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Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)

(Work In Progress: output at 24/08/2026 17:44:10)

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Chapter Contents

  1. Abstract1
  2. Methodology2
  3. Introduction3
  4. Note Hierarchy4
  5. Main Text5
  6. Concluding Remarks6
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed7
  8. Works Read8
  9. Further Reading9
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection.
  2. Since the body is destroyed at death, it would seem that any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong.
  3. Consideration of arguments by Peter Van Inwagen in this respect.
  4. This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued, and factually correct concerning what is actually believed by intellectually-aware Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists (other religions are available …), unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion.
  5. It also needs to cover other putative forms of post-mortem survival: I’m considering changing the title to “Life After Death”.


Research Methodology

Chapter Introduction12
  1. While I wish in this chapter seriously to consider the religious hope of Resurrection, I do not want to get side-tracked onto matters of Scriptural exegesis, or into evidential matters of whether particular resurrections – specifically of Jesus – happened or not. In this regard, I’m interested only in what believers in resurrection take it to be, and whether they provide any detailed metaphysical account of how it is supposed to work.
  2. As in the chapter on Thought Experiments, this chapter is partly aimed at checking how (my version of) Animalism copes with the projected situations. As such, I may extend this to other posited versions of post-mortem survival, though most are ruled out by the essentially physical nature of the human person as proposed by Animalism.
  3. While not wanting to get too far off topic, especially at the end of the thesis, I want to consider some of the ethical consequences of adopting Animalism with – as I have argued – the lack of hope of post-mortem existence. The topic of “Death and Ethics” is already a bit tangential to my thesis, but there’s a set of questions in which I have an interest and on which I wonder whether my views on Personal Identity have anything to say. These two are the most important:-
    • Why is death bad (for the deceased)?, and
    • Can the dead be harmed (assuming they no longer exist)?
  4. So, we start off with a discussion of Death13, which – like Life (discussed in Chapter 6) – I take to be a biological event (or rather a Process). We touched on Brain Death in Chapter 2. Despite its pragmatic utility (which I suspect is the main motivator for accepting it as a criterion of Death) this idea is rather confused on any Biological View of What We Are.
  5. I will also discuss certain occasional events on the periphery of Death, namely Near Death Experiences14 and Out of Body Experiences15. Do these events have anything to say about “where we’re going”, in the first case, or what we are, in the second?
  6. Getting closer to Death itself, I need to discuss Persistent Vegetative States16. From an Animalist perspective, such persons are not dead – any more than (though this may be more controversial) the brain-dead are dead – but whether they should be kept alive is (I would claim) primarily a pragmatic issue to do with the use of resources, coupled with consideration of what life is like – if there is anything – for those in such a state.
  7. Then we get to the meat of the Chapter – discussion of Life after Death17. What is it supposed to involve, where is it enjoyed, and how do we get there? Clearly, there are many options. The question is are any of them possible – and better – actual?
  8. The two options I consider are Resurrection18 and Reincarnation19. In both cases, the big question is what makes it the case that the individual Resurrected or Reincarnated is the same individual as the one who died. I suspect ‘nothing’ in the absence of a Soul, though much argumentation is required to reach this conclusion in the face of objections and various suggestions for possible mechanisms.
  9. We discussed Uploading to a Computer as a (bare) possibility for Life after Death in the Previous Chapter.
  10. In this regard, we need to discuss the possible interim states between Death and putative post-mortem survival. I need to discuss Corpses20, which – in some of the easiest cases – are (supposed to be) the mediators of continuity of identity between Death and Resurrection. Corpses also cause philosophical worries – on many physicalist accounts of Personal Identity – about where they “come from” and whether “we” end up as Corpses.
  11. We need to discuss the possibility of Disembodied Existence21 (which I imagine is the Interregnum22 for Reincarnation) together with a reconsideration of Intermittent Objects discussed in Chapter 5.
  12. Finally, we need to reflect on the consequences of Life after Death, which is usually taken to be Immortality23 (though supporters of the ‘conditional immortality’ position in Christianity have Resurrection followed by destruction for those found unworthy of eternal life).
  13. Before doing so, I will reflect on the supposed difficulty – displayed by Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilych24 – of truly and practically accepting the inevitability of our own deaths, whatever logic and the facts may dictate.
  14. But, is Immortality really something to be desired? Reflection on the Makropulos Case25 suggests that an infinite life would be unbearably tedious, even though at each possible terminus we might want to live on.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Death26
    1. Near Death Experiences27
    2. Out of Body Experiences28
    3. Persistent Vegetative State29
  2. Life After Death30
    1. Resurrection31
    2. Reincarnation32
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses33
    2. Disembodied Existence34
    3. Interregnum35
  4. Immortality36
    1. Ivan Ilych37
    2. Makropulos Case38


Main Text
  1. Death39
    1. Death is important to our study because we’re considering our persistence conditions40, whether we consider ourselves to be
      1. Human Persons41.
      2. Human Animals42 (members of the species homo sapiens43), or
      3. Human Beings44
      and death would seem to be the terminus of such existence45.
    2. That this is so has often been resisted, which is why we must consider such matters as:-
      1. Resurrection46,
      2. Reincarnation47, and
      3. Disembodied Existence48.
    3. Death should be considered a biological event, or maybe – better – a process49. It is the termination of life50, which is also a biological process, though usually a longer one.
    4. Other forms of – and terminations of – existence51 may be termed “life” or “death”, but these are metaphorical expressions used by analogy with biological life or death. So, is the resurrection52 life – if there is one – really “life” or a continued and enhanced form of existence53? Also, is the “second death” really “death”? I suppose we would allow alternative metabolisms to count as “life54”, so that an Android55 that maintained itself might be said to be “alive”; and, consequently, the destruction of such a being might be classified as “death”. A case for this is made in "Lyons (Siobhan) - Death and the Machine: Intersections of Mortality and Robotics".
    5. A particular case of the above is Brain Death56. It’s a large question for Animalists57 – and for holders of the Psychological View58 – whether Brain59 Death is really death, or whether it is (for holders of the PV60) the death (or end) of the Person61.
    6. As a spin-off from the (alleged) Corpse Problem62 for animalism63 (see "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", p. 81 for this objection to animalism64) we need to discuss the process65 of dying – the transition from life66 to death. Just when does death occur (for human animals67)?
    7. No doubt there is a degree of vagueness68 here (though ascribing ‘vagueness’ to such a ‘terminal’ event as death seems counter-intuitive).
    8. Consideration of whether we should fear death, or the process69 of dying, is probably beyond the bounds of this Thesis. However, for a comforting account of the normal process of dying in old age, see this “short” from the BBC: BBC: Dying is not as bad as you think. The author – a medical doctor (Kathryn Mannix – she’s now written "Mannix (Kathryn) - With the End in Mind: How to Live and Die Well") – talks about the “good death” and the process of dying in your bed being not so scary. The dying drift in and out of consciousness70 and return from unconsciousness feeling much as after a refreshing sleep, so we know the coma doesn’t feel frightening and isn’t noticed when it happens. The “death rattle” shows just how relaxed you were. Normal dying is a really gentle process.
    9. Would that were the way for all, rather than as the result of a rather painful trauma71 when you’re not ready to go.
    1. Near Death Experiences72
      1. NDEs, if they are experiences of anything veridical:-
        1. Offer a serious challenge to those who deny the possibility or actuality of life after death73,
        2. Appear to offer support for non-physicalist accounts of the mind and
        3. Cause problems for animalists74 by lending support to alternative accounts of what we are75 – maybe souls76.
      2. Most of the phenomena – which I need to document and comment on (see "Wikipedia - Near-death experience") – can probably be explained by the usual “dying brain” / anoxia / endorphins suggestions, though this can be rather facile – partly because not all NDEs are had by those near death77, but also because the dying brain78 might not be up to the job of having (and remembering79) scenes of such alleged clarity. However, see "Jarrett (Christian) - Ketamine trips are uncannily like near-death experiences", which reports on a study that makes a detailed connection between the experiences of Ketamine (and LSD) users and NDE-reports.
      3. I have my doubts about when such experiences actually occur – but the suggestion that they occur when the experiencer is “coming round” doesn’t seem to be popular.
      4. A difficult situation to “explain away” is where the NDE-experiencer claims to see something (while having an Out of Body Experience80) they could not have seen under normal circumstances.
      5. Further “awkward” cases to dispose of are where experiences analogous to the NDE are had by / shared with friends / relatives of the dying. I presume these accounts should be rejected out of hand, along with all other incredible reports of exotic parapsychological phenomena. The Fenwicks give a sympathetic hearing to (the then) recent results of parapsychological research – but in an undocumented way and showing unawareness that the claims are of slight (though allegedly statistically significant) deviations from chance, not of the exotic phenomena exhibited in the accounts of NDEs. See "Fenwick (Peter) & Fenwick (Elizabeth) - The Truth in the Light: An Investigation of Over 300 Near-Death Experiences", which also rejects the “shoe” case, but for different reasons to that on the Infidels site ("Augustine (Keith) - Hallucinatory Near-Death Experiences"): see also OBEs81.
      6. See "IANDS - Journal of Near-Death Studies". A wealth of material to download for free.
      7. Recently (December 2025) I’ve been challenged to make something of the case of George G. Richie:-
        → "Ritchie (George G.), Sherrill (Elizabeth) - Return from Tomorrow", and
        → "Ritchie (George G.) - Ordered to Return: My Life After Dying"
    2. Out of Body Experiences82
      1. As is the case with Near Death Experiences83, which sometimes include them, OBEs offer various challenges to physicalist84 accounts of the mind85, and to animalist86 accounts of what we are87.
      2. OBEs may or may not be a concomitant of an NDE. They seem sometimes to occur during other crisis times of illness.
      3. An example – see "BBC, Burgess (Gary) - Why do we know so little about ME?" – was given in March 2018 by a reporter suffering from Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, also known as ME, or Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS). He stated quite casually, without any self-consciousness about the prima facie absurdity of his account – “In the middle of a piece about maternity and paternity benefits, during the 6pm news programme, I had the most wonderful sensation. I left my body, was suddenly up in the studio ceiling, and was looking down on myself, the presenters, and all of the camera crew. I was having an out-of-body experience.”
      4. The question is – of course – whether these experiences are of anything outside the mind88. Do they really prove that something like a soul89 can wander out of the body90?
      5. A difficult situation to “explain away” is where the NDE-experiencer claims – as in the example above – to see something (while having an Out of Body Experience) they could not have seen under normal circumstances. The difficulty with evaluating such reports is that they are either vague and unsurprising, or anecdotal and hard to verify – so the presumption is that they aren’t veridical.
      6. There’s a famous “shoe” case where no follow-up seems to have been possible. There’s a (naturally sceptical) page on Infidels.org ("Augustine (Keith) - Hallucinatory Near-Death Experiences") which references this “shoe” case amongst others.
      7. The case of our reporter is surprisingly off-hand for such a surprising claim. "Blackmore (Susan) - Beyond the Body" asserts that 10% of people claim to have had OBEs. Maybe most also believe in immaterial souls91, and think that most other people do likewise. So, they may claim more than they strictly observed as a way of making their experience seem more important than those of rival accounts. Rather than thinking they are distorting the evidence-base for this phenomenon, they may simply take it as a fact, and want to share in the glamour associated with having experienced it. Much like alien abduction.
    3. Persistent Vegetative State92
      1. For information on what a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) actually is, see for example "Wikipedia - Persistent vegetative state". Note that the Wikipedia article uses the PVS acronym to stand for a Permanent Vegetative State.
      2. It’s never clear whether any such state is permanent, whereas it is clear that it is persistent. In the UK, the state becomes legally “permanent” after 12 months, and the term “continuous” is used in preference to “persistent”.
      3. The medical definition is given there as “A wakeful unconscious state that lasts longer than a few weeks”. Despite the (occasional) wakefulness, there is a “complete lack of cognitive function”.
      4. The interest in the Persistent Vegetative State within the topic of Personal Identity is that when in a PVS the attributes of personhood93 are not in evidence – and maybe not capable of being evidenced – so that it is possible to argue that the individual94 in the PVS is no longer a person95. It thus provides the opportunity to pull apart such prima facie co-referential terms as Human Person96 and Human Being97 (or Human Animal98).
      5. One may wonder why PVS is used in philosophical Thought experiments99 rather than Coma (a more severe condition). I suppose the issue is that in a PVS the brain-stem100 is substantially intact (whatever other brain-damage has been incurred), so that no life-support is required other than feeding tubes. In irreversible comas, the brain-stem may be so severely damaged that the basic functions of the organism101 cannot be carried on without life102 support. Consequently, there’s no debate whether those in a PVS are animals103, whereas it might be argued that those on life support in an irreversible coma are not. Hence, while the PVS definitely distinguishes human animals104 from human persons105 (according to most definitions), irreversible coma might not.
      6. I had originally put “vegetative functions” (rather than simply “functions”) above, but I’m unconvinced that any activity above cellular level ought to be classed as “vegetative”; but I think the Aristotelian classification is often adopted, where “animal” functions are those involving locomotion and the like, rather than nutrition, respiration, etc.
      7. I have discussed PVSs in my reviews of the following papers, amongst others:-
        → "Baillie (James) - What Am I?",
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood",
        → "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter",
        → "Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'", and
        → "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?"
  2. Life After Death106
    1. Here we must discuss possible ways in which post-mortem107 survival108 might be actualised, namely:-
      1. Resurrection109,
      2. Reincarnation110, or
      3. Immortality111 of the Soul112.
    2. To this list might be added the collection of hopeful possibilities expected by the Transhumanists113.
    3. We will discuss here broad issues rather than the specifics of the particular options.
    4. We need to discuss whether life114 after death115 – in the sense of eternal, or at least unending, life – is to be desired, though this can mostly be hived off to the Makropulos Case116.
    5. I’m not interested in cases of resuscitation, which are commonplace these days. The paradigm cases I’m interested in are after the total – or near-total – destruction of the body117.
    6. Resuscitation is probably best dealt with under the head of Near Death Experiences118, but see
      1. "Moody (Raymond A.) - Life After Life", and
      2. "Moody (Raymond A.) - The Light Beyond".
    7. Mark Johnston thinks (in "Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death") that there’s a forensic119 need for post-mortem survival120 of some sort, as otherwise there’s no incentive to be good, and hopes to provide it by a radical redefinition of what the person121 is. But this strikes me as changing the subject.
    8. "Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death" is a comprehensive sceptical attack on the possibility of post mortem survival.
    1. Resurrection122
      1. Many people hope for some form of post-mortem survival, preferably some sort of continuation of their earthly life. Even if not a life of bliss, they hope that it will be an unending positive experience wherein they can renew acquaintance with their friends and loved ones and carry on their projects.
      2. Plato hoped for the escape of the soul from the prison of the body, but in the Abrahamic religions the hope has been for some form of Resurrection – the provision of a renewed physical existence, though the details of where this new life will be enjoyed, and the qualities of the new body, are somewhat vague.
      3. The hope of a resurrection to paradise has occasionally pernicious effects – topically these days in Shia Islam, but there have been many less destructive Christian and Jewish martyrs – where people are willing – sometimes eager – to sacrifice their earthly lives in the hope of a ‘better resurrection’.
      4. Consequently, the metaphysical123 possibility124 of the resurrection of beings like us125 is very important.
      5. "Olson (Eric) - Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave" - taking the resurrection body to be the pre-mortem one reconstituted in some way – claims that resurrection is metaphysically impossible. I have some sympathy for this view, but it is far from clear-cut. Historically, the possibility of the resurrection of the very same individual has been facilitated by the continuity of an immaterial soul, at one time clothed in an earthly body, later by a heavenly one. If resurrection requires substance dualism126 it would seem to be a long shot given the well-known objections to the physics and metaphysics thereof.
      6. It is important to understand just what is believed by intellectually-respectable Jews, Christians and Muslims. Some discussion will be had about the orthodox Christian view being that there is no continuity of matter127 (the conundrum about the person consumed by cannibals was early recognised), and that the resurrection body128 is said to be in some sense a “spiritual” body.
      7. The locus classicus for the canonical Christian account of resurrection is in St. Paul’s 1st Letter to the Corinthians, Chapter 15, on which I’ve prepared a verse-by-verse commentary129.
      8. A good place to start for an understanding of what resurrection meant to Christians prior to the modern era is "Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336".
      9. As for contemporary Christian understanding, "Bacchiocchi (Samuele) - Immortality or Resurrection? A Biblical Study on Human Nature and Destiny" may be a good place to start, together with "Klett (Leah MarieAnn) - NT Wright: Western Christians have misread Heaven, the End Times, spiritual warfare".
      10. One thing that strikes me is that the resurrection of Christ, taken to be the guarantee of the Christian’s own resurrection, is no such thing in the sense of “showing it can be done”. The physical130 and metaphysical issues in resurrecting Jesus (or Lazarus, or Jairus’s daughter, or any recently-deceased131 person whose body132 is substantially intact) are much less than in the case of those whose bodies have been destroyed. Indeed, it might one day be possible133 to resurrect the recently-deceased134 by way of microscopic repair; at least this seems conceivable, whereas the resurrection of a human being whose body has become dispersed and whose parts have been recycled doesn’t even seem to make sense (on a materialist135 account of what we human persons136 are).
      11. The best place to start evaluating contemporary philosophical views on the metaphysical possibility of resurrection is "Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?". This includes "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death", a more balanced account than the one cited above.
      12. The early modern concern with the topic ‘took off’ in in 1694 when John Locke (1632–1704) added the chapter (Book 2, Chapter 27) – in which he treats of persons and their persistence conditions – to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. See "Thompson (Jon W.) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: Early Modern Philosophical Perspectives".
      13. Locke’s motivation was to provide an account of resurrection that was not open to sceptical objections. At the time, when the scientific revolution was in its early days, there was a division amongst ‘natural philosophers’ as to whether ‘thinking matter’ was coherent – could ‘mere matter’ think and be conscious or was an immaterial soul needed? Locke claimed to be agnostic on the question, but his intuition was that God could have enabled things so that matter could think, and he wanted an account of personal identity in which resurrection – in the absence of a soul that would provide the link between the pre- and post-mortem individual – made sense. The important issue in resurrection – or any other survival of death – is that the survivor should be the very same individual that died, even though that individual might have changed many of his properties.
      14. Locke made the seminal distinction between the ‘person’ and the ‘human being’ – a person is – he claims – “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places”.
      15. The important point – for Locke – is that it is mental states – in particular memory – that define the person, who – he claims – can ‘hop’ from one body to another. If a prince’s consciousness ‘informs’ the body of a cobbler ‘all’ would allow that the cobbler is the prince, Locke claims. Likewise, if the resurrected individual inherits enough of the mental states of the person who died, it is the same individual for Locke and his modern followers. Locke was particularly concerned to ensure the right individual got the right judgement in the great post-mortem assize.
      16. Most contemporary philosophers – and most people, most likely – are neo-Lockeans in adopting a ‘psychological view’ of personal identity. Those holding the minority view, to which I belong, are known as ‘animalists’. They hold that human beings are essentially human animals. We survive as long as the human animal – an organism – does, irrespective of its mental states. While our mental states are – for the most part – what matter to us – we don’t cease to exist if those mental states change radically or cease altogether. My view is that personhood is a ‘phase sortal’ like being a teacher. A human being doesn’t cease to be when they lose their job or become a different individual if they change it. Similarly, a human being doesn’t literally become ‘a different person’ if they suffer a radical personality change. Neo-Lockeans worry their heads about just how much of a change of personality an individual can undergo before they become a ‘different person’. Animalists will have none of this.
      17. This distinction is important when it comes to resurrection. If we are essentially human animals, there’s a problem if we claim that the resurrected individual is the very same individual that died. Normally, we would deny that if something is totally destroyed that it – that very same thing – could be recreated. If a bicycle is dismantled, cleaned up and repaired most would agree it’s the same bicycle. But if it’s mulched up and remanufactured we might doubt it was the same one. It might be just as good, but not the very same thing any more than two exactly similar bicycles coming off the production line are identical. Atheistic animalists deny that resurrection of the very same individual makes any sort of sense137.
      18. There is still – for the neo-Lockean who focuses on our psychology – something of a problem with the Christian view of resurrection. We are – presumably – not resurrected with exactly the same personalities – with all their sinful inclinations – as when we died, especially if we died in a demented state. So, just what is it that defines us – in the absence of an immaterial soul – if it is neither our bodies nor our mental states?
      19. A point that’s worth stressing – and which aligns well with the Christian view of resurrection as the means of post-mortem survival – is that we are ‘concrete particulars’ – in contemporary terms we are bits of hardware. There’s a view around amongst today’s technologists and transhumanists that we are ‘software’, ‘patterns in information space’ and that ‘we’ – that is our mental states as stored in our brain’s ‘connectome’ – might – in principle at least – be uploaded to a digital computer where we might live on indefinitely. Were this to be possible – which I very much doubt – and if a digital computer could be conscious – which I also doubt – it would be the computer (or a partition there of) that would be the new ‘us’, not the program or data.
      20. A final point has to do with first person experience – it may seem convincing but may not give the true situation. In multiple-realisation version of the teletransportation thought experiment, each ‘clone’ of you would have your memories, character, exactly similar body and so on, and would think itself ‘you’. But it would be deceived. It would only know the truth from the testimony of others or from a consideration of logic. I like to say that there is a distinction between forward and backward psychological continuity. My clone has backward psychological continuity with me – all his memories convince him he’s me. But in this case, I would have no forward psychological continuity – I just die and that’s it (or maybe I die and am resurrected somewhere completely different, taking the Christian view; but for the sake of the thought experiment, we assume secular materialism; what I don’t do is wake up on Mars).
      21. The notion of sleep is interesting. How do I know, after a peaceful night, that it’s me that wakes up in my bed? If it was not me, but some clone with my memories and so on, how would I ever know, from the inside? For all I know, yesterday’s ‘me’ went into oblivion and a new me was substituted. This new ‘me’ would think of himself as me unless someone successfully convinced him otherwise. Would this strange state of affairs really make any difference? Well, it would, in that it is we ourselves who want to survive and not some imposter just like us. It might also make an awful practical difference. Maybe in some ‘slasher movie’ version of the Truman Show there’s a big conspiracy. Each night the then ‘me’ is carted off, subjected to unspeakable tortures in order to create a clone of me that – with the willing compliance of those around me – is plopped back in my bed to awake none the wiser. That is not a good state of affairs – certainly not one conducive to a good night’s sleep should I get to know about it.
      22. Christian Philosophical Views on Personal Identity: There are three that I know of.
        1. Dualists: Relatively rare amongst contemporary philosophers, but the traditional Christian view. We are – basically – souls that ‘have’ bodies – an earthly one and later a heavenly one. The reason this is now doubted by philosophers is that there’s no scientific evidence for the existence of souls and – given the closure of physics – how could they interact with matter? Some Christian philosophers hold the view that the existence of the immaterial souls is a Christian doctrine they must believe and tough it out. I might just note that the same problem arises for ‘spirit’ if it’s taken to be some extra ‘fizz’.
        2. Materialists: Our current persistence conditions are basically those of animals. How they deal with resurrection is covered in the next session. Most Christian materialists seem to hold view the Constitution View below.
        3. Constitution View: We ‘are’ animals in the sense that we are – currently – constituted by them but are not identical to them. The analogy is with a statue and the marble of which it is made. Actually, it’s easier to explain the distinction if the statue is made of squishy clay. The statue cannot survive being squished into a ball, but the lump of clay can, so they cannot be identical (it is said; identical things have to have identical properties, including ‘modal’ ones – possible situations and all that). We are – it is claimed – essentially persons, who have a ‘first person perspective138’ on the world. We are essentially embodied, but not necessarily by the same body. This ‘first person perspective’ is reified and it is claimed that it can hop from one body to another, as at the resurrection. Note that this first person perspective isn’t an immaterial soul but is something ‘had’ by the body that currently constitutes the person. I have my doubts about this. If the first person perspective is a property of a body, then can that property really hop from one body to another. And couldn’t it hop onto multiple bodies, causing the logical difficulties we’ve seen before.
      23. Resurrection Options for Materialists: There are three proposals by modern Christian philosophers who are (or – in Zimmerman’s, a dualist’s, case – can adopt the stance of) ‘materialists’ – in denying the existence of incorporeal souls – not put forward as ‘actual’ but to show the logical possibility of resurrection:-
        1. Body Snatching ("Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection"): God miraculously swaps out our pre-mortem ‘corpse-to-be’ with a simulacrum and whisks away the original to the future world where it repaired and ‘spiritualised’.
        2. ‘Falling Elevator’ (think ‘Looney Tunes’ – the hero hops out of the falling elevator just before it crashes to the ground; Dean Zimmerman: "Zimmerman (Dean) - The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The “Falling Elevator” Model", "Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited" and "Zimmerman (Dean) - Personal Identity and the Survival of Death"): God sets up a miraculous mechanism that causes the dying body to connect to – and be continuous with – the future resurrection body in the next world. This is really a slightly less ludicrous version of the above.
        3. Luz Bone139 ("Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'"): there is some ‘atom’ or other small particle that survives corruption and is the ‘continuity particle’ on which the resurrection body is built (much like a pearl on a grain of sand). Some ancient Jews equated this, absurdly, with the Coccyx.
    2. Reincarnation140
      1. "Perrett (Roy W.) - Rebirth" makes a case for the metaphysical coherence of the traditional Indian account of rebirth – preferring the term “Rebirth” to “Reincarnation” because Buddhists deny the existence of an eternal Soul141, which may be presupposed by the concept of Reincarnation.
      2. My intuition142 is that – as well as doubts about its actual occurrence – Reincarnation suffers from even more philosophical problems from the perspective of personal identity than does resurrection itself.
      3. However, I’m substantially ignorant of the detailed philosophy and theology underpinning these ideas, though have read the rebuttal "Edwards (Paul) - Reincarnation: A Critical Examination".
      4. The topic is addressed negatively in the following works:-
        → "Edwards (Paul) - Reincarnation: A Critical Examination",
        → "Angel (Leonard) - Is There Adequate Empirical Evidence for Reincarnation? An Analysis of Ian Stevenson’s Work",
        → "Ransom (Champe) - A Critique of Ian Stevenson’s Rebirth Research",
        → "Smythe (Ingrid Hansen) - Objections to Karma and Rebirth: An Introduction", and maybe
        → "Penelhum (Terence) - 'Reincarnation'".
      5. I have only just bought – and therefore haven’t read – "Stevenson (Ian) - Children Who Remember Previous Lives: A Question of Reincarnation", much ridiculed by Edwards and others.
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses143
      1. The “Corpse Problem”
        • Corpses are troublesome144 for animalism145, which alleges (correctly in my view) that corpses are not animals146.
        • The claim is that, at death147, something ontologically148 new comes on the scene – because a corpse has different persistence149 conditions150 (those of masses of matter151) to those of organisms152.
        • Some philosophers – eg. Fred Feldman, in "Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death" – disagree. Feldman claims that we survive153 death154, but – rather disappointingly – as a corpse, which solves the “corpse problem”, but at the cost – most likely – of saying that we are bodies155 rather than organisms156.
        • The problem if we don’t survive death as our corpses – it is said – is to answer the question where the corpse comes from, and to answer the objection that if it was there all along – as a “corpse-to-be” – then we have a situation where we have two things of different sorts157 in the same place158 at the same time.
        • If this is taken seriously, then it can be used against the form of the animalist’s “too many thinkers159” argument.
        • I’m willing to accept that this “thinking animal” argument is unsound. However, just how the analogy would work for the “corpse-to-be” needs to be spelled out. The corpse has the persistence conditions160 of a mass of matter161. What are the persistence conditions162 of the “corpse-to-be”? If they are those of an organism163, then the corpse-to-be cannot be the same individual164 as the corpse. The Constitution View165 might be happy with this situation, promoting the idea that persons are constitute by bodies166 (rather than organisms) but what about Animalism?
        • I think the issue is again a parallelism in argumentation (the fetus problem for the CV versus the corpse problem for Animalism). We don’t need to follow this argumentative line.
        • The problem is discussed in the following works:-
          → "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity"
          → "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman"
          → "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem"
          → "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?"
          → "Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity"
          → "Olson (Eric) - The Person and the Corpse"
          For now I’ll just transcribe my notes thereon …
        • "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity"
          1. Proponents of the psychological view (PV) have a Fetus Problem, but animalists have an analogous Corpse Problem. While the person pops into existence after the fetus (a problem for the PV) the corpse pops into existence after the animal’s demise (a problem for the animalist).
          2. This summary is a bit quick. What Markosian actually says is that the supporter of the PV faces a dilemma. Since they have to deny that they were a fetus (as fetuses don’t have any psychological properties), they have a choice:-
            1. You replaced your fetus.
            2. Your fetus continued to exist and shares space, parts and matter with you.
          3. Markosian doesn’t like either horn, but thinks the animalist has a similar problem, as is argued in "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?". This is the Corpse Problem, but before considering it, we must note that the CV finds no problem with the second option – cohabitation – claiming that constitution gets round this worry.
          4. The Corpse Problem arises because if your persistence conditions are those of an organism, and a corpse is not an organism, then you are not identical to your corpse. Markosian thinks this leaves the animalist with a trilemma:-
            1. When you die, a new object comes into existence.
            2. When you die, nothing is left, not even a corpse – corpses do not exist.
            3. You cohabit space with, and share matter with, a thing that is non-identical with you that will become your corpse.
          5. Markosian thinks this is a problem, because he doesn’t like any of these options, but thinks that he is a physical thing, with the persistence conditions of physical things, and that a physical thing continues after death, and that physical thing – your body – is you as long as it exists. Olson rightly objects to this view – the PCs of animals aren’t at all like the PCs of lumps of matter.
          6. Markosian thinks (rightly) that as Olson is suspicious of bodies, he’ll be suspicious of corpses too, and so will go for option (ii). He thinks other animalists will go for option (i). Again, he ignores the CV whereby option (iii) is not a problem. The dialectical position here, of course, is that considerations concerning the objectionabilty of (iii) – cohabitation – are central to Olson’s main argument for animalism. I don’t think he needs that argument, so should accept (iii).
        • "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman"
          1. Olson notes that many critics of "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" have accepted that we are animals, that psychology has nothing to do with our identity-conditions, yet have balked at Olson’s account of animal identity. While he hasn’t seen a better account, he would view one as a friendly improvement on his own theory.
          2. The reason he thinks animals cease to exist when they die is that the PCs of corpses are radically different from those of animals.
          3. Olson even seems to doubt the existence of corpses. Why is this? Is that because he’s worried by the “corpse to be” problem, where we would have too many thinkers?
          4. What would the PCs of corpses be? Similar to other inanimate things – such as statues, if there are such things! He considers some possibilities. Retention of shape; the bulk of atoms; gradual change.
          5. What it takes for a living organism to persist is entirely different. There are radical changes of shape from embryo to adult. The adult can survive losses of arms and legs. It might even survive paring down to a head on life-support. It survives because its biological life continues.
          6. Consequently, because the PCs of organism and corpse are so different, he can think of no (disjunctive?) account that covers both. But if there is one, he’d welcome it.
          7. He covers these matters further in "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem".
        • "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem"
          1. The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal167 looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism168. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal169 coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
        • "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?"
          1. Eric Olson argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the standard view of personal identity is mistaken.
          2. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson's favored biological view of personal identity.
          3. Rejection of the identity claim that raises the fetal problem;
          4. Analysis of the Biological View and standard view of personal identity;
          5. Eliminativist position of corpses in regard to their biological and psychological activity.
        • "Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity"
          1. Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It is argued that such an identification would be a mistake. A living organism has a different part/whole relationship and persistence conditions than the alleged body. A case will be made that the concept ‘human body’ is a conceptual mess, vague in an unprincipled manner, and that an eliminativist stance towards dead bodies is the appropriate response.
        • "Olson (Eric) - The Person and the Corpse"
          1. What happens to us when we die, if there is no afterlife? We might cease to exist, or continue existing as corpses. The view that we become corpses is hard to defend, because it makes it hard to say what our identity over time could consist in. The view that we cease to exist is little better: it seems to imply that there are no such things as corpses. A satisfying metaphysics of death is elusive.
          2. Sections
            → The Person and the Corpse
            → Pluralism
            → Speaking of the Dead
            → The Person/Body Argument
            → The Essentialism Argument
            → The Psychological-Continuity Argument
            → The Dead-Animal Argument
            → Animals and Corpses
            → The Annihilationist’s Dilemma
            → Animal Identity
            → The Historic-Dependence Account
            → Troubles for Historic Dependence
            → Pluralism and Corpse Eliminitivism
      2. Resurrection
        • Corpses are probably also important for most Christian materialists170 who hope for some form of resurrection171.
        • If there is a corpse to be resurrected172, it is easier to see how identity is preserved than if we have total destruction. This is obviously so in the case of resuscitation, but even where we have a real case of death173 – not just clinical death, or brain death174, but real death with a bit of mouldering – there is some physical thing that is responsible for preserving identity.
    2. Disembodied Existence175
      1. As an Animalist176, I don’t hold out much hope for disembodied existence for such beings as ourselves177.
      2. It is true that most people, most of the time, seem to have thought it possible – or even certain. Presumably it is closely related to the view that we are – or at least have – immortal178 souls179 that survive the death180 of our bodies181. Maybe there are alternative “possibilities” to explain the origins of the belief. But there are worries whether disembodied existence is even coherent for concrete particulars.
      3. Note that “disembodied” is sometimes used for “disembodied brains”. Since the brain182 is part of the body183, I cover such possibilities under Brains In Vats184.
      4. There is some overlap between this topic and at least one topic in Transhumanism185. The idea behind Uploading186 seems to be that we are “patterns in information187 space” (Andy Clark) and these “patterns” could – in principle – be uploaded188 to a computer189. The entities resulting from such uploads would appear to be disembodied, at least if their experience (assuming that they are conscious190) is of having simulated bodies191 they don’t really have, as in The Matrix. But, all this illusion aside, are these minds192 actually disembodied, or are their “bodies193” (parts of) the computer194 that “runs” them?
    3. Interregnum195
      1. This is a term of art for the (supposed) period between death196 and reincarnation197, of which this is a sub-topic. I think the term is due to Paul Edwards.
      2. The problem with this period – whatever it is called – is that it may seem to imply intermittent existence198.
      3. Alternatively, it has to rely on some alternative substrate for the existence199 of which there is little or no evidence.
      4. The obvious candidate is a substantial soul200. However, it seems that orthodox Hinduism thinks of a rather tenuous “astral body” as providing the link.
      5. That said, the same issue arises for any post-mortem survival201 that is alleged to follow the total destruction of the body202. At least reincarnation203 has some tenuous evidence in its favour, whereas there are – as far as I’m aware – no claimed occurrences of the resurrection204 of a totally-destroyed body205.
      6. I suppose that theists might claim that the information206 that constitutes207 a person208 is held in the mind of God during the interregnum.
  4. Immortality209
    1. In the Biblical Christian tradition, God is the only being with natural immortality (see 1 Timothy 6:16 “God … who alone is immortal”, NIV), but Plato (and his Platonising Christian followers) had it that the (human) soul210 is also naturally immortal. The Biblical view – at least on some interpretations – is rather that God gives or denies immortality to whoever he wishes (and there is consequently no need to eternally roast the immortal souls of the wicked).
    2. St. Paul has it that “the perishable must clothe itself with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality” (1 Corinthians 15:53, NIV). This is in the context of the resurrection211 of the just dead212 (or the metamorphosis213 of the just living) at the return of Christ.
    3. In the context of identity theory, it is doubtful whether the very same thing can at one time be perishable and at another time immortal, because a thing’s persistence conditions214 are taken to be essential215 properties216 of the sort217 it is, and a single thing cannot change sort218,219.
    4. As such, (as "Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death" notes), natural immortality of the soul220 is the only hope for post-mortem survival221. But this hope is itself dashed by the lack of empirical evidence for the existence of the substantial222 soul223, immortal or otherwise.
    5. It does seem incongruous to talk about post-mortem immortality – how can something that has died be immortal? The idea, no doubt, is that it is the body224 that the soul225 occupied that was mortal. Hence, the soul226 needs a new immortal body227 to be clothed with. That seems to be the Pauline picture, though debated by the “Conditional Immortality” people.
    6. The Transhumanists228 hope that Uploading229 to a computer230 might lead to indefinitely extended life231, though this is hardly immortality. Indefinite identity-preserving life extensions might be possible using repair-microbots.
    7. In all this, I’m talking about the persistence of the individual232. I’m not talking about “immortality” in the sense of “undying fame”. As Woody Allen quipped (I’m not sure where this is from, but see Woody Allen: Immortality) – “I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality through not dying. I don't want to live on in the hearts of my countrymen; I want to live on in my apartment”.
    8. "Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality" argues that we wouldn’t even want immortality, but I’m not convinced. However, a bad immortality – uploading233 to an evil computer234, for instance – would be worse than no immortality, though some (eg. Miguel De Unamuno) are not even convinced of that. This topic is covered further under the Makropulos Case235.
    9. Of course, if animalism236 is the correct account of personal identity, immortality is not on offer, though if the transhumanists237 succeed, and an alternative account of personal identity is correct, an indefinite extension of life might be possible.
    1. Ivan Ilych238
      1. Tolstoy’s short novella "Tolstoy (Leo) - The Death of Ivan Ilyich" tends to feature in discussions on the philosophy of death239.
      2. I first came upon it via "Kagan (Shelly) - The nature of death (continued); Believing you will die". The contention in Kagan’s lecture was that Tolstoy’s novella taught that no-one really expects to die, an idea Kagan rejects.
      3. My own view is that this isn’t really what the novella is about, but is rather about how we should live our lives – or at least how we should not live them.
      4. In this Note, I intend to consider two main questions:-
        1. Does Tolstoy suggest that no-one really expects to die?
        2. What is the aim of the novella?
      5. As I’m not a literary critic, I’ll be somewhat briefer with regards to the second question than Tolstoy’s work deserves.
      6. The explicit passage on the expectation of death is where Ivan – on hearing that he is about to die – observes that the syllogism beginning “all men are mortal” applies to “all men”, but not specifically to him.
      7. Of course, no-one really believes they are immortal240 (or, at least, that they are not going to die) but the reality of personal death241 is pushed so far into the background that it is hardly taken into account in our plans (other than in the making of rather impersonal provisions), until it is just around the corner. Our plans always extend infinitely on, without the explicit acknowledgement until the last possible minute that we – and more urgently our faculties – will not continue on for ever, and that we need to eke out our time more carefully.
      8. No doubt this is especially true of the young, but I can vouch for the fact that it’s still true of at least one person aged 62242.
    2. Makropulos Case243
      1. This discussion is slightly off-topic, in that the focus isn’t on whether there is, in fact, any such thing as immortality244 (for human beings245).
      2. Rather, it is whether immortality – again for embodied human beings – would be desirable (or, indeed, tolerable).
      3. This discussion will investigate the controversy started in 1973 by "Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality".
      4. Williams’s conclusion – needless to say – is that immortality is not tolerable, though his reasoning is rather subtle.
      5. Thoughts on the value – or disvalue – of immortality246 tie in with the evil – or lack of evil – of death247. Some discussions of the disvalue of death mention the Makropulos Case in that regard.
      6. Ultimately, all discussion of the evils of death248 will fall under this Note.
      7. Since animalism249 strongly implies that “death is the end of us”, this may be important.


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed everything on our Agenda, we now in our next Chapter250 make our conclusions.
  2. This is work in progress251.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed252
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. I have segregated those works on the core topic of Resurrection that are from a religio-philosophical perspective from those that are pure philosophy. In general, those written by professional philosophers are in the latter section, even if addressed to a religious audience.
  3. The motivation for some of the works is as follows:-
    • Gasser is the most important work I need to address.
    • Wright’s big book (hopefully) supplies all there is from the Christian side – even though the focus is on a specific – and theologically and metaphysically special – resurrection.
    • Bynum and Gillman provide background information from the Christian and Jewish perspectives, respectively.
    • Badham is a rather elementary Christian discussion, and may be rejected.
    • Corcoran is an important survey, already included in the reading for a couple of other Chapters.
    • Edwards, Flew and Penelhum are useful surveys of older material, which is useful just to read for the appropriate background. There is some considerable overlap in the selections.
    • I suppose I need to discuss death itself, hence Kagan, McMahan, Regan & Wyatt – though skipping the ethical bits.
    • Perrett and Tippler may be a little off-centre, and I may reject them on closer inspection.
    • The other individual papers – especially those by van Inwagen and Shoemaker – are probably important, but justification is to be supplied.
  4. Many aspects of these and other works will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read255, include the following:-
  1. Death
    1. Death256
    2. Near Death Experiences261
    3. Out of Body Experiences262
    4. Persistent Vegetative State264
  2. Life After Death
    1. Life After Death270
    2. Resurrection272
    3. Reincarnation279
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses280
    2. Disembodied Existence285
    3. Interregnum287
  4. Immortality
    1. Immortality288
    2. Ivan Ilych290
    3. Makropulos Case292

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Death
    1. Death293
    2. Near Death Experiences298
    3. Out of Body Experiences300
    4. Persistent Vegetative State303
  2. Life After Death
    1. Life After Death305
    2. Resurrection309
    3. Reincarnation312
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses313
    2. Disembodied Existence314
    3. Interregnum317
  4. Immortality
    1. Immortality318
    2. Ivan Ilych319
    3. Makropulos Case320


In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 12: Footnote 71:
  1. Consider (random examples at a time in 2018) Wikipedia: Ray Wilkins & Wikipedia: Eric Bristow dying of cardiac arrest “before their time”, plus far too many young blacks (and those mistaken for being young blacks) dying from puncture wounds.
Footnote 129:
  1. See "Todman (Theo) - Thesis - 1 Corinthians: 15".
Footnote 137:
  1. The situation is more difficult for resurrection than the bicycle case. For artifacts it’s to some degree up to us what we take to be the same article after some misadventure. In this case, as the same material is used to make the new bicycle, we might allow that it is the same one. But in the case of an organism, it doesn’t have a fixed collection of matter and some of its matter at one time may form part of another at others.
Footnote 138:
  1. I think the idea of a first person perspective is important. It is – in the sense of being our conscious ‘window on the world’ – what matters to us.
  2. However, Christian materialists have spotted that non-human animals also have a conscious ‘window on the world’ , so they ratchet up the requirement to include being able to contemplate your own death and worry about it. If it could be demonstrated that some animals could do this – and surely cows in the slaughter-house do – they would ratchet it up some more.
Footnote 139:
  1. This attempt isn’t completely without motivation.
  2. It can be considered to be an analogy to the recently-discovered existence of ‘imaginal discs’ in the caterpillar that ensure the continuity of its development into pupa and thereon to imago.
Footnote 242:
  1. When I originally wrote this in February 2016.
Footnote 252: Footnote 258: Footnote 259: Footnote 263: Footnote 266: Footnote 294: Footnotes 295, 297: Footnote 296: Footnote 301: Footnote 304: Footnote 306: Footnote 307: Footnotes 310, 311: Footnote 315: Footnote 316: Footnote 321:

Table of the Previous 12 Versions of this Note: (of 19)

Date Length Title
14/02/2026 00:41:46 66750 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
06/07/2023 00:43:12 63772 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
28/09/2022 10:24:58 63495 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
16/05/2022 21:18:43 63358 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
11/04/2022 00:01:26 31827 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
01/10/2021 13:17:46 30597 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
29/03/2021 19:23:31 21607 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
22/03/2021 00:28:48 17715 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
08/02/2021 18:10:05 9890 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
29/12/2019 12:57:36 10132 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
18/04/2019 18:18:43 10126 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
05/04/2016 23:19:41 9859 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)


Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
06/09/2026 04:46:36 None available Thesis - Chapter 00 (Preface)

Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

1 Corinthians: 15 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal Androids Animalism Animalism - Objections
Animals Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Baillie - What Am I? Body Brain
Brain Death Brain Transplants Brains in Vats Bynum - Resurrection of the Body (Preface + Introduction) Chisholm - Which Physical Thing Am I?
Christian Materialism Coincidence Computers Consciousness Constitution
Constitution View Continuity Corpses Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood Death
Disembodied Existence Dualism Existence Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter Forensic Property
Homo Sapiens Human Animals Human Beings Human Persons Immortality
Individual Information Intermittent Objects Interregnum Intuition
Ivan Ilych Jen_080204 (Brandom, Chisholm, Baillie) Life Life After Death Makropulos Case
Markosian - The Human Animal: Three Problems for Olson Matter Memory Metamorphosis Metaphysics
Mind Modality Near Death Experiences Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death Olson - Persons and Bodies - Response
Olson - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman Olson - The Human Animal (Precis) Olson - What Are We? Souls Ontology Organisms
Out of Body Experiences Persistence Persistence Criteria Persistent Vegetative State Person
Physical Continuity Physicalism Process Metaphysics Properties Psychological View
Reincarnation Resurrection Rosenberg - Thinking Clearly About Death: Prefaces & Prelude Russell - Do We Survive Death? Sortals
Souls Status: Thesis Dashboard (2026: September) Strawson - Why I Have No Future Substance Survival
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion) Thesis - Method & Form Thinking Animal Argument
Thought Experiments Todman - Review - Sylvia Penny - The Resurrection Chapter: 1 Corinthians 15 Transhumanism Uploading Vagueness
What are We? Works Read - Explanation      

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Existence PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 Reincarnation Resurrection Resurrection (OBT)
Status: Thesis Dashboard (2026: September), 2 Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Thesis - Personal Identity, 2 Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
Website Generator Documentation - Thesis Technology, 2        

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Todman (Theo) Resurrection Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Existence Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Personal Identity Paper High Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Reincarnation Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Resurrection Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes


References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Aeon Video - By the river Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 30 June 2021 Yes
Aeon Video - Crannog Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 09 September 2019 Yes
Aeon Video - Dying for beginners Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 23 November 2023 Yes
Aeon Video - In dog years Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 24 December 2020 Yes
Aeon Video - The animal that wouldn't die Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 16 January 2015 Yes
Aeon Video - This ciliate is about to die Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 03 July 2024 Yes
Aeon Video - What does dying really feel like? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 23 June 2022 Yes
Aeon Video - What science tells us about the afterlife Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 28 September 2023 Yes
Almeder (Robert) Death and Personal Survival: Evidence for Life After Death Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Almeder (Robert) - Death and Personal Survival: Evidence for Life After Death 2%
Almeder (Robert) Death and Personal Survival: Evidence for Life After Death - Preface Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Almeder (Robert) - Death and Personal Survival: Evidence for Life After Death Yes
Alter (Michael J.) The Resurrection & Christian Apologetics: A Critical Inquiry Volume 2 Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Alter (Michael J.) - The Resurrection & Christian Apologetics: A Critical Inquiry Volume 2 15%
Alter (Michael J.) The Resurrection: A Critical Inquiry Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Alter (Michael J.) - The Resurrection: A Critical Inquiry 7%
Angel (Leonard) Is There Adequate Empirical Evidence for Reincarnation? An Analysis of Ian Stevenson’s Work Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 4, Chapter 27 No
Antony (Louise M.) Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) High Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 30%
Atkinson (Basil F.C.) Life and Immortality: An Examination of the Nature and Meaning of Life and Death as they are revealed in the Scriptures Book - Cited Atkinson (Basil F.C.) - Life and Immortality: An Examination of the Nature and Meaning of Life and Death as they are revealed in the Scriptures Yes
Atkinson (Thomas) Human organisms and the survival of death: a systematic evaluation of the possibility of life after death given animalism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract PhD thesis, University of Liverpool Website, August 2017 Yes
Atkinson (Thomas) Material Beings and the Metaphysics of the Resurrection Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Website: Lecture Handout Yes
Augustine (Keith) Hallucinatory Near-Death Experiences Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Infidels Website 6%
Ayer (A.J.) Postscript to a Postmortem Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Ayer - The Meaning of Life Yes
Ayer (A.J.) That Undiscovered Country Paper - Cited Ayer - The Meaning of Life Yes
Ayer (A.J.) The Meaning of Life Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
Ayer (A.J.) What I Saw When I Was Dead Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Edwards - Immortality, pp, 269-275 Yes
Bacchiocchi (Samuele) Immortality or Resurrection? A Biblical Study on Human Nature and Destiny Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bacchiocchi (Samuele) - Immortality or Resurrection? A Biblical Study on Human Nature and Destiny 1%
Badham (Paul) Christian Beliefs About Life After Death Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Badham (Paul) - Christian Beliefs About Life After Death 1%
Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) Immortality or Extinction Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction 5%
Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) Immortality or Extinction: Introduction Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction, Introduction Yes
Baggini (Julian) Goodbye Pixel Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 24 January 2023 Yes
Baillie (James) Problems in Personal Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 45%
Baillie (James) What Am I? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 4 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001): 151-167 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) When Do Persons Begin and End? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005 Yes
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