Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages

Personal Identity

Endurantism

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. Endurantism is the traditional account of persistence², that doesn’t invoke the metaphysics of temporal parts. What follows is a modified version of a write-up³ of the relevant section of "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?".
  2. Kurtz introduces the acronym MET for Metaphysics of Enduring Things. The contrasting acronym is MTP for Metaphysics of Temporal Parts. These Temporal Parts exist only instantaneously, and are otherwise known as Stages or Time-Slices. A duck – according to MTP – is wholly or partly constituted by temporal parts. It seems odd to think of a duck as being wholly constituted by a single temporal part, but this just is the exdurantist⁴ claim.
  3. There are two forms of MTP – Perdurantism⁵ and Exdurantism⁶ – and (says Kurtz) their motivation – and that of MTP itself – comes from how well either of these accounts for persistence. I had thought the motivation came from the need to explain conundrums like Fission⁷, but it seems there are philosophical difficulties with MET (the problem of Temporary Intrinsics⁸).
  4. Kurtz sees three ‘non-negotiable theses’ in accounting for persistence. These are:-
     1. Consistency: the same thing cannot have incompatible properties. Follows either from the law of non-contradiction or from Leibniz’s Law.
     2. Change: Change involves incompatible properties.
     3. Persistence: Objects persist through change.
        
  5. Perdurantism and Exdurantism share a metaphysics of temporal parts, which Endurantism claims ordinary things lack. Each maintains the tension between the three ‘non-negotiable theses’ given above by sacrificing at least one “intuitively and philosophically appealing” metaphysical claim on persistence. Kurtz sees this as the “real problem of persistence”.
  6. According to MET, at least some objects endure – a numerically self-identical object is wholly present at different times.
  7. For both MTP and MET, objects may have temporal parts. So, the existence of stages or a space-time worm is not denied by MET.
  8. Neither a space-time worm nor a stage is an enduring thing, as neither is wholly present at different times. Nevertheless, says Kurtz, “MET does not entail the claim that ordinary objects lack temporal parts”. This sounds wrong as far as ordinary objects are concerned – I need to check what the endurantists say on this. Though the worm is not an “ordinary thing”, but (presumably) a collection of momentary stages, which are themselves not ordinary things.
  9. Endurantists claim that ordinary objects persist by enduring, that is, that identity over time is strict identity between objects wholly present at different times. Change is the holding of incompatible properties by objects identical over time. So far seems to be common sense.
  10. I need to put the following comment somewhere, so here goes:
      1. I had the impression that MET goes along with Substances⁹, while MTP does not.
      2. I need to see what "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed" has to say.
      3. I note that SUBSTANCE is not mentioned once by Kurtz in her Introduction.
         
  11. To avoid the contradiction of an object having incompatible properties, endurantists adopt temporally mediated property instantiation, whereby temporal facts (whether of time or tense) external to the object mediate the instantiation of incompatible properties without an appeal to temporal parts. Thus, an ordinary object persists through change and both alters and survives. What has to be given up is the “just having” of properties. The question seems to be how important the having of properties only mediated by internal facts is.
  12. There are various implementations of endurantism. Those in "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings" are as below, though presumably, these chapters present, but don’t necessarily support, endurantism:-
      → "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Four-Dimensional Objects",
      → "Mellor (D.H.) - Selections from 'Real Time'",
      → "Hinchliff (Mark) - The Puzzle of Change", and
      → "Markosian (Ned) - A Defense of Presentism".
  13. Kurtz thinks that the introduction of time or tense into property instantiation creates four potential problems. I’m not hugely convinced by these – presumably for MET only – and Kurtz admits she’s only gestured at them to get them on the table:-
      1. She thinks it irrelevant what the time is to whether an object has an intrinsic property or not.
      2. Issues like Bradley’s Regress (to be discussed under the head of Temporary Intrinsics¹⁰) threaten our understanding of how a property can be predicated of an object at all.
      3. Indexing properties to times makes them seem like different properties, and so gets rid of the prima facie problem of inconsistent properties too easily. And, if they are different properties it (to my mind) obscures what makes Red-at-T₁ and Red-at-T₂ both instances of Red.
      4. Given the definition of change, then if the properties aren’t incompatible, why do we have change at all?

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings", 2006, Book, Read = 30%
  2. "Hinchliff (Mark) - The Puzzle of Change", 1996, Internal PDF Link, Read = 13%
  3. "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?", 2006, Write-Up Note¹¹, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read
  4. "Markosian (Ned) - A Defense of Presentism", 2006, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
  5. "Mellor (D.H.) - Selections from 'Real Time'", 2006, Read = 67%
  6. "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Four-Dimensional Objects", 2006, Internal PDF Link, Read = 22%
  7. "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed", 2001, Book, Read = 16%
• For a Page of Links¹² to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read¹³, include the following:-
  • General:
    1. "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?", 2006, Write-Up Note¹⁴, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Identity Across Time: A Defense of Three-Dimensionalism", 2009, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
    2. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Three-dimensionalism defended", 2007
    3. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Three-Dimensionalism Rescued: A Brief Reply to Michael Della Rocca", 2013, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    4. "Balashov (Yuri) - Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time", 2000, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil) - Endurance is paradoxical", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Footnote₁₅
    6. "Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil) - Paradoxes of multi-location", 2003, Internal PDF Link
    7. "Beebee (Helen) & Rush (Michael) - Non-paradoxical multi-location", 2003, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Carrara (Massimiliano) - Comments on Hughes", 2005, Internal PDF Link
    9. "Crisp (Thomas M.) & Smith (Donald P.) - 'Wholly Present' Defined", 2005, Internal PDF Link
    10. "Della Rocca (Michael) - Primitive Persistence and the Impasse between Three Dimensionalism and Four-Dimensionalism", 2011, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    11. "Fine (Kit) - In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism", 2006, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
    12. "Forrest (Peter) - Endurance and Fatalism", 2006
    13. "Gilmore (Cody) - Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts", 2002, Internal PDF Link
    14. "Gilmore (Cody) - Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence", 2007, Internal PDF Link, Footnote₁₆
    15. "Hales (Steven D.) & Johnson (Timothy A.) - Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity", 2003, Internal PDF Link
    16. "Haslanger (Sally) - Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics", 1989, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
    17. "Haslanger (Sally) - Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things", 1994, Internal PDF Link
    18. "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings", 2006, Book, Read = 30%
    19. "Hawley (Katherine) - David Lewis on Persistence", 2015, Internal PDF Link, Read = 44%
    20. "Hawley (Katherine) - Persistence and Determination", 2008, Internal PDF Link, Read = 60%
    21. "Hawthorne (John) - Three-Dimensionalism", 2006
    22. "Hinchliff (Mark) - The Puzzle of Change", 1996, Internal PDF Link, Read = 13%
    23. "Hofweber (Thomas) - How to Endure", 2010, Internal PDF Link
    24. "Ingthorsson (Rognvaldur) - Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time", 2009, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
    25. "Langford (Simon) - Three-dimensionalism and counterpart theory", 2005, Internal PDF Link
    26. "Loux (Michael) - Concrete Particulars II: Persistence Through Time", 2002, Read = 3%
    27. "Loux (Michael) - Endurantism and Perdurantism", 2001
    28. "Lowe (E.J.) - Vagueness and Endurance", 2005, Internal PDF Link
    29. "Mackie (Penelope) - Coincidence and Identity", 2008, Internal PDF Link, Read = 10%
    30. "Markosian (Ned) - A Defense of Presentism", 2006, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
    31. "Markosian (Ned) - Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity", 2002, Read = 11%
    32. "McDaniel (Kris) - No paradox of multi-location", 2003, Internal PDF Link
    33. "McGrath (Matthew) - Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence", 2007
    34. "Mellor (D.H.) - Selections from 'Real Time'", 2006, Read = 67%
    35. "Merricks (Trenton) - Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity", 1999
    36. "Miller (Kristie) - A New Definition of Endurance", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
    37. "Miller (Kristie) - Enduring Special Relativity", 2004, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
    38. "Miller (Kristie) - Issues of Composition", 2007
    39. "Miller (Kristie) - Non-mereological Universalism", 2006, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
    40. "Miller (Kristie) - Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?", 2009, Internal PDF Link, Read = 8%
    41. "Miller (Kristie) - Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time", 2006, Internal PDF Link, Read = 29%
    42. "Parsons (Josh) - Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe In Temporal Parts?", 2000, Internal PDF Link
    43. "Rosenkrantz (Gary) - An Epistemic Argument for Enduring Human Persons", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%
    44. "Seibt (Johanna) - Beyond Endurance and Perdurance: Recurrent Dynamics", 2008, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 4%
    45. "Simons (Peter) - Modes of Extension: Comments on Kit Fine’s ‘In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism’", 2008, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    46. "Stone (Jim) - Counterpart theory and three-dimensionalism: a reply", 2005, Internal PDF Link
    47. "Stone (Jim) - Why counterpart theory and three-dimensionalism are incompatible", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Footnote₁₇
    48. "Teller (Paul) - Against Overlap and Endurance", 2001, No Abstract
    49. "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Four-Dimensional Objects", 2006, Internal PDF Link, Read = 22%
    50. "Wasserman (Ryan) - Framing the Debate over Persistence", 2004, Internal PDF Link
    51. "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed", 2001, Book, Read = 16%

  ---

• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder¹⁸.

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 15:

• See also:-
  → "Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil) - Paradoxes of multi-location",
  → "Beebee (Helen) & Rush (Michael) - Non-paradoxical multi-location",
  → "McDaniel (Kris) - No paradox of multi-location".

Footnote 16:

• An important-looking paper, also against perdurantism, along similar lines to "McGrath (Matthew) - Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence".

Footnote 17:

• See also:-
  → "Langford (Simon) - Three-dimensionalism and counterpart theory", and
  → "Stone (Jim) - Counterpart theory and three-dimensionalism: a reply"

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Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
20/09/2022 11:24:00	8246	Endurantism
04/05/2022 21:46:05	7865	Endurantism
11/02/2021 11:29:46	7548	Endurantism
23/09/2020 10:39:22	6273	Endurantism
14/07/2018 00:23:02	8403	Endurantism
15/10/2017 15:15:50	6226	Endurantism
26/03/2014 19:09:07	4711	Endurantism
18/12/2010 19:58:05	89	Endurantism
26/11/2007 23:25:26	84	Endurantism

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
06/07/2023 00:43:12	Endurantism	Persistence

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Endurantism	Exdurantism	Fission	Kurtz - Persistence (Introduction)
Note Links Explanation	Perdurantism	Persistence	Plug Note Apologia	Substance
Temporary Intrinsics	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Baker - Personal Identity Over Time	Baker - The Human Animal: Response to Olson	Kurtz - Persistence (Introduction)	Olson - What Are We? Constitution	Origins
Perdurantism	Persistence	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3	Properties	Psychological Continuity - Forward, 2
Teletransportation, 2	Temporary Intrinsics	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2	Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion)	Thesis - Current Stance	Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Time	Time Travel	Universals	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Personal Identity Over Time	Paper		Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Response to Eric Olson	Paper		Yes
Balashov (Yuri)	Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5
Balashov (Yuri)	Persistence and Space-Time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn	Paper
Balashov (Yuri)	Relativity and Persistence	Paper	2
Balashov (Yuri)	Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts: A Reply to Gilmore	Paper
Balashov (Yuri)	Time, Fission, Fusion: An Argument against the Block Universe with Endurance	Paper	2
Balashov (Yuri)	Times of our Lives: Negotiating the Presence of Experience	Paper
Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil)	Endurance is paradoxical	Paper	2, 3
Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil)	Paradoxes of multi-location	Paper
Brennan (Andrew)	Discontinuity and Identity	Paper
Butterfield (Jeremy)	On the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter	Paper
Butterfield (Jeremy)	On the Persistence of Particles	Paper
Chandler (Hugh S.)	Theseus' Clothes-Pin	Paper		Yes
Crisp (Thomas M.) & Smith (Donald P.)	'Wholly Present' Defined	Paper
Dorato (Mauro)	Presentism / Eternalism and Endurantism / Perdurantism: why the unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second	Paper
Friebe (Cord)	Eternalism and the Temporal Content of Persistence	Paper
Gilmore (Cody)	Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts	Paper	2, 3
Gilmore (Cody)	Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Hales (Steven D.) & Johnson (Timothy A.)	Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity	Paper	2
Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds.	Persistence : Contemporary Readings	Book	2, 3, 4, 5
Hawley (Katherine)	David Lewis on Persistence	Paper	2
Hawley (Katherine)	How Things Persist: Introduction	Paper		Yes
Hawley (Katherine)	Persistence and Determination	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Hofmann (Frank)	Substrate	Paper
Hofweber (Thomas)	How to Endure	Paper	2
Kurtz (Roxanne)	Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Yes
Loux (Michael)	Concrete Particulars II: Persistence Through Time	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Loux (Michael)	Endurantism and Perdurantism	Paper
Lowe (E.J.)	Vagueness and Endurance	Paper
Mackie (Penelope)	Coincidence and Identity	Paper
Markosian (Ned)	Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity	Paper
McDaniel (Kris)	Modal Realism with Overlap	Paper
McDaniel (Kris)	No paradox of multi-location	Paper	2, 3
Meincke (Anne Sophie)	Persons as Biological Processes: A Bio-Processual Way Out of the Personal Identity Dilemma	Paper
Meincke (Anne Sophie)	Powers, Persistence and Process	Paper
Meincke (Anne Sophie)	The Disappearance of Change: Towards a Process Account of Persistence	Paper
Merricks (Trenton)	Endurance and Indiscernibility	Paper
Miller (Kristie)	A New Definition of Endurance	Paper	2
Miller (Kristie)	Enduring Special Relativity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Miller (Kristie)	Issues of Composition	Paper
Miller (Kristie)	Non-mereological Universalism	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Miller (Kristie)	Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Miller (Kristie)	The Metaphysical Equivalence of Non-Unitary Three- and Four-dimensionalism	Paper
Miller (Kristie)	Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
Noonan (Harold)	Identity and Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Constitution	Paper		Yes
Parsons (Josh)	Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe In Temporal Parts?	Paper	2, 3
Rea (Michael) & Silver (David)	Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity	Paper
Sattig (Thomas)	Three-Dimensionalism and Four-Dimensionalism	Paper	2
Schmechtig (Pedro)	Zeit und Persistenz	Paper
Smith (Quentin) & Oaklander (L. Nathan)	Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics	Book
Taylor (James Stacey)	The Myth of Posthumous Harm	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Origins	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Perdurantism	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Persistence	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Properties	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Teletransportation	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Temporary Intrinsics	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Time	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Time Travel	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Universals	Paper		Yes
Van Inwagen (Peter)	Material Beings: Preface	Paper		Yes
Varzi (Achille)	Time-Travel	Paper		Yes
Velleman (David)	So It Goes	Paper		Yes
Wasserman (Ryan)	Framing the Debate over Persistence	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Wilson (Jack)	Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities	Paper		Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Identity Across Time: A Defense of Three-Dimensionalism	Paper - Cited	Benedikt Schick and Edmund Runggaldier, Eds., Unity and Time as Problem Across Metaphysics, pages 1–14. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2009	7%
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Personal Identity Over Time	Paper - Referencing	Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 5, pp. 118-146	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	2%
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Three-dimensionalism defended	Paper - Cited	Baker (Lynne) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, Chapter 10	No
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Three-Dimensionalism Rescued: A Brief Reply to Michael Della Rocca	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy, 110(3):166–170, 2013	17%
Balashov (Yuri)	Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies 99 (2000): 129−166	No
Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil)	Endurance is paradoxical	Paper - Cited	Analysis 65.1, Jan 2005, p69-74, 6p	No
Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil)	Paradoxes of multi-location	Paper - Cited	Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 106-114	No
Beebee (Helen) & Rush (Michael)	Non-paradoxical multi-location	Paper - Cited	Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 311-317	No
Brody (Baruch)	Enduring and Nonenduring Objects	Paper - By Subtopic	Brody - Identity and Essence, 1980, Chapter 2	No
Brody (Baruch)	Identity and Essence	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Brody (Baruch) - Identity and Essence	No
Brody (Baruch)	The Theory of Identity for Enduring Objects	Paper - By Subtopic	Brody - Identity and Essence, 1980, Chapter 1	No
Carrara (Massimiliano)	Comments on Hughes	Paper - Cited	Dialectica, 59.4, December 2005, pp. 481-484(4)	No
Chandler (Hugh S.)	Theseus' Clothes-Pin	Paper - Referencing	Analysis, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Mar., 1984), pp. 55-58	Yes
Costa (Damiano), Gilmore (Cody) & Calosi (Claudio)	Relativity and Three Four-Dimensionalisms	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy Compass, 11:2, 2016, 102-120	27%
Crisp (Thomas M.) & Smith (Donald P.)	'Wholly Present' Defined	Paper - Cited	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Sep., 2005), pp. 318-344	No
Della Rocca (Michael)	Primitive Persistence and the Impasse between Three Dimensionalism and Four-Dimensionalism	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy, CVIII, 11 (November 2011): pp. 591-616	17%
Dorato (Mauro)	Presentism / Eternalism and Endurantism / Perdurantism: why the unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):25-41 (2012)	7%
Dorato (Mauro)	Presentism and the Experience of Time	Paper - By Subtopic	Topoi 34 (1):265-275 (2015)	6%
Dorato (Mauro)	The Irrelevance of the Presentist / Eternalist Debate for the Ontology of Minkowski Spacetime	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy and Foundations of Physics: The Ontology of Spacetime, D. Dieks (Editor), Chapter 5, 2006, Elsevier	11%
Doyle (Robert O.)	Persistence (Perdurance and Endurance)	Paper - By Subtopic	Personal Website	No
Fine (Kit)	In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):699-714 (2006)	7%
Forrest (Peter)	Endurance and Fatalism	Paper - Cited	Metaphysica 7.2 (2006), pp. 73-82	No
Friebe (Cord)	Eternalism and the Temporal Content of Persistence	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophia Naturalis, 2012	7%
Gilmore (Cody)	Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies 109: 241-263 (June 2002)	No
Gilmore (Cody)	Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy Compass 3/6 (2008): 1224–1254	4%
Gilmore (Cody)	Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence	Paper - Cited	Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3	No
Hales (Steven D.) & Johnson (Timothy A.)	Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Quarterly, 2003, Vol. 53 Issue 213, p524, 16p	No
Haslanger (Sally)	Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics	Paper - Cited	Analysis 49, 1989, pp. 119-125	33%
Haslanger (Sally)	Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things	Paper - By Subtopic	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72:3; 339-359. 1994.	No
Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds.	Persistence : Contemporary Readings	Book - Cited	Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings	30%
Hawley (Katherine)	David Lewis on Persistence	Paper - Referencing	Blackwell Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, 2015	44%
Hawley (Katherine)	How Things Persist	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	5%
Hawley (Katherine)	How Things Persist: Introduction	Paper - Referencing	Hawley - How Things Persist, Introduction	Yes
Hawthorne (John)	Three-Dimensionalism	Paper - By Subtopic	Hawthorne - Metaphysical Essays, 2006, Chapter 5, pp. 85-109	No
Hawthorne (John)	Three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism	Paper - By Subtopic	Sider (Ted), Hawthorne (John) & Zimmerman (Dean), Eds. - Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, 2008	11%
Hinchliff (Mark)	The Puzzle of Change	Paper - Cited	Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings	13%
Hofweber (Thomas)	How to Endure	Paper - By Subtopic	The Philosophical Quarterly, July 2010	No
Ingthorsson (Rognvaldur)	Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time	Paper - By Subtopic	Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy 10(1): 79-99, 2009	6%
Kurtz (Roxanne)	Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?	Paper - Cited	Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings	Yes
Langford (Simon)	Three-dimensionalism and counterpart theory	Paper - Cited	Analysis 65, October 2005, pp. 321-325(5)	No
Lowe (E.J.)	Vagueness and Endurance	Paper - By Subtopic	Analysis 65.2, April 2005, pp. 104-112(9)	No
Mackie (Penelope)	Coincidence and Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy 83 supplement 62 (2008), 151-176 (special issue on Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics)	10%
Markosian (Ned)	A Defense of Presentism	Paper - Cited	Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings	7%
Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith)	The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	15%
McDaniel (Kris)	No paradox of multi-location	Paper - Cited	Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 309-311	No
McGrath (Matthew)	Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence	Paper - Cited	Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3	No
Mellor (D.H.)	Selections from 'Real Time'	Paper - Cited	Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings	No
Merricks (Trenton)	Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Dec99, Vol. 59 Issue 4, p983, 15p;	No
Miller (Kristie)	A New Definition of Endurance	Paper - By Subtopic	Theoria 71 (4), 2005:309-332	5%
Miller (Kristie)	Defining Our Terms	Paper - By Subtopic	Miller (Kristie) - Issues in Theoretical Diversity, Chapter 3	No
Miller (Kristie)	Empirical Equivalence and Special Relativity	Paper - By Subtopic	Miller (Kristie) - Issues in Theoretical Diversity, Chapter 8	No
Miller (Kristie)	Enduring Special Relativity	Paper - By Subtopic	Southern Journal of Philosophy, Fall2004, Vol. 42 Issue 3, p349-370, 22p	6%
Miller (Kristie)	Issues in Theoretical Diversity: Persistence, Composition, and Time	Book - Referenced	Miller (Kristie) - Issues in Theoretical Diversity: Persistence, Composition, and Time	4%
Miller (Kristie)	Issues of Composition	Paper - By Subtopic	Miller (Kristie) - Issues in Theoretical Diversity, Chapter 4	No
Miller (Kristie)	The Metaphysical Equivalence of Non-Unitary Three- and Four-dimensionalism	Paper - By Subtopic	Miller (Kristie) - Issues in Theoretical Diversity, Chapter 6	No
Miller (Kristie)	The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four Dimensionalism	Paper - By Subtopic	Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 62, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 91-117	4%
Miller (Kristie)	The Metaphysical Equivalence of Unitary Three- and Four-dimensionalism	Paper - By Subtopic	Miller (Kristie) - Issues in Theoretical Diversity, Chapter 5	No
Miller (Kristie)	The Puzzles of Persistence	Paper - By Subtopic	Miller (Kristie) - Issues in Theoretical Diversity, Chapter 2	No
Miller (Kristie)	Travelling in Time	Paper - By Subtopic	Miller (Kristie) - Issues in Theoretical Diversity, Chapter 7	No
Olson (Eric)	Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave	Paper - Referencing	Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 19, 2015: 409-423	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Constitution	Paper - Referencing	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 3 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Rosenkrantz (Gary)	An Epistemic Argument for Enduring Human Persons	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 209-224	7%
Sattig (Thomas)	The Language and Reality of Time	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Sattig (Thomas) - The Language and Reality of Time	No
Sattig (Thomas)	Three-Dimensionalist Supervenience	Paper - By Subtopic	Sattig - The Language and Reality of Time, Chapter 5	No
Seibt (Johanna)	Beyond Endurance and Perdurance: Recurrent Dynamics	Paper - By Subtopic	Persistence, ed. by C. Kanzian, Frankfurt et al.: de Gruyter, 133-163, 2008	4%
Sider (Ted), Hawthorne (John) & Zimmerman (Dean), Eds.	Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Sider (Ted), Hawthorne (John) & Zimmerman (Dean), Eds. - Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics	10%
Simons (Peter)	Modes of Extension: Comments on Kit Fine’s ‘In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism’	Paper - By Subtopic	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 62 , July 2008 , pp. 17 - 21	17%
Stone (Jim)	Counterpart theory and three-dimensionalism: a reply	Paper - Cited	Analysis 65, October 2005, pp. 325-329(5)	No
Stone (Jim)	Why counterpart theory and three-dimensionalism are incompatible	Paper - By Subtopic	Analysis 65, January 2005, pp. 24-27(4)	No
Taylor (James Stacey)	The Myth of Posthumous Harm	Paper - Referencing	American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 311-322	Yes
Teller (Paul)	Against Overlap and Endurance	Paper - By Subtopic	Preyer & Siebelt, 2001, Reality and Humean supervenience : essays on the philosophy of David Lewis, pp. 105-122	No
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper - Referencing		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Endurantism	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper - Referencing		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward	Paper - Referencing		Yes
Van Inwagen (Peter)	Four-Dimensional Objects	Paper - Cited	Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings	22%
Van Inwagen (Peter)	Material Beings	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	27%
Van Inwagen (Peter)	Material Beings: Preface	Paper - Referencing	Van Inwagen - Material Beings, Preface	Yes
Wiggins (David)	Sameness and Substance Renewed	Book - Cited	Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed	16%
Wilson (Jack)	Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities	Paper - Referencing	Wilson, Jack - Biological Individuality: The identity and Persistence of Living Entities; 1999, Chap. 1, pp. 1-21	Yes
Wilson (Jack)	Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Zimmerman (Dean), Ed.	Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	10%

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2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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