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Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1

(Text as at 18/12/2010 19:58:05)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)

Dear Peter,

Good to hear from you. Are your researches formal, or private interest? I'm just a beginning research student, so any comments I may have come with a big health-warning.

I can't think of any papers specifically on your topic. My database tells me that all I've found on the forensic aspects of personal identity are in the following link, not that I've read much in this area.

David Oderberg (Wikipedia: David S. Oderberg) might be able to help, as he has interests both in Personal Identity and Ethics. I don't know him personally, and disagree with most of what I've read by him, so don't treat this as a personal introduction!

For what they're worth, here are my own thoughts:

Firstly, I don't think this topic has much to do with personal identity. The thesis I'm going to defend is that human persons1 are phase sortals2 of human animals, and that a person persists as long as (the infrastructure for) that self-consciousness3 that is definitive of being a person persists in that animal (with a lot of loose ends to be tidied up!). My view is that any talk of "so-and-so" not being the same person as he once was is highly metaphorical - someone can act or seem "as if" they are a different person, but they are the same person for all that. All this psychological4,5 connectedness6 stuff is a complete muddle. People have a "first person perspective7" that remains definitive of them, and their qualities just evolve over time. Actually, I'm tempted by perdurantism8,9, which may complicate (or even simplify) matters.

Secondly, I think there are various linguistic conventions at work in the "-er" suffix in English (and with "-ist" and such-like). Vitali Kitschko is a boxer who (I believe) still boxes. Muhammad Ali is a boxer who doesn't. Klint the mad axeman is a murderer who is prone to murder. David the King is/was a murderer who sincerely repented of the indirect murder of Uriah the Hittite. I have no doubt under duress told many a porky pie, but don't think I thereby deserve the term "liar". So, I think we could use "liar" and "murderer" in either of many ways; one who is/was by profession an X, one who has ever X'd or one who is currently prone to X if not watched carefully. I think it's just that not all the slots in this n x 3 matrix are equally useful. Murdering is thankfully rare, but highly significant, so we have a term for someone who has ever murdered. Even George Washington told lies (Oh yes he did ...), so being told that someone is a liar in the "did it once" sense isn't very enlightening (in fact, the opposite is enlightening). Someone who repeatedly murders is so unusual that we have a special term (serial-killer) for it. And so on.

Finally, quite when we're right to label someone who is regularly prone to X "an X-er" may, as you say, be arbitrary. It probably depends on comparisons with social norms and peer groups. Elizabeth I, who had a bath every year whether she needed one or not, was probably a stinker by today's standards, but not by those of 16th century England. And she'd still be a stinker after her bath, by our standards, even though she didn't then stink, because when you passed by her next month, she'd be stinking again. Presumably Eric the Pillager would have been a really mean Viking.

So, your problem reduces to deciding just how prone someone is to X, how frequently they X, and whether they've repented of X-ing. The thresholds vary with X (how important or unusual is it) and with the standards of society. There will be grey areas, but this is just a ubiquitous problem with vagueness.

I hope these off-the-top-of-the-head jottings aren't too trivial (or wrong-headed). I'd be interested in your more detailed thoughts on the matter.

Best wishes,

Theo (17th August 2007)

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Date Length Title
19/08/2007 11:34:05 3899 Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1

Note last updated Reference for this Topic Parent Topic
18/12/2010 19:58:05 543 (Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1) Personal Identity and Moral Action

Summary of Note Links from this Page

Connectedness vs Continuity First-Person Perspective Perdurantism Persistence Person
Phase Sortals Psychological Continuity Psychological Continuity - Forward Self-Consciousness  

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Summary of Note Links to this Page

Personal Identity and Moral Action        

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