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Crane - Thoughts and Beliefs
(Text as at 12/02/2015 16:48:00)
This is a review of Section 31 of "Crane (Tim) - Thought", from "Crane (Tim) - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind". For the previous Section, (the last Section of Chapter 3 – "Crane (Tim) - Consciousness") see this Note1.
Crane’s Abstract The term 'thought' will be used for a kind of mental state or act, not for the content of such states or acts.
My Notes
- Crane firstly introduces some terminology by distinguishing between thoughts as acts (that is, thoughts proper) and thoughts as the intentional contents of such acts (that is, ideas).
- Crane notes that much recent philosophy has been interested in propositional attitudes: belief, desire, hope, etc. He rejects the Propositional Attitude Thesis that all intentional states are propositional attitudes, since neither all conscious states, nor all thoughts (ideas), are propositional attitudes.
- Not all thoughts involve the same intentional modes – wondering, imagining and considering are kinds or ways of thinking. Thinking is a determinable concept, of which wondering, imagining and considering are determinates. Crane draws an analogy with another determinable concept – being coloured. Being red is a way of being coloured, which requires being a particular colour and a particular shade, but these are not extras to being coloured.
- The second distinction is between thoughts and beliefs. While “I think that …” can be used as synonymous with “I believe that …”, this doesn’t mean that thoughts and beliefs are identical, since wondering, imagining or considering are not ways of believing. Thoughts and beliefs belong to different metaphysical categories since thoughts are mental acts (and therefore events) while beliefs are dispositions (and therefore states). Crane now defends an important but unorthodox thesis about belief – that there is no such thing as a conscious belief.
- To establish this thesis, Crane discusses belief, which is a state – a property instantiated by a believer. Beliefs aren’t events that happen or have temporal parts. It is the paradigmatic propositional attitude. Beliefs are of the form “belief that p”, where the proposition p is true or false. Beliefs are distinctive in that the attitude – the intentional mode – of belief entails a commitment to the truth of the proposition believed. Belief’s relation to truth – holding something to be true – is central to its concept.
- Belief is related to judgement and assertion. Not all beliefs are formed as a result of judgement – perception, unconscious inference and innateness are alternatives. Belief ←→ Judgement as Intention ←→ Decision. Assertion is the linguistic expression of belief.
- Moore’s paradox is the form “I believe that p, but not-p” (ie. the holding of false beliefs). This is not paradoxical in itself – we all hold beliefs that, unbeknownst to us, are false – but we’d never rationally make such a statement. Assertion is the expression of belief, so asserting that not-p is to express my believe that not-p, so it would be irrational simultaneously to assert not-p and my belief that p.
- This isn’t the case with the other attitudes. “I want that p, but not-p” isn’t irrational – indeed it would be irrational if p.
- What agents do depends on what they believe, want and intend. Rational agents take account of how they believe the world is. They avoid goals they are unlikely to achieve because the world is against them. Hence, an agent’s beliefs impact both what their goals are and which they try to achieve.
- Beliefs have actual and potential consequences – but don’t have any particular consequences, but only those given other states of mind, especially desires.
- The functionalist theory of mind claims that mental states are individuated by their causal roles – the distinctive pattern of their relations to other mental states and to actions. Crane’s ideas are similar to, but independent of, functionalism which:
- Typically gives a reductive definition of the mental, and
- Sees the mind as a causal mechanism.
That people act on beliefs and desires is independent of functionalism.
- It is obvious that not all your beliefs need be in your stream of consciousness in order to have actual or potential consequences, not even those that are currently guiding your action. Beliefs need not be conscious at all in order to guide action. So, is there a valid distinction between dispositional and occurrent beliefs? If so, since occurrences are events, the conscious (occurrent) beliefs would have to be acts or events, while the non-conscious ones (dispositional) would be mental states. Crane doesn’t doubt belief-states, but denies that there are conscious belief- events2.
The Note for the next Section is here3.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 2: What about coming to believe, or forming a belief?
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - References |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Thought |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Crane (Tim) |
Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind |
Book - Cited  |
Crane (Tim) - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind |
Yes |
| Crane (Tim) |
Thought |
Paper - Cited |
Crane - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, Chapter 4 |
Yes |
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- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2025
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)