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1. Introduction: Something like this document, but in narrative form, maybe including a brief historical general survey of Personal Identity.
2. What are We? : The topic “personal identity” has historically presupposed that we are (in the sense of “identical to”, or “most fundamentally”) persons, whereas I (along with other animalists) claim that we are identical to human animals. “We” being the sort of entity likely to be reading this paper. This chapter will sort out the topic of discussion for the thesis as a whole.
3. What is a Person?: This chapter will canvass the various views and consider how important issues in this area are to my main concern of our identity.
4. Souls, Substances, Sortals and Natural Kinds: Substances and sortals are central to the persistence of anything, and in particular to my claim that persons are phase sortals of human animals (the substances). I need to address souls as they are the major counter-claim to the persisting entity being an animal; or at least popularly so. The question of Natural Kinds arises in considering whether PERSON is a natural kind concept.
5. Animalism and Arguments for it: Focusing on Olson’s account.
6. The Constitution View and Arguments for it: Focusing on Lynne Rudder Baker’s account.
7. Arguments against Animalism: A discussion of the arguments against animalism, as given by those of anti-animalist persuasion and defended by the principal animalists (with a focus on Olson), with a critique.
8. Arguments against the Constitution View: A discussion of the arguments against the Constitution View, focusing on the principal animalists, with a critique.
   • In particular, I intend to critique Olson’s “thinking animal” argument against the Constitution View (though I think this argument is unnecessary).
9. Perdurantism versus Endurantism: A number of thought experiments that feature in the following chapter seem to fail if perdurantism is true (because the reduplication objections fail). Depending on whether any of these are critical to my arguments, I may need to consider the impact of perdurantism. But this complex area may be a step too far within a fairly limited word-count. I’m also unsure whether it should feature before or after the account of Thought Experiments.
10. Thought Experiments: Any account of personal identity needs to give an account of what is going in the various thought experiments that have been thought relevant to the topic. It’s also the area that’s most fun. Indeed, I think that the whole exercise is one of inference to the best explanation. It needs to account for our intuitions (if there is a universal response) or explain them away as confused. I will firstly briefly consider the propriety of using thought experiments in this domain of enquiry, and then consider the usual suspects, such as:
    • Fission¹⁸, fusion¹⁹ and replication²⁰ in general
    • Commissurotomy²¹
    • Multiple Personality Disorder²²
    • Brain-state Transfer²³
    • Brain Transplants²⁴
    • Teletransportation²⁵
    • Siliconisation²⁶
    • Etc?
11. Resurrection: If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection. Since the body is destroyed at death, any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong. Consideration of arguments by Peter Van Inwagen in this respect. This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued (unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion). Maybe I should also cover reincarnation.
12. Conclusion: Brief summary of the above;
    • that we are human animals,
    • that human persons are phase sortals of human animals and that substance dualism is false,
    • that the person is inseparable from the animal,
    • that the animal is utterly destroyed at death, and
    • consequently (given the sort of thing we are) that resurrection or any other post-mortem survival is impossible for us.

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1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2023