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Personal Identity

Partial Identity

(Text as at 30/11/2019 22:58:05)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)

Plug Note¹

• I’d not heard of this variant until recently. It seems to be a mereological² claim, that something that has some of the parts of another things is “partially identical” to it. Two things are “partially identical” to the degree that they share parts. So, on this account, I am partially identical to my own head, and I am more partially identical to the mereological fusion of my head and my right hand.
• However, it also seems to apply to properties³ (take to be universals⁴ with universals viewed as their instantiations).
• For a page of Links⁵ to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read⁶ include the following:-
  1. "Lewis (David) - Composition As Identity", Lewis
• A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
  1. "Armstrong (David) - The Resemblance of Universals (II): A New Account", Armstrong
  2. "Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense", Baxter
  3. "Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Instantiation as Partial Identity", Baxter
  4. "Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Many-One Identity", Baxter
  5. "Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Temporary and Contingent Instantiation as Partial Identity", Baxter
  6. "Britton (T.) - The Problem of Verisimilitude and Counting Partially Identical Properties", Britton
  7. "Denkel (Arda) - Resemblance Cannot be Partial Identity", Denkel
  8. "Hawley (Katherine) - Almost Identical, Almost Innocent", Hawley
  9. "Heil (John) - Imperfect Similarity", Heil
  10. "Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One", Lewis
  11. "Weatherson (Brian) - The Problem of the Many", Weatherson
• This is mostly a place-holder⁷.

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Printable Versions:

• Follow (this link) for level 0 (with reading list), and
• Follow (this link) for level 0.

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Previous Version of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
18/01/2019 21:53:17	3223	Partial Identity

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
30/11/2019 22:58:05	None available	Logic of Identity

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Summary of Note Links from this Page

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Mereology	Note Links Explanation	Plug Note Apologia	Properties
Universals	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Note Links to this Page

Logic of Identity

Status: Personal Identity (2019 - December)

Status: Priority Task List (2020: February)

Status: Summary (2019 - December)

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Armstrong (David)	The Resemblance of Universals (II): A New Account	Paper
Baxter (Donald L.M.)	Instantiation as Partial Identity	Paper
Britton (T.)	The Problem of Verisimilitude and Counting Partially Identical Properties	Paper
Denkel (Arda)	Resemblance Cannot be Partial Identity	Paper	2
Hawley (Katherine)	Almost Identical, Almost Innocent	Paper	2, 3, 4
Heil (John)	Imperfect Similarity	Paper	2
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Logic of Identity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Partial Identity	Paper		Yes
Weatherson (Brian)	The Problem of the Many	Paper

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Armstrong (David)	The Resemblance of Universals (II): A New Account	Paper - Cited	Armstrong - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals), 1978, Chapter 22	No
Armstrong (David)	Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	7%
Baxter (Donald L.M.)	Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense	Paper - Cited	Mind, 97.3 (Oct. 1988), 575-582	No
Baxter (Donald L.M.)	Instantiation as Partial Identity	Paper - Cited	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 79, Number 4, December 01, 2001, pp. 449-464(16)	No
Baxter (Donald L.M.)	Many-One Identity	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Papers 17, 1988, 193-216	No
Baxter (Donald L.M.)	Temporary and Contingent Instantiation as Partial Identity	Paper - Cited	International Journal for Philosophical Studies, 26 (5):763-780 (2018)	17%
Britton (T.)	The Problem of Verisimilitude and Counting Partially Identical Properties	Paper - Cited	Synthese, Volume 141, Number 1, July 2004, pp. 77-95(19)	No
Denkel (Arda)	Resemblance Cannot be Partial Identity	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 191, Apr., 1998, pp. 200-204	No
Hawley (Katherine)	Almost Identical, Almost Innocent	Paper - Cited	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Volume 82 (Metaphysics) - July 2018, pp. 249-263	17%
Heil (John)	Imperfect Similarity	Paper - Cited	Heil - From an Ontological Point of View, Chapter 14	No
Lewis (David)	Composition As Identity	Paper - Cited	Lewis - Parts of Classes, Section 3.6	Yes
Lewis (David)	Many, But Almost One	Paper - Cited	Lewis - Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology	8%
Lewis (David)	Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	5%
Lewis (David)	Parts of Classes	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	4%
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed.	Metaphysics	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	8%
Weatherson (Brian)	The Problem of the Many	Paper - Cited	Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2003-14	6%

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1. Black: Printable Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
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