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Personal Identity
Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View)
(Text as at 05/07/2023 21:27:22)
Abstract
- A discussion of the arguments against the Constitution View, focusing on those mustered by the principal animalists, with a critique.
- Additionally, I intend here to critique Olson’s “Thinking Animal” Argument1. While this is largely an argument for Animalism2, though I think it unnecessary to establish the case for Animalism, and this aspect is covered in Chapter 63, Olson uses it against the Constitution View, though it ‘works’ – if at all – against any alternative to Animalism.
Research Methodology
- Follow this Link4 for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
- The method is broken down into 16, possibly iterative, stages, some of which have sub-stages.
- Follow this Link5 for my progress dashboard on these tasks.
Chapter Introduction6
- Like the previous Chapter, there is mostly a 1-1-match between this Chapter and a single Note – in this case Constitution View – Objections7. That’s because Olson’s Master Argument – which is both an argument for Animalism and an objection to the Constitution View – has its own Note but appears in Chapter 7.
- The Note on Holes & Smiles8 is relevant because it illustrates how a property – like the Cheshire Cat’s smile – cannot exist in the absence of the infrastructural body that makes it possible, nor can they be transferred from one body to another and remain the same property. So, I would argue, a First Person Perspective is the property of a particular human body, and cannot be transplanted from one body to another.
Note Hierarchy
- The Constitution View9. Excluded10
- Arguments against the Constitution View11
- Holes & Smiles12
- The Thinking Animal Argument13. Excluded14
Main Text
- Arguments against the Constitution View15
- The two obvious issues are:-
- The “too many minds” objection (otherwise known as the “thinking animal argument16”), and
- The “fetus problem17”
- Thinking Animals18
- In saying that an Individual19 is a human animal20 and that also that that Individual is a person21 that is ontologically distinct from, and merely constituted by22, the human animal, Eric Olson argues that we have too many thinkers and therefore the constitution view23 is false.
- I don’t like this argument, in that the form would prove too much. I see analogies with various mereological24 arguments:-
→ Peter Unger’s argument that “there are no ordinary things”,
→ The Sorites25 arguments against the existence of material objects with parts, and maybe with
→ Tib/Tibbles26, and
→ Dion/Theon27
- All these arguments seem to have the same form – there are alleged to be too many co-located items, leading to the denial of some seemingly obvious premise.
- Yet maybe I accept a version of this in disliking immaterial souls28 (again, too many thinkers – if the brain29 thinks, why do we need a soul that thinks as well). However, the degree of ontological30 distinctness between “the self31 and its brain32” is greater than that between the person33 and the human being34 that (maybe temporarily) constitutes35 it. I will reconsider this collection of arguments in due course.
- Fetus Problem36
- This is the question whether I37 was ever a Fetus. According to the Constitution View38, I was not, as the Fetus had no First Person Perspective39 (FPP), not even a rudimentary one, and since the FPP is constitutive / individuative of me.
- But, if I was not the Fetus, where did I40 come from?
- I’m not hugely impressed by this argument either. It’s also a problem for Animalism (it is said) – is the early fetus an animal41? Was the fetus a proper part of the mother? See "Kingma (Elselijn) - Were You Part of Your Mother?".
- So, should I accept the Constitution View42? I think not. I am an animal43, and objections to Animalism44 can be overcome. The whole idea of Constitution45 as conceived of by the CV is very odd, and the CV was invented to provide the hope of resurrection46. I need to justify these assertions, of course!
- Holes & Smiles47
- I was unsure whether to title this Note as “Holes” or “Smiles”, so decided on a combination. While only the former is a recognised philosophical topic, the latter is a recognised as a problem for the Constitution View48.
- The relevance to my Thesis is somewhat tangential, but the idea is that there are features49 of other things that are – most likely – not separable entities but which still have persistence conditions50. It makes sense to ask whether a particular hole is the same hole as it was a week ago, or a particular smile the same smile as a few seconds ago – smiles “wear thin” if the photographer takes too long. But neither holes nor smiles can exist separately to their host. The Cheshire Cat’s smile is not to be taken at face value.
- I see an analogy with this situation and persons51 or First Person Perspectives52. Often, when a non-philosopher doubts whether someone is the same person53 as they had been previously, they are thinking of a radical personality change. A personality54 is like a very complex and enduring smile – a property55 of something else. It cannot exist on its own, disembodied56, or pass from one body57 to another.
Concluding Remarks
- Having now discussed the arguments against both Animalism and the Constitution View, we now in our next Chapter58 turn to the question of Thought Experiments in general, and how they bear on this topic in particular.
- This is work in progress59.
Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed60
- This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
- I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 763. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
- Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
Works on this topic that I’ve actually read64, include the following:-
- Arguments against the Constitution View65
- General:
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on my 'The Ontological Status of Persons'", 2002, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism", 2004, Annotations
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Zimmerman’s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism'", 2004, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons", 2000, Write-Up Note66, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'", 2001, Book
- "Garrett (Brian) - The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'", 2001, Write-Up Note67, Annotations
- "Kingma (Elselijn) - Were You Part of Your Mother?", 2019, Annotations
- "Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'", 2001, Write-Up Note68, Annotations
- "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View", 2001, Write-Up Note69, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'", 2002, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Reflections on the Ontological Status of Persons", 2002, Internal PDF Link
- "Sider (Ted) - Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies", 2002, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism", 2004, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism'", 2004, Annotations
- Holes & Smiles70
- Aeon:
- "Finn (Suki) - Is a hole a real thing, or just a place where something isn’t?", 2018, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- General:
- "Baillie (James) - What Am I?", 1993, Write-Up Note71, Footnote72
- "Casati (Roberto) & Varzi (Achille) - Holes", 1996-2014, Internal PDF Link
- "Lewis (David) & Lewis (Stephanie) - Holes", 1970
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We?", 2007, Write-Up Note73, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Footnote74
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - Plato's Phaedo", 2000, Footnote75
A further reading list might start with:-
- Arguments against the Constitution View76
- General:
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Replies to Zimmerman, Rea & Pereboom", 2002, External Link
- "Burke (Michael) - Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism", 1997, Internal PDF Link
- "De Waal (Frans) - The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist", 2001, Book, Read = 7%, Footnote77
- "Noller (Jorg) - Beyond Animalism and Constitutionalism: The Person as A Form of Life", Undated, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Olson (Eric) - Review of Lynne Baker's 'Persons And Bodies'", 2001, Internal PDF Link, Read = 67%
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Constitution", 2007, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
- "Pereboom (Derek) - On Baker's Persons and Bodies", 2002
- "Rea (Michael) - Lynne Baker on Material Constitution", 2002
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons and Bodies: Constitution Without Mereology?", 2002
- Holes & Smiles78
- General:
- "Bench-Capon (T.J.M.) - A Note on Mr. Karmo's Disturbances", 1977, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
- "Casati (Roberto) & Varzi (Achille) - Counting the Holes", 2004, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Casati (Roberto) & Varzi (Achille) - Immaterial Bodies", 1994, No Abstract
- "Geach (Peter) & Stoothoff (Robert) - Symposium: What Actually Exists", 1968, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
- "Giralt (Nuria) & Bloom (Paul) - How Special Are Objects? Children's Reasoning about Objects, Parts, and Holes", 2000, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Karmo (Toomas) - Disturbances", 1977, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
- "Lewis (David) & Lewis (Stephanie) - Casati and Varzi on Holes", 1996, No Abstract
- "Meadows (Phillip John) - What Angles Can Tell Us About What Holes Are Not", 2013, Internal PDF Link, Read = 8%
- "Miller (Kristie) - Immaterial Beings", 2007, Internal PDF Link, Read = 10%
- "Sosa (Ernest) - Subjects Among Other Things", 1987, Internal PDF Link, Read = 12%, Footnote79
- "Wake (Andrew), Spencer (Joshua) & Fowler (Gregory) - Holes as Regions of Spacetime", 2007, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 6:
- The hyperlinks in this Introduction – as in the other Chapter Introductions – are intended to help motivate the various Notes used in the construction of the Chapter.
- So, a link appears once and once only per Note in the Note Hierarchy below, and appears – as far as possible – in the order of the Hierarchy, even if this is not its first mention.
- Links to other Notes are omitted in the Chapter Introduction, but appear passim in the Main Text.
Footnote 10:
- This Note will be excluded from the Reading List for this Chapter.
- It is included in the Reading List for Chapter 7.
Footnote 14:
- This Note will be excluded from the Reading List for this Chapter.
- It is included in the Reading List for Chapter 6.
Footnote 60:
- See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
Footnote 72: Footnote 74:
- See Draft Note.
- Review Comments:–
→ First Half,
→ Second Half.
- Olson mentions dents rather than holes, but a dent is a hole philosophically-speaking, it seems.
- Topologically-speaking, a dent is a smile.
Footnote 75:
- Simmias’s “tuning of the lyre” objection to the separable existence of souls. Thomas mentions the Cheshire Cat.
Footnote 77:
- Argues against human uniqueness.
- No doubt there are a number of other books of this ilk.
Footnote 79:
- Mentions smiles and persons in Section G.
Table of the Previous 11 Versions of this Note:
| Note last updated |
Reading List for this Topic |
Parent Topic |
| 05/07/2023 21:27:22 |
None available |
Thesis - Introduction |
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Introduction & Chapter Outlines |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Origins |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Thinking Animal Argument |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on my 'The Ontological Status of Persons' |
Paper - Cited  |
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, September 2002, pp. 394-395 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism |
Paper - Cited |
Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Replies to Zimmerman, Rea & Pereboom |
Paper - Cited |
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64.3 (May 2002), pp. 623-635 |
No |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Reply to Zimmerman’s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism' |
Paper - Cited |
Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons |
Paper - Cited |
Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 8 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. |
E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' |
Book - Cited |
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' |
Yes |
| Burke (Michael) |
Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism |
Paper - Cited |
American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 (4), 1997: 457-467 |
No |
| Casati (Roberto) & Varzi (Achille) |
Holes |
Paper - Cited |
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 1996-2014 |
Yes |
| De Waal (Frans) |
The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist |
Book - Cited  |
De Waal (Frans) - The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist |
7% |
| Finn (Suki) |
Is a hole a real thing, or just a place where something isn’t? |
Paper - Cited |
Aeon, 29 June, 2018 |
Yes |
| Garrett (Brian) |
The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies' |
Paper - Cited |
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" |
Yes |
| Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) |
Aeon: C-F |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
51% |
| Kingma (Elselijn) |
Were You Part of Your Mother? |
Paper - Cited |
Mind, Volume 128, Issue 511, July 2019, Pages 609–646 |
Yes |
| Lewis (David) |
Philosophical Papers Volume I |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Lewis (David) & Lewis (Stephanie) |
Holes |
Paper - Cited |
Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 1: Ontology, Chapter 1 |
Yes |
| Noller (Jorg) |
Beyond Animalism and Constitutionalism: The Person as A Form of Life |
Paper - Cited |
Retrieved from Academia.edu |
17% |
| Noonan (Harold) |
Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies' |
Paper - Cited |
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson) |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
16% |
| Olson (Eric) |
Review of Lynne Baker's 'Persons And Bodies' |
Paper - Cited |
Mind, 110, Number 438, April 2001, pp. 427-430(4) |
No |
| Olson (Eric) |
Thinking Animals and the Constitution View |
Paper - Cited |
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I' |
Paper - Cited |
Philosophical Topics 30: 189-208. 2002 |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
99% |
| Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? Constitution |
Paper - Cited |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 3 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
| Pereboom (Derek) |
On Baker's Persons and Bodies |
Paper - Cited |
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64.3 (May 2002), pp. 615-622 |
No |
| Peterson (Michael) & VanArragon (Raymond) |
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
13% |
| Rosenkrantz (Gary) |
Reflections on the Ontological Status of Persons |
Paper - Cited |
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, September 2002, pp. 389-393 |
Yes |
| Sider (Ted) |
Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies |
Paper - Cited |
Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 45-48 |
Yes |
| Thomas (Janice L.) |
Mind and Person in the Philosophy of Religion |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Thomas (Janice L.) |
Plato's Phaedo |
Paper - Cited |
Thomas (Janice L.) - Mind and Person in the Philosophy of Religion |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Zimmerman (Dean) |
Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism |
Paper - Cited |
Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 |
Yes |
| Zimmerman (Dean) |
Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism' |
Paper - Cited |
Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 |
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2023