<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /> <title>Note: Write-ups - Crane - Elements of Mind (Theo Todman's Web Page)</title> </head><body> <a name="Top"></a> <h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages</h1><hr><h2>Write-ups</h2><h3>Crane - Elements of Mind</h3><p class = "Centered">(Text as at 12/02/2015 16:48:00)<p>For Text Colour-conventions (at end of page): <A HREF="#ColourConventions">Click Here</a>.</p><hr> <P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ul type="disc"><li>This is a very full analysis of <a name="51"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_420.htm">Crane (Tim) - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind</A>", undertaken when I was an undergraduate at Birkbeck, though I intend to re-read and update it. </li><li>What follows are Crane s Chapter Summaries, taken from his TOC. </li><li>Follow the links for the Notes providing my analysis of the various Sections. </li></ul> <BR><U>Section Summaries</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li><b>Chapter 1</b>: <a name="46"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7093.htm">Crane (Tim) - Mind</A>"<ol type="1"><li><b><a name="1"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1030.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP>  Philosophy of mind and the study of mental phenomena</b>: We have a scientific view of ourselves and a non-scientific view; philosophy has preoccupied itself with the question of if (and how) these views are compatible; but there is a prior question: what is the content of the non-scientific view we have of ourselves? </li><li><b><a name="2"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1031.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>  Perspectives and points of view</b>: The idea that having a mind is having a perspective on things, or on the world, introduced; the distinction between those creatures with a perspective and those without is vague, but it matches the vagueness in the concept of a mind. </li><li><b><a name="3"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1032.htm">Note</A><SUP>3</SUP>  Perspectives and their objects</b>: Two features of a perspective introduced: objects are presented within perspectives, and perspectives are partial, they let in some things and leave out others. These correspond to the two defining features of intentionality: 'directedness' and 'aspectual shape'. </li><li><b><a name="4"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1033.htm">Note</A><SUP>4</SUP>  The origin of the concepts of intentionality and intension</b>: The origin of the term 'intentionality' explained; intentionality as a mental feature should be distinguished from the logical feature, intensionality; the connection and difference between these ideas explained. </li><li><b><a name="5"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1034.htm">Note</A><SUP>5</SUP>  Directedness and intentional objects</b>: All intentional phenomena have two essential features: directedness upon an object and aspectual shape; the idea of an intentional object introduced; intentional objects are not a kind of thing; an intentional object is what is thought about. </li><li><b> <a name="6"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1035.htm">Note</A><SUP>6</SUP>  Aspectual shape and intentional content</b>: Aspectual shape is the way in which something is apprehended in an intentional state or act; connections and differences are described between the idea of aspectual shape and Frege's idea of sense; for a state to have intentional content is for it to have an intentional object and a certain aspectual shape. </li><li><b><a name="7"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1036.htm">Note</A><SUP>7</SUP>  The problem of intentionality</b>: Various things are called the problem of intentionality: the problem discussed here is the problem of how intentional states can concern things that do not exist; the best solution is to deny that intentional states are relations to genuinely existing objects; internalism and externalism introduced. </li><li><b><a name="8"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1037.htm">Note</A><SUP>8</SUP>  The structure of intentionality</b>: All intentional states have intentional objects (something they are about) but they are not relations to these objects; rather, intentional states are relations to intentional contents; intentional contents need not be propositional; intentional modes introduced; the relational structure of an intentional state is subject mode content. </li></ol> </li><li><b>Chapter 2</b>: <a name="47"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7094.htm">Crane (Tim) - Body</A>"<ol start = "9" type="1"><li><b><a name="9"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1038.htm">Note</A><SUP>9</SUP>  Interaction between mind and body</b>: Descartes's view that he is not lodged in his body like a pilot in a ship endorsed; the mind and the body do interact causally; this is taken as a starting point for debate, not something which is in need of defence. </li><li><b><a name="10"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1039.htm">Note</A><SUP>10</SUP>  Substance, property, event</b>: Some basic metaphysical categories introduced; substance distinguished from attribute or property; a state is a thing having a property at a time; states are distinguished from events on the grounds that events are particulars with temporal parts; mental phenomena comprise both mental states and mental events (or 'acts'). </li><li><b><a name="11"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1040.htm">Note</A><SUP>11</SUP>  The 'intelligibility' of mental causation</b>: Mental-physical causation may be considered problematic because of something about causation or something about the mental, or something about the physical; the first two of these dismissed; the problem of mental causation is a result of 'physicalist' assumptions about the physical world. </li><li><b><a name="12"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1041.htm">Note</A><SUP>12</SUP>  Physics and physicalism</b>: Physicalism distinguished from monism in general and from materialism; physicalism gives a special role to physics; the 'generality of physics' distinguished from the 'completeness of physics' and the 'explanatory adequacy of physics'. </li><li><b><a name="13"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1042.htm">Note</A><SUP>13</SUP>  The problem of mental causation for dualists</b>: The problem arises from the apparent conflict between mental causation and the completeness of physics; overdetermination of mental and physical causes ruled out. </li><li><b><a name="14"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1043.htm">Note</A><SUP>14</SUP>  The identity theory</b>: The identity theory solves the problem of mental causation by identifying mental and physical causes; which version of the identity theory is accepted depends on what the relata of causation are (events or properties). </li><li><b><a name="15"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1044.htm">Note</A><SUP>15</SUP>  Reductionism</b>: The identity theory is an ontologically reductionist theory; ontological reduction distinguished from explanatory reduction, a relation between theories; the two types of reduction are independent. </li><li><b><a name="16"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1045.htm">Note</A><SUP>16</SUP>  Against the identity theory; anti-reductionism</b>: The identity theory is implausible because of Putnam's variable or multiple realization argument; ontological reduction should therefore be rejected. </li><li><b><a name="17"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1046.htm">Note</A><SUP>17</SUP>  The problem of mental causation for non-reductive physicalism</b>: If ontological reduction is denied, then the problem of mental causation returns for non-reductive physicalism; the non-reductive physicalist response is to hold that the mental is necessarily determined by the physical; the difficulties with this view discussed. </li><li><b><a name="18"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1047.htm">Note</A><SUP>18</SUP>  Emergence</b>: An alternative non-physicalist position introduced: mental properties are 'emergent' properties with their own causal powers; this position denies the completeness of physics. </li><li><b><a name="19"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1048.htm">Note</A><SUP>19</SUP>  Physicalism as the source of the mind-body problem</b>: Some see physicalism as the source of the mind-body problem, not its solution; the problem here is how to explain the place of consciousness in the physical world; the contemporary mind-body problem as a dilemma: if the mind is not physical, then how can it have physical effects? But if the mind is physical, how can we understand consciousness? </li><li><b><a name="20"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1049.htm">Note</A><SUP>20</SUP>  What does a solution to the mind-body problem tell us about the mind?</b>: Whether the identity theory, non-reductive physicalism, or emergentism are true does not tell us much of interest about the nature of mental properties themselves. </li></ol> </li><li><b>Chapter 3</b>: <a name="48"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7095.htm">Crane (Tim) - Consciousness</A>"<ol start = "21" type="1"><li><b><a name="21"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1050.htm">Note</A><SUP>21</SUP>  The conscious and the unconscious</b>: Different senses of 'conscious' and 'unconscious' distinguished; Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness discussed; our concern is with phenomenal consciousness; a state is phenomenally conscious when there is something it is like to be in that state. </li><li><b><a name="22"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1051.htm">Note</A><SUP>22</SUP>  The distinction between the intentional and the qualitative</b>: Mental phenomena are often divided into intentional and qualitative phenomena; this distinction is not very clear; many intentional states are phenomenally conscious; qualitative states are a variety of phenomenally conscious states, those having a sensory character. </li><li><b><a name="23"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1052.htm">Note</A><SUP>23</SUP>  Qualia</b>: The term 'qualia' defined: qualia are non-intentional conscious mental properties; it is a substantial thesis that qualitative character is explicable in terms of qualia. </li><li><b><a name="24"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1053.htm">Note</A><SUP>24</SUP>  The intentionality of bodily sensation</b>: Bodily sensation examined as the apparently best case for a non-intentionalist view of the mind; a proper conception of bodily sensation shows it to be intentional in the sense of 8; bodily sensations are ways of being aware of one's body. </li><li><b><a name="25"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1054.htm">Note</A><SUP>25</SUP>  Strong intentionallsm and weak intentionallsm</b>: Intentionalists believe that all mental states or acts are intentional; weak intentionalists hold that some intentional states or acts also have qualia which account for their phenomenal character; strong intentionalists deny this; strong intentionalism defended. </li><li><b><a name="26"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1055.htm">Note</A><SUP>26</SUP>  Physicalism, consciousness, and qualia</b>: The problems of consciousness for physicalism revisited; these problems do not depend on the existence of qualia; three arguments distinguished: the explanatory gap, the knowledge argument, and the zombie argument. </li><li><b><a name="27"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1056.htm">Note</A><SUP>27</SUP>  The explanatory gap</b>: The explanatory gap argument claims that consciousness remains beyond the explanatory reach of physicalism; this argument is shown to rest either on excessively strong understandings of physicalism and explanation, or on the zombie hypothesis. </li><li><b><a name="28"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1057.htm">Note</A><SUP>28</SUP>  The knowledge argument examined</b>: The knowledge argument is a sound argument against the view that all facts are physical facts; but physicalism should not define itself in that way. </li><li><b><a name="29"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1058.htm">Note</A><SUP>29</SUP>  Zombies</b>: The zombie argument is effective against the forms of physicalism discussed in 14 and 17; if it is accepted, it provides a further motivation for emergence. </li><li><b><a name="30"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1059.htm">Note</A><SUP>30</SUP>  The prospects for explaining consciousness</b>: The prospects for a reductive account of consciousness summarized. </li></ol> </li><li><b>Chapter 4</b>: <a name="49"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7096.htm">Crane (Tim) - Thought</A>"<ol start = "31" type="1"><li><b><a name="31"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1060.htm">Note</A><SUP>31</SUP>  Thoughts and beliefs</b>: The term 'thought' will be used for a kind of mental state or act, not for the content of such states or acts. </li><li><b><a name="32"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1061.htm">Note</A><SUP>32</SUP>  Consciousness and belief</b>: Belief, properly so-called, is never conscious; belief is a mental state, not a mental act; what philosophers call 'conscious belief is really the event of becoming conscious of what one believes. </li><li><b><a name="33"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1062.htm">Note</A><SUP>33</SUP>  Propositional attitudes</b>: Russell's term 'propositional attitude' picks out those intentional states whose intentional content is evaluable as true or false; the nature of propositional content discussed; Fregean and neo-Russellian accounts compared. </li><li><b><a name="34"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1063.htm">Note</A><SUP>34</SUP>  The propositional attitude thesis</b>: The thesis that all intentional states are propositional attitudes introduced and rejected; the thesis is unmotivated and it has obvious counter-examples. </li><li><b><a name="35"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1064.htm">Note</A><SUP>35</SUP>  De re and de dicto attitudes</b>: Thoughts and attitudes can be described in a 'de re' or relational style as well as in the more usual 'de dicto' style; the fact that there are such de re ascriptions does not imply that there is a category of de re thoughts or attitudes; the nature of intentional states can be separated from the conditions for their ascription. </li><li><b><a name="36"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1065.htm">Note</A><SUP>36</SUP>  Internalism and externalism</b>: Externalists about intentionality believe that some intentional states or acts constitutively depend on the existence of their objects, while the strongest form of internalism denies this; it is argued that internalist intentionality is coherent, and that there is no prima facie intuitive case in favour of externalism. </li><li><b><a name="37"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1066.htm">Note</A><SUP>37</SUP>  The argument for externalism</b>: Externalists employ the influential 'Twin Earth' argument in favour of their position; internalists may challenge this argument in two ways; the most plausible way is to deny the externalist's claim that content determines reference; no positive argument for internalism is provided, though. </li><li><b><a name="38"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1067.htm">Note</A><SUP>38</SUP>  Demonstrative thought</b>: Demonstrative thoughts ('that F is G') have been claimed to be another source of externalist arguments; much of what externalists claim about demonstrative thought can be accepted by internalists. </li><li><b><a name="39"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1068.htm">Note</A><SUP>39</SUP>  The prospects for explaining thought</b>: The prospects for a reductive account of thought or intentionality briefly considered. </li></ol> </li><li><b>Chapter 5</b>: <a name="50"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7097.htm">Crane (Tim) - Perception</A>"<ol start = "40" type="1"><li><b><a name="40"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1069.htm">Note</A><SUP>40</SUP>  The problem of perception</b>: The phenomenological problem of perception distinguished from the epistemological and psychological problems; the phenomenological problem is a result of the conflict between the immediacy of perception and the 'Phenomenal Principle', once one allows the possibility of perfect hallucination. </li><li><b><a name="41"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1070.htm">Note</A><SUP>41</SUP>  The argument from Illusion</b>: The argument outlined, and its most plausible version defended; the argument is shown to rest on the 'Phenomenal Principle'. </li><li><b><a name="42"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1071.htm">Note</A><SUP>42</SUP>  Perception as a form of intentionality</b>: The way to solve the problem of perception is to give a correct account of the intentionality of perception; the 'Phenomenal Principle' rejected; the nature of perceptual contents and modes examined. </li><li><b><a name="43"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1072.htm">Note</A><SUP>43</SUP>  The phenomenal character of perceptual experience</b>: It is sometimes said that an intentionalist view of perception cannot account for the phenomenal character of perception; two kinds of evidence for this claim considered: introspective evidence and inverted spectrum/earth thought-experiments; introspective evidence shown to be inconclusive, once we understand intentionality in the proper way. </li><li><b><a name="44"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1073.htm">Note</A><SUP>44</SUP>  Inverted spectrum, Inverted Earth</b>: The inverted spectrum possibility (if it is one) presents no knock-down argument against intentionalism; Inverted Earth only presents a problem for a purely externalist version of intentionalism; if narrow perceptual content is coherent, then the inverted earth argument is unsuccessful. </li><li><b><a name="45"></a><A HREF = "../Notes_10/Notes_1074.htm">Note</A><SUP>45</SUP>  Perception as non-conceptual</b>: A further aspect of the phenomenal character of perception introduced: its distinctness from belief and judgement; this is expressed by saying that perceptions have non-conceptual contents; this idea is clarified, motivated, and defended against its critics. </li></ol> </li></ul></FONT></P> <br><hr><h3 class = "Left">Printable Versions:</h3> <UL><li>Follow (<A Href="Notes_Print/NotesPrint_1029_0_P_R.htm" TARGET = "_top">this link</A>) for level 0 (with reading list), and </li><li>Follow (<A Href="Notes_Print/NotesPrint_1029_1_P.htm" TARGET = "_top">this link</A>) for level 1.</li></UL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><TR> <TH WIDTH="25%">Note last updated</TH> <TH WIDTH="50%">Reading List for this Topic</TH> <TH WIDTH="25%">Parent Topic</TH></TR> <TR><TD WIDTH="25%">12/02/2015 16:48:00</TD> <TD WIDTH="50%">None available</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%">None</TD></TR> </TABLE></center> <hr><h3>Summary of Note Links from this Page</h3> <CENTER> <TABLE Class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1045.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Against the Identity Theory : Anti-reductionism</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1035.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Aspectual Shape and Intentional Content</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1061.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Consciousness and Belief</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1064.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - De Re and De Dicto Attitudes</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1067.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Demonstrative Thought</span></A></TD> </TR> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1034.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Directedness and Intentional Objects</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1047.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Emergence</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1038.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Interaction Between Mind and Body</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1065.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Internalism and Externalism</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1073.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Inverted Spectrum, Inverted Earth</span></A></TD> </TR> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1071.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Perception as a Form of Intentionality</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1074.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Perception as Non-conceptual</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1031.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Perspectives and Points of View</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1032.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Perspectives and Their Objects</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1030.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Philosophy of Mind and the Study of Mental Phenomena</span></A></TD> </TR> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1048.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Physicalism as the Source of the Mind-body Problem</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1055.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Physicalism, Consciousness and Qualia</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1041.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Physics and Physicalism</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1062.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Propositional Attitudes</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1052.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Qualia</span></A></TD> </TR> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1044.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Reductionism</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1054.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Strong Intentionalism and Weak Intentionalism</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1039.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Substance, Property, Event</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1040.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The  Intelligibility of Mental Causation</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1066.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Argument for Externalism</span></A></TD> </TR> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1070.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Argument from Illusion</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1050.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Conscious and the Unconscious</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1051.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Distinction between the Intentional and the Qualitative</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1056.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Explanatory Gap</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1043.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The identity theory</span></A></TD> </TR> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1053.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Intentionality of Bodily Sensation</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1057.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Knowledge Argument Examined</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1033.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Origin of the Concepts of Intentionality and Intension</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1072.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Phenomenal Character of Perceptual Experience</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1036.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Problem of Intentionality</span></A></TD> </TR> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1042.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Problem of Mental Causation for Dualists</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1046.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Problem of Mental Causation for Non-reductive Physicalism</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1069.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Problem of Perception</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1063.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Propositional Attitude Thesis</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1059.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Prospects for Explaining Consciousness</span></A></TD> </TR> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1068.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Prospects for Explaining Thought</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1037.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - The Structure of Intentionality</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1060.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Thoughts and Beliefs</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1049.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - What Does a Solution of the Mind-body Problem Tell Us About the Mind?</span></A></TD> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1058.htm"><span title="High Quality">Crane - Zombies</span></A></TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P class = "Centered">To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.</P> <BR><HR><BR><h3>Summary of Note Links to this Page</h3> <CENTER> <TABLE Class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR> <td bgcolor="#b3ffb3" WIDTH="20%"><A href = "../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1144.htm#22"><span title="High Quality">Theo Todman's BA Papers</span></A></TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%">&nbsp;</TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P class = "Centered">To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.</P> <br><hr><br><CENTER> <h3>Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note</h3> <TABLE class = "ReadingList" WIDTH=950> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B><B>Author</B></B></TD> <TD WIDTH="45%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B><B>Title</B></B></TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B><B>Medium</B></B></TD> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Extra Links</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter"><B><B>Read?</B></B></TD> <TR> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="45%" class = "BridgeLeft">Body</TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7094.htm#26">Paper</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="High Quality"></TD> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="45%" class = "BridgeLeft">Consciousness</TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7095.htm#11">Paper</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="High Quality"></TD> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="45%" class = "BridgeLeft">Mind</TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7093.htm#9">Paper</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="High Quality"></TD> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="45%" class = "BridgeLeft">Perception</TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7097.htm#8">Paper</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="High Quality"></TD> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="45%" class = "BridgeLeft">Thought</TD> <TD WIDTH="10%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7096.htm#10">Paper</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="High Quality"></TD> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">&nbsp;</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> </TABLE></center> <CENTER> <br><hr><br><h3>References & Reading List</h3> <TABLE class = "ReadingList" WIDTH=950> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Author</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Title</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Medium</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft"><B>Source</B></TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter"><B>Read?</B></TD> <TR> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Body</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7094.htm">Paper - Cited</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="Write-Up Complete"></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, Chapter 2</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Consciousness</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7095.htm">Paper - Cited</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="Write-Up Complete"></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, Chapter 3</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_420.htm">Book - Cited</A> <img src="../../accept.png" alt="High Quality Abstract"></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim) - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Mind</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7093.htm">Paper - Cited</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="Write-Up Complete"></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, Chapter 1</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Perception</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7097.htm">Paper - Cited</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="Write-Up Complete"></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, Chapter 5</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> <TR> <TD WIDTH="15%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane (Tim)</TD> <TD WIDTH="25%" class = "BridgeLeft">Thought</TD> <TD WIDTH="20%" class = "BridgeLeft"><A HREF="../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7096.htm">Paper - Cited</A> <img src="../../accept.png"alt="High Quality Abstract" Title="Write-Up Complete"></TD> <TD WIDTH="35%" class = "BridgeLeft">Crane - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, Chapter 4</TD> <TD WIDTH="5%" class = "BridgeCenter">Yes</TD> </TR> </TABLE> </CENTER> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><br><hr><br><h3 class = "Left">Text Colour Conventions</h3><OL TYPE="1"><li><FONT COLOR = "000000">Black</FONT>: Printable Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><li><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL><BR> <center><BR><HR><BR><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - 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