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Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)

(Text as at 28/09/2022 10:24:58)

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Abstract

  1. This Chapter provides a motivating statement for the study of the particular path through the topic of Personal Identity I intend to pursue and a brief historical survey of the subject to situate my particular stance.
  2. Why should we care about the topic of Personal Identity? In one sense, this question of “why” hardly needs answering, as it’s just about the most important question to be posed by a reflective (if maybe self-obsessed) person.
  3. Historically, answers to the question of what Personal Identity consists in have provided – or so Locke hoped – grounds for the possibility of life after death.
  4. Yet, this second question is difficult, and has had many attempted solutions offered. While some philosophers think there is no problem left to solve, there is no consensus as to the solution. In any case, before we can answer this question we need to clarify it and decide what sort of beings we persons are.
  5. My favourite paradigm – in the sense of the one I think most likely to be correct, rather than necessary the one I’d like to be correct – is Animalism1. This is the claim that we are human animals and that consequently death is the end of us. This sensible – if to many disappointing – view is only supported by around 17% of philosophers, according to a 2009 poll2 with about twice as many supporting some form of psychological view3.
  6. In one sense it is just obvious that we are – in some sense of that weasel word “are” – human animals. But then the problem cases kick in – whether actual real-life cases or thought experiments that may never be real-life possibilities.
  7. About 36% of the respondents in the aforementioned survey though we could survive teletransportation – though 31% thought that the result would be death and Transhumanists4 think we can be uploaded5 to computers, which makes no sense if we are animals.
  8. So, how did we get to this lack of consensus?



Research Methodology


Chapter Introduction11
  1. Unless kept in check, this chapter could cover more ground than any number of PhD Theses. Its purpose is to prepare the ground – and clear the way – for detailed investigation of the dispute between Animalism and the Constitution View, as well as to demonstrate that I do – at least to some degree – understand more of the wider question than that pursued in detail later.
  2. There are many fine introductory books – and General Surveys12 – on the topic of Personal Identity, and I don’t intend to compete with them here. What I want to do is situate what I want to say in its historical context. I don’t intend to supply this section with a detailed scholarly apparatus.
  3. Of course, the modern discussion of Personal Identity has been a series of footnotes to Locke13, so it’s important to demonstrate an understanding of just what Locke thought on the subject, what positive insights he had, and how – in my view – he led us all astray on the subject. One positive aspect of his though is to stress that the topic is a Forensic14 one; it has ethical implications and motivations.
  4. As noted, historically – and indeed presently – the majority of philosophers (and probably most people) hold to some form of Psychological View15 of personal identity. So, I need to demonstrate an understanding of what this view – or views – is or are. I have a number of Notes on the topic other than the one just cited. The one on Psychology16 is something of a general repository, but should aim to describe just what it is that is deemed so important to us that it is (allegedly) constitutive of what we are. That on the Psychological Criterion17 is supposed to explain how this criterion of identity is intended to work.
  5. We need to analyse Psychological Continuity18 in general, but the backward form falls prey to reduplication objections. But, it’s difficult to gainsay the psychological view in the face of experiential Forward Psychological Continuity19. If it seems to me that I continue to exist during some adventure during which I’m continually conscious, it would be difficult to deny that I do; or so it seems to me.
  6. There’s a major sub-plot of the psychological view to do with Memory20, which – while admitted not to be the only psychological element of importance – has been beset with problems since Locke’s days, having been refined into quasi-memory21 to avoid problems with the logic of identity. David Lewis’s Methuselah22 thought-experiment also stresses the memory-criterion.
  7. Finally, there’s the question of dreamless Sleep23. Just what happens to the persistence of the person during this period, in the absence of either the Body or the Organism defining identity?
  8. In this section, I should at least briefly discuss the positions of some of the major philosophers who have held neo-Lockean views (or other views not discussed later in this thesis). This would be an endless task, and the ones chosen – Descartes24, Kant25, Leibniz26, David Lewis27, Parfit28 and Wittgenstein29 – are those that happen to have come up.



Note Hierarchy
  1. General Surveys30
  2. Locke31
    1. Forensic Property32
  3. The Psychological View
    1. Psychological View33
    2. Psychology34
    3. Psychological Criterion35
    4. Memory38
    5. Sleep41
  4. Other Philosophers of Note
    1. Descartes42
    2. Kant43
    3. Leibniz44
    4. Lewis45
    5. Parfit46
    6. Wittgenstein47
See also:-
  1. My Current Stance48



Main Text: Brief historical survey of the topic of Personal Identity
  1. General Surveys49
    1. There are many fine introductory books on this topic, and I don’t intend to compete with them here. What I want to do is situate what I want to say in its historical context. I don’t intend to supply this section with a detailed scholarly apparatus.
    2. Naturally, there are numerous General Surveys50 that treat of Personal Identity. The majority of these hail from the last century and reflect the concerns of the time, which was basically the dispute between holders of the majority position – the Psychological View51 and those supportive of the Body Criterion52. The latter view, which will be discussed in a the next Chapter, has largely been replaced by the Biological Criterion53 (Animalism54), though the Brain Criterion55 is still somewhat popular in preserving the advantages of both the PV and the Body Criterion.
  2. Locke56
    1. Locke was responsible for setting the terms of engagement for the modern discussion of Personal Identity.
    2. It was Locke who first – or at least most famously – made the distinction between the Person57 and the ‘Man’.
    3. The ‘Man’ is these days variously cashed out as the Human Being58 or Human Animal59, though for much of the time since Locke the division has been between the Mind60 (thought of as what the person really is) and the Body61.
    4. It is occasionally claimed that philosophers prefer the mind to the body, and are naturally inclined to take the “mental” side in these debates. While that may be true, the consciousness envisaged is not that of philosophical contemplation, but the everyday sort enjoyed by cobblers and the rest of us. It includes appreciation of all things bodily, and is the ground of everything that matters62 to us.
    5. Locke was correct in saying that the term Person63 is a forensic concept64; that is, it has to do with ethical matters. He was also right to connect the topic to the then concern with Resurrection65.
    6. However, while he’s correct to distinguish the person from the “man”, I believe him to be wrong in supposing that the “person” is separable from the “man”.
    7. Rather, we66 are human beings (human animals67) who happen to have the property68 of being persons, a property that cannot be transferred to some other entity.
    8. For Locke, the Person69 is individuated by a locus of consciousness and extends as far at that consciousness70 extends. No doubt for most of the time since Locke, this locus of consciousness was thought of as an immaterial Soul71, which makes the thought experiments72 – from Locke’s Prince and Cobbler onwards – easier to credit, though for some time this has been no longer an option for most philosophers.
    9. All I otherwise have to say on Locke is covered by my final-year BA essay What, if anything, is wrong with Locke’s account of personal identity?73.
  3. Forensic Property74
    1. Locke75’s recognition that there are important Forensic – that is, moral – aspects to the topic of Personal Identity is as true today as in his own day, even though we might not share his primary concern in justifying the importance of identifying the resurrected76 with the pre-mortem individuals.
    2. Animalism77 may say that psychology has nothing to do with the metaphysics of our identity – in that we continue on as the same animal – if we do – irrespective of our psychological states and history. While this may be true, most of what matters78 to us in our Survival79 is psychological, and ethical, and our concerns about praise and blame, and especially punishment, remain.
    3. Also, forensic matters are central to the Concept80 of Person81, even if we are82 not – most fundamentally – persons, and Person is an honorific rather than a Substance83 term.
    4. Forensic matters are central to discussions as to whether – and if so why – all human beings84 are persons for the entirety of their lives.
    5. Finally, Animalism is especially well-motivated in considering – for forensic reasons – whether certain Non-Human Animals85 are suitable for admission to the class of Person, maybe of reduced degree86.
  4. Psychology & The Psychological View
    1. Introduction
      1. In the arguments between those supporting psychological continuity87 and connectedness88, and those preferring bodily continuity89, the question what we are90 often seems to have been forgotten. Maybe it has often been assumed that Person91 is a substance92-concept?
      2. This is still assumed by those who think that Persons – whether as Souls93 or reified First-Person Perspectives94 – are separable from the infrastructure that – in normal circumstances – “grounds” them.
      3. But, for most people these days it is – or ought to be – obvious that the default position is that “we” are human animals, and that the consequences that stem from this have to be lived with.
      4. But it is difficult not to be – and maybe correct to be – dissatisfied with this. We may end up with a “Hybrid95” account: we are animals, but even so, we “go where our psychology goes”. In particular, the brain transplant96 intuition is difficult to escape from.
      5. If this is so, the answers to our questions will rest on just where our “psychology” does – or can (in the widest sense) – “go”.
      6. Transhumanists97 imagine all sorts of scenarios whereby “we” are uploaded98 to a computer. Even were this practical it assumes that “we” are our mental contents rather than the things that enjoy these contents. This strikes me as continuing a mistaken route in the history of philosophy taken by supporters of the psychological view99, and continued by Parfit100 and his supporters.
    2. The Psychological View101
      1. The Psychological View – hereafter the PV – is the view, originating with Locke102, that the matter of primary importance in matters of personal identity is psychological continuity103 (or maybe of psychological connectedness104). Indeed, this view – which was dominant until fairly recently (and maybe still is, given the Bourget & Chalmers survey) – is stronger, in saying that psychological continuity and connectedness are constitutive of Personal Identity.
      2. No-one denies that our psychology105 is important to us106, but making it constitutive of our identity has led to much confusion and paradox.
      3. I think, however, that Elselijn Kingma is incorrect in diagnosing the popularity of the PV as due to philosophers being intellectuals.
      4. In particular it encourages the idea that the same human being107 may not be the same person108 throughout its life109, or that the same person may “hop” from one human being to another as has been considered in many TEs110.
      5. I wish to deny both these possibilities.
    3. Psychology111
      1. If we adopt the Psychological View112 of Personal Identity – which I don’t – then it is psychological factors that are important in determining our persistence criteria113.
      2. However, while these factors do matter114 to the survivor115, they don’t matter in the binary sense of “have I survived or not” unless we take the Psychological View116 and make such factors constitutive of personal identity. As an animalist117, I do not.
      3. Supporters of the PV118 - or even the CV119 - tend to stress the discontinuity between the psychologies of human and non-human animals120. Animalists121 tend to focus on similarities, or continuities, as an evolutionary argument for animalism122.
      4. Because Psychology is so important to us, it is important to consider just what is important in it, and how it is grounded in our brains123 and bodies124. The idea of the Embodied Mind125 is very important when we consider phantastical ideas such as Uploading126.
      5. We must consider not just memory127 but other psychological capacities, including character.
    4. Psychological Criterion128
      1. The Psychological Criterion is the use of psychological facts as a criterion of personal identity, as definitive of whether we persist or not. So (on this view) if we want to know whether a person survives or not, it’s matters of psychological continuity or connectedness that we must investigate.
      2. In general, doubts arise about whether an individual has persisted if there are too radical changes in its properties in
        1. a short space of time (failure of continuity) or
        2. over longer stretches of time (failure of connectedness).
      3. These factors can be in tension129, as had been noted since Reid’s “Brave Officer” objection to Locke’s “memory criterion”, and Lewis’s Methuselah130 case. Identity is an equivalence relation, so transitivity is expected. Yet it is not necessarily respected in the case of memory – because continuous so-called memory-identity fails to lead to connectedness over long periods of time.
      4. Another factor I have noted is that there’s a distinction between the evidential force of forward and backward psychological continuity, covered below.
      • Psychological Continuity131
        1. Like any persisting thing, the persistence132 of a psychology requires continuity to an appropriate degree of the entity supposedly persisting: hence ‘psychological continuity’.
        2. I’m not quite sure what ‘a psychology’ is supposed to be, but it is supposedly constitutive of personal identity for those accepting the Psychological View133
        3. Popularly, we say that an individual is ‘not the same person’ as they were before if their character or aims differ too much from that former state. Hence, such characteristics would seem to be constitutive of a psychology.
        4. As noted, it is usual for someone’s character to develop gradually over time, often in a positive sense, though there may be Dorian Grey like declensions. However, there can also be sudden changes, as when someone has a religious or political conversion experience, though – even there – there is continuity of more general psychological factors.
        5. We are comfortable with gradual changes – new memories are added and lost gradually, and tastes stay fairly constant; knowledge is acquired gradually. But, over time, these gradual changes accumulate to the degree that one might not recognise the child in the adult, say. But usually, we allow that such gradual changes are identity-preserving, even though psychological connectedness134 is to some degree lost.
        6. All this is associated with one’s First Person Perspective135, one’s window on the world from which standpoint one anticipates the future, enjoys the present, and remembers the past.
      • Forward Psychological Continuity136
        1. I think there’s a conceptual difference between:-
          1. Forward psychological continuity, and
          2. Backward psychological continuity.
        2. Imagine the case where137, I’m put into a duplicating machine138, but something goes wrong and my body is destroyed by the duplication139 process, though my duplicate wakes up perfectly happily. Then, it seems to me, I140 would never wake up, and would have no experience beyond entry to the duplicating machine. I would have no forward psychological continuity.
        3. However, my duplicate141 does have backward psychological continuity. Any duplicate of me, looking backward, would consider himself to be “me”, having my memories142, abilities, plans and so forth, and a body looking just like mine. But, would I143 ever wake up as the duplicate? My intuition on the endurantist account, as I have said, is that I would not, though I suspect that on the perdurantist144 account, this might be seen as a case of intended fission145 in which I was intended to wake up twice, provided we consider that the right sort of causality146 is in place.
        4. The above considerations raise issues similar to those in closest continuer147 accounts of personal identity, and the Only 'X' and 'Y' Principle148. How can what happens to someone else affect whether (so to speak) I am me? How could the “right sort of causality” have anything to do with how I experience things?
        5. Fission is, in any case, hard to imagine happening to oneself. Just what does it mean to “wake up twice”? I dare say one could get one’s head(s) around it. The two selves would then be distinct individuals, with distinct consciousnesses, but with a shared past. On the perdurantist account, we were always distinct, but co-located with everything in common.
        6. Let’s consider forward psychological continuity in everyday life. What ensures forward continuity of consciousness149 in the normal case of sleep and temporary unconsciousness? I cannot know “from the inside” that when I awake I’m the same human being150 as the one that went to sleep in my bed. The reason I believe this is for external reasons: duplication151 is not physically possible (or at least practical), and in any case I have no reason to believe it happened to me last night. Other people assure me that there was nothing out of the ordinary going on.
        7. Andy Clark152, raises this question about what ensures psychological continuity – more or less than in the case of Teletransportation – in the case of dreamless sleep, or (hypothetically) being frozen and then thawed out. We might ask what it is in the normal waking case. Maybe the whole thing is related to the arrow of time153 or in the distinctions between forward-looking psychological properties – desires and intentions yet to be satisfied or acted upon – and memories of what has already taken place.
        8. This is the sort of question that the Logical Positivists would denounce as meaningless, as no empirical evidence can decide it.
    5. Memory154
      1. Obviously, if I were to become tempted by the Psychological View155 of personal identity, I would have to give an account of memory, and it would appear here.
      2. Though quasi-memory156 is the more relevant concept for those espousing the Psychological Criterion157, it depends on the concept of memory itself.
      3. While neither version of memory is constitutive of personal identity, memories represent much of what matters158 to us in Survival159.
      4. In this regard, I might note in passing that some of the supposed memories that matter most to us may not be true accounts of what actually happened – assuming there is even a single such true account that includes any mattering in the first place.
      5. It is supposed memories that convince the experiencer thereof that he has survived some escapade in a TE160 when in fact he has not.
      • Methuselah161
        1. David Lewis’s Methuselah thought experiment162 seems to be a reductio ad absurdum of the psychological163 connectedness164 approach to personal identity.
        2. I’m unimpressed165 by Lewis166’s solution. Can there really be an uncountable infinity of persons167 residing in a single body168? But why not? Lewis thrives on pressing credibility.
        3. The “no prudential concern for the future” argument also seems to be another reductio of the connectedness approach. If I’m not the same person as the future occupant of my body, why make provisions for him. Yet, he’ll share my first-person perspective169 and I’ll be psychologically continuous170 with him.
        4. Of course, Lewis’s model (of a 137-year cut-off for psychological connectedness) is admittedly too crude. Parfit171 sees temporally extended persons as persons of reduced degree172, according to the degree of connectedness. However, this seems to destroy the natural growth and maturation of the person.
        5. I’m still the same person as was my immature self, even though most of my hopes and desires have changed. If I’m in control of my life, I own these changes, brought them about, and often think them for the good.
        6. What about where I don’t own them, but regret my corruption (moral and physical)? It’s still my corruption that I regret. I’m the same human being173.
        7. It depends what concept174 we want to use the term “person” for. We always have to distinguish personality175 from persons.
        8. Finally, consider Saul Kripke on individuation by origin176. Is this a possible objection to overlapping persons? If a person’s origin is what individuates177 it, how is it possible for persons to have vague178,179 origins as in an un-simplified Methusalah case? There are two issues here that need spelling out.
      • Quasi-Memory180
        1. One problem with Locke’s memory theory of Personal Identity181 is that it is prima facie circular. A memory can properly only be had by the person who had the experience, so cannot be used to analyse “Person182”.
        2. However, “Quasi-” prefixes do not presuppose ownership.
        3. Snowdon puts it this way183:-
          1. There is a causal linkage L linking a person’s memory to that person’s history.
          2. There is – we may suppose – a neural trace laid down at the time, and re-activated during an act of remembering.
          3. This trace might be transferred – again we may suppose – to some other subject by micro-surgery.
          4. This new subject thereby Q-remembers an event that he did not experience.
          5. So, since Q-remembering does not presuppose the identity of the person doing the Q-remembering with the person involved in the event Q-remembered, Q-predicates can without circularity be used to analyse personal identity in terms of psychological continuity and connectedness.
          6. Or so it is said.
    6. Sleep184
      1. In the context of Parfit’s185 Teletransportation186 TE187, the thought188 is that the “pulling yourself together” that the individual does on awaking is very closely analogous to what happens in the “reception pod” in teletransportation. If this is right, then either the awakening sleeper is not identical to the one who went to sleep, or the teletransportee is indeed identical to the individual who set off, and teletransportation is indeed a form of travel.
      2. I don’t believe any of this. However, it needs to be considered carefully as it’s central to the Psychological View189, which says – roughly speaking – that we are190 most fundamentally mental substances, and there has – since Descartes – been an issue about whether the thinking thing has to be continually thinking, and the dreamless sleep was the classic case of when it appeared not to be.
      3. Another context in which the word “sleep” is used is in the New Testament (Pauline) account of (believers’) death191 – and the state of the dead between death and resurrection192, which is described as “sleep”. This is also referenced in Hamlet’s soliloquy (“perchance to dream193”).
      4. There’s a mildly heretical Christian view – called “soul sleep” by detractors (though those that hold the view tend not to believe in immaterial souls) – that the individual experiences nothing between death and resurrection194.
      5. Of course, we refer to the euthanasia of animals as “putting to sleep”, but this isn’t understood to mean anything significant about the post-mortem state of the animal195.
  5. Other Philosophers of Note
    1. Introduction
      1. Apart from Locke, discussed above, almost every major philosopher – both historical and contemporary – has had something to say about personal identity, whether or not it has been a major area of concern. How could it be otherwise?
      2. I have chosen half a dozen that have featured in my researches. Some of these – together with other philosophers – will appear again in later Chapters.
    2. Descartes196
      1. Descartes is important as the initiator within modern philosophy of the psychological view197 that we are198 thinking things (res cogitans).
      2. He also initiated the use of Thought Experiments199 in the topic of personal identity. In my view he introduced (or confirmed) the muddle within philosophy that what is (clearly and distrinctly) conceivable is possible200. This will be considered in Chapter 10201.
      3. He will be considered further in the Chapter 2202, under the head of Cartesian Egos203.
    3. Kant204
      1. Text to be supplied.
    4. Leibniz205
      1. I’m uncertain whether I will have anything to say on Leibniz apart from Leibniz’s Law(s), which are covered under the Logic of Identity206.
      2. However, Leibniz’s critique of Locke’s account of personal identity, in "Leibniz (Gottfried) - What Identity Or Diversity Is", may be worth following up.
      3. As may his wider criticism of Locke in "Leibniz (Gottfried), Remnant (Peter), Bennett (Jonathan) - New Essays on Human Understanding", though I suspect life’s too short.
    5. Lewis207
      1. David Lewis’s views on personal identity are characterised by his espousal of perdurantism208.
      2. As is discussed under that Note, perdurantist metaphysics avoids the reduplication209 problems for identity-preservation following fission210. See also my Note on Counting Persons211.
      3. Lewis is also important for espousing realism with respect to possible worlds. The modal212 counterpart relation is used as an analogy in exdurantism213. I will not discuss any of this here.
      4. Lynne Rudder Baker charges Lewis with trying to reduce the First Person Perspective214.
      5. Lewis discusses the Thought Experiment215 of Methuselah216, important for the Psychological View217 of personal identity. Lewis espouses the PV218 and thinks that several Persons219 can exist successively in a single human animal220.
    6. Parfit221
      1. Parfit is famous for the dictum “identity is not what matters in survival”.
        1. I have a note – What Matters222 on this, which I cover along with other general metaphysical matters in Chapter 4223.
        2. My view remains that there must be some confusion in this dictum, in that survival224 is the same as persistence225, and without identity there is no persistence, so identity is a necessary condition for survival and must, therefore, “matter”.
        3. There may well be situations wherein other things matter – either to others or to myself – more than my survival, but this is not the same thing.
        4. Also, Parfit espouses a psychological view226 of personal identity, and has many interesting things to say on whether – given the psychological difference between myself now and my future self – I should make provision for someone to whom I am only weakly psychologically connected227, and whether others should honour advance directives made by my former self228.
        5. My view on that remains that I’m stuck with my FPP229, which persists (though it may degrade) through all the changes in my psychology, and that prudence demands that I take this into account. It matters.
      2. In addition, Parfit has invented or refined a number of interesting TEs230 to do with Fission231, Fusion232 or Teletransportation233, which will receive attention in their due place in Chapter 10234.
    7. Wittgenstein235
      1. Text to be supplied.
  6. Further text to be supplied236 in due course.



Concluding Remarks
  1. To make any progress on this topic, we need to come to a conclusion as to what sort of thing we are. We discuss this in the next Chapter237.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed238
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  3. The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce and motivate the Thesis. As such, I need to situate it in the history of the topic. This is done in a number of introductory books, General Surveys, or collections of Papers that are standard fodder in courses on Personal Identity.
  4. Consequently, I will review the various Surveys of Personal Identity that feature in the standard reading lists, both to demonstrate that I’ve read them, and to ensure I’ve missed nothing major.
  5. If a Paper in a Collection or Chapter in an Introduction is specific to a later Chapter in this Thesis, its major consideration may be reserved until a later Chapter, even if the Book itself is not. These will be noted in due course.
  6. As the topic of Personal Identity stems primarily from Locke’s account, I need a brief statement of what this is. Most of the relevant material will appear in due course in the anthologies, but a few items not anthologised are listed below.
  7. I have largely ignored the many works by Lynne Rudder Baker and Eric Olson in this Chapter, as they feature heavily later in the Thesis.
  8. Other works were considered and either cut or reserved for later. The easiest way to see all the works considered is via the reading list at the end of this Note.



Works on this topic that I’ve actually read241, include the following:-
  1. General Surveys242
  2. Locke
    1. Locke251
    2. Forensic Property259
  3. The Psychological View
    1. Psychological View263
    2. Psychology265
    3. Psychological Criterion267
    4. Memory
    5. Sleep286
  4. Other Philosophers of Note
    1. Descartes287
    2. Kant288
    3. Leibniz289
    4. Lewis291
    5. Parfit293
    6. Wittgenstein302


A further reading list might start with:-
  1. General Surveys304
  2. Locke
    1. Locke315
    2. Forensic Property317
  3. The Psychological View
    1. Psychological View318
    2. Psychology319
    3. Psychological Criterion320
    4. Memory
    5. Sleep328
  4. Other Philosophers of Note
    1. Descartes329
    2. Kant330
    3. Leibniz333
    4. Lewis334
    5. Parfit336
    6. Wittgenstein340



In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 2: Footnote 11: Footnote 137:
  1. On an endurantist account of persistence – see elsewhere for the distinction and it’s relevance to this case – between endurantism and perdurantism.
Footnote 138:
  1. I don’t think this is a tendentious term.
  2. The intended use of the machine is to produce an exact copy without destroying the original.
  3. So, this isn’t the same as Dennett’s “Telecloning” machine in "Dennett (Daniel) - The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul: Introduction", where the destruction of the original is intended, yet (despite the label) the machine is used as a means of transport.
Footnote 152: In "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality".

Footnote 165:
  1. This text is all a bit of a jumble.
  2. I need to revise it after re-reading, and commenting on, "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity", in which the TE appears.
Footnote 172:
  1. I need to re-read Parfit to see what he means (assuming he said this!).
  2. I have a Note on Degrees of Personhood, but it is talking about something else, I think.
Footnote 183:
  1. In "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity".
Footnote 188:
  1. In Paul Broks’s contribution to "Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) - Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me?".
Footnote 193:
  1. To die, to sleep – to sleep, perchance to dream – ay, there’s the rub, for in this sleep of death what dreams may come…
    → Hamlet, Act-III, Scene-I, Lines 66-68
Footnote 238: Footnote 244: Footnotes 245, 262: Footnote 246: Footnote 247: Footnote 248: Footnote 249: Footnote 254: Footnote 261: Footnote 273: Footnote 275: Footnote 292: Footnote 294: Footnote 296: Footnote 298: Footnote 299: Footnote 301: Footnote 305: Footnote 306: Footnotes 307, 310: Footnotes 308, 309: Footnote 311: Footnote 312: Footnote 313: Footnote 314: Footnote 316: Footnote 332: Footnote 335: Footnote 338: Footnote 339: Footnote 341: Footnote 343:


Table of the Previous 12 Versions of this Note: (of 22)

Date Length Title
11/05/2022 18:59:02 82290 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
01/05/2022 18:20:10 76054 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
11/04/2022 00:01:26 77774 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
03/01/2022 23:58:34 54931 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
01/10/2021 13:17:46 49027 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
29/03/2021 19:23:31 28916 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
22/03/2021 00:28:48 15896 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
07/02/2021 19:46:34 11920 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
14/07/2019 18:05:46 11854 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
18/04/2019 18:18:43 8847 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
24/04/2018 00:12:58 14139 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
05/04/2016 23:19:41 14136 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)



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28/09/2022 10:24:58 None available Thesis - Introduction


Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Animalism Animalism - Arguments For Animalism - Objections Animals Atherton - Locke and the Issue Over Innateness
Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Baillie - What Am I? Baker - Personal Identity Over Time Baker - What Am I? Biological Criterion
Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Body Body Criterion Brain Brain Criterion
Brain Transplants Brandom - Toward a Normative Pragmatics (Introduction) Cartesian Ego Causality Closest Continuer
Concepts Connectedness vs Continuity Consciousness Constitution View Counting Persons
Dancy - Memory Death DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons? Degrees of Personhood Descartes
Duplication Endurantism Exdurantism Fine - A Counter-Example to Locke's Thesis First-Person Perspective
Fission Forensic Property Frankfurt - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Fusion Garrett - Personal Identity and Reductionism
General Surveys Human Animals Human Beings Hybrid Theories I
Jen_080204 (Brandom, Chisholm, Baillie) Jen_080317 (Baker) Johnston - Human Beings Kant Leibniz
Lewis Life Locke Locke on Personal Identity Logic of Identity
Lowe - Locke on Identity Memory Metaphysics Methuselah Mind
Modality Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death Olson - Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online Only 'X' and 'Y' Principle Origins
Parfit Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be Perdurantism Persistence Persistence Criteria
Person Personality PID Note, Book & Paper Usage Properties Psychological Continuity
Psychological Continuity - Forward Psychological Criterion Psychological View Psychology Quasi-Memory
Reduplication Objections Resurrection Self Sleep Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity
Souls Status: Thesis Dashboard (2022: November) Sterelny & Griffiths - From Sociobiology to Evolutionary Psychology Substance Survival
Teletransportation Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)
Thesis - Current Stance Thesis - Method & Form Thought Experiments Time Transhumanism
Uploading Vague Identity What are We? What Matters Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein - Bodily Sensations Woolhouse - Leibniz and Substance Woolhouse - Locke’s Theory of Knowledge Works Read - Explanation  

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2 Status: Thesis Dashboard (2022: November), 2 Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Thesis - Introduction
Website - Progress to Date (2022 - November), 2 Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21      

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Introduction & Chapter Outlines Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes



References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
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Allison (Henry) Locke's Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-Examination Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Tipton - Locke on Human Understanding - Selected Essays No
Alston (William) & Bennett (Jonathan) Locke on People and Substances Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, Jan., 1988, pp. 25-46 No
Armstrong (David) Identity Through Time Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Van Inwagen - Time and Cause, 1980, pp. 67-78 Yes
Armstrong (John) La bella vita Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 14 February, 2014 Yes
Arnold (Carrie) Watchers of the earth Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 13 April, 2017 Yes
Arnold (Keith) The Subject of Radical Change Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (May, 1978), pp. 395-401 Yes
Askowitz (Andrea) So I exaggerate a little – am I wrong to jazz up my stories? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 20 June, 2017 Yes
Asma (Stephen) We could all do with learning how to improvise a little better Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Aeon, 29 May, 2017 Yes
Atherton (Margaret) Locke and the Issue Over Innateness Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Chappell - Locke - Oxford Readings Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Artificial and Other Problematical Objects Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 21, pp. 239-253 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Contemporary Reactions to Locke's Theory Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 24, pp. 269-277 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Forms of Material Unity Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 20, pp. 229-238 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Identity: Introduction Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Introduction to Part III, pp. 205-206 Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke (Ontology) - Introduction & Conclusion Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Introduction (pp. 1-14) & Conclusion (pp. 293-295) Yes
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 17%
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke on Living Things Paper - Cited Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 19, pp. 216-228 Yes
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Ayers (Michael R.) Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 25, pp. 278-292 Yes
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Baillie (James) Problems in Personal Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity 45%
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Baker (Lynne Rudder) On the Very Idea of a Form of Life Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Inquiry, 27:277–89, 1984 8%
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Bourgeois (Warren) Modern Philosophers' Views on Persons: More Moderns Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bourgeois - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You, 2003, Chapter 6 Yes
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Brennan (Andrew) Review of Harold Noonan's 'Personal Identity' Paper - Cited Philosophical Quarterly 42, No. 166, Jan., 1992, pp. 103-106 No
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Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity Yes
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Chambers (Oswald) Biblical Psychology Book - Cited Chambers (Oswald) - Biblical Psychology Yes
Chappell (Vere), Ed. Locke: Oxford Readings in Philosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 8%
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Chihara (Charles S.) & Fodor (Jerry) Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fodor - Representations - Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science No
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Aeon, 19 August, 2019 Yes
Clarke (D.S.) A Defence of the No-Ownership Theory Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind, 81, No. 321 (Jan., 1972), pp. 97-101 No
Claxton (Guy) Get your kicks Paper - Cited Aeon, 08 November, 2013 Yes
Clay (Alexa) Utopia Inc Paper - Cited Aeon, 28 February, 2017 Yes
Conee (Earl) Reply to Timothy Chappell Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Mind, Volume 109, Number 434, 1 April 2000 , pp. 281-283(3) Yes
Cope (Suzanne) Cognitive dissonance helps old dogs with their new tricks Paper - Cited Aeon, 21 June, 2017 Yes
Crabb (Jon) Monster mash Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 23 October, 2017 Yes
Craig (William Lane) McTaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 122-127 33%
Crane (Tim) Substance (4-Lecture BA Course) Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Tim Crane's Home Page, 2005 Yes
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Dainton (Barry) From Phenomenal Selves to Hyper-Selves Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. - Mind, Self and Person, 2015 Yes
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Damasio (Antonio) Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Damasio (Antonio) - Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain Yes
Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. Reading Parfit Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. - Reading Parfit 17%
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Ehring (Douglas) Personal Identity and Time Travel Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433 Yes
Fehlhaber (Kate) What know-it-alls don’t know, or the illusion of competence Paper - Cited Aeon, 17 May, 2017 Yes
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Flora (Carlin) Praise them! Paper - Cited Aeon, 09 July, 2014 Yes
Fodor (Jerry) Representations - Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Fodor (Jerry) The Mind Doesn't Work That Way - The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fodor (Jerry) - The Mind Doesn't Work That Way - The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology Yes
Fodor (Jerry) The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Fodor (Jerry) - The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology Yes
Francis (Matthew) Cognitive celebrity Paper - Cited Aeon, 22 July, 2014 Yes
Frankfurt (Harry) Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind Yes
Funkhouser (Eric) Metaphysics, Spring 2014 Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 94%
Funkhouser (Eric) Notes on Lewis, 'Survival and Identity' Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014 No
Furedi (Frank) The ages of distraction Paper - Cited Aeon, 01 April, 2016 Yes
Gale (Richard) On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Ed. Tamara Horowitz & Gerald J. Massey, 1991 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Garrett, Brian (1998, 2004). Personal identity. Retrieved December 22, 2005 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Personal Identity and Self-consciousness Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness Yes
Garrett (Brian) Persons Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Garrett, Brian (1998). Persons. Yes
Garrett (Brian) Review of Noonan's 'Personal Identity' Paper - Cited Nous, Vol. 26, No. 1, Mar., 1992, pp. 128-130 No
Garrett (Neil) Dishonesty gets easier on the brain the more you do it Paper - Cited Aeon, 07 March, 2017 Yes
Gasser (Georg) & Stefan (Matthias), Eds. Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Gasser (Georg) & Stefan (Matthias), Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? 4%
Gershon (Livia) The future is emotional Paper - Cited Aeon, 22 June, 2017 Yes
Glausiusz (Josie) Would the world be more peaceful if there were more women leaders? Paper - Cited Aeon, 27 October, 2017 Yes
Gopnik (Alison) Video - Alison Gopnik: Cognition, care and spirituality Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 20 September 2021 Yes
Grayling (Anthony) Wittgenstein - A Very Short Introduction Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Grayling (Anthony) - Wittgenstein - A Very Short Introduction Yes
Grice (H. Paul) Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Perry - Personal Identity Yes
Guerrero (Alexander) The lottocracy Paper - Cited Aeon, 23 January, 2014 Yes
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) Aeon: A-B (& General) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 100%
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) Aeon: C-F Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 51%
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) Aeon: G-K Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 31%
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) Aeon: L-P Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 33%
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) Aeon: T-Z Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 21%
Hanink (Johanna) Even the ancient Greeks thought their best days were history Paper - Cited Aeon, 26 June, 2017 Yes
Henderson (Gretchen E.) The history of ugliness shows that there is no such thing Paper - Cited Aeon, 08 March, 2016 Yes
Heneghan (Liam) We have a new word for that feeling when travel makes everything new Paper - Cited Aeon, 18 September, 2017 Yes
Hershenov (David) Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy - 79, Jul2004, Issue 309, p447-474, 28p; Yes
Hershenov (David) Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Religious Studies, 43:2, June 2007, 237-242 Yes
Hirsch (Eli) The Concept of Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity Yes
Hofstadter (Douglas) & Dennett (Daniel), Eds. The Mind's I - Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 14%
Horowitz (Tamara) & Massey (Gerald J.) Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 3%
Hossack (Keith) Five Lectures on the Logic and Metaphysics of Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hossack - Lecture Handouts Yes
Humphrey (Nicholas) Humans are the only animals who crave oblivion through suicide Paper - Cited Aeon, 28 July, 2017 Yes
Isaacs (Anton) Chemobrain is real. Here’s what to expect after cancer treatment Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 1 April 2020 Yes
Jaekl (Philip) Sleepwalking is the result of a survival mechanism gone awry Paper - Cited Aeon, 03 March, 2017 Yes
Johnston (Mark) Human Beings Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83 Yes
Jolley (Nicholas) Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Jolley - Locke: His Philosophical Thought, OUP, 1999 Yes
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Kreplin (Ute) Meditation under the microscope Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 09 July, 2018 Yes
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Labaree (David) An unlikely triumph Paper - Cited Aeon, 11 October, 2017 Yes
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Lee (Jihyun) Why the most successful students have no passion for school Paper - Cited Aeon, 06 March, 2017 Yes
Leibniz (Gottfried) What Identity Or Diversity Is Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Leibniz, Remnant, Bennett - New Essays on Human Understanding, Chapter 27 25%
Leibniz (Gottfried), Remnant (Peter), Bennett (Jonathan) New Essays on Human Understanding Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Leibniz (Gottfried), Remnant (Peter), Bennett (Jonathan) - New Essays on Human Understanding 2%
Leibniz (Gottfried), Woolhouse (Roger), Francks (Richard) Leibniz - Philosophical Texts Book - Cited Leibniz (Gottfried), Woolhouse (Roger), Francks (Richard) - Leibniz - Philosophical Texts Yes
Lerner (Berel Dov) Review of 'Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction' by David Shoemaker Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Metapsychology Online Reviews, Jun 16th 2009 (Volume 13, Issue 25) Yes
Lewis (David) Philosophical Papers Volume I Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Lewis (David) - Philosophical Papers Volume I Yes
Lewis (David) Philosophical Papers Volume II Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 15%
Lewis (David) Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume II, Part 7: Dependence and Decision, Chapter 26 33%
Lewis (David) Survival and Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 1: Ontology, Chapter 5 Yes
Lewis (Marc) & Shelly (Shaun) We need ecstasy and cocaine in place of Prozac and Xanax Paper - Cited Aeon, 15 May, 2017 Yes
Liao (S. Matthew) The Organism View Defended Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 334-350 Yes
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Locke (John) Of Identity and Diversity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Locke - Essay, Book 2, Chapter 27 Yes
Locke (John), A.M. Locke on the Human Understanding Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 5%
Lockwood (Michael) When Does a Life Begin? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 Yes
Lockwood (Michael), Ed. Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 29%
Lowe (E.J.) Locke on Human Understanding Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 30%
Lowe (E.J.) Locke: Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Lowe - Locke on Human Understanding Chapter 5, 1995 Yes
Lowe (E.J.) Review of Noonan's 'Personal Identity' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind 99.395, July 1990, pp. 477-479 No
Luria (A.R.) The Mind of a Mnemonist Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Luria (A.R.) - The Mind of a Mnemonist Yes
Mackie (David) Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 49, Number 196, July 1999, pp. 369-376(8). Yes
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Shoemaker (Sydney) Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology' Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Nous, Sep99, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p496, 9p; Yes
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Wiggins (David) Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 196 (Apr., 1976), pp. 131-158 Yes
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Williams (Bernard) Consistency and Realism Paper - Cited Williams - Problems of the Self Yes
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