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Crane - The Problem of Mental Causation for Non-reductive Physicalism
(Text as at 17/04/2018 21:04:19)
This is a review of Section 17 of "Crane (Tim) - Body", from "Crane (Tim) - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind". For the previous Section, see this Note1.
Crane’s Abstract If ontological reduction is denied, then the problem of mental causation returns for non-reductive physicalism2; the non-reductive physicalist3 response is to hold that the mental is necessarily determined by the physical; the difficulties with this view discussed.
My Notes
- There’s a tension between the following statements:
- Mental phenomena have effects in the physical world
- All physical effects have physical causes that are sufficient to bring them about (= the completeness of physics)
- Mental and physical causes don’t over-determine their physical effects
- Mental causes are identical with physical causes
- Properties are causes
- Mental properties aren’t identical with physical properties.
- In the above, (4) resolves the over-determination problem, with (5) taking sides with the type-identity theorists, but this is undermined by non-reductive physicalism4 which proposes (6). Hence, if we want to retain (4) – which is the whole advantage of physicalism5 – one of the other 5 statements must go.
- Crane sees two possible strategies in response.
- Detect equivocation in the claims.
- Provide some extra assumption to make (1) – (3) and (5) – (6) consistent6.
- Taking option (A) first, we can say the point is the kind of explanation. Physical explanations fit things into pre-understood patterns of nature. Mental explanations say why we do things. No conflict. Description of the flight of the cricket ball in physical terms and in terms of the bowler’s aims. So, we don’t need to identify the mental and physical entities as there’s no conflict7. Crane agrees with the analysis, but says it’s irrelevant since we’re talking about causation and not explanation. The completeness of physics implies one special kind of cause, and if non-reductive physicalism8 rejects this it must reject the completeness of physics, which destroys physicalism9.
- Another version of (A) is to tinker with the notion of cause. Either:
- Distinguishing causal relevance from causal efficacy.
- Claiming that mental causes “programme” their effects but without physical causation.
- Treating mental events as structuring but not triggering causes.
Crane thinks tinkering with the notion of mental causation to solve the problem is merely ad hoc.
- Option (B) is more promising. Causation is taken for granted, but non-reductive physicalism10 is clarified by another claim – a supervenience11 thesis that the physical (given that it is as it is) metaphysically necessitates the mental. This is a fine distinction – Frank Jackson’s claim is that any physical duplicate12 of our world is a duplicate13 simpliciter14. Given the way things are physically, the mental couldn’t be otherwise. This differs both from (a) the thesis that physicalism15 is a necessary truth and from (b) that which claims supervenience16 to be a contingent relation17.
- Crane describes how mental causation is addressed by treating causation as counterfactual dependence. Defining M = mental cause, E = physical effect, P = physical cause. ¬M ⊃ ¬E. Also, ¬P ⊃ ¬E. Since M supervenes18 on P, we have ¬M ⊃ ¬P19. P causally determines E and metaphysically determines M. So, ¬M ⊃ ¬E because ¬M ⊃ ¬P20. There’s no overdetermination. Whenever a physical cause brings about an effect, a mental cause comes along for the ride.
- Since both identity and necessary supervenience21 are necessary relations, the mental cannot “float free” and vary independently of the physical, so the mental and physical act in harmony. Necessary supervenience22 can play the part of Horgan’s Superdupervenience.
- Crane has two objections to this.
- Unlike identity, we have no good understanding of necessary metaphysical relations, which appear rather mysterious.
- Metaphysical necessity rules out zombies – physical replicas without mental properties. We’d prefer a solution to the mental causation problem that didn’t involve this strong commitment.
The Note for the next Section is here23.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 6: I’d expected “(1) – (6) consistent”, so review this later to see whether this is what Crane means. The question is over (4), which seems to be the point of physicalism.
Footnote 7: This seems to reject (4) and be happy with (6).
Footnote 14: ie. has the same mental properties.
Footnote 17: In possible worlds where the physical is different to what it is in our world, all bets are off. I’m not quite sure about (b) – it must be referring to different laws of physics, rather than simply that octopuses have a different physiology.
Footnote 19: This is the right way round. If M supervenes on P, then without change in P, no change in M; so, P ⊃ M which is equivalent to ¬M ⊃ ¬P (since both are equivalent to ¬P v M)
Footnote 20: ¬M ⊃ ¬P, ¬P ⊃ ¬E, therefore ¬M ⊃ ¬E by transitivity of the conditional.
Previous Version of this Note:
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
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Summary of Notes Citing This Note
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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Crane (Tim) |
Body |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Physicalism |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Crane (Tim) |
Body |
Paper - Cited |
Crane - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, Chapter 2 |
Yes |
| Crane (Tim) |
Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind |
Book - Cited |
Crane (Tim) - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Physicalism |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
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