if annoyed at having to reassemble it themselves.
          • But, as with all things artifactual, there’s a question whether our intuitions are conventional, and could be otherwise. My gut-feel, however, is that disassembled artifacts just exist in a disassembled, scattered state, rather than ceasing to exist. Hence, disassembled artifacts are examples of scattered objects196 rather than of intermittent objects.
          • I suppose the counter-argument might be that artifacts are the things they are for functional reasons, but does a disassembled thing have a function (or, at any rate, the same function it had when assembled)? I imagine we could say that an object might be delivered in kit-form, and then assembled, and it is probably arbitrary (or can be stipulated) whether the kit is of the same kind as the object or not.
          • The Write-up197 of "Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission" will cover all this in more detail.
        2. Persons198
          • When it comes to Persons, it’s the possession of certain capacities, not the present exercise of them, that qualifies an individual as a person.
          • David Wiggins holds the view that a person is one who belongs to a kind whose typical members possess some open-ended list of properties.
          • In that case, a foetus or someone in a PVS199 would still be a person. They would not “intermit” while in that state.
          • However, on a “present capacity” view, they would not qualify as persons in such a state, and a person might have intermittent existence. For instance, if I were to fall into, and then recover from, a PVS I would not be a person when in the PVS, but would on recovery again be a person, and (importantly) the same person.
          • So, someone like Baker200 might be committed to persons as intermittent objects because she thinks of human persons as ontologically separate from the human animals that constitute them.
          • However, an animalist like Olson201 would not be so committed. For the animalist, it’s the animal that’s the persisting thing, and the animal persists throughout the PVS.
          • I’m not sure what Olson’s view is of the ontological status of persons (I don’t think he considers them a kind); they are just individuals of another kind (most notably human animals) with special, maybe temporary, properties.
        3. Phase Sortals202
          • My view is that human persons are phase203 sortals204 of human animals.
          • So, I side with Olson against Baker in the controversy about what Persons are.
          • While persons are ontologically significant, this does not bring into being a new kind of PERSON, but raises the status of the kind whose typical members are persons (and of the individuals who are persons, of course).
          • So, I do not think that persons – at least persons falling under the kind HUMAN ANIMAL – can have intermittent existence. A fetus or a human animal in a PVS remains the same human animal.
        4. Constitution205
        5. Scattered Objects211
          • The topic of physical continuity212 addresses – amongst much else – both scattered objects213 and intermittent objects, the former intermitting in space, the latter in time (and maybe in space as well).
          • So, if persons are things constituted by other things, then the person intermits during a PVS, but there is no physical discontinuity.
          • But, as Baker believes, the very same person can be constituted by different bodies at different times, then there must necessarily be persistence in the absence of spatio-temporal continuity, which it usually taken as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for persistence.
          • This leads on to our next topic.
        6. Resurrection214
          • The possibility of Resurrection215 is the main reason for my interest in intermittent objects.
          • Clearly, if we are to claim that the very same individual who died is resurrected somewhere else (maybe not a place as such, though it is difficult to envisage bodies that are not at places) at some other time (or not in time – but similar worries apply) then we have an intermittent object.
          • This process (or fiat) would also seem to involve some sort of metamorphosis216, though maybe the Constitution View does not worry about such things, as it is the constituted person that persists, not the constituting body.
    3. Theories of Persistence
      • Endurantism217
        1. Endurantism is the traditional account of persistence218, that doesn’t invoke the metaphysics of temporal parts. What follows is a modified version of a write-up219 of the relevant section of "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?".
        2. Kurtz introduces the acronym MET for Metaphysics of Enduring Things. The contrasting acronym is MTP for Metaphysics of Temporal Parts. These Temporal Parts exist only instantaneously, and are otherwise known as Stages or Time-Slices. A duck – according to MTP – is wholly or partly constituted by temporal parts. It seems odd to think of a duck as being wholly constituted by a single temporal part, but this just is the exdurantist220 claim.
        3. There are two forms of MTP – Perdurantism221 and Exdurantism222 – and (says Kurtz) their motivation – and that of MTP itself – comes from how well either of these accounts for persistence. I had thought the motivation came from the need to explain conundrums like Fission223, but it seems there are philosophical difficulties with MET (the problem of Temporary Intrinsics224).
        4. Kurtz sees three ‘non-negotiable theses’ in accounting for persistence. These are:-
          1. Consistency: the same thing cannot have incompatible properties. Follows either from the law of non-contradiction or from Leibniz’s Law.
          2. Change: Change involves incompatible properties.
          3. Persistence: Objects persist through change.
        5. Perdurantism and Exdurantism share a metaphysics of temporal parts, which Endurantism claims ordinary things lack. Each maintains the tension between the three ‘non-negotiable theses’ given above by sacrificing at least one “intuitively and philosophically appealing” metaphysical claim on persistence. Kurtz sees this as the “real problem of persistence”.
        6. According to MET, at least some objects endure – a numerically self-identical object is wholly present at different times.
        7. For both MTP and MET, objects may have temporal parts. So, the existence of stages or a space-time worm is not denied by MET.
        8. Neither a space-time worm nor a stage is an enduring thing, as neither is wholly present at different times. Nevertheless, says Kurtz, “MET does not entail the claim that ordinary objects lack temporal parts”. This sounds wrong as far as ordinary objects are concerned – I need to check what the endurantists say on this. Though the worm is not an “ordinary thing”, but (presumably) a collection of momentary stages, which are themselves not ordinary things.
        9. Endurantists claim that ordinary objects persist by enduring, that is, that identity over time is strict identity between objects wholly present at different times. Change is the holding of incompatible properties by objects identical over time. So far seems to be common sense.
        10. I need to put the following comment somewhere, so here goes:
          1. I had the impression that MET goes along with Substances225, while MTP does not.
          2. I need to see what "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed" has to say.
          3. I note that SUBSTANCE is not mentioned once by Kurtz in her Introduction.
        11. To avoid the contradiction of an object having incompatible properties, endurantists adopt temporally mediated property instantiation, whereby temporal facts (whether of time or tense) external to the object mediate the instantiation of incompatible properties without an appeal to temporal parts. Thus, an ordinary object persists through change and both alters and survives. What has to be given up is the “just having” of properties. The question seems to be how important the having of properties only mediated by internal facts is.
        12. There are various implementations of endurantism. Those in "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings" are as below, though presumably, these chapters present, but don’t necessarily support, endurantism:-
          → "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Four-Dimensional Objects",
          → "Mellor (D.H.) - Selections from 'Real Time'",
          → "Hinchliff (Mark) - The Puzzle of Change", and
          → "Markosian (Ned) - A Defense of Presentism".
        13. Kurtz thinks that the introduction of time or tense into property instantiation creates four potential problems. I’m not hugely convinced by these – presumably for MET only – and Kurtz admits she’s only gestured at them to get them on the table:-
          1. She thinks it irrelevant what the time is to whether an object has an intrinsic property or not.
          2. Issues like Bradley’s Regress (to be discussed under the head of Temporary Intrinsics226) threaten our understanding of how a property can be predicated of an object at all.
          3. Indexing properties to times makes them seem like different properties, and so gets rid of the prima facie problem of inconsistent properties too easily. And, if they are different properties it (to my mind) obscures what makes Red-at-T1 and Red-at-T2 both instances of Red.
          4. Given the definition of change, then if the properties aren’t incompatible, why do we have change at all?
      • Perdurantism227
        1. As developed by W.V. Quine, David Lewis, Ted Sider and others, Perdurance – otherwise known as Four-Dimensionalism (4-D) – is to be contrasted with Endurance228 and Exdurance229.
        2. I will take "Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time" as my primary text, though "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?", the introduction to "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings", provides a good overview of these matters.
        3. The logical problems with 4-D need to be carefully considered and, for good or ill, the four-dimensional approach has the advantage – or maybe disadvantage – of undermining the reduplication objection230 to identity231 being maintained in certain fission232 thought experiments233.
        4. Does 4-D imply fatalism234? According to perdurantism, a thing is a 4-D object, but not only do we not know the future, but the future may not even exist.
        5. How does this tie in with Lewis’s realism about possible worlds? Maybe if possible worlds are real, all possible futures are real as well.
        6. Note that perdurantism is inimical to a high view of substance235. A temporal worm cannot change, it just is. The purpose of positing substances is as the enduring things that change236.
        7. Perdurance also impacts on Leibniz’s Law, where property exemplification is usually taken to be relative to a time.
        8. Look at the adverbial defence of endurantism. See "Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics" (probably … this is the explicit response to Lewis)
          → "Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence, Change, and Explanation",
          → "Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time" and
          → "Haslanger (Sally) - Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things"; and
          → "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?" in "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings" seems to cover much the same ground).
        9. If perdurantism really is incompatible with a high view of substance237, then I may not need a chapter on perdurance (though I would have thought that I would need to argue for the incompatibility), and I can thereby ignore perdurantist objections to the cogency of reduplication objections.
        10. I note also that Eric Olson sets perdurance to one side. He assumes that we are concrete substances that “endure through time by being wholly present at different times”. He claims238 that if this (and a couple of other assumptions) should be false, then there are no substantive metaphysical questions of our identity over time, only semantic ones.
      • Exdurantism239
        1. What follows is a modified version of a write-up240 of the relevant section of "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?".
        2. Exdurantism is otherwise known as Stage Theory and Kurtz describes it as analogous to identity between possible worlds. Just as an object might have had incompatible properties – and this is cashed out as a counterpart in a possible world having these properties – so a temporal counterpart stage of the object has them. The objects with incompatible properties are, in both cases, non-identical counterparts of one another. So, the exdurantist then contends that change over time is nothing more than an object and its temporal counterpart having incompatible properties and existing at different moments in the actual world.
        3. Exdurantists have it that an object is numerically identical to a single stage, and is wholly present at the moment it exists. In contrast to Perdurance241, according to Exdurantists, objects persist when they exdure, and exdure by changing over time. An object changes over time, then, when it and a counterpart stage just have incompatible properties. Consequently, an exduring object does not – strictly speaking – survive change242.
        4. Just Having (a property) is a term of art. To quote Kurtz: an object just has a property243 if and only if no extrinsic facts are relevant to the truth of the proposition that the object has that property. It is a slightly tricky concept, and "Lewis (David) - Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe" is invoked, which refers to non-relational changes (the example is of changing your shape by sitting, etc.).
        5. The primary proponents of Exdurance are Ted Sider and Katherine Hawley.
        6. Acording to Exdurance, an object undergoes change244 when it and a counterpart “just have” incompatible properties. It persists245 when it changes over time by standing in the counterpart relation to a stage from a different time. As no single thing has incompatible properties (different stages are different objects), Exdurantism satisfies the demands of consistency. Just how is this “Counterpart Relation” cashed out?
        7. Exdurantism has the advantage over Perdurantism246 in that it’s the object itself that “just has” its properties247, rather than a (temporal) part of the object. However, just like Perdurantism248, Exdurantism rules out change249 as is commonly understood. In both cases, it’s just different stages that have the incompatible property, not one and the same whole object.
        8. But, Exdurantism does much worse over survival, in that an exduring object doesn’t survive250, as the different stages are different objects. At best, an exduring object “continues251,252” in some way, but the momentary stages are no more identical than are links in a chain.
  5. Does Identity Matter?
    1. Survival253
      1. Just what does ‘survival’ mean in philosophical contexts? Is it no more than a sloppy locution when ‘persistence254’ is intended, or is it a lesser relation?
      2. The term found its way into the philosophical literature in Derek Parfit’s expressions “identity is not what matters in survival”. Unfortunately, this expression is ambiguous, and is not clarified by being often repeated. It could mean one of:-
        1. When we survive – that is persist through – some adventure, what matters to us isn’t self-identity as such, but the continuation of our projects, relationships and other things that matter to us. However, of course, we need to persist in order for all these things to be ours.
        2. We can survive some adventure without persisting. That is, without being identical to the person who emerges from the adventure.
      3. We need to distinguish these two possible interpretations of Parfit255 according to whether survival is or is not identity-preserving. By “survival” does Parfit mean the same as other philosophers mean by “persistence256”?
      4. Some philosophers (eg. E.J. Borowski) claim that Parfit thinks that “survival is a matter of degree” (implying, it would seem, Partial Identity257) or that (eg. Frederick Doepke) “survival is one to many”.
      5. In the standard Parfitian claim that “what matters in survival is not identity”, Parfit is right that the issue isn’t necessarily “am I (A) identical to B or C”, but “will I have what matters258 in survival if B, or C, or both survive”, and that the reason the two questions are elided is that they don’t usually come apart.
      6. However, there’s incoherence in an expression such as “will I survive as B”, if I’m not supposed identical to B, since survival and this use of the personal pronoun seem to imply identity. That is, if Relative Identity259 is incoherent, as I believe it to be.
      7. Also in an expression such as “will I have what matters”, to what does the “I260” refer if I’m assumed not to persist? To my present self261 only? I might now see that I would be happy that a certain future state of affairs, not involving me, appertains; but I would not then have what matters, nor indeed have anything at all.
      8. So, I think a temporal262 element fits in. Looking forward to some future contingency, we might say that the state of affairs then – in the future – gives me now much of what I want (now) to be the case. My plans will have gone well, my family is in a good state, I am famous or whatever it is that matters to me now. But at that future time I will have nothing that matters, because I won’t exist.
      9. I note that – in "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?" – Parfit says that – in the teletransportation263 case – he would not survive, but would have what mattered to him in survival. So, I take the “what matters in survival” to mean – for Parfit – what would have mattered had he survived.
      10. So, I think we can indeed distinguish, with Parfit, identity264 from what matters in survival265. His idea seems to be that we can have what matters in survival266 without surviving.
      11. Parfit’s concerns are fundamentally ethical, with Buddhist267 tendencies. He’s trying to remove self268 from ethics and persuade us that we don’t need self, and therefore don’t need self-identity.
      12. Parfit’s claim, which I believe to be false, is that we don’t really care about our persistence269 as such, but about the future success of our projects, which can as well or better be prosecuted by others. But we are more selfish than that, and in many circumstances justifiably so. It may be that some people – saints – could live with this ethic. But most people (entrepreneurs, students and the like) – at least some of the time – make sacrifices now so that they themselves can reap the benefits in the future. If they didn’t have the possibility of this recompense, they might not do what they do, and we might be all worse off. Yes, some people (parents in particular) invest in others and they might well be satisfied if their charges, and not themselves, survived and flourished in the future. But society needs some people to use their own talents initially for their own selfish reasons so that we might all benefit from what they do.
    2. What Matters270
      1. We need further discussion of Parfit271’s claims that we can have what matters to us in survival272 without the need for identity. That is, if the individual who follows on from us experiences good things or fulfils our projects, then provided that individual is sufficiently close to us, or those projects are sufficiently close to ours, we will have what matters to us even if that individual is not – strictly-speaking – us.
      2. The situation envisaged is where the logic of identity273 – maybe as a result of fission274 – means that it is logically impossible that we should survive275 some vicissitude. In those circumstances it’s not mere quibbles over identity that matter to us, but those benefits that are usually concomitant with identity.
      3. It seems obvious that our survival276 matters to us, or at least some of the benefits of surviving matter to us. If we don’t survive, we can have none of those benefits of survival. Such questions come up in trying to explain why death277 is bad for the one who dies.
      4. However, the question has been raised that some people (eg. those contemplating suicide) don’t want to persist278, so persistence doesn’t matter to them. I think it does – persistence matters, though maybe persisting doesn’t. What I mean is that whether they persist or not matters to persons, who can anticipate – in a good or bad light, accurately or not – the future. If things get too bad (or are perceived to be that way), it may be important to them that they don’t persist. In the normal case, it’s important that they do. Either way, persistence matters to them.
      5. Where I differ from (an interpretation of) Parfit is that it’s not just my projects that matter to me. If I had a worthwhile project and I died before completing it – but someone else completed it for me279 – then – provided it was done competently – that would be a good thing. If this happened to all my outstanding projects, even those I’d not started, that would be better. But it would not be as good as – or even the same thing as – my completing them myself. Sometimes the journey is as good as the arrival, and even where it isn’t it is often an extra good. But if I don’t arrive, I would miss out.


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now cleared up all our preliminaries, we can now turn to the meat of the Thesis in our next Chapter280, where we consider Animalism and the arguments for it.
  2. This is work in progress281.

Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed282
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. The references are segregated by sub-topic, as below, but there is much overlap.
  3. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read285, include the following:-
  1. Change
    1. Change286
    2. Causality287
    3. Properties290
    4. Thisness (Haecceity)303
  2. Time
    1. Time304
    2. Time Travel307
  3. Modality309
  4. Persistence
    1. Persistence317
    2. Persistence Criteria323
    3. Continuity328
    4. Theories
    5. Survival345
    6. What Matters346

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Change
    1. Change348
    2. Causality349
    3. Properties350
    4. Thisness (Haecceity)352
  2. Time
    1. Time356
    2. Time Travel365
  3. Modality367
  4. Persistence
    1. Persistence369
    2. Persistence Criteria373
    3. Continuity374
    4. Theories
    5. Survival389
    6. What Matters391


In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 3: Footnote 41: Footnote 119:
  1. I’m warned by a philosopher-friend that “I would beware of stating anything about modern physics as though it were set in stone – have a look at the work of Lee Smolin. There are many contradictions which still need resolution. ”
  2. But, serendipitously, I came across the following passage in Aeon: Baggott - But is it science? (sub-titled “Theoretical physicists who say the multiverse exists set a dangerous precedent: science based on zero empirical evidence”), which shows how embedded the theories of Reativity are in our everyday lives, unbeknownst to the vast majority of us:
      Successful theories are essential to this progress. When you use Google Maps on your smartphone, you draw on a network of satellites orbiting Earth at 20,000 kilometres, of which four are needed for the system to work, and between six and 10 are ‘visible’ from your location at any time. Each of these satellites carries a miniaturised atomic clock, and transmits precise timing and position data to your device that allow you to pinpoint your location and identify the fastest route to the pub. But without corrections based on Albert Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity, the Global Positioning System would accumulate clock errors, leading to position errors of up to 11 kilometres per day. Without these rather abstract and esoteric – but nevertheless highly successful – theories of physics, after a couple of days you’d have a hard time working out where on Earth you are.
Footnote 120:
  1. This ‘rant’ was inspired by a first reading of "Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History: A Philosophical Enquiry".
  2. Of course, the book requires closer consideration and its arguments formally refuted.
  3. For now, see my comments on the transcript of the promotional video"Botros (Sophie) - Truth, Time and History - A Philosophical Inquiry with Dr Sophie Botros".
Footnote 121:
  1. See, for instance, Barry C. Smith’s analogous argument about the philosophy of the Senses and neuroscience in Aeon: Video - Smith - Aristotle was wrong and so are we: there are far more than five senses.
Footnote 122:
  1. So, if I say “there will be a sea-battle tomorrow”, and that happening is contingent, then this is just a speculation with a greater or lesser probability of truth, though it may subsequently turn out to have been correct or incorrect as the case may be.
Footnote 238:
  1. See:-
    → "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction", pp. 4-5 and
    → "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives",
    both in "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology".
Footnote 279:
  1. Like Mozart’s Requiem (Wikipedia: Requiem (Mozart)) or "Wittgenstein (Ludwig) - Philosophical Investigations".
Footnote 282: Footnote 305: Footnote 308: Footnotes 321, 327: Footnote 322: Footnote 347: Footnote 353: Footnotes 354, 355: Footnote 357: Footnote 358: Footnote 359: Footnote 360: Footnote 361: Footnote 362: Footnote 363: Footnote 364: Footnotes 366, 380, 384: Footnote 368: Footnote 370: Footnote 371: Footnote 372: Footnote 379: Footnote 381: Footnote 383: Footnote 385: Footnote 387: Footnote 388: Footnote 390:

Table of the Previous 12 Versions of this Note: (of 15)

Date Length Title
28/09/2022 10:24:58 124220 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
11/05/2022 18:59:02 123337 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
04/05/2022 21:46:05 109077 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
11/04/2022 00:01:26 58530 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
01/10/2021 13:17:46 56536 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
29/03/2021 19:23:31 16507 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
22/03/2021 00:28:48 15427 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
08/02/2021 11:26:53 7162 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
18/04/2019 18:18:43 7140 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
05/04/2016 23:19:41 6867 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
02/07/2015 23:12:29 6833 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
13/01/2015 19:07:41 6304 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)


Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
06/07/2023 00:43:12 None available Thesis - Introduction

Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Androids Animalism Animals Aristotle - Sea Battle Artifacts
Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Baker Baker - Persons and Bodies - Precis Baker - Persons in the Material World Baker - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution
Baker - The Constitution View of Human Persons Baker - The Very Idea of Constitution Bealer - The A Priori Biological View Bodily Continuity
Brain Brain Transplants Brandom - Toward a Normative Pragmatics (Introduction) Buddhism Carter – Artifacts of Theseus
Causality Change Chisholm - Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions Christian Materialism Closest Continuer
Connectedness vs Continuity Constitution Constitution View Continuity Corpses
Crane - Interaction Between Mind and Body Cyborgs Death DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons? Disembodied Existence
Dualism Duplication Endurantism Essentialism Exdurantism
Existence Fetuses Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter (Essay) First-Person Perspective
Fission Fusion Gibbard - Contingent Identity Hume I
Individual Intermittent Objects Intuition Jackson - Epiphenomenal Qualia Johnston - Human Beings
Kinds Kripke - Naming and Necessity - Lecture I Kripke - Naming and Necessity - Lecture III Kurtz - Persistence (Introduction) Leibniz
Lewis Life After Death Locke Logic of Identity Markosian - The Human Animal: Three Problems for Olson
McDowell - Values and Secondary Qualities Memory Mereology Metamorphosis Modality
Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Human Persons as Substances or Property-Things Narrative Identity Olson Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death Ontology
Organisms Parfit Partial Identity Perdurantism Persistence
Persistence Criteria Persistent Vegetative State Person Phase Sortals Physical Continuity
Physicalism Process Metaphysics Properties Psychological Continuity Psychological View
Reduplication Objections Reincarnation Relative Identity Resurrection Scattered Objects
Self Siliconisation Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity Sorites Sortals
Soul Criterion Souls Status: Thesis Dashboard (2023: September) Strawson - Why I Have No Future Substance
Survival Teletransportation Temporary Intrinsics Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Thesis - Method & Form Thisness (Haecceity) Thought Experiments Time
Time Travel Transhumanism Transplants Universals Vagueness
What are We? What Matters Works Read - Explanation    

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Existence PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2 Status: Thesis Dashboard (2023: September), 2 Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues), 2, 3 Thesis - Introduction
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22        

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2, 3 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Existence Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Introduction & Chapter Outlines Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes


References & Reading List

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Abelson (Raziel) Not Necessarily Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Philosophical Review, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Jan., 1961), pp. 67-84 Yes
Aeon Video - Not the same river. Not the same man. Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 07 July 2021 Yes
Aeon Video - Who decides how long a second is? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 08 February 2021 Yes
Aguirre (Anthony) The Cosmic Now Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 20 June, 2019 Yes
Armstrong (David) In Conclusion (Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals) Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Armstrong - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals), 1978 Yes
Armstrong (David) Introduction to Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 1 (Nominalism and Realism) Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Armstrong - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism), 1977 Yes
Armstrong (David) The Argument of Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 1 (Nominalism and Realism) Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Armstrong - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals), 1978 Yes
Armstrong (David) The Argument of Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 2 (A Theory of Universals) Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Armstrong - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism), 1977 Yes
Armstrong (David) Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 6%
Armstrong (David) Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 4%
Armstrong (David) What is a Law of Nature? Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 22%
Armstrong (David) What is a Law of Nature? Conclusions Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Armstrong - What is a Law of Nature? Yes
Arnold (Keith) The Subject of Radical Change Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (May, 1978), pp. 395-401 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 23%
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke on 'Masses of Matter' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 18, pp. 207-215 Yes
Bais (Sander) Very Special Relativity: An Illustrated Guide Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Bais (Sander) - Very Special Relativity: An Illustrated Guide Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on my 'The Ontological Status of Persons' Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, September 2002, pp. 394-395 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 19%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Introduction Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons in the Material World Paper - Cited Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 1 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Review of 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' by Nancey Murphy Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006.08.03 (August 2006) Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Selfless Persons: Goodness in an Impersonal World? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. - Mind, Self and Person, 2015 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution Paper - Cited Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 7 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Constitution View of Human Persons Paper - Cited Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 4 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Very Idea of Constitution Paper - Cited Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 2 Yes
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