Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages


Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)

(Work In Progress: output at 13/01/2022 00:27:14)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)


Abstract




Research Methodology


Chapter Introduction
  1. This Chapter has a plethora of supporting Notes discussing the sort of thing that I think we are NOT. Like the preceding Chapter, this one could run and run, so can only provide a superficial summary.
  2. Discussion of our being Persons3 is reserved for Chapter 34, the next Chapter.
  3. Discussion of our being Human Animals5 is reserved for Chapter 66.
  4. The first obvious candidate is that we are Human Beings7, but this is – or has become – a rather obscure term of art in philosophy, not that it’s any clearer in general parlance, where it can mean many things that have their carefully demarcated terms in philosophy.
  5. It was once an up-and-coming idea, in reaction to the PV8, that we might be Bodies9, but with has been replaced by Animalism10. The Body Criterion11, despite having the advantage of Bodily Continuity12, is more difficult to define than the persistence of Organisms13.
  6. No-one would think that we are Brains14 unless forced into that corner by various TEs15 and this leads on to the further possibility that we might be individual Cerebra16. Nevertheless, the Brain Criterion17 should be taken seriously, particularly as the criterion of Brain Death18 for our demise seems to at least incline towards the view that that is what we really are. I’ve got my Note on Brains in Vats19 in this section, as it covers a number of cases including that we might be living in a Computer-Simulated world.
  7. I need to address the concept of a Soul20 as souls were once the major counter-claim to the persisting entity being an animal; or at least popularly so. However – scientific objections aside – the Soul Criterion21 is difficult to make out.
  8. Then, there’s the suggestion that we might be Selves22. This is a highly complex topic, with lots of associated Notes, which might be segregated in three groups:-
    1. Candidates for what the self might be – the I23, or Cartesian Ego24. The latter leads on to Dualism25 (though both the latter might be better covered under Souls26).
    2. The connection of the Self with Narrative Identity27; the sort of thing people mean when they say Bloggs is not the same person as he used to be. Because the concept of Race28 is so topical, I’m including a discussion in this section.
    3. The reason people think they might be Selves is because they are Self-Conscious29 (ie. conscious of being selves, rather than being shy). Thinking about this requires brief forays into Consciousness30 studies, including Supervenience31, Functionalism32 and philosophical Zombies33.
  9. An intuition I do not share is that we might be “Patterns in Information Space34”. This is the sort of intuition that Transhumanists35 have, and will be considered in detail in Chapter 1036.
  10. There are Bundle Theories37, at one time espoused by Hume38, which seem to put the cart before the horse, in saying that we are nothing but bundles of “perceptions”, when – it seems to me – these “perceptions” have to be had by something, and this something – whatever it might be – is what we are.
  11. There may be Hybrid Theories39 which try to get the best bits out of more than one of the main-line theories, usually in response to awkward TEs or unusual circumstances.
  12. Finally, there are Nihilists40 who pretend to deny that we exist at all, or at least – as Buddhists41 committed to Reincarnation42– claim that our aim should be not to exist.



Links to Notes
  1. What are We?43
  2. Candidates for what we are, considered in this Chapter
    1. Human Beings44
    2. Bodies45
    3. Brains48
    4. Souls53
    5. Selves55
    6. Patterns in Information Space66
    7. Bundle Theories67
    8. Hybrid Theories69
    9. Nihilism70
  3. Candidates for what we are, considered in later Chapters
    1. Animals72. Excluded73
    2. Organisms74. Excluded75
    3. Persons76. Excluded77



Main Text: What are We?
  1. What are We?78
    1. This Chapter has the title “What Are We?”. The “We” is of some significance, as we will see in the course of this Thesis when we consider the social and reciprocal aspects of what it is to be a person. Nonetheless, should we not start with the singular, maybe even solipsist, question “What Am I?”, and expand out from there into the collective question? How we phrase our initial question has an impact on the course of our investigations, and may reflect our deepest presuppositions. The first-person question adopts the Cartesian stance of looking from the inside out, whereas the third-person question considers “us” collectively. The first-person question may presuppose that the answer to the question is that I am primarily a psychological being, whereas the third-person question may assume or expect the answer that I am fundamentally physical.
    2. Some of the potential answers to the question will be the same whether we phrase the question in the singular or the plural.
    3. Taking it in the plural for now, we need to distinguish, as candidates for what we might be on the physical side, (prefixing “human-” passim):-
      • Animals,
      • Organisms,
      • Bodies,
      • Beings, and
      • Brains.
    4. On the psychological side, I might be a self or, more popularly, a person. I might even be a non-essentially-embodied entity like a soul.
    5. I will consider all these options in due course; with the exception of a detailed discussion of the concept PERSON (which is reserved for the next Chapter79), I will do so later in this chapter.
    6. Olson80 also considers whether we might be Humean bundles81 of mental states and events, and even the nihilist view that we don’t exist at all. I’m not sure I’ll have space for these, but need to remain aware of the possibilities and motivations for these positions.
    7. However, for the moment I want to consider some themes connecting the possible answers to our question. Firstly, does there have to be a single answer? I know that I, and presume that my readers also, fall happily under the concepts HUMAN ANIMAL, HUMAN ORGANISM and HUMAN BEING. I at least have a human body and a human brain, though I would initially feel reluctant to say that I am one of either of these things. I would certainly claim to be a SELF, and also a PERSON, as no doubt would my reader. So, cannot all these answers be correct?
    8. This raises the question of what I mean by saying what I am (or we are) something. In saying that I am any of these things, what sort of relation is the “am”? Am I using am in the sense of an identity relation, a constitution relation, ascribing a predicate, or have some other sense in mind?
    9. There are two kinds of questions I want to ask. Firstly, what sort of being am I identical to? Secondly, what sort of properties do I have; both metaphysically essential properties (those without which I would cease to exist), and those I merely consider essential (that is, “very important”, though I would continue to exist without them)?
    10. Any “is” that does duty for the identity relation inherits the formal properties of an equivalence relation; in particular, it is a transitive relation. Additionally, the “two” identical entities either side of the copula must satisfy Leibniz’s law; “they” share (at a time) all their properties; actual and modal, intrinsic and relational. So, if I am identical to a human animal, and also identical to a human person, then that human animal must be identical to that human person. This would mean that these “two” entities are really one. They co-exist at all times in all possible worlds where either of “them” exists, and share all their properties and relations, at any time and world. Everything that happens to “one” at a world and time happens to the “other” at those coordinates. This places strong logical constraints on how much cake I can have and eat. I may want to say that I am identical both to a human animal, and to a human person, yet claim that a human person has certain mental properties essentially, but deny that a human animal does. However, I am then claiming what is logically impossible, at least for the classical logic of identity82 that denies that such notions as relative identity are coherent. As we will see, this point is essential to the animalist case that we are not identical to human persons (given the claim that we are identical to human animals).
    11. My thesis addresses the topic of personal identity, but we might claim that what we’re really interested in is in our identity. Not that we have doubts as individuals as to which particular individual we are (as though I, as Bill Clinton, don’t know whether I am Bill Clinton or George W. Bush), but what sort of individual we are, together with worries about our persistence (how long we are going to last, and in what form). Historically, it has been a standard presupposition that what we are most fundamentally is persons, or at least that’s all we care about. So, concern about our identity has been elided with concern for personal identity, almost as though we thought that the two questions are the same. Animalists argue that the two questions are indeed different, but for convenience, and the historical continuity of the general topic under discussion, still say they are talking about personal identity.
  2. Candidates for what we are, considered in this Chapter
    1. Human Beings83
      1. Text to be supplied.
    2. Bodies84
      1. Text to be supplied.
    3. Brains87
      1. Text to be supplied.
    4. Souls92
      1. Text to be supplied.
    5. Selves94
      1. Text to be supplied.
    6. Patterns in Information Space105
      1. Text to be supplied.
    7. Bundle Theories106
      1. Text to be supplied.
      • Hume107
        1. Text to be supplied.
    8. Hybrid Theories108
      1. Text to be supplied.
    9. Nihilism109
      1. Text to be supplied.
  3. Further text to be supplied111.



Concluding Remarks
  1. In our next Chapter112, we consider just what a Person is.
  2. This is work in progress113.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed114
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. For this Chapter I have already worked on the various papers or book chapters under supervisory control. Where this is the case, for ease of reference, the analytical Note for each reference is hyperlinked directly.
  3. Additionally, I may need to consider other papers or book chapters in the following lists (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going. Some that I have considered have been culled or reserved for later.
  4. The list on Selves list is rather long, and contains many whole books. I may have to cull several of these further down the line. However, the Self is important, as it’s the root of Baker’s FPP117, and the motivator for all psychological theories of PI, so understanding just what it is supposed to be is central to my concerns.
  5. The comment about the prolixity of the reading list applies even more to Souls than Selves, without the positive connection my primary thesis. However, if we were to be souls, this would solve the resurrection problem; so I need to thoroughly understand the reasons why we might be – but most likely are not – souls.
  6. Many aspects of these papers will need to be left for later chapters.



Works on this topic that I’ve actually read118, include the following:-
  1. What are We?119
  2. Candidates for what we are, considered in this Chapter
    1. Human Beings137
    2. Bodies
    3. Brains
    4. Souls
    5. Selves
    6. Patterns in Information Space175
    7. Bundle Theories
    8. Hybrid Theories179
    9. Nihilism


A further reading list might start with:-
  1. What are We?184
  2. Candidates for what we are, considered in this Chapter
    1. Human Beings193
    2. Bodies
    3. Brains
    4. Souls
    5. Selves
    6. Patterns in Information Space224
    7. Bundle Theories
    8. Hybrid Theories228
    9. Nihilism



In-Page Footnotes:

Footnotes 73, 75: Footnote 77: Footnote 80: In "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology"

Footnote 114: Footnote 121: Footnote 127: Footnote 129: Footnote 131: Footnote 134: Footnote 145: Footnote 150: Footnote 161: Footnote 176: Footnote 183: Footnote 186: Footnote 188: Footnote 191: Footnote 194: Footnote 204: Footnote 206: Footnote 208: Footnote 213: Footnote 215: Footnote 217: Footnote 218: Footnote 221: Footnote 227:


Table of the Previous 12 Versions of this Note: (of 16)

Date Length Title
01/10/2021 13:17:46 68548 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
29/03/2021 19:23:31 35329 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
22/03/2021 00:28:48 20906 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
07/02/2021 21:38:53 15250 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
18/04/2019 18:18:43 15194 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
24/04/2018 00:12:58 14748 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
05/04/2016 23:19:41 14694 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
04/04/2015 00:17:17 14560 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
13/01/2015 19:07:41 14517 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
06/11/2014 10:13:26 14248 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
02/10/2014 17:12:29 13468 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
22/07/2014 22:23:31 8719 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)



Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
13/01/2022 00:27:29 None available Thesis - Introduction

Summary of Note Links from this Page

Animalism Animals Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Baillie - What Am I? Baker - Persons and Bodies - Precis
Baker - Persons in the Material World Baker - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution Baker - The First-Person Perspective Baker - The Human Animal: Big-Tent Metaphysics Baker - The Human Animal: Response to Olson
Baker - What Am I? Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit? Bodily Continuity Body Body Criterion
Brain Brain Criterion Brain Death Brains in Vats Brandom - Toward a Normative Pragmatics (Introduction)
Buddhism Bundle Theories Carter – Artifacts of Theseus Cartesian Ego Cerebrum
Chisholm - Which Physical Thing Am I? Consciousness Crane - The Conscious and the Unconscious Curran - Facing America's History Of Racism Requires Facing The Origins Of 'Race' As A Concept DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons?
Doepke - What are We? Doepke - What We Are Dualism First-Person Perspective Functionalism
Garrett - Persons and Bodies - Response Haiti and the Problem of Evil - Sylvia's Second Response Human Animals Human Beings Hume
Hybrid Theories I Information Jen_080204 (Brandom, Chisholm, Baillie) Jen_080218 (Olson)
Jen_080303 (Olson, Baillie) Jen_080317 (Baker) Johnston - Human Beings Kripke - Naming and Necessity - Lecture III Kurtz - Persistence (Introduction)
Logic of Identity Moore - Common Sense Moore - External World Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Introduction Narrative Identity
Nihilism Olson - What Are We? Organisms Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be Person
Race Reincarnation Searle - Minds, Brains, and Programs Self Self-Consciousness
Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity Soul Criterion Souls Status: Thesis Dashboard (2022: January) Supervenience
Swinburne - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?) Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)
Thesis - Method & Form Thought Experiments What are We? Williams - The Self and the Future Wilson - Descartes's Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness
Works Read - Explanation Zombies      

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Summary of Note Links to this Page

Disembodied Existence Jen_080204 (Brandom, Chisholm, Baillie), 2 Origins PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2 Self
Status: Personal Identity (Summary of Progress to Date) Status: Thesis Dashboard (2022: January), 2 Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2
Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Thesis - Introduction Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3 What are We?  

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Disembodied Existence Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Introduction & Chapter Outlines Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Origins Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Self Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - What Are We? Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes



References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Bailey (Andrew M.) The Elimination Argument Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 168 (2014): 475-482 56%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Big-Tent Metaphysics Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil) Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons in the Material World Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 1 Yes
Bauby (Jean-Dominique) The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bauby (Jean-Dominique) - The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly Yes
Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) Neuroscience Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) - Neuroscience Yes
Black (Jeremy) A Brief History of Slavery Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Black (Jeremy) - A Brief History of Slavery Yes
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds. Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 22%
Bloom (Paul) Descartes' Baby: How Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bloom (Paul) - Descartes' Baby: How Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human 0%
Broks (Paul) Into the Silent Land: Travels in Neuropsychology Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Broks (Paul) - Into the Silent Land: Travels in Neuropsychology 3%
Brown (Warren) Numinous or Carnal Persons - The Practical Costs of Inner Souls and Selves Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Last Seminary: Non-Reductive Physicalism, February 16, 2005 6%
Bynum (Terrell Ward) Audio: Two Philosophers of the Information Age Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Backdoor Broadcasting Company; Metaphilosophical Directions for the 21st Century - 11 December 2009 No
Callcut (Daniel) What are we? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 11 June 2018 Yes
Challenger (Melanie) How to Be Animal: A New History of What it Means to Be Human Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Challenger (Melanie) - How to Be Animal: A New History of What it Means to Be Human Yes
Chitty (Andrew) First Person Plural Ontology and Praxis Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 97 (1997), pp. 81-96 20%
Chomsky (Noam) What Kind of Creatures Are We? Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Chomsky (Noam) - What Kind of Creatures Are We? 4%
Christian (Brian) The Most Human Human: A Defence of Humanity in the Age of the Computer Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Christian (Brian) - The Most Human Human: A Defence of Humanity in the Age of the Computer Yes
Churchland (Patricia) Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy Yes
Churchland (Patricia) Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Churchland (Patricia) - Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain Yes
Churchland (Paul) Matter & Consciousness Book - Cited Churchland (Paul) - Matter & Consciousness Yes
Claxton (Guy) Intelligence in the Flesh - Limbering Up: An Introduction Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Claxton (Guy) - Intelligence in the Flesh: Chapter 1 Yes
Claxton (Guy) Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than it Thinks Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 28%
Corcoran (Kevin) Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul 13%
Curran (Andrew) Facing America's History Of Racism Requires Facing The Origins Of 'Race' As A Concept Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Time On-Line, 10 July 2020 Yes
Dalziel (Nigel) The Penguin Historical Atlas of the British Empire Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dalziel (Nigel) - The Penguin Historical Atlas of the British Empire Yes
Damasio (Antonio) Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Damasio (Antonio) - Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain Yes
DeGrazia (David) Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Forum; Winter2002, Vol. 33 Issue 1, p101, 20p Yes
Eaton (Richard M.) India in the Persianate Age: 1000-1765 Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Eaton (Richard M.) - India in the Persianate Age: 1000-1765 Yes
Ferguson (Niall) Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ferguson (Niall) - Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World Yes
Fetzer (James) The Evolution of Intelligence: Are Humans the Only Animals with Minds? Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 3%
Fetzer (James) The evolution of intelligence: TOC & Preface Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Fetzer - The evolution of intelligence : are humans the only animals with minds? 2005 Yes
Finley (Moses I.), Shaw (Brent D.), Ed. Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Finley (Moses I.), Shaw (Brent D.), Ed. - Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology Yes
Fodor (Jerry) The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Fodor (Jerry) - The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology Yes
Garrett (Brian) Personal Identity and Self-consciousness Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness Yes
Genova (Lisa) Still Alice Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Genova (Lisa) - Still Alice Yes
Green (Toby) Africa, in its fullness Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Aeon, 16 January 2020 Yes
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) Aeon: C-F Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 51%
Hunt (Peter) Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hunt (Peter) - Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery Yes
Kaku (Michio) The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest To Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Kaku (Michio) - The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest To Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind Yes
Keay (John) India: A History Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Keay (John) - India: A History Yes
MacKay (Donald) Brains, Machines & Persons Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract MacKay (Donald) - Brains, Machines & Persons Yes
Marks (Charles) Commissurotomy, Consciousness and Unity of Mind Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Marks (Charles) - Commissurotomy, Consciousness and Unity of Mind Yes
Marsh (Henry) Do No Harm: Stories of Life, Death and Brain Surgery Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Marsh (Henry) - Do No Harm: Stories of Life, Death and Brain Surgery Yes
Martin (Raymond) Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Martin (Raymond) - Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival Yes
Murray (Douglas) The Madness of Crowds: Gender, Race and Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Murray (Douglas) - The Madness of Crowds: Gender, Race and Identity Yes
Olson (Eric) What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology 68%
Olson (Eric) What Are We? The Question Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) Yes
Olson (Eric) What Are We? What Now? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 9 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) 57%
Olson (Eric), Etc. Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal' Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) High Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Olusoga (David) Black and British: A Forgotten History Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Olusoga (David) - Black and British: A Forgotten History Yes
Papineau (David) Introducing Consciousness Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Papineau (David) - Introducing Consciousness Yes
Parfit (Derek) Nagel's Brain Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Parfit - Reasons and Persons, Appendix D Yes
Parfit (Derek) Reasons and Persons Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Parfit (Derek) We Are Not Human Beings Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part I, Chapter 2, pp. 31-49 38%
Parfit (Derek) What We Believe Ourselves To Be Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 199-219(21). Yes
Parkin (Alan) Explorations in Cognitive Neuropsychology Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Parkin (Alan) - Explorations in Cognitive Neuropsychology Yes
Paxman (Jeremy) Empire: What Ruling the World Did to the British Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Paxman (Jeremy) - Empire: What Ruling the World Did to the British Yes
Shoemaker (David) Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Shoemaker (David) Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 2 Yes
Stevenson (Leslie) & Haberman (David) Ten Theories of Human Nature Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Stevenson (Leslie) & Haberman (David) - Ten Theories of Human Nature 25%
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper - Referencing   Yes
Trigg (Roger) Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Trigg (Roger) - Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction 6%
Unger (Peter) Identity, Consciousness and Value Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value Yes



Text Colour Conventions

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2022




© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Jan 2022.Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com.File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this PageReturn to Theo Todman's Philosophy PageReturn to Theo Todman's Home Page