Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages


Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)

(Text as at 05/04/2016 23:19:41)

(For earlier versions of this Note, see the table at the end)


Abstract

  1. The topic “personal identity” has historically presupposed that we are (in the sense of “identical to”, or “most fundamentally”) persons, whereas I (along with other animalists) claim that we are identical to human animals.
  2. “We” requires explanation. This chapter attempts to sort out the topic of discussion for the Thesis as a whole.
  3. I need to address the concept of a SOUL as souls are the major counter-claim to the persisting entity being an animal; or at least popularly so. The same goes for SELVES, and also for HUMAN BEINGS, insofar as these are supposed to be distinct from HUMAN ANIMALs.
  4. I also need to have some discussion of what is meant by the various other possibilities of what we are, but leave explications of PERSONs, BODIES and ANIMALs / ORGANISMs until later Chapters.
  5. I’m not quite sure where the possibility that we are BRAINs ought to go, but for the time being it’s here; and this leads on to the possibility (tacitly assumed in some TEs) that we might be individual CEREBRA.



Research Methodology


Chapter Introduction
  1. This Chapter has the title “What Are We?”. The “We” is of some significance, as we will see in the course of this Thesis when we consider the social and reciprocal aspects of what it is to be a person. Nonetheless, should we not start with the singular, maybe even solipsist, question “What Am I?”, and expand out from there into the collective question? How we phrase our initial question has an impact on the course of our investigations, and may reflect our deepest presuppositions. The first-person question adopts the Cartesian stance of looking from the inside out, whereas the third-person question considers “us” collectively. The first-person question may presuppose that the answer to the question is that I am primarily a psychological being, whereas the third-person question may assume or expect the answer that I am fundamentally physical.
  2. Some of the potential answers to the question will be the same whether we phrase the question in the singular or the plural.
  3. Taking it in the plural for now, we need to distinguish, as candidates for what we might be on the physical side, (prefixing “human-” passim):-
    • Animals,
    • Organisms,
    • Bodies,
    • Beings, and
    • Brains.
  4. On the psychological side, I might be a self or, more popularly, a person. I might even be a non-essentially-embodied entity like a soul.
  5. I will consider all these options in due course; with the exception of a detailed discussion of the concept PERSON (which is reserved for the next Chapter3), I will do so later in this chapter.
  6. Olson4 also considers whether we might be Humean bundles of mental states and events, and even the nihilist view that we don’t exist at all. I’m not sure I’ll have space for these, but need to remain aware of the possibilities and motivations for these positions.
  7. However, for the moment I want to consider some themes connecting the possible answers to our question. Firstly, does there have to be a single answer? I know that I, and presume that my readers also, fall happily under the concepts HUMAN ANIMAL, HUMAN ORGANISM and HUMAN BEING. I at least have a human body and a human brain, though I would initially feel reluctant to say that I am one of either of these things. I would certainly claim to be a SELF, and also a PERSON, as no doubt would my reader. So, cannot all these answers be correct?
  8. This raises the question of what I mean by saying what I am (or we are) something. In saying that I am any of these things, what sort of relation is the “am”? Am I using am in the sense of an identity relation, a constitution relation, ascribing a predicate, or have some other sense in mind?
  9. There are two kinds of questions I want to ask. Firstly, what sort of being am I identical to? Secondly, what sort of properties do I have; both metaphysically essential properties (those without which I would cease to exist), and those I merely consider essential (that is, “very important”, though I would continue to exist without them)?
  10. Any “is” that does duty for the identity relation inherits the formal properties of an equivalence relation; in particular, it is a transitive relation. Additionally, the “two” identical entities either side of the copula must satisfy Leibniz’s law; “they” share (at a time) all their properties; actual and modal, intrinsic and relational. So, if I am identical to a human animal, and also identical to a human person, then that human animal must be identical to that human person. This would mean that these “two” entities are really one. They co-exist at all times in all possible worlds where either of “them” exists, and share all their properties and relations, at any time and world. Everything that happens to “one” at a world and time happens to the “other” at those coordinates. This places strong logical constraints on how much cake I can have and eat. I may want to say that I am identical both to a human animal, and to a human person, yet claim that a human person has certain mental properties essentially, but deny that a human animal does. However, I am then claiming what is logically impossible, at least for the classical logic of identity that denies that such notions as relative identity are coherent. As we will see, this point is essential to the animalist case that we are not identical to human persons (given the claim that we are identical to human animals).
  11. My thesis addresses the topic of personal identity, but we might claim that what we’re really interested in is in our identity. Not that we have doubts as individuals as to which particular individual we are (as though I, as Bill Clinton, don’t know whether I am Bill Clinton or George W. Bush), but what sort of individual we are, together with worries about our persistence (how long we are going to last, and in what form). Historically, it has been a standard presupposition that what we are most fundamentally is persons, or at least that’s all we care about. So, concern about our identity has been elided with concern for personal identity, almost as though we thought that the two questions are the same. Animalists argue that the two questions are indeed different, but for convenience, and the historical continuity of the general topic under discussion, still say they are talking about personal identity.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed5
  1. For this Chapter I have already worked on the various papers or book chapters under supervisory control. Where this is the case, for ease of reference, the analytical Note for each reference is hyperlinked directly.
  2. Additionally, I may need to consider other papers or book chapters in the following lists (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going. Some that I have considered have been culled or reserved for later.
  3. The General Question:-
  4. Brains / Cerebra
  5. Neurological Background
  6. Human Beings
  7. Selves32
  8. Souls34
  9. Nihilism
  10. Many aspects of these papers will need to be left for later chapters.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. The General Question
  4. Brains / Cerebra
  5. Human Beings
  6. Selves
  7. Souls



Links to Notes
  1. For an out-of-date skeleton giving a fuller reading list, follow this link37.
  2. Candidates for what we are, considered in this Chapter:-
  3. Candidates for what we are, considered in later Chapters:-



Final Remarks
  1. This is work in progress48.



In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 4: In "Olson (Eric) - What are We?"

Footnote 5: Footnote 12: The excerpt from Brandom raises some questions about the community we call “we”.

Footnote 15: Baker often expresses indebtedness to Roderick Chisholm, who is reviewed on that account.

Footnote 17: An annoying book, but one I ought to study.

Footnote 21: The book. From my perspective, probably the most important source for this Chapter.

Footnote 22: See also the Chapters on Brains and Souls in the subsequent reading-lists.

Footnote 26: Useful historical background, maybe!

Footnote 28: Lockwood might deny that this is his view, but he seems committed to it, as far as I can see.

Footnote 29: This maybe ought to be categorised as an “anti-soul” view.

Footnote 30: Some of the papers by Puccetti will be reconsidered in (or maybe reserved for – a couple already have been) Chapter 10.

Footnote 32: Footnote 33: Alexander thinks that we are Selves, and that Selves are tropes – abstract particulars – which by my lights is about as far from the truth as you can get, so I need to consider his arguments carefully.

Footnote 34: Footnote 35: This looks interesting, but is somewhat off-topic for a priority reading-list.

Footnote 36: This is rather elementary, and ought to have been reviewed in Chapter 01.


Printable Versions:



Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:

Date Length Title
04/04/2015 00:17:17 14558 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
13/01/2015 19:07:41 14515 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
06/11/2014 10:13:26 14246 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
02/10/2014 17:12:29 13466 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
22/07/2014 22:23:31 8719 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
05/07/2014 13:48:00 8052 Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)
18/12/2010 19:58:05 7347 What are We? (Essay)
12/02/2009 21:30:14 7759 What are We? (Essay)
15/02/2008 20:36:58 7618 What are We? (Essay)



Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
05/04/2016 23:19:41 None available Thesis - Outline

Summary of Note Links from this Page

Animals Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Baillie - What Am I? Baker - What Am I? Body
Brain Brandom - Toward a Normative Pragmatics (Introduction) Cerebrum Chisholm - Which Physical Thing Am I? DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons?
Human Beings Jen_080204 (Brandom, Chisholm, Baillie) Jen_080218 (Olson) Jen_080303 (Olson, Baillie) Jen_080317 (Baker)
Johnston - Human Beings Nihilism Olson - What Are We? Olson - What Are We? The Question Olson - What Are We? What Now?
Organisms Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be Person Self Souls
Status: Thesis Dashboard (2017: October) Swinburne - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)
Thesis - Method & Form What are We?      

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Summary of Note Links to this Page

Disembodied Existence Jen_080204 (Brandom, Chisholm, Baillie), 2 Origins Self Status: Personal Identity (2017 - September)
Status: Personal Identity (Summary of Progress to Date) Status: Summary (2017 - September) Status: Thesis Dashboard (2017: October) Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2 Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Thesis - Outline What are We?    

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.




Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Disembodied Existence Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Origins Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Self Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes



References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Alexander (Ronald) The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Alexander (Ronald) - The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity No
Andrewes (David) Neuropsychology: From Theory to Practice Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Andrewes (David) - Neuropsychology: From Theory to Practice No
Baillie (James) Problems in Personal Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Baillie (James) What Am I? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 4 Yes
Baker (Deane-Peter) Alvin Plantinga Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) What Am I? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p151, 9p; Yes
Bambrough (Renford), Ed. Philosophy - 67/262 (October 1992) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) Neuroscience Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) - Neuroscience Yes
Becker (Lawrence) Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4.4 (Summer 1975), 334-359 Yes
Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience No
Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds. The Body and the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds. - The Body and the Self No
Blackmore (Susan) Beyond the Body Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blackmore (Susan) - Beyond the Body No
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Bloom (Paul) Descartes' Baby: How Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bloom (Paul) - Descartes' Baby: How Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human No
Bourgeois (Warren) Persons: What Philosophers Say about You Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bourgeois (Warren) - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You No
Brandom (Robert) Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Brandom (Robert) Toward a Normative Pragmatics Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Brandom (Robert) - Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment, 1994, Chapter 1 No
Brennan (Andrew) Fragmented Selves and the Problem of Ownership Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 90 (1989 - 1990), pp. 143-158 No
Brennan (Andrew) Persons and their Brains Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis 30.1, 1969, pp. 27-30 No
Brown (Warren), Murphy (Nancey) & Malony (H. Newton), Eds. Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Brown (Warren), Murphy (Nancey) & Malony (H. Newton), Eds. - Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature No
Campbell (Courtney S.) A No-Brainer: Criticisms of Brain-Based Standards of Death Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Oct. 2001 26.5, pp. 539-551 No
Campbell (John) Past, Space and Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Campbell (John) - Past, Space and Self No
Carruthers (Peter) Identity and the Soul (Mind) Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carruthers - The Nature of the Mind, 2004, Chapter 3 Yes
Carruthers (Peter) The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Cassam (Quassim) Kant and Reductionism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Review of Metaphysics 43 (Sept. 1989), pp. 72-106 Yes
Cassam (Quassim) Self and World Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Cassam (Quassim) - Self and World No
Chisholm (Roderick) On the Simplicity of the Soul Paper - Cited Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 167-181 No
Chisholm (Roderick) Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from "Is There a Mind-Body Problem?" Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Van Inwagen & Zimmerman - Metaphysics: The Big Questions Yes
Chitty (Andrew) First Person Plural Ontology and Praxis Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 97 (1997), pp. 81-96 No
Chopra (Deepak) & Hameroff (Stuart) Can science explain the soul? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract San Francisco Chronicle, Website - 9th August 2010 No
Churchland (Patricia) Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy Yes
Churchland (Patricia) Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Churchland (Patricia) - Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain Yes
Churchland (Patricia) Self and Self-Knowledge Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy, Chapter 3 Yes
Cockburn (David) The Mind, the Brain and the Face Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 234 (Oct., 1985), pp. 477-493 No
Cockburn (David), Ed. Human Beings Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Cockburn (David), Ed. - Human Beings No
Cooper (John) Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate No
Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons No
Crabbe (James), Ed. From Soul to Self Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Crabbe (James), Ed. - From Soul to Self No
DeGrazia (David) Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Forum; Winter2002, Vol. 33 Issue 1, p101, 20p No
DeMyer (William) Neuroanatomy Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract DeMyer (William) - Neuroanatomy No
Dennett (Daniel) Consciousness Explained Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Dennett (Daniel) The Reality of Selves Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991, Chapter 13 No
Dennett (Daniel) The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity Paper - Cited F. Kessel, P. Cole and D. Johnson, eds, Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992. Yes
Doepke (Frederick) Introduction: What Are We? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Doepke - The Kinds of Things, Chapter 1 No
Doepke (Frederick) The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Doepke (Frederick) What We Are Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Doepke - The Kinds of Things, Chapter 9 No
Feinberg (Todd) Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Feinberg (Todd) - Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self No
Ford (Norman) When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ford (Norman) - When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science No
French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard) Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol IV, 1979) - Metaphysics Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Gallagher (Shaun) & Shear (Jonathan), Eds. Models of the Self Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Gallagher (Shaun) & Shear (Jonathan), Eds. - Models of the Self No
Geach (Peter) God and the Soul (Analytical ToC) Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Geach (Peter) - God and the Soul, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, pp. vii - xx Yes
Godelek (Kamuran) Review of Thomas Metzinger's "The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self" Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Metapsychology Online Reviews, Oct 6th 2009 (Volume 13, Issue 41) Yes
Graham (George) & Stephens (G. Lynn) Philosophical Psychopathology Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Graham (George) & Stephens (G. Lynn) - Philosophical Psychopathology No
Graham (Gordon) Review of David Cockburn's "Human Beings" Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy - 67/262 (October 1992) No
Green (Michael) & Wikler (Daniel) Brain Death and Personal Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1980, 105-133 Yes
Harre (Rom) Persons and Selves Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Peacocke & Gillett - Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry, 1987, Chapter 6 No
Heyd (David) Human Nature: An Oxymoron? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Apr. 2003, 28.2, pp. 151-169 No
Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) Are Souls Unintelligible? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 183-212 No
JCS Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Issue 05-06 (2007) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Jenkins (Phil) Review of Galen Strawson's "Selves" Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Metapsychology Online Reviews - Volume 14, Number 09, 2010 Yes
Johnston (Mark) "Human Beings" Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3 No
Johnston (Mark) Human Beings Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83 Yes
Johnstone (Henry) Persons and Selves Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28.2 (Dec 1967), 205-212 No
Kolak (Daniel) & Martin (Raymond), Eds. Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Korsgaard (Christine) Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Korsgaard (Christine) - Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity No
Lakoff (George) & Johnson (Mark) Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Lakoff (George) & Johnson (Mark) - Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought No
Le Fanu (James) Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Le Fanu (James) - Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves Yes
Lockwood (Michael) When Does a Life Begin? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 Yes
Lockwood (Michael), Ed. Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Lowe (E.J.) Subjects of Experience Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Lowe (E.J.) Substance and Selfhood Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lowe - Subjects of Experience, Chapter 2 No
Ludwig (Arnold) How do we Know who we are? A Biography of the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ludwig (Arnold) - How do we Know who we are? A Biography of the Self No
Luper (Steven), Ed. The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
MacDonald (Graham) Perception & Identity - Essays Presented to A J Ayer with His Replies Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Madell (Geoffrey) The Identity of the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Madell (Geoffrey) - The Identity of the Self No
Manninen (Tuomas) Review of Alva Noe's "Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain" Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Metapsychology Online Reviews, Sep 15th 2009 (Volume 13, Issue 38) Yes
Martin (Raymond) Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Martin (Raymond) - Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival Yes
Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. Personal Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
McGinn (Colin) The Character of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
McGinn (Colin) The Self Paper - Cited McGinn - The Character of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind No
Merricks (Trenton) Considerations in Favour of Eliminating Us? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Merricks - Objects and Persons, 2001, Chapter 5 No
Merricks (Trenton) Considerations in Favour of Eliminativism Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Merricks - Objects and Persons, 2001, Chapter 2 No
Merricks (Trenton) Objects and Persons Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Metzinger (Thomas) Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Metzinger (Thomas) - Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity No
Metzinger (Thomas) The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Metzinger (Thomas) - The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self No
Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) Body & Soul - Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) - Body & Soul - Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics No
Murphy (Nancey) Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Murphy (Nancey) - Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? No
Murphy (Nancey) I Cerebrate Myself: Is there a little man inside your brain? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Books and Culture 5/1 (Jan-Feb 1999), p. 24 Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Mind and Body Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Nagel (Thomas) - A View from Nowhere, Chapter 3 Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Mortal Questions Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Subjective and Objective Paper - Cited Nagel (Thomas) - Mortal Questions Yes
Nagel (Thomas) The Objective Self Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Nagel (Thomas) - A View from Nowhere, Chapter 4 Yes
Nagel (Thomas) The View from Nowhere Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Noe (Alva) Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Noe (Alva) - Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness No
Oderberg (David) Johnston on Human Beings Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy, 86.3, Mar., 1989, pp. 137-141 Yes
Olson (Eric) The Nature of People Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Luper - The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, 2014, Chapter 2 No
Olson (Eric) What are We? Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Olson (Eric) - What are We? No
Olson (Eric) What Are We? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Issue 05-06 (2007), pp. 37-55 (19) Yes
Olson (Eric) What Are We? Brains Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 4 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) No
Olson (Eric) What Are We? Souls Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 7 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) No
Olson (Eric) What Are We? The Question Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) Yes
Olson (Eric) What Are We? What Now? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 9 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) No
Parfit (Derek) Reasons and Persons Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Parfit (Derek) We Are Not Human Beings Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part I, Chapter 2, pp. 31-49 No
Parfit (Derek) What We Believe Ourselves To Be Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 199-219(21). Yes
Peacocke (Arthur) & Gillett (Grant) Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Perry (John) The Self Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract In Supplement to the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998) No
Perry (John), Ed. Personal Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Peters (Ted) Resurrection of the Very Embodied Soul? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person No
Pollock (John L.) What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Mar., 2008), pp. 237-309 No
Popper (Karl) & Eccles (John) The Self and Its Brain Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Popper (Karl) & Eccles (John) - The Self and Its Brain No
Porter (Roy) Flesh in the Age of Reason - The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Porter (Roy) - Flesh in the Age of Reason - The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul No
Puccetti (Roland) Brain Transplants and Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis 29.3, 1969, pp. 65-77 No
Puccetti (Roland) Mr. Brennan on Person's Brains Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis 31.1, 1970, pp. 30-32 No
Puccetti (Roland) The Conquest of Death Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract The Monist, Vol. 59, No. 2, Philosophical Problems of Death (April, 1976) (pp. 249-263) No
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