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Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)

(Work In Progress: output at 17/01/2022 23:08:25)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)


Abstract

  1. This Chapter provides a motivating statement for the study of the particular path through the topic of Personal Identity I intend to pursue and a brief historical survey of the subject to situate my particular stance.
  2. Why should we care about the topic of Personal Identity? In one sense, this question of “why” hardly needs answering, as it’s just about the most important question to be posed by a reflective (if maybe self-obsessed) person.
  3. Historically, answers to the question of what Personal Identity consists in have provided – or so Locke hoped – grounds for the possibility of life after death.
  4. Yet, this second question is difficult, and has had many attempted solutions offered. While some philosophers think there is no problem left to solve, there is no consensus as to the solution. In any case, before we can answer this question we need to clarify it and decide what sort of beings we persons are.
  5. My favourite paradigm – in the sense of the one I think most likely to be correct, rather than necessary the one I’d like to be correct – is Animalism1. This is the claim that we are human animals and that consequently death is the end of us. This sensible – if to many disappointing – view is only supported by around 17% of philosophers, according to a 2009 poll2 with about twice as many supporting some form of psychological view3.
  6. In one sense it is just obvious that we are – in some sense of that weasel word “are” – human animals. But then the problem cases kick in – whether actual real-life cases or thought experiments that may never be real-life possibilities.
  7. About 36% of the respondents in the aforementioned survey though we could survive teletransportation – though 31% thought that the result would be death and Transhumanists4 think we can be uploaded5 to computers, which makes no sense if we are animals.
  8. So, how did we get to this lack of consensus?



Research Methodology


Chapter Introduction
  1. Unless kept in check, this chapter could cover more ground than any number of PhD Theses. It’s purpose is to prepare the ground – and clear the way – for detailed investigation of the dispute between Animalism11 and the Constitution View12, as well as to demonstrate that I do – at least to some degree – understand more of the wider question than that pursued in detail later.
  2. There are many fine introductory books on the topic of Personal Identity, and I don’t intend to compete with them here. What I want to do is situate what I want to say in its historical context. I don’t intend to supply this section with a detailed scholarly apparatus.
  3. Of course, the modern discussion of Personal Identity has been a series of footnotes to Locke13, so it’s important to demonstrate an understanding of just what Locke thought on the subject, what positive insights he had, and how – in my view – he led us all astray on the subject. One positive aspect of his though is to stress that the topic is a Forensic14 one; it has ethical implications and motivations.
  4. As noted, historically – and indeed presently – the majority of philosophers (and probably most people) hold to some form of Psychological View15 of personal identity. So, I need to demonstrate an understanding of what this view – or views – is / are. I have a number of Notes on the topic other than the one just cited. The one on Psychology16 is something of a general repository, but should aim to describe just what it is that is deemed so important to us that it is (allegedly) constitutive of what we are. That on the Psychological Criterion17 is supposed to explain how this criterion of identity is intended to work.
  5. There’s a major sub-plot of the psychological view to do with Memory18, which – while admitted not to be the only psychological element of importance – has been beset with problems since Locke’s days, having been refined into quasi-memory19 to avoid problems with the logic of identity. David Lewis’s Methuselah20 thought-experiment also stresses the memory-criterion.
  6. Finally, there’s the question of dreamless Sleep21. Just what happens to the persistence of the person during this period, in the absence of either the Body or the Organism defining identity?
  7. My summary view on all this is that philosophers have confused What Matters22 to us with what What we are23.
  8. All this notwithstanding, it’s difficult to gainsay the psychological view in the face of experiential Forward Psychological Continuity24. We need to analyse Psychological Continuity25 in general, but the backward form falls prey to reduplication objections. But if it seems to me that I continue to exist during some adventure during which I’m continually conscious, it would be difficult to deny that I do; or so it seems to me.
  9. In this section, I should at least briefly discuss the positions of some of the major philosophers who have held neo-Lockean views (or other views not discussed later in this thesis). This would be an endless task, and the ones chosen – Descartes26, Kant27, Leibniz28, David Lewis29, Parfit30 and Wittgenstein31 – are those that happen to have come up in other contexts.



Links to Notes
  1. General Surveys32
  2. Locke33
    1. Forensic Property34
  3. The Psychological View
    1. Psychological View35
    2. Psychology36
    3. Psychological Criterion37
    4. Memory40
    5. Sleep43
  4. Other Philosophers of Note
    1. Descartes44
    2. Kant45
    3. Leibniz46
    4. Lewis47
    5. Parfit48
    6. Wittgenstein49
See also:-
  1. My Current Stance50



Main Text: Brief historical survey of the topic of Personal Identity
  1. General Surveys51
    1. There are many fine introductory books on this topic, and I don’t intend to compete with them here. What I want to do is situate what I want to say in its historical context. I don’t intend to supply this section with a detailed scholarly apparatus.
    2. Naturally, there are numerous General Surveys52 that treat of Personal Identity. The majority of these hail from the last century and reflect the concerns of the time, which was basically the dispute between holders of the majority position – the Psychological View53 and those supportive of the Body Criterion54. The latter view, which will be discussed in a the next Chapter, has largely been replaced by the Biological Criterion55 (Animalism56), though the Brain Criterion57 is still somewhat popular in preserving the advantages of both the PV and the Body Criterion.
  2. Locke58
    1. Locke was responsible for setting the terms of engagement for the modern discussion of Personal Identity.
    2. It was Locke who first – or at least most famously – made the distinction between the Person59 and the ‘Man’.
    3. The ‘Man’ is these days variously cashed out as the Human Being60 or Human Animal61, though for much of the time since Locke the division has been between the Mind62 (thought of as what the person really is) and the Body63.
    4. It is occasionally claimed that philosophers prefer the mind to the body, and are naturally inclined to take the “mental” side in these debates. While that may be true, the consciousness envisaged is not that of philosophical contemplation, but the everyday sort enjoyed by cobblers and the rest of us. It includes appreciation of all things bodily, and is the ground of everything that matters64 to us.
    5. Locke was correct in saying that the term Person65 is a forensic concept66; that is, it has to do with ethical matters. He was also right to connect the topic to the then concern with Resurrection67.
    6. However, while he’s correct to distinguish the person from the “man”, I believe him to be wrong in supposing that the “person” is separable from the “man”.
    7. Rather, we68 are human beings (human animals69) who happen to have the property70 of being persons, a property that cannot be transferred to some other entity.
    8. For Locke, the Person71 is individuated by a locus of consciousness and extends as far at that consciousness72 extends. No doubt for most of the time since Locke, this locus of consciousness was thought of as an immaterial Soul73, which makes the thought experiments74 – from Locke’s Prince and Cobbler onwards – easier to credit, though for some time this has been no longer an option for most philosophers.
    9. All I otherwise have to say on Locke is covered by my final-year BA essay What, if anything, is wrong with Locke’s account of personal identity?75.
  3. Forensic Property76
    1. Locke77’s recognition that there are important Forensic – that is, moral – aspects to the topic of Personal Identity is as true today as in his own day, even though we might not share his primary concern in justifying the importance of identifying the resurrected78 with the pre-mortem individuals.
    2. Animalism79 may say that psychology has nothing to do with the metaphysics of our identity – in that we continue on as the same animal – if we do – irrespective of our psychological states and history. While this may be true, most of what matters80 to us in our Survival81 is psychological, and ethical, and our concerns about praise and blame, and especially punishment, remain.
    3. Also, forensic matters are central to the Concept82 of Person83, even if we are84 not – most fundamentally – persons, and Person is an honorific rather than a Substance85 term.
    4. Forensic matters are central to discussions as to whether – and if so why – all human beings86 are persons for the entirety of their lives.
    5. Finally, Animalism is especially well-motivated in considering – for forensic reasons – whether certain Non-Human Animals87 are suitable for admission to the class of Person, maybe of reduced degree88.
  4. Psychology & The Psychological View
    1. Introduction
      1. In the arguments between those supporting psychological continuity89 and connectedness90, and those preferring bodily continuity91, the question what we are92 often seems to have been forgotten. Maybe it has often been assumed that Person93 is a substance94-concept?
      2. This is still assumed by those who think that Persons – whether as Souls95 or reified First-Person Perspectives96 – are separable from the infrastructure that – in normal circumstances – “grounds” them.
      3. But, for most people these days it is – or ought to be – obvious that the default position is that “we” are human animals, and that the consequences that stem from this have to be lived with.
      4. But it is difficult not to be – and maybe correct to be – dissatisfied with this. We may end up with a “Hybrid97” account: we are animals, but even so, we “go where our psychology goes”. In particular, the brain transplant98 intuition is difficult to escape from.
      5. If this is so, the answers to our questions will rest on just where our “psychology” does – or can (in the widest sense) – “go”.
      6. Transhumanists99 imagine all sorts of scenarios whereby “we” are uploaded100 to a computer. Even were this practical it assumes that “we” are our mental contents rather than the things that enjoy these contents. This strikes me as continuing a mistaken route in the history of philosophy taken by supporters of the psychological view101, and continued by Parfit102 and his supporters.
    2. The Psychological View103
      1. The Psychological View – hereafter the PV – is the view, originating with Locke104, that the matter of primary importance in matters of personal identity is psychological continuity105 (or maybe of psychological connectedness106). Indeed, this view – which was dominant until fairly recently (and maybe still is, given the Bourget & Chalmers survey) – is stronger, in saying that psychological continuity and connectedness are constitutive of Personal Identity.
      2. No-one denies that our psychology107 is important to us108, but making it constitutive of our identity has led to much confusion and paradox.
      3. I think, however, that Elselijn Kingma is incorrect in diagnosing the popularity of the PV as due to philosophers being intellectuals.
      4. In particular it encourages the idea that the same human being109 may not be the same person110 throughout its life111, or that the same person may “hop” from one human being to another as has been considered in many TEs112.
      5. I wish to deny both these possibilities.
    3. Psychology113
      1. If we adopt the Psychological View114 of Personal Identity – which I don’t – then it is psychological factors that are important in determining our persistence criteria115.
      2. However, while these factors do matter116 to the survivor117, they don’t matter in the binary sense of “have I survived or not” unless we take the Psychological View118 and make such factors constitutive of personal identity. As an animalist119, I do not.
      3. Supporters of the PV120 - or even the CV121 - tend to stress the discontinuity between the psychologies of human and non-human animals122. Animalists123 tend to focus on similarities, or continuities, as an evolutionary argument for animalism124.
      4. Because Psychology is so important to us, it is important to consider just what is important in it, and how it is grounded in our brains125 and bodies126. The idea of the Embodied Mind127 is very important when we consider phantastical ideas such as Uploading128.
      5. We must consider not just memory129 but other psychological capacities, including character.
    4. Psychological Criterion130
      1. The Psychological Criterion is the use of psychological facts as a criterion of personal identity, as definitive of whether we persist or not. So (on this view) if we want to know whether a person survives or not, it’s matters of psychological continuity or connectedness that we must investigate.
      2. In general, doubts arise about whether an individual has persisted if there are too radical changes in its properties in
        1. a short space of time (failure of continuity) or
        2. over longer stretches of time (failure of connectedness).
      3. These factors can be in tension131, as had been noted since Reid’s “Brave Officer” objection to Locke’s “memory criterion”, and Lewis’s Methuselah132 case. Identity is an equivalence relation, so transitivity is expected. Yet it is not necessarily respected in the case of memory – because continuous so-called memory-identity fails to lead to connectedness over long periods of time.
      4. Another factor I have noted is that there’s a distinction between the evidential force of forward and backward psychological continuity, covered below.
      • Psychological Continuity133
        1. Like any persisting thing, the persistence134 of a psychology requires continuity to an appropriate degree of the entity supposedly persisting: hence ‘psychological continuity’.
        2. I’m not quite sure what ‘a psychology’ is supposed to be, but it is supposedly constitutive of personal identity for those accepting the Psychological View135
        3. Popularly, we say that an individual is ‘not the same person’ as they were before if their character or aims differ too much from that former state. Hence, such characteristics would seem to be constitutive of a psychology.
        4. As noted, it is usual for someone’s character to develop gradually over time, often in a positive sense, though there may be Dorian Grey like declensions. However, there can also be sudden changes, as when someone has a religious or political conversion experience, though – even there – there is continuity of more general psychological factors.
        5. We are comfortable with gradual changes – new memories are added and lost gradually, and tastes stay fairly constant; knowledge is acquired gradually. But, over time, these gradual changes accumulate to the degree that one might not recognise the child in the adult, say. But usually, we allow that such gradual changes are identity-preserving, even though psychological connectedness136 is to some degree lost.
        6. All this is associated with one’s First Person Perspective137, one’s window on the world from which standpoint one anticipates the future, enjoys the present, and remembers the past.
      • Forward Psychological Continuity138
        1. I think there’s a conceptual difference between:-
          1. Forward psychological continuity, and
          2. Backward psychological continuity.
        2. Imagine the case where139, I’m put into a duplicating machine140, but something goes wrong and my body is destroyed by the duplication141 process, though my duplicate wakes up perfectly happily. Then, it seems to me, I142 would never wake up, and would have no experience beyond entry to the duplicating machine. I would have no forward psychological continuity.
        3. However, my duplicate143 does have backward psychological continuity. Any duplicate of me, looking backward, would consider himself to be “me”, having my memories144, abilities, plans and so forth, and a body looking just like mine. But, would I145 ever wake up as the duplicate? My intuition on the endurantist account, as I have said, is that I would not, though I suspect that on the perdurantist146 account, this might be seen as a case of intended fission147 in which I was intended to wake up twice, provided we consider that the right sort of causality148 is in place.
        4. The above considerations raise issues similar to those in closest continuer149 accounts of personal identity, and the Only 'X' and 'Y' Principle150. How can what happens to someone else affect whether (so to speak) I am me? How could the “right sort of causality” have anything to do with how I experience things?
        5. Fission is, in any case, hard to imagine happening to oneself. Just what does it mean to “wake up twice”? I dare say one could get one’s head(s) around it. The two selves would then be distinct individuals, with distinct consciousnesses, but with a shared past. On the perdurantist account, we were always distinct, but co-located with everything in common.
        6. Let’s consider forward psychological continuity in everyday life. What ensures forward continuity of consciousness151 in the normal case of sleep and temporary unconsciousness? I cannot know “from the inside” that when I awake I’m the same human being152 as the one that went to sleep in my bed. The reason I believe this is for external reasons: duplication153 is not physically possible (or at least practical), and in any case I have no reason to believe it happened to me last night. Other people assure me that there was nothing out of the ordinary going on.
        7. Andy Clark154, raises this question about what ensures psychological continuity – more or less than in the case of Teletransportation – in the case of dreamless sleep, or (hypothetically) being frozen and then thawed out. We might ask what it is in the normal waking case. Maybe the whole thing is related to the arrow of time155 or in the distinctions between forward-looking psychological properties – desires and intentions yet to be satisfied or acted upon – and memories of what has already taken place.
        8. This is the sort of question that the Logical Positivists would denounce as meaningless, as no empirical evidence can decide it.
    5. Memory156
      1. Text to be supplied.
    6. Sleep159
      1. Text to be supplied.
  5. Other Philosophers of Note
    1. Descartes160
      1. Text to be supplied.
    2. Kant161
      1. Text to be supplied.
    3. Leibniz162
      1. Text to be supplied.
    4. Lewis163
      1. Text to be supplied.
    5. Parfit164
      1. Text to be supplied.
    6. Wittgenstein165
      1. Text to be supplied.
  6. Further text to be supplied166 in due course.



Concluding Remarks
  1. To make any progress on this topic, we need to come to a conclusion as to what sort of thing we are. We discuss this in the next Chapter167.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed168
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  3. The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce and motivate the Thesis. As such, I need to situate it in the history of the topic. This is done in a number of introductory books, General Surveys, or collections of Papers that are standard fodder in courses on Personal Identity.
  4. Consequently, I will review the various Surveys of Personal Identity that feature in the standard reading lists, both to demonstrate that I’ve read them, and to ensure I’ve missed nothing major.
  5. If a Paper in a Collection or Chapter in an Introduction is specific to a later Chapter in this Thesis, its major consideration may be reserved until a later Chapter, even if the Book itself is not. These will be noted in due course.
  6. As the topic of Personal Identity stems primarily from Locke’s account, I need a brief statement of what this is. Most of the relevant material will appear in due course in the anthologies, but a few items not anthologised are listed below.
  7. I have largely ignored the many works by Lynne Rudder Baker and Eric Olson in this Chapter, as they feature heavily later in the Thesis.
  8. Other works were considered and either cut or reserved for later. The easiest way to see all the works considered is via the reading list at the end of this Note.



Works on this topic that I’ve actually read171, include the following:-
  1. General Surveys172
  2. Locke
    1. Locke181
    2. Forensic Property189
  3. The Psychological View
    1. Psychological View192
    2. Psychology194
    3. Psychological Criterion196
    4. Memory
    5. Sleep211
  4. Other Philosophers of Note
    1. Descartes212
    2. Kant213
    3. Leibniz214
    4. Lewis217
    5. Parfit218
    6. Wittgenstein223


A further reading list might start with:-
  1. General Surveys225
  2. Locke
    1. Locke236
    2. Forensic Property238
  3. The Psychological View
    1. Psychological View239
    2. Psychology240
    3. Psychological Criterion241
    4. Memory
    5. Sleep248
  4. Other Philosophers of Note
    1. Descartes249
    2. Kant250
    3. Leibniz252
    4. Lewis254
    5. Parfit256
    6. Wittgenstein259



In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 2: Footnote 139:
  1. On an endurantist account of persistence – see elsewhere for the distinction and it’s relevance to this case – between endurantism and perdurantism.
Footnote 140:
  1. I don’t think this is a tendentious term.
  2. The intended use of the machine is to produce an exact copy without destroying the original.
  3. So, this isn’t the same as Dennett’s “Telecloning” machine in "Dennett (Daniel) - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction", where the destruction of the original is intended, yet (despite the label) the machine is used as a means of transport.
Footnote 154: In "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality".

Footnote 168: Footnote 174: Footnote 175: Footnote 176: Footnote 177: Footnote 178: Footnote 179: Footnote 184: Footnote 191: Footnote 202: Footnote 204: Footnote 215: Footnote 219: Footnote 221: Footnote 222: Footnote 226: Footnote 227: Footnotes 228, 231: Footnotes 229, 230: Footnote 232: Footnote 233: Footnote 234: Footnote 235: Footnote 237: Footnote 251: Footnote 253: Footnote 255: Footnote 257: Footnote 258: Footnote 261:


Table of the Previous 12 Versions of this Note: (of 19)

Date Length Title
03/01/2022 23:58:34 54931 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
01/10/2021 13:17:46 49027 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
29/03/2021 19:23:31 28916 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
22/03/2021 00:28:48 15896 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
07/02/2021 19:46:34 11920 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
14/07/2019 18:05:46 11854 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
18/04/2019 18:18:43 8847 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
24/04/2018 00:12:58 14139 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
05/04/2016 23:19:41 14136 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
04/04/2015 00:17:17 13307 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
13/01/2015 19:07:41 12400 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
06/11/2014 10:13:26 12058 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)



Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
17/01/2022 23:08:36 None available Thesis - Introduction

Summary of Note Links from this Page

Animalism Animalism - Arguments For Animals Atherton - Locke and the Issue Over Innateness Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)
Baillie - What Am I? Baker - Personal Identity Over Time Baker - What Am I? Biological Criterion Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?
Body Body Criterion Brain Brain Criterion Brain Transplants
Brandom - Toward a Normative Pragmatics (Introduction) Causality Closest Continuer Concepts Connectedness vs Continuity
Consciousness Constitution View Dancy - Memory DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons? Degrees of Personhood
Descartes Duplication Endurantism Fine - A Counter-Example to Locke's Thesis First-Person Perspective
Fission Forensic Property Frankfurt - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Garrett - Personal Identity and Reductionism General Surveys
Human Animals Human Beings Hybrid Theories I Jen_080204 (Brandom, Chisholm, Baillie)
Jen_080317 (Baker) Johnston - Human Beings Kant Leibniz Lewis
Life Locke Locke on Personal Identity Lowe - Locke on Identity Memory
Metaphysics Methuselah Mind Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death Olson - Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online
Only 'X' and 'Y' Principle Parfit Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be Perdurantism Persistence
Persistence Criteria Person PID Note, Book & Paper Usage Properties Psychological Continuity
Psychological Continuity - Forward Psychological Criterion Psychological View Psychology Quasi-Memory
Resurrection Sleep Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity Souls Status: Thesis Dashboard (2022: January)
Sterelny & Griffiths - From Sociobiology to Evolutionary Psychology Substance Survival Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Thesis - Current Stance Thesis - Method & Form Thought Experiments Time
Transhumanism Uploading What are We? What Matters Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein - Bodily Sensations Woolhouse - Leibniz and Substance Woolhouse - Locke’s Theory of Knowledge Works Read - Explanation  

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Summary of Note Links to this Page

PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2 Status: Thesis Dashboard (2022: January), 2 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time), 2 Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Thesis - Introduction
Website - Progress to Date (2022 - January), 2 Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4      

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Introduction & Chapter Outlines Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes



References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Allison (Henry) Locke's Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-Examination Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Tipton - Locke on Human Understanding - Selected Essays No
Alston (William) & Bennett (Jonathan) Locke on People and Substances Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, Jan., 1988, pp. 25-46 No
Armstrong (David) Identity Through Time Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Van Inwagen - Time and Cause, 1980, pp. 67-78 Yes
Arnold (Keith) The Subject of Radical Change Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (May, 1978), pp. 395-401 Yes
Atherton (Margaret) Locke and the Issue Over Innateness Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Chappell - Locke - Oxford Readings Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Artificial and Other Problematical Objects Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 21, pp. 239-253 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Contemporary Reactions to Locke's Theory Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 24, pp. 269-277 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Forms of Material Unity Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 20, pp. 229-238 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Identity: Introduction Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Introduction to Part III, pp. 205-206 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke (Ontology) - Introduction & Conclusion Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Introduction (pp. 1-14) & Conclusion (pp. 293-295) Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 25%
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke on Living Things Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 19, pp. 216-228 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke's Theory of Personal Identity Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 23, pp. 260-268 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 25, pp. 278-292 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Personal Identity Before the Essay Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 22, pp. 254-259 Yes
Baillie (James) Problems in Personal Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity 68%
Baillie (James) What Am I? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 4 Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism (SEP) Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2014 Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism and its Implications Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract OU Website (now deleted) Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism Unburdened Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract OU Website (now deleted) Yes
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds. Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds. - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity 22%
Blatti (Stephan), Ed. The Lives of Human Animals Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 52, Spindel Supplement, 2014 Yes
Bourgeois (Warren) Modern Philosophers' Views on Persons: More Moderns Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Chapter 6 Yes
Bourgeois (Warren) Modern Philosophers' Views on Persons: The Renaissance and the Early Moderns Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Chapter 5 Yes
Bourgeois (Warren) Persons: What Philosophers Say about You Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 22%
Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies: Vol. 170, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 465-500 Yes
Brennan (Andrew) Review of Harold Noonan's 'Personal Identity' Paper - Cited Philosophical Quarterly 42, No. 166, Jan., 1992, pp. 103-106 No
Butler (Joseph) Of Personal Identity Paper - Cited Perry - Personal Identity Yes
Button (Tim) Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’ Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Volume 82 (Metaphysics) - July 2018, pp. 205-229 5%
Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity Yes
Chappell (Vere), Ed. Locke: Oxford Readings in Philosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 8%
Chihara (Charles S.) & Fodor (Jerry) Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fodor - Representations - Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science No
Clarke (D.S.) A Defence of the No-Ownership Theory Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind, 81, No. 321 (Jan., 1972), pp. 97-101 No
Craig (William Lane) McTaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 122-127 33%
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