<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Printable Note - Blog - Personal Identity and Moral Action (Theo Todman's Web Page) </title><link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <P ALIGN="Center"><FONT Size = 3 FACE="Arial"><B><HR>Theo Todman's Web Page<HR><p>For Text Colour-conventions (at end of page): <A HREF="#ColourConventions">Click Here</a></p><U>Blog - Personal Identity and Moral Action</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <FONT COLOR = "800080">Hello Theo,<BR><BR>Greetings from Australia! Hope this email finds you well.<BR><BR>I'm researching the topic of personal identity as it relates to moral action and am hoping for some direction towards relevant books and papers.<BR><BR>I'm wrestling with the idea of when a person becomes "unethical", "criminal", a "liar", a "murderer" and whether these apparent aspects of identity persist. In conventional reasoning we generally regard someone that has murdered a "murderer", the act appears to become a feature of personal identity. However, when a person lies once we tend not to stick them with the identity "liar". On the face of it this seems inconsistent. Yet there are those such as swindlers that we have no problem with labelling "liar". Does this imply that there is some threshold to be exceeded? How many times would I have to lie to legitimately acquire the identity "liar". This again seems arbitrary. I know of no formulaic method for "identity assay" and I doubt such a thing exists.<BR><BR>Can you help clarify my confusions?<BR><BR>Sincerely<BR><BR>Peter (17<SUP>th</SUP> August 2007)<BR><BR><HR><BR><BR>Theo s <a name="1"></a><U>Reply</U><SUP>1</SUP><FONT COLOR = "000000"></P><B>Note last updated:</B> 19/08/2007 11:34:05<BR> </P><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1: (Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> Dear Peter,<BR><BR>Good to hear from you. Are your researches formal, or private interest? I'm just a beginning research student, so any comments I may have come with a big health-warning. <BR><BR>I can't think of any papers specifically on your topic. My database tells me that all I've found on the forensic aspects of personal identity are in the following <A HREF="../../../PaperCatalogIdentityFullSubTopic_415.htm">link</A>, not that I've read much in this area. <BR><BR>David Oderberg (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_S._Oderberg" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_S._Oderberg)) might be able to help, as he has interests both in Personal Identity and Ethics. I don't know him personally, and disagree with most of what I've read by him, so don't treat this as a personal introduction!<BR><BR>For what they're worth, here are my own thoughts: <BR><BR>Firstly, I don't think this topic has much to do with personal identity. The thesis I'm going to defend is that human <a name="1"></a><U>persons</U><SUP>1</SUP> are phase <a name="1"></a><U>sortals</U><SUP>2</SUP> of human animals, and that a person persists as long as (the infrastructure for) that <a name="1"></a><U>self-consciousness</U><SUP>3</SUP> that is definitive of being a person persists in that animal (with a lot of loose ends to be tidied up!). My view is that any talk of "so-and-so" not being the same person as he once was is highly metaphorical - someone can act or seem "as if" they are a different person, but they are the same person for all that. All this <a name="1"></a><U>psychological</U><SUP>4</SUP>,<a name="1"></a><U></U><SUP>5</SUP> <a name="1"></a><U>connectedness</U><SUP>6</SUP> stuff is a complete muddle. People have a "first person <a name="1"></a><U>perspective</U><SUP>7</SUP>" that remains definitive of them, and their qualities just evolve over time. Actually, I'm tempted by <a name="1"></a><U>perdurantism</U><SUP>8</SUP>,<a name="1"></a><U></U><SUP>9</SUP>, which may complicate (or even simplify) matters. <BR><BR>Secondly, I think there are various linguistic conventions at work in the "-er" suffix in English (and with "-ist" and such-like). Vitali Kitschko is a boxer who (I believe) still boxes. Muhammad Ali is a boxer who doesn't. Klint the mad axeman is a murderer who is prone to murder. David the King is/was a murderer who sincerely repented of the indirect murder of Uriah the Hittite. I have no doubt under duress told many a porky pie, but don't think I thereby deserve the term "liar". So, I think we could use "liar" and "murderer" in either of many ways; one who is/was by profession an X, one who has ever X'd or one who is currently prone to X if not watched carefully. I think it's just that not all the slots in this n x 3 matrix are equally useful. Murdering is thankfully rare, but highly significant, so we have a term for someone who has ever murdered. Even George Washington told lies (Oh yes he did ...), so being told that someone is a liar in the "did it once" sense isn't very enlightening (in fact, the opposite is enlightening). Someone who repeatedly murders is so unusual that we have a special term (serial-killer) for it. And so on. <BR><BR>Finally, quite when we're right to label someone who is regularly prone to X "an X-er" may, as you say, be arbitrary. It probably depends on comparisons with social norms and peer groups. Elizabeth I, who had a bath every year whether she needed one or not, was probably a stinker by today's standards, but not by those of 16th century England. And she'd still be a stinker after her bath, by our standards, even though she didn't then stink, because when you passed by her next month, she'd be stinking again. Presumably Eric the Pillager would have been a really mean Viking. <BR><BR>So, your problem reduces to deciding just how prone someone is to X, how frequently they X, and whether they've repented of X-ing. The thresholds vary with X (how important or unusual is it) and with the standards of society. There will be grey areas, but this is just a ubiquitous problem with vagueness. <BR><BR>I hope these off-the-top-of-the-head jottings aren't too trivial (or wrong-headed). I'd be interested in your more detailed thoughts on the matter. <BR><BR>Best wishes,<BR><BR>Theo (17<SUP>th</SUP> August 2007)</P><B>Note last updated:</B> 18/12/2010 19:58:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.1: (Person)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with? Wiggins claims that the Greeks had no term for  person (I need to re-read the paper by "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7220.htm">Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person</A>" to double-check this). Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to <a name="1"></a>human beings rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons? </li><li>I need to start with some <a name="1"></a>conceptual analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely <a name="1"></a>semantic or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn t a <a name="1"></a>natural kind concept. </li><li>I accept <a name="1"></a>Locke s conceptual distinction between <a name="1"></a>Human Beings ( Men ), Persons and <a name="1"></a>Substances. I accept Locke s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man  the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics. </li><li><BR>Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke s definition of a person as <ol type="1"> <FONT COLOR = "800080">a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places</FONT> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" - Essay II.27.2)</ol>& be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image. </li><li>But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this  qua-ing can lead to <a name="1"></a>relative identity, and shows how difficult it is for me, at least, to maintain the strict <a name="1"></a>logic of identity in these discussions. </li><li>Some further, fairly random, thoughts:-<ul type="square"><li>We must not ignore potential differences between the Person, the <a name="1"></a>Self and the <a name="1"></a>Individual. </li><li>I doubt the truth of the contention that one s Self is the sum of one s projects, one s individual  <a name="1"></a>identity .</li><li>We must also note the potential for <a name="1"></a>degrees of personhood. </li><li>Are persons essentially sentient? Or rational? And is rationality, like the mental generally, overstated by philosophers whose favourite habitat it is? </li><li>What about <a name="1"></a>temporal gaps in sentience & rationality in the life of an individual  does the person pop in and out of existence? </li><li>What about legal persons: not companies, but the comatose, who still have estates (but then so do the <a name="1"></a>deceased)? </li><li>How important is  person , as against  <a name="1"></a>sentient being in my research concerns? The Cartesians denied sentience to <a name="1"></a>animals and until recently there has been a down-playing of the capacities of animals, particularly their emotional capacities. Consequently, the <a name="1"></a>persistence criteria for sentient non-humans may not have been given the focus they ought. I suspect that many of the <a name="1"></a>thought experiments work just as well if we drop some of the more onerous requirements of personhood in such contexts. Some of the thought experiments play on the thought of  <a name="1"></a>being tortured tomorrow . While animals may not have the concept TOMORROW, I presume the higher animals have some capacity for anticipating future ills about to befall them. I wonder whether my research concerns should be about all beings that care about the future, whether or not they have a clear concept of it as <em>their</em> future.</li></ul></li><li>I will probably start with Dennett s six criteria of personhood (see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_545.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood</A>") & <ol type="1"><li>rationality, </li><li>intentionality   predicated of </li><li>intentionality   adopted towards </li><li>reciprocation of the personal stance, </li><li>verbal communication and </li><li>consciousness</li></ol> & in investigating what persons are. See the following <a name="1"></a>essay.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_23">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_23"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_9_24">include</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_9_24"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list, which is enormously bloated and needs considerable pruning. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_9_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_9_23"></A><B>Footnote 23</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_9_24"></A><B>Footnote 24</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.2: (Phase Sortals)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_29_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_29_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>See under <a name="1"></a>Sortals for the introduction of the concept Phase Sortal. I seem to have misappropriated the term. In its standard usage (I am told), a phase sortal is a biologically-motivated term. The clearest examples are of individuals that <a name="1"></a>metamorphose; for example the butterfly: egg to larva (caterpillar) to pupa (chrysalis) to adult (butterfly). The caterpillar is a phase sortal of the organism, with clear spatio-temporal boundaries. My standard example is of Child, which is a (vaguely-boundaried) biological phase of the substance sortal <a name="1"></a>Human Being. </li><li>An example of a possible human phase sortal that is a non-person is Infant. This example might be especially relevant to the topic, because  infant is derived from the Latin in-fans  without speech , and the capacity for speech is often claimed to be an essential prerequisite for being a <a name="1"></a>person. </li><li>Any suggestion that the concept Person is  no more than a phase sortal of an umbrella concept isn t intended to imply unimportance. Rather, simply that persons might not form a <a name="1"></a>kind (and in particular a <a name="1"></a>natural kind), nor be <a name="1"></a>substances, but that personhood might be a <a name="1"></a>property of substances (of <a name="1"></a>animals, for instance). </li><li>What about  periodic phase sortals such as Student? A human being can  pop in and out of studenthood by registering or deregistering, but he can t do this with childhood. Which model suits personhood? See the discussion of <a name="1"></a>intermittent objects. </li><li>However, if the above suggestion that the concept Phase Sortal is biologically motivated is correct, a purely social concept such as Student is not a phase sortal in this sense, and Person might not be either. I could, of course, invent a new term of art.</li><li>All roads seem to lead to <a name="1"></a>Wiggins (<A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Snowdon (Paul).htm">Paul Snowdon</A> refers to him a lot in the context of <a name="1"></a>Animalism, though I seem to remember that <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> thinks Wiggins isn t a true Animalist, but a supporter of the <a name="1"></a>psychological view). </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_29_15">Links</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_29_15"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_29_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_29_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_29_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_29_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_29_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7312.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3741.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21125.htm">Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", Lockwood</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5099.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Persons and Substances</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5851.htm">Price (Marjorie) - Identity Through Time</A>", Price</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5481.htm">Wiggins (David) - Metaphysics: Substance</A>", Wiggins</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_54.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance</A>", Wiggins, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3491.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Absoluteness of Sameness (S&S)</A>" and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3492.htm">Wiggins (David) - Outline of a Theory of Individuation (S&S)</A>"</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_29_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_29_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_29_16"></A><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_29_17"></A><B>Footnote 17</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 01/05/2018 00:46:05<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.3: (Self-Consciousness)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>This is more than just phenomenal <a name="1"></a>consciousness (which may be a watershed in itself with moral consequences greater than generally accepted) but the consciousness of oneself as a <a name="1"></a>self (as <a name="1"></a>Locke noted). </li><li>But we need also consider the view that this  watcher is an illusion, a falsely assumed <a name="1"></a>Cartesian Ego whose existence is undermined by neuroscience, the modularity of mind, and such-like.</li><li>I was alerted to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_6">quotation</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_6"></A> from <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Updike" TARGET = "_top">John Updike</A> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Updike) s "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6705.htm">Updike (John) - Self-Consciousness</A>":- <ul type="square"> <FONT COLOR = "800080">Not only are selves conditional but they die. Each day, we wake slightly altered, and the person we were yesterday is dead. So why, one could say, be afraid of death, when death comes all the time? </FONT> </ul>I think <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_7">this thought</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_7"></A> is muddled in several respects:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="1"></a>Death is a biological event that  at least in the ordinary case  can happen to an organism only once. Whatever <a name="1"></a>Selves are, they don t die every night. Follow the links for further discussion. </li><li>We do indeed  wake slightly altered ; indeed, we alter slightly whenever we encounter an event that has an impact on us. </li><li>I m not sure what Updike means by our selves being  conditional , but I can well believe it. </li><li>Updike seems to subscribe to some  strict and philosophical view of identity, whereby nothing survives change. This is not a useful understanding. </li><li>Any comfort we might get from such thoughts concerning our inevitable deaths is entirely spurious. </li></ol></li><li>For a page of Links to this Note, <a href="Notes_21_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>The categorised reading list is rather small; naturally, see also those on <a name="1"></a>Self and <a name="1"></a>Consciousness.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_21_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_21_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_97.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness</A>", Garrett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11981.htm">Kriegel (Uriah) - Strange Loops and Self-conscious Marbles</A>", Kriegel</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2053.htm">Eilan (Naomi), Marcel (Anthony) & Bermudez (Jose Luis) - Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Approach</A>", Eilan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2690.htm">Laycock (Stephen) - Consciousness It/Self</A>", Laycock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3697.htm">Neisser (Ulric) - Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge</A>", Neisser</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4953.htm">Pollock (John L.) - The Self-Conscious Machine</A>", Pollock</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3831.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - The Self and the Contents of Consciousness</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3920.htm">Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Are We Intimately Conscious of What We Call Our Self</A>", Vesey</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5067.htm">Vjecsner (Paul) - Searching for the Heart of Human Nature</A>", Vjecsner</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_21_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_21_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>It appeared in <em>The Week</em>, but it seems to be a popular one. </li><li>See <A HREF = "https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/939545-not-only-are-selves-conditional-but-they-die-each-day" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/939545-not-only-are-selves-conditional-but-they-die-each-day). </li><li>I m not yet clear of the context: the book is on order. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_21_7"></A><B>Footnote 7</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Which has little to do with self-consciousness other that the book s title. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_21_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_21_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 24/04/2018 00:12:58<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.4: (Psychological Continuity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_16_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_16_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Psychological continuity (and <a name="1"></a>connectedness) is central to personal identity for those who adopt the <a name="1"></a>Psychological View. However, it is said by some <a name="1"></a>animalists - <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> in particular  to be irrelevant to our <a name="1"></a>survival, given that <a name="1"></a>we are <a name="1"></a>Human Animals. </li><li>Following on from discussions on <a name="1"></a>survival, maybe the way to put things is that without psychological continuity I might survive, but not with <a name="1"></a>what matters to me in survival. </li><li>If  <a name="1"></a>Person is a <a name="1"></a>phase sortal of  <a name="1"></a>Human Animal , can there be sequential but different persons within the same animal (as <a name="1"></a>Lewis suggests, though not from the perspective of <a name="1"></a>animalism, in his  <a name="1"></a>Methuselah case) or can there be different and encapsulated <a name="1"></a>First Person Perspectives (either synchronically  as in <a name="1"></a>MPD  or diachronically) within the same animal? </li><li> Person may indeed come apart from  animal , but even then, the person cannot  float free of the animal, but <a name="1"></a>supervenes upon it. See the <a name="1"></a>CV for this. </li><li>This topic is related to others in this general area (in addition to those already noted):-<BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Psychology<BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Psychological Criterion<BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Psychopathology</li><li>I also distinguish between backward and <a name="1"></a>forward psychological continuity. The former  traditionally involving <a name="1"></a>memory and psychological traits  is the usual focus, but it is not necessarily identity-preserving even for those espousing the <a name="1"></a>PV, on account of <a name="1"></a>reduplication objections. The same may be true of <a name="1"></a>fission of the <a name="1"></a>FPP, but this is more difficult to imagine. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_16_29">Links</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_16_29"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_16_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>The list of works  to be read below is highly selective, given the overlap with other topics and my focus on <a name="1"></a>animalism. However, I ve been more liberal with those items I ve actually read. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_16_31">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_16_31"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_16_32">include</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_16_32"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3961.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy</A>", Ayers</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3799.htm">Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: Preface</A>", Baillie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3678.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4282.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7623.htm">Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases</A>", Blatti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11679.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap</A>", Campbell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7613.htm">Corcoran (Kevin) - Biology or Psychology? Human Persons and Personal Identity</A>", Corcoran</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5807.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply</A>", DeGrazia</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5929.htm">Gale (Richard) - On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments</A>", Gale</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5102.htm">Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5028.htm">Mackie (David) - Going Topless</A>", Mackie</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22090.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism</A>", Noonan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18372.htm">Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18989.htm">Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5041.htm">Olson (Eric) - Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4426.htm">Olson (Eric) - Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3506.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4739.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12010.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? The Question</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3573.htm">Parfit (Derek) - How We Are Not What We Believe</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3583.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16541.htm">Thomas (Janice L.) - Psychological continuity</A>", Thomas</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3617.htm">Unger (Peter) - Conscious Experiences and Subjects of Consciousness: Six Metaphysical Doctrines</A>", Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3618.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Psychological Approach To Our Survival</A>", Unger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5167.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Survival of the Sentient</A>", Unger</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20313.htm">Francescotti (Robert) - Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity</A>", Francescotti</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21103.htm">Hershenov (David) - The Memory Criterion and the Problem of Backward Causation</A>", Hershenov</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5981.htm">Kitcher (Patricia) - The Crucial Relation in Personal Identity</A>", Kitcher</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3404.htm">Madell (Geoffrey) - Personal Identity Through Time</A>", Madell</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4328.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5939.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Perdurance and Psychological Continuity</A>", Merricks</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12011.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12013.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12014.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Temporal Parts</A>", Olson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19245.htm">Ord (Toby) - Implications of fission, fusion and teletransportation to a view of personal identity through psychological continuity</A>", Ord</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3572.htm">Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be</A>", Parfit</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5941.htm">Rea (Michael) & Silver (David) - Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity</A>", Rea & Silver</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15846.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity</A>", Schechtman</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11984.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Unger's Psychological Continuity Theory</A>", Shoemaker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_657.htm">Slors (Marc) - The Diachronic Mind: An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem</A>", Slors, especially<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3764.htm">Slors (Marc) - A Content-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20195.htm">Slors (Marc) - Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory</A>"</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3660.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity</A>", Van Inwagen</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_16_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_16_29"></A><B>Footnote 29</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_16_31"></A><B>Footnote 31</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_16_32"></A><B>Footnote 32</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 06/05/2018 23:16:48<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.5: (Psychological Continuity - Forward)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_38_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_38_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>I think there s a conceptual difference between:- <ol type="i"><li>Forward psychological continuity, and </li><li>Backward psychological continuity. </li></ol></li><li>Imagine the case where (on an <a name="1"></a>endurantist account of <a name="1"></a>persistence), I m put into a duplicating machine, but something goes wrong and my body is destroyed by the duplication process, though my duplicate wakes up perfectly happily. Then, it seems to me, I would never wake up, and would have no experience beyond entry to the duplicating machine. I have no forward psychological continuity. But my <a name="1"></a>duplicate does have backward psychological continuity. </li><li>Any duplicate of me, looking backward, would consider himself to be  me , having my <a name="1"></a>memories, abilities, plans and so forth, and a body looking just like mine. But, would I ever wake up as the duplicate? My intuition on the endurantist account, as I have said, is that I would not, though I suspect that on the <a name="1"></a>perdurantist account, this might be seen as a case of <a name="1"></a>fission in which I might wake up twice, provided we consider that the right sort of <a name="1"></a>causality is in place. </li><li>But, what gives forward continuity of <a name="1"></a>consciousness in the normal case of sleep and temporary unconsciousness? I cannot know  from the inside that when I awake I m the same human being as went to sleep in my bed. The reason I believe this is for external reasons: duplication is not physically possible (or at least practical), and in any case I have no reason to believe it happened to me last night. </li><li>This seems a very important issue to me, and I need to make more of it. For example, in <a name="1"></a>teletransportation <a name="1"></a>thought experiment, it seems to me that a new person wakes up, but I don t, nor do I experience anything, though the new person claims to be me. Incidentally, it s not just a new <a name="1"></a>person, but a new <a name="1"></a>human being. </li><li>This is the sort of question that the Logical Positivists would denounce as meaningless, as no empirical evidence can decide it.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_38_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_38_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_38_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_38_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_38_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_38_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_38_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 05/02/2018 20:02:24<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.6: (Connectedness vs Continuity)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_60_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_60_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>When defining <a name="1"></a>persistence conditions, we need to distinguish between connectedness and continuity. <ol type="1"><li>Continuity is a transitive relation that relates adjacent stages. </li><li>Connectedness is intransitive and requires enough of the properties of interest to be maintained over time. </li></ol></li><li>At root, this is just the message of the Old Soldier, raised against Locke, and answered by Ancestrals of the  remembers relation.</li><li>Indeed, "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>" (Journal of Philosophy, p. 61) describes Continuity as the <u>ancestral</u> of Connectedness. </li><li><a name="1"></a>Persons  like <a name="1"></a>animals  develop and  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_60_5">grow</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_60_5"></A> . We can admit that we have the same animal from <a name="1"></a>fetus to <a name="1"></a>corpse (with some arguments about the termini). However, do we have the same person? </li><li>I d contend that whatever physical and psychological <a name="1"></a>discontinuities the human animal undergoes, we do have the same person where we have a person at all, provided a single <a name="1"></a>First Person Perspective (FPP) is maintained. </li><li>If one s character changes radically over time, do you remain the same person? Yes, if we want the child and the adult to be the same person (as we do), or the convert to be the same person as the unbeliever.</li><li>The relevance of this to the present debate is that it is continuity that is relevant to personal identity, and not connectedness. This applies whatever view of Personal Identity we hold. </li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/P/Author_Parfit (Derek).htm">Derek Parfit</A>  who doesn t think identity is <a name="1"></a>what matters  holds a different view; that it is connectedness that matters, and so we need have no concern for future <a name="1"></a>selves that are psychologically unconnected to our current selves. I think this view is mistaken, as we are locked in to a FPP and will have to experience the fate of that future self, however unconnected. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_60_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_60_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_60_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_60_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>", Shoemaker</li></ol></li><li>I don t  and won t  have a Note on Connectedness <em>per se</em>: this Note will cover all I have to say on the topic. </li><li>However, this note is linked to two others:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Continuity, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Methuselah.</li><li>So, a rather diminutive reading list might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12114.htm">Belzer (Marvin) - Notes on Relation R</A>", Belzer</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5076.htm">Campbell (Scott) - Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival?</A>", Campbell</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_60_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_60_5"></A><B>Footnote 5</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Not necessarily physically  that would be begging the question as to what persons are. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_60_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_60_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 04/02/2018 17:09:36<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.7: (First-Person Perspective)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_22_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_22_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>The concept of a  First-Person Perspective (FPP) is central to the <a name="1"></a>Constitution View of personal identity. </li><li>Just what this is needs spelling out  what does <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> think this is, and why does she think it so <a name="1"></a>ontologically important. She seems to be obsessed by the thought that beings that can contemplate their own <a name="1"></a>deaths are ontologically different. Why is it that this, rather than simply a phenomenally <a name="1"></a>conscious perspective, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_22_6">that counts</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_22_6"></A> as the ontological watershed? </li><li>We might instead posit another <a name="1"></a>property  that of consciousness of <a name="1"></a>Self  as the critical moment in the ontological ladder leading to persons. I suspect some philosophers of rigging the qualifications for personhood so that only <a name="1"></a>human beings  and maybe some others even more exalted (like God and angels)  qualify. Non-human <a name="1"></a>animals must be excluded to ensure the uniqueness and specialness of humans. </li><li>Also, can we really use this term to <a name="1"></a>explain personal identity, as  <a name="1"></a>person appears in it? If it s supposed to be elucidatory of personal identity, we seem to have a circle. </li><li>Really what s important  it seems to me  is that we have animals with certain properties that are important to them. We can t reify the property and make it a stand-alone thing, like the Cheshire Cat s smile. Nor can we assume without a lot of careful argument that this property can hop from one infrastructure to another  as in <a name="1"></a>uploading or <a name="1"></a>resurrection. </li><li>An argument I m fond of is that  despite whatever psychological differences there may be between me and my future self  I can both rationally anticipate his experiences and should display rational concern for his well-being. That is because we share the same  window on the world . Try out the <a name="1"></a>future great pain test and see if I'm worried! Now is this  window on the world the same as a FPP? After all, it may be that my senile old self no longer qualifies as a person, though is phenomenally conscious, and I should be concerned for him whatever his ontological status; only the absence of phenomenal consciousness would remove all that <a name="1"></a>matters. </li><li>In summary, I think the FPP is a useful concept, and represents our window on the world, and what matters to us in survival. But it is a property of a human animal, and that animal s <a name="1"></a>persistence doesn t rest upon it. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_22_18">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_22_18"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_22_19">include</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_22_19"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21344.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3676.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The First-Person Perspective</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_802.htm">Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?</A>", Dennett</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6352.htm">Genova (Lisa) - Still Alice</A>", Genova</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15140.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern</A>", Shoemaker_D</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_34.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - The First-Person Perspective</A>", Shoemaker_S</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21052.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Does God Know Our First-Person Perspectives?</A>", Zimmerman</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_634.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The First Person</A>", Anscombe</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22996.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Cartesianism and the First-Person Perspective</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21187.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Can Subjectivity be Naturalized?</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21204.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - First-Person Externalism</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6374.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22993.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The First-Person Perspective and its Relation to Cognitive Science</A>", Baker</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_601.htm">Eilan (Naomi) - The First Person Perspective</A>", Eilan</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18375.htm">Johnston (Mark) - 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal</A>", Johnston</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23101.htm">Kolak (Daniel) - Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity</A>", Kolak</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21580.htm">Kripke (Saul) - The First Person</A>", Kripke</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6403.htm">Metzinger (Thomas) - Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity</A>", Metzinger</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23100.htm">Thomson (Garrett) - Counting subjects</A>", Thomson</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12803.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - The Uses of the First Person</A>", Valberg</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12804.htm">Valberg (J.J.) - What Makes First-Person Reference First Personal?</A>", Valberg</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_22_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_22_6"></A><B>Footnote 6</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I suppose either both or neither might count ontologically. </li><li>Also, both might have enormous significance, yet not imply that an ontologically distinct entity had come on the scene. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_22_18"></A><B>Footnote 18</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_22_19"></A><B>Footnote 19</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 13/02/2018 00:07:12<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.8: (Perdurantism)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_42_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_42_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>As developed by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Q/Author_Quine (W.V.).htm">W.V. Quine</A>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Lewis (David).htm">David Lewis</A>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Sider (Ted).htm">Ted Sider</A> and others, Perdurance is to be contrasted with <a name="1"></a>Endurance and <a name="1"></a>Exdurance  see "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1339.htm">Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time</A>". </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12472.htm">Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What s the Problem?</A>", the introduction to "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>" provides a good overview of these matters. </li><li>The logical problems with 4-D need to be carefully considered and, for good or ill, the four-dimensional approach has the advantage  or maybe disadvantage  of undermining the <a name="1"></a>reduplication objection to <a name="1"></a>identity being maintained in certain <a name="1"></a>fission <a name="1"></a>thought experiments. </li><li>Does 4-D imply <a name="1"></a>fatalism? According to perdurantism, a thing is a 4-D object, but not only do we not know the future, but the future may not even exist. </li><li>How does this tie in with Lewis s realism about possible worlds? Maybe if possible worlds are real, all possible futures are real as well.</li><li>Note that perdurantism is inimical to a high view of <a name="1"></a>substance. A temporal worm cannot change, it just is. The purpose of positing substances is as the enduring things that <a name="1"></a>change. </li><li>Perdurance also impacts on Leibniz s Law, where property exemplification is usually taken to be relative to a time. </li><li>Look at the adverbial defence of endurantism. See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6036.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics</A>" (probably & this is the explicit response to Lewis, though there are also <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6676.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence, Change, and Explanation</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4724.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time</A>" and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5114.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things</A>"; and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12472.htm">Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What s the Problem?</A>" in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>" seems to cover much the same ground). </li><li>If perdurantism really is incompatible with a high view of substance, then I may not need a chapter on perdurance (though I would have thought that I would need to argue for the incompatibility), and I can thereby ignore perdurantist objections to the cogency of reduplication objections. </li><li>Note also that <A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> sets perdurance to one side. He assumes that we are concrete substances that  endure through time by being wholly present at different times . He also sets to one side two other issues, namely that there are <a name="1"></a>no such things as persons (taken to be  rational conscious beings such as you and I ) and that the classical notion of strict <a name="1"></a>numerical identity is correct, rejecting <a name="1"></a>relative identity. See <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3506.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction</A>", pp. 4-5 and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3513.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives</A>", <BR>both in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>". He claims that if any of these assumptions is false, then there are no substantive metaphysical questions of our identity over time, only semantic ones.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_42_14">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_42_14"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_42_15">include</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_42_15"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_42_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_42_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_42_15"></A><B>Footnote 15</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 11/03/2018 20:19:41<BR><BR><HR> <P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Footnote 1.9: (Persistence)</B></U></P> <P ALIGN="Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"> <u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_1">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_1"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Persistence is the continuing in existence of one thing from one time to another. </li><li>Different <a name="1"></a>kinds of thing have different kinds of <a name="1"></a>persistence criteria. </li><li>My interest is in the persistence of <a name="1"></a>Persons, or at least of beings such as Us; consequently I need to know <a name="1"></a>what kind of thing we are. </li><li>This Note partly acts as an umbrella for three other items that represent different theories or account of persistence, namely <BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Endurantism, <BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Perdurantism and <BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Exdurantism. </li><li>See also the Notes on <BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Time, and<BR>&rarr; <a name="1"></a>Change. </li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_11">Links</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_11"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_90_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_12">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_12"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_13">include</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_13"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere  ie. in the Notes above) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6021.htm">Carter (William) & Hestevold (H. Scott) - On Passage and Persistence</A>", Carter & Hestvold, 1994</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4724.htm">Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time</A>", Haslanger, 2003</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1390.htm">Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</A>", Haslanger, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1345.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist</A>", Hawley, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19964.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Persistence and Determination</A>", Hawley, 2008</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3704.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - The Persistence of Objects: Introduction</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_14">Hirsch, 1982</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_14"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3627.htm">Hudson (Hud) - Persistence and the Partist View</A>", Hudson, 2001</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4174.htm">Loux (Michael) - Concrete Particulars II: Persistence Through Time</A>", Loux, 2002</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4594.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Persistence and Substance</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_15">Lowe, 2001</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_15"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22018.htm">Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence</A>", Madden, 2016</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4327.htm">Merricks (Trenton) - Persistence, Parts and Presentism</A>", Merricks, 1999</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1372.htm">Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time</A>", Oderberg, 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21129.htm">Oderberg (David) - Persistence</A>", Oderberg, 2009</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5211.htm">Olson (Eric) - Relativism and Persistence</A>", Olson, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson, 1999</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20279.htm">Pollock (John L.) - Reasoning about Change and Persistence: A Solution to the Frame Problem</A>", Pollock, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6214.htm">Sider (Ted) - Persistence and Parthood Seminar</A>", Sider, 1998</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5355.htm">Sider (Ted) - Recent Work: Identity Over Time</A>", Sider, 2000</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_442.htm">Sider (Ted) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence - Bibliography</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_90_16">Sider+Zimmerman, 2004</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_90_16"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6215.htm">Sider (Ted) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence Seminar</A>", Sider+Zimmerman, 2004</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9535.htm">Vander Laan (David) - Persistence and Divine Conservation</A>", Vander Laan, 2006</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9770.htm">Wasserman (Ryan) - Framing the Debate over Persistence</A>", Wasserman, 2004</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6633.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Persistence and Presentism</A>", Zimmerman, 1996</li><li>Also, see <A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/problems/persistence/" TARGET = "_top">Bob Doyle: Persistence</A> (http://metaphysicist.com/problems/persistence/). </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="1"></a>place-holder. </li></ul><BR><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_90_1"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 1</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_90_11"></A><B>Footnote 11</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_90_12"></A><B>Footnote 12</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_90_13"></A><B>Footnote 13</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_90_14"></A><B>Footnote 14</B>: And the rest of Part 1 of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_32.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_90_15"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 15</B>: And other Chapters in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_639.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_90_16"></A><BR><BR><B>Footnote 16</B>: <ul type="disc"><li>The Bibliography  and the Seminnar  cover much beyond Persistence as such. </li><li>I need to extract the relevant items to the various sub-topics. </li></ul> </P><B>Note last updated:</B> 06/08/2018 09:28:48<BR><BR><HR> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><BR><P ALIGN="Left"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U></B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "000000">Black</FONT>: Printable Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018<LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</OL><hr><BR><a href = "../../../index.htm">Return to Home page</a><BR><B>Timestamp: 06/08/2018 09:46:08. 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