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Sensations as Perceptions

(Text as at 31/08/2017 19:35:02)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)


Introduction


Are bodily sensations perceptions of one’s body?
Bodily Sensations
Perceptions
Bodily Sensations as Bodily Perceptions
Objections to Armstrong
Conclusion



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Footnote 3:


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Previous Version of this Note:

Date Length Title
01/08/2017 00:11:31 443 Sensations as Perceptions



Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
31/08/2017 19:35:02 None available None

Summary of Note Links from this Page

Crane - The Intentionality of Bodily Sensation Extraneous Bodily Sensations Pains as Mental Objects    

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Summary of Note Links to this Page

Extraneous Bodily Sensations Pains as Mental Objects Theo Todman's BA Papers    

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References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Anscombe (G.E.M.) On Sensations of Position Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jan., 1962), pp. 55-58 Yes
Armstrong (David) A Materialist Theory of the Mind Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Armstrong (David) - A Materialist Theory of the Mind No
Armstrong (David) Bodily Sensations Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Armstrong - A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Chapter 14 Yes
Crane (Tim) Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Crane (Tim) - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Yes



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