Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages


Jackson - Grue

(Text as at 04/01/2018 13:36:29)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)

This note provides my detailed review of "Jackson (Frank) - Grue".

Currently, this write-up is only available as a PDF. For a précis, click File Note (PDF). I am in the process of converting this to Note, as below:-

Detailed analysis

I. The Three Ways of defining “Grue”
Discussion of D1
Discussion of D2
Introductory discussion of D3
II. What is the Grue Paradox?
III. The Counterfactual Condition
IV. The Projectibility of Being Sampled
V. Summary

In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 1: Jackson talks primarily of properties rather than of hypotheses; so follows A Query rather than FFF.

Footnote 2: Supported by Kyburg, Hacking and Barker.

Footnote 3: Supported by Kyburg & Nagel, Achinstein & Barker and Skyrms (Jackson explains Kyburg and Barker’s support for both D1 and D2 under the discussion of D2).

Footnote 4: Jackson claims this as Goodman’s own definition in FFF, but I find that itself ambiguous – need to check the wording against Goodman’s, as well as ascertain that Jackson hasn’t missed any ambiguities.

Footnote 5: This is a very odd definition that seems to apply only to objects that are blue before T, then change to green and stay green. Hence their colour-history is mapped out for them and they can’t change colour like a green object can.

Footnote 6: Jackson doesn’t discuss the case of emeralds examined after T. If they were all blue, and that we knew those examined before T had been green, then we could happily project that all emeralds are grue. So, he is correct that, where coherent, grue1 is perfectly projectible.

Footnote 7: I have to admit to not understanding what he means here.

Footnote 8: Eg. by Kyburg and Barker, as noted above.

Footnote 9: Kelly gets the credit for this.

Footnote 10: Jackson may expatiate on this later – if not, and in any case, change this footnote!

Footnote 11: His actual wording is “grue applies to all things examined before t just in case they are green and to all other things just in case they are blue”.

Footnote 12: In what sense? Formally? Both predicates imply that a1, …., an, are green.

Footnote 13: What prediction is? Ie, what colour are we to expect an+1 to be? According to Jackson’s atemporal definition, once an+1 has been examined, to be grue it has to be green, which it is. Is this why Jackson sees no problem? The paradox is supposed to arise because after T, to be grue an emerald has to be blue.

Footnote 14: What does equivalence mean – that all have been equally examined are found to be equally green. Why, if (1) & (2) were not equivalent are (3) & (4) obviously equivalent?

Footnote 15: I seem to remember reading somewhere recently that support for a proposition doesn’t lend support for propositions entailed by that proposition. Check this out!

Footnote 16: What’s this extraordinary claim supposed to mean? That because I’ve examined the one card that accidentally fell out of my opponent’s hand that I have examined (or even ‘will examine’) them all?

Footnote 17: Dodgy: ignoring of tenses again?

Footnote 18: Check my analysis of FFF to see whether I even note this point!

Footnote 19: But this contradicts it’s being green and examined.

Footnote 20: NB: it is unimportant whether a1 … an are G.

Footnote 21: But the “diagnosis” contains conjunctions rather than disjunctions?

Footnote 22: There is something fishy about treating this as a property like any other – almost like treating existence in this way.

Footnote 23: Jackson has recast the counterfactual condition into a positive form (… would have been …) at this stage, so regards the condition as satisfied, which comes to the same thing.

Footnote 24: He takes t to be now and T in the very near futures such that any further examinations will be after T. Examined means examined by now.

Footnote 25: Check this out in Dretske (?)

Footnote 26: "Quine (W.V.) - Natural Kinds", in "Quine (W.V.) - Ontological Relativity". Look this up sometime!

Footnote 27: But, we normally take “sampled” as “sampled by me”, or even if we take it more widely, we don’t expect that all emeralds, say, have already been sampled by someone.

Footnote 28: This seems a bizarre notion. After drawing two marbles they belong in a range, but this doesn’t entitle me to believe the next one will lie in the middle.

Footnote 29: Presumably only if we had just discovered this source.

Footnote 30: Of course, the SR would be wrong in the case of all unexamined emeralds in fact being red!

Footnote 31: Jackson refers to Goodman’s appeal to the entrenchment of predicates, saying it’s not circular but excessively anthropocentric.

Printable Versions:

Previous Version of this Note:

Date Length Title
01/08/2017 13:56:38 310 Jackson - Grue

Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
04/01/2018 13:36:29 None available None

Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Jackson (Frank) Grue Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes

References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Goodman (Nelson) A Query on Confirmation Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 43, No. 14 (Jul. 4, 1946), pp. 383-385 No
Goodman (Nelson) Fact, Fiction and Forecast Book - Cited Goodman (Nelson) - Fact, Fiction and Forecast Yes
Jackson (Frank) Grue Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy 72.5, Mar. 1975, pp. 113-131 Yes
Quine (W.V.) Natural Kinds Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Quine - Ontological Relativity 19%
Quine (W.V.) Ontological Relativity Book - Cited Quine (W.V.) - Ontological Relativity 5%

Text Colour Conventions

  1. Black: Printable Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Dec 2018.Please address any comments on this page to output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this PageReturn to Theo Todman's Philosophy PageReturn to Theo Todman's Home Page