Theo Todman's Web Page

For Text Colour-conventions (at end of page): Click Here

Personal Identity - Thesis - Introduction

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 1: (Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction))

Abstract

  • This Chapter provides a motivating statement for the study of the particular path through the topic of Personal Identity I intend to pursue and a brief historical survey of the subject to situate my particular stance.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.
  • The methodology for this Chapter differs somewhat from most other Chapters in that there is little real work, other than background reading and checking that the Thesis as a whole hangs together.
  • However, I do need to record while reading the general surveys anything that needs to go into the Historical Survey.
  • Another couple of “clearing up” tasks3 specific to this Chapter are:-
    1. To ensure that all the Papers on Identity that I have actually read are referenced somewhere4 in this Thesis.
    2. To ensure that all the Notes on Identity that I have actually produced are referenced somewhere5 in this Thesis.



Links to Notes
  1. General Surveys,
  2. Locke,
  3. My Current Stance
  4. Maybe others (to be supplied).



Chapter Introduction
  1. Why should we care about the topic of Personal Identity? The question hardly needs answering, as it’s just about the most important question to be posed by a reflective (if selfish) person. Historically, answers to this question have provided – or so Locke hoped – grounds for the possibility of life after death. Yet, the question is difficult, and has had many attempted solutions offered – and while some philosophers think there is no problem left to solve, there is no consensus as to the answer.
  2. My favourite paradigm – in the sense of the one I think most likely to be correct, rather than necessary the one I’d like to be correct – is Animalism. This is the claim that we are human animals and that consequently death is the end of us. This sensible view is only supported by around 17% of philosophers, according to a 2009 poll9 with about twice as many supporting some form of psychological view.
  3. In one sense it is just obvious that we are – in some sense of that weasel word “are” – human animals. But then the problem cases kick in – whether actual real-life cases or thought experiments that may never be real-life possibilities.
  4. About 36% of the respondents in the aforementioned survey though we could survive teletransportation – though 31% thought that the result would be death.
  5. Transhumanists think we can be uploaded to computers, which makes no sense if we are animals.
  6. So, as noted, there’s no consensus.
  7. Further detail to be supplied.



Main Text: Brief historical survey of the topic of Personal Identity
  1. As already noted, there are many fine introductory books on this topic, and I don’t intend to compete with them here. What I want to do is situate what I want to say in its historical context. I don’t intend to supply this section with a detailed scholarly apparatus.
  2. Further detail to be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. To make any progress on this topic, we need to come to a conclusion as to what sort of thing we are. We discuss this in the next Chapter.
  2. Further details to be supplied.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed15
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce and motivate the Thesis. As such, I need to situate it in the history of the topic. This is done in a number of introductory books, General Surveys, or collections of Papers that are standard fodder in courses on Personal Identity.
  3. Consequently, I will review the various Surveys of Personal Identity that feature in the standard reading lists, both to demonstrate that I’ve read them, and to ensure I’ve missed nothing major.
  4. If a Paper in a Collection or Chapter in an Introduction is specific to a later Chapter in this Thesis, its consideration may be reserved until a later Chapter, even if the Book itself is not. These will be noted in due course.
  5. As the topic of Personal Identity stems primarily from Locke’s account, I need a brief statement of what this is. Most of the relevant material will appear in due course in the anthologies, but I few items not anthologised are listed below.
  6. Other works were considered and either cut or reserved for later, as indicated below. The easiest way to see all the works considered is via the reading list at the end of this Note.
  7. Introductory or General Books
  8. Standard Collections
  9. Locke



The Cut
  1. Various works were considered for this Chapter, but were either reserved for consideration in other Chapters, or were rejected, at least for the time being.
  2. Priority Works to be read later for other Chapters:-
  3. Secondary Works to be “parked” for the time being:





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3:
  • These will be left until all Chapters have completed Task 7.
Footnote 4:
  • This may either be “as utilised” or “as ignored”.
  • Follow this link for those Papers I’ve read.
  • As of mid-Oct 2014, this task is now complete!
Footnote 5:
  • This may either be “as utilised” or “as ignored”.
  • Follow this link for the Jump-Table of all my Notes related to Personal Identity.
Footnote 9: Footnote 15:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 16: As this is a PhD Thesis in my general subject-area, I ought at least to have read it!

Footnote 17: Somewhat elementary, but worth (re-)reading quickly

Footnote 18:
  • This is a course of lectures on Metaphysics, at the advanced undergraduate / beginning graduate level.
  • All the issues raised – in the discussion of standard papers – many of them covered elsewhere in my Thesis – are useful background.
Footnote 19: This is a set of papers for discussion in a research seminar. Most are probably covered elsewhere, but in case not …

Footnote 20: For a review, see "Lerner (Berel Dov) - Review of 'Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction' by David Shoemaker".

Footnote 21: Decide where to park the various Chapters of this book after reading the précis.

Footnote 22:
  • Harris is an interesting case, in that it includes three important papers and three that are off-topic, but important in illustrating the divergent usages of the term “identity”.
Footnote 23: This is more recent than the others.

Footnote 28: But note that Baker’s account of constitution differs from the mereological account assumed in Rea’s anthology.

Footnote 29: The works by Reuscher and Trupp are too eccentric to be given any priority.

Footnote 30: The works by Slors may be worth reading as a fairly contemporary defence of the psychological view; just not yet.

Footnote 31: The work by Vesey is too out of date for a priority item.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 2: (Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?))

Abstract

  • The topic “personal identity” has historically presupposed that we are (in the sense of “identical to”, or “most fundamentally”) persons, whereas I (along with other animalists) claim that we are identical to human animals.
  • “We” requires explanation.
  • This chapter will sort out the topic of discussion for the Thesis as a whole.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.
  • Progress on this Chapter is unusual in that it was the sample Chapter on which I was working with my Supervisor when registered for the PhD at Birkbeck.



Links to Notes
  1. For an out-of-date skeleton giving a fuller reading list, see
    • What Are We?.
  2. Candidates for what we are, considered in this Chapter:-
    • Human Beings,
    • Brains,
    • Cerebra,
    • Selves,
    • Souls,
    • Others to be Supplied?
  3. Candidates for what we are, considered in later Chapters:-
    • Animals,
    • Bodies,
    • Organisms,
    • Persons,
    • Nihilism.



Chapter Introduction
  1. The topic “personal identity” has historically presupposed that we are (in the sense of “identical to”, or “most fundamentally”) persons, whereas I (along with other animalists) claim that we are identical to human animals.
  2. “We” requires explanation. This chapter attempts to sort out the topic of discussion for the Thesis as a whole.
  3. I need to address the concept of a SOUL as souls are the major counter-claim to the persisting entity being an animal; or at least popularly so. The same goes for SELVES, and also for HUMAN BEINGS, insofar as these are supposed to be distinct from HUMAN ANIMALs.
  4. I also need to have some discussion of what is meant by the various other possibilities of what we are, but leave explications of PERSONs, BODIES and ANIMALs / ORGANISMs until later Chapters.
  5. I’m not quite sure where the possibility that we are BRAINs ought to go, but for the time being it’s here; and this leads on to the possibility (tacitly assumed in some TEs) that we might be individual CEREBRA.



Main Text
  1. This Chapter has the title “What Are We?”. The “We” is of some significance, as we will see in the course of this Thesis when we consider the social and reciprocal aspects of what it is to be a person. Nonetheless, should we not start with the singular, maybe even solipsist, question “What Am I?”, and expand out from there into the collective question? How we phrase our initial question has an impact on the course of our investigations, and may reflect our deepest presuppositions. The first-person question adopts the Cartesian stance of looking from the inside out, whereas the third-person question considers “us” collectively. The first-person question may presuppose that the answer to the question is that I am primarily a psychological being, whereas the third-person question may assume or expect the answer that I am fundamentally physical.
  2. Some of the potential answers to the question will be the same whether we phrase the question in the singular or the plural.
  3. Taking it in the plural for now, we need to distinguish, as candidates for what we might be on the physical side, (prefixing “human-” passim):-
    • Animals,
    • Organisms,
    • Bodies,
    • Beings, and
    • Brains.
  4. On the psychological side, I might be a self or, more popularly, a person. I might even be a non-essentially-embodied entity like a soul.
  5. I will consider all these options in due course; with the exception of a detailed discussion of the concept PERSON (which is reserved for the next Chapter), I will do so later in this chapter.
  6. Olson15 also considers whether we might be Humean bundles of mental states and events, and even the nihilist view that we don’t exist at all. I’m not sure I’ll have space for these, but need to remain aware of the possibilities and motivations for these positions.
  7. However, for the moment I want to consider some themes connecting the possible answers to our question. Firstly, does there have to be a single answer? I know that I, and presume that my readers also, fall happily under the concepts HUMAN ANIMAL, HUMAN ORGANISM and HUMAN BEING. I at least have a human body and a human brain, though I would initially feel reluctant to say that I am one of either of these things. I would certainly claim to be a SELF, and also a PERSON, as no doubt would my reader. So, cannot all these answers be correct?
  8. This raises the question of what I mean by saying what I am (or we are) something. In saying that I am any of these things, what sort of relation is the “am”? Am I using am in the sense of an identity relation, a constitution relation, ascribing a predicate, or have some other sense in mind?
  9. There are two kinds of questions I want to ask. Firstly, what sort of being am I identical to? Secondly, what sort of properties do I have; both metaphysically essential properties (those without which I would cease to exist), and those I merely consider essential (that is, “very important”, though I would continue to exist without them)?
  10. Any “is” that does duty for the identity relation inherits the formal properties of an equivalence relation; in particular, it is a transitive relation. Additionally, the “two” identical entities either side of the copula must satisfy Leibniz’s law; “they” share (at a time) all their properties; actual and modal, intrinsic and relational. So, if I am identical to a human animal, and also identical to a human person, then that human animal must be identical to that human person. This would mean that these “two” entities are really one. They co-exist at all times in all possible worlds where either of “them” exists, and share all their properties and relations, at any time and world. Everything that happens to “one” at a world and time happens to the “other” at those coordinates. This places strong logical constraints on how much cake I can have and eat. I may want to say that I am identical both to a human animal, and to a human person, yet claim that a human person has certain mental properties essentially, but deny that a human animal does. However, I am then claiming what is logically impossible, at least for the classical logic of identity that denies that such notions as relative identity are coherent. As we will see, this point is essential to the animalist case that we are not identical to human persons (given the claim that we are identical to human animals).
  11. My thesis addresses the topic of personal identity, but we might claim that what we’re really interested in is in our identity. Not that we have doubts as individuals as to which particular individual we are (as though I, as Bill Clinton, don’t know whether I am Bill Clinton or George W. Bush), but what sort of individual we are, together with worries about our persistence (how long we are going to last, and in what form). Historically, it has been a standard presupposition that what we are most fundamentally is persons, or at least that’s all we care about. So, concern about our identity has been elided with concern for personal identity, almost as though we thought that the two questions are the same. Animalists argue that the two questions are indeed different, but for convenience, and the historical continuity of the general topic under discussion, still say they are talking about personal identity.
  12. Further text to be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. In our next Chapter, we consider just what a Person is.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed19
  1. For this Chapter I have already worked on the various papers or book chapters under supervisory control. Where this is the case, for ease of reference, the analytical Note for each reference is hyperlinked directly.
  2. Additionally, I may need to consider other papers or book chapters in the following lists (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going. Some that I have considered have been culled or reserved for later.
  3. The General Question:-
  4. Brains / Cerebra
  5. Neurological Background
  6. Human Beings
  7. Selves46
  8. Souls48
  9. Nihilism
  10. Many aspects of these papers will need to be left for later chapters.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. The General Question
  4. Brains / Cerebra
  5. Human Beings
  6. Selves
  7. Souls





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 15: In "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology"

Footnote 19:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 26: The excerpt from Brandom raises some questions about the community we call “we”.

Footnote 29: Baker often expresses indebtedness to Roderick Chisholm, who is reviewed on that account.

Footnote 31: An annoying book, but one I ought to study.

Footnote 35: The book. From my perspective, probably the most important source for this Chapter.

Footnote 36: See also the Chapters on Brains and Souls in the subsequent reading-lists.

Footnote 40: Useful historical background, maybe!

Footnote 42: Lockwood might deny that this is his view, but he seems committed to it, as far as I can see.

Footnote 43: This maybe ought to be categorised as an “anti-soul” view.

Footnote 44:
  • Some of the papers by Puccetti will be reconsidered in (or maybe reserved for – a couple already have been) Chapter 10.
Footnote 46:
  • This list is rather long, and contains many whole books. I may have to cull several of these further down the line.
  • However, the Self is important, as it’s the root of Baker’s FPP, and the motivator for all psychological theories of PI, so understanding just what it is supposed to be is central to my concerns.
Footnote 47:
  • Alexander thinks that we are Selves, and that Selves are tropes – abstract particulars – which by my lights is about as far from the truth as you can get, so I need to consider his arguments carefully.
Footnote 48:
  • The comment about the prolixity of the reading list applies even more to Souls than Selves, without the positive connection my primary thesis.
  • However, if we were to be souls, this would solve the resurrection problem; so I need to thoroughly understand the reasons why we might be – but most likely are not – souls.
Footnote 49: This looks interesting, but is somewhat off-topic for a priority reading-list.

Footnote 50: This is rather elementary, and ought to have been reviewed in Chapter 01.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 3: (Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?))

Abstract

  • This chapter will canvass the various views of what Persons are and consider how important issues in this area are to my main concern of our identity.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes
  1. The primary Notes are:-
    • Person,
    • Human Persons,
    • Non-Human Persons,
    • Reductionism,
    • Simple View
    • Taking Persons Seriously,
    • First-Person Perspective.
  2. No doubt there are others:-
    • To be supplied.



Chapter Introduction
  1. The main philosophical argument about Persons is whether PERSON is a substance-concept in its own right, or whether it is parasitic on other substance-concept(s).
  2. My own view is that Human Persons are phase sortals of human animals, but other philosophers have more robust views of persons and think of them as substances in their own right.
  3. Famously, Locke held this view, and Lynne Rudder Baker is a contemporary exponent – her view being that human persons are constituted by, but not identical to, human animals.
  4. In this thesis, I’m only concerned with human persons, and – like most philosophers – allow that there can be non-human persons (God, gods, angels, aliens, robots, etc.)
  5. All this is predicated on deciding just what PERSONS are, which in turn depends somewhat on whether we take PERSON to be a natural kind concept, or something that is socially constructed and so not something the correct definition of we can discover.
  6. Further text to be supplied.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. In our next Chapter, now that we have determined what we are – and what persons are – we consider various metaphysical issues that bear on the arguments for and against the various positions on Personal Identity.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed18
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. Reductionism
  3. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  4. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them.





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 18:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 19: This is very elementary, but short and maybe entertaining.

Footnote 20: Read this as an example from the Animal Liberation movement.

Footnote 21: This is rather introductory to Parfit’s ideas, so read it quickly for that purpose.

Footnote 22: Restrict a close reading to Part 3 (Personal Identity).

Footnote 23: May be useful both as a take on Strawson, and for Plantinga’s own views.

Footnote 24: Stanley got into a debate with Jen Hornsby, though not on this topic, so it’ll be interesting to see how he argues.

Footnote 25: This is a difficult book with which I expect to have little sympathy, but one that has to be read.

Footnote 26: This is rather elementary, and ought to have been reviewed in Chapter 1.

Footnote 27: This paper may be important, but is too long (and difficult) for a first pass through the literature

Footnote 28: Too similar to "Lowe (E.J.) - Substance and Selfhood", which was read for Chapter 2.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 4: (Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues))

Abstract

  • We must consider the logic of identity, as non-standard logics are favourite means of escaping from some of the puzzle cases. We ask – along with Parfit – whether identity matters.
  • Substances and sortals are central to the persistence of anything, and define their persistence conditions. In particular my claim is that persons are phase sortals of human animals (the substances).
  • The question of Kinds – and in particular Natural Kinds – are related to those of Substance, and are important in considering whether PERSON is a natural kind concept.
  • Metamorphosis might be important if it is claimed that we can change kind.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes
  1. Logic of Identity, including:-
    Contingent Identity, and
    Indeterminate Identity,
    Occasional Identity.
    Relative Identity,
    Vague Identity.
  2. Criteria of Identity,
  3. Does Identity Matter?,
  4. Substance,
  5. Sortals,
    Phase Sortals,
  6. Kinds,
    Natural Kinds,
    Metamorphosis,
  7. Others?
    → to be supplied as they come up.



Chapter Introduction
  1. I need to discuss the logic of identity, survival and persistence, and even whether identity matters in survival.
  2. Substances and sortals are central to the persistence of anything, and in particular to my claim that persons are phase sortals of human animals (the substances).
  3. The question of Natural Kinds arises in considering whether PERSON is a natural kind concept.
  4. Certain four-dimensional approaches to persistence do away with the substance concept, but I discuss this issue in the next Chapter.



Main Text
  1. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify my views on a number of logical and metaphysical issues that are central to the core of this Thesis.
  2. I will also consider Derek Parfit’s claim that “Identity is not what matters in survival” in this Chapter.
  3. The coverage in the Chapter itself will have to be very brief lest it consume the word-count for the entire thesis. Most information – and in particular the bulk of the justification for my views – will remain in the Notes.
  4. Three background issues, namely my views on:-
    • Persistence and Time,
    • Thought Experiments, and
    • Constitution
    are covered elsewhere (follow the links above).
  5. Other topics may be added as they arise.
  6. Further text to be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. In our next Chapter, we need to consider further the question of Persistence and Time and how they impact on the topic of Personal Identity.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed23
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going:-
  2. Basic Metaphysics24
  3. Logic of Identity (General)
  4. Relative Identity
  5. Vague Identity
  6. Indeterminate Identity
  7. Contingent Identity
  8. Occasional Identity
  9. Criteria of Identity
  10. Substances
  11. Sortals & Phase Sortals
  12. Kinds and Natural Kinds
  13. Metamorphosis
  14. Does Identity Matter?
  15. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  16. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Some of the items above are likely to be culled when I come to process them, and will appear below.
  4. Items to be Supplied.





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 23:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 24: There’s an endless amount of stuff in this area, so I’ve (for now) chosen a couple of contrasting approaches.

Footnote 25: Footnote 26:
  • Modality is important in my thesis, because modal questions come into persistence criteria.
  • That said, the last two essays in the book – by Hossack and Olson – are the most important, though of these two only that by Hossack really belongs to this Chapter.
Footnote 27: I’m not sure where this book should be parked, and not all of it is relevant.

Footnote 28: I doubt this paper is really about Relative Identity, but more about Brain Transplants).

Footnote 29: Read the Synopsis below first.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 5: (Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time))

Abstract

  • A number of thought experiments that feature in Chapter 10 seem to fail if perdurantism is true (because the reduplication objections fail).
  • Depending on whether any of these are critical to my arguments, I may need to consider the impact of perdurantism.
  • But this complex area may be a step too far within a fairly limited word-count.
  • I’m also unsure whether it should feature before or after the Chapter on Thought Experiments.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes
  1. Time,
    Time Travel,
  2. Persistence,
    Persistence Criteria,
    Endurantism,
    Perdurantism,
    Exdurantism.
  3. Survival.



Chapter Introduction
  1. Any discussion of identity over time – of anything – needs to have some discussion of just what it is for something to persist, and what we take time to be.
  2. Additionally, as noted in the Abstract above, depending on our approach to time and persistence, some of the troubling thought experiments that worry us about the persistence of human persons are resolved, though we get nothing for nothing. As is usual in philosophy, a gain here is compensated for by a loss somewhere else. We need to determine these losses, and agree that they are “worth it”.
  3. Further text to be supplied.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now cleared up all our preliminaries, we can now turn to the meat of the Thesis in our next Chapter, where we consider Animalism and the arguments for it.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed17
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. The references are segregated by sub-topic, as below, but there is much overlap.
  3. Time:
  4. Time Travel18:
  5. Modality / Possible Worlds20:
  6. Persistence:
  7. Survival22:
  8. Endurantism:
  9. Perdurantism:
  10. Exdurantism:
  11. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  12. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them.





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 17:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 18:
  • I thought I’d written somewhere that this – fun though it might be – is a bridge too far. But it is relevant.
  • I’ll expand the reading list based on the items already listed.
Footnote 19: And the rest of an interesting 2005 edition of The Monist.

Footnote 20:
  • This is parked here until it finds its final resting place.
  • If I do cover possible worlds, I’ll need more material than this.
Footnote 21: This might also be useful for perdurantism, or for the logic of identity.

Footnote 22:
  • There is some overlap – as far as papers reviewed are concerned – between this Section and the “Does Identity Matter” Section in Chapter 4.
  • This Chapter focuses on the meaning of “Survival”, while the previous chapter focuses on its relation to Identity, and the importance of identity for survival.
  • But, I think they should probably be covered in the same place, and probably not here.
Footnote 23: These three papers by Butterfield are very specialised, and this one is very long, and may be left to one side for now.

Footnote 24: This looks like an important paper, which rejects the “proofs” of 4D based on the “coincidence” TEs.

Footnote 25: Another important-looking paper, also against perdurantism, along similar lines to the above.

Footnote 26: Oderberg seems to be arguing that Perdurantism is an unwanted consequence of a common-sense notion of persistence.

Footnote 27: I’m not sure whether this belongs here, but it looks an interesting paper.

Footnote 28: I don’t have the paper in any case!

Footnote 29: This is an ethical rather than metaphysical discussion.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 6: (Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It))

Abstract

  • This Chapter describes what Animalism is, with an excursus on animals and organisms and their persistence.
  • It puts forward the arguments in favour of animalism, those against being reserved for a later Chapter.
  • It focuses on the account of Eric Olson, the primary contemporary exponent of Animalism.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes
  1. Animalism,
    Animalists,
  2. Animals
    Bodies,
    Organisms,
    Life,
  3. Olson,
    Thinking Animal Argument,
    Other Arguments for Animalism12,
  4. Others to be supplied?



Chapter Introduction
  1. As we saw in Chapter 02, nothing is more obvious than that we are human animals.
  2. The disadvantages of whole-hearted acceptance of this seemingly obvious fact are firstly that it seems to demote human beings from their status of being made in the image of the God most people no longer believe in. There are two responses to this; either to deny that it does, or to accept that the differences between human beings and other animals are those of degree rather than kind.
  3. A second disadvantage is that accepting that we are human animals makes the prospects for post-mortem survival look bleak. This is addressed in Chapter 11.
  4. So, while saying that we are human animals might seem to be the default position – and so the burden is on others to demonstrate that we are not – the historical situation places a burden on the animalist to present the case for animalism with as much rigour as possible.
  5. Further text to be supplied.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. Having discussed Animalism, we can now in our next Chapter turn to the main alternative I want to consider, the Constitution View and the arguments for it.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed19
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. As this is a “core” chapter, the coverage of the literature will be very complete, if not exhaustive, when it comes to Animalism itself.
  3. For background topics, it will be more selective20. Hence, I have divided the reading list into two.
  4. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 8. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  5. Core Topics
  6. Background Material
  7. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  8. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them.
    • To be supplied.





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 12: This needs a Note!

Footnote 19:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 20:
  • There are a few papers listed on the cognitive capacities of animals.
  • I got bored with listing these, so the sample may not be representative.
  • These are, in any case, probably more relevant to Chapter 9 – as an antidote to Baker’s attempted ontological separation of human persons from human animals – so I will move them there – and expand the list if necessary – in due course.
Footnote 22: A knowledge of genetics is important in arguments about the comings into being and identities of animals.

Footnote 23: What is this important book doing here?

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 7: (Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It))

Abstract

  • This Chapter gives an account of Lynne Rudder Baker’s thesis that human persons are not identical to human animals, but are – temporarily at least – constituted by them.



Research Methodology
  • Followthis Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes
  1. Baker,
  2. Constitution View,
    Constitution,
    First-Person Perspective,
  3. Mereology,
    Dion and Theon,
  4. Others to be supplied?



Chapter Introduction
  1. Baker’s account of constitution is not the standard mereological account, of some larger body being constituted by its parts, but is her own idea that requires explication.
  2. Baker also has a commitment to PERSONs being substances in their own right, rather than being an honorific title applied to substances that at other times might not deserve the honorific.
  3. She also reifies a useful idea – that of a First-person Perspective. It is the FPP that individuates persons, according to Baker, so the FPP requires explanation as well.
  4. Further text to be supplied.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed both Animalism and the Constitution View, we can now in our next Chapter turn to the arguments against these views, starting with those against Animalism.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed14
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 9. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  3. Baker
  4. Constitution
  5. Mereology16
  6. Co-Location17
  7. First-Person Perspectives
  8. Constitution View
  9. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  10. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them.





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 14:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 16: While Baker’s understanding of constitution is distinct from a mereological one, it is necessary to understand mereology.

Footnote 17: I’m not sure whether this section belongs here, but it must go somewhere!

Footnote 18: This may properly belong to one of the Chapters on Animalism.

Footnote 19: This Chapter has rather more to do with distributive ethics than personal identity or the FPP.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 8: (Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism))

Abstract

  • A discussion of the arguments against animalism, as given by those of anti-animalist persuasion and defended by the principal animalists (with a focus on Eric Olson), with a critique.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes3
  1. Animalism - Objections,
  2. Animalism.



Chapter Introduction
  1. To be supplied.



Main Text
  1. For now, just see the Note Animalism – Objections.
  2. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed the arguments against Animalism, we now in our next Chapter turn to the arguments against the Constitution View.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed11
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 6. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  3. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  4. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them.
    • To be supplied.





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3:
  • There is effectively a 1-1-match between this Chapter and the Note Animalism – Objections.
  • I imagine that this Chapter will be more focussed and less exploratory than that Note.
Footnote 11:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 9: (Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View))

Abstract

  • A discussion of the arguments against the Constitution View, focusing on the principal animalists, with a critique.
  • In particular, I intend to critique Olson’s “thinking animal” argument against the Constitution View (though I think this argument is unnecessary for Olson to establish the case for Animalism).



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes
  1. Constitution View – Objections,
  2. Thinking Animal Argument,
  3. Others to be supplied?



Chapter Introduction
  1. To be supplied.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed the arguments against both Animalism and the Constitution View, we now in our next Chapter turn to the question of Thought Experiments in general, and how they bear on this topic in particular.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed10
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. There’s a Christian turf-war between Baker and Zimmerman which may be worth including:-
  3. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 7. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  4. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  5. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them.
    • To be supplied.





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 10:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 11: Argues against human uniqueness.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 10: (Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments))

Abstract

  • Any account of personal identity needs to give an account of what is going on in the various thought experiments that have been considered relevant to the topic.
  • It’s also the area that’s most fun. Indeed, I think that the entire Thesis will be an exercise in inference to the best explanation of what’s going on in these thought experiments.
  • Any theory of Personal Identity needs to account for our intuitions (if there is a universal response) or explain them away as confused.
  • I will firstly briefly consider the propriety of using thought experiments in this domain of enquiry, and then consider the usual suspects.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes
  1. Propriety of Thought Experiments
  2. Principal Examples:-
    • Fission
      Clones
      Twinning
    • Fusion
    • Pregnancy
    • Replication
    • Commissurotomy
    • Multiple Personality Disorder
    • Brain-state Transfers
    • Brain Transplants
    • Teletransportation
    • Siliconisation
  3. Transhumanism
    Cyborgs
    Androids
    Chimeras
  4. Others?



Chapter Introduction
  1. In this chapter we will consider all the usual suspects, as itemised in the list of Notes above.
  2. It is to be noted that some – in particular Commissurotomy – are more actual experiments than thought-experiment, though quite a lot of armchair thinking is involved in working out their import.
  3. Pregnancy and birth in placental mammals might be described as fusion followed by fission.
  4. Multiple Personality Disorder is again – at least allegedly – an existent pathology rather than a Thought Experiment. Moreover, it might be better situated in Chapter 9 as a critique of the idea of an individuating First-Person Perspective.
  5. Brain Transplants come in various forms. We need to distinguish Whole-Brain Transplants (WBTs) from single or double Cerebrum transplants, and these from brain-tissue transplants, which shade off into Siliconisation and Brain State Transfers.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed Thought Experiments in general, we now in our next Chapter turn to the question of Resurrection – the matter that first motivated Locke (and – I suspect - Lynne Rudder Baker and many others) in their discussions of Personal Identity.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed25
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. I have segregated the papers by sub-topic, but some would fit into more than one category.
  3. Theory
  4. Brain State Transfers26
  5. Brain Transplants
  6. Commissurotomy
  7. Fission
  8. Fusion
  9. Multiple Personality Disorder
  10. Replication
  11. Siliconisation27
  12. Teletransportation
  13. Transhumanism29
  14. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  15. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them.





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 25:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 26:
  • There must be many more papers than the classic one by Williams (and commentaries thereon) – I just haven’t got them correctly categorised.
  • Under this head should be included references to “Brain Zaps” and the like.
Footnote 27: Footnote 28:
  • Tye seems to be discussing brain-partition, with silicon transceivers. But he uses Unger’s term “zippering”.
  • He is indebted to Arnold Zuboff, who may be worth following up.
Footnote 29:
  • This is is a very wide topic, and is different to the other notions, in which we are and remain organic.
  • One item of particular interest is where “we” – that is, our psychology – is supposedly uploaded to a computer.
  • Most of the papers in my possession on the subject seem to assume this is possible, and some even argue whether it is – unbeknownst to us – actual.
  • Olson argues against the metaphysical possibility in "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands", pp. 61-2.
  • This is associated with “Brains in Vats”.
Footnote 30: I’ve read this book, but it’s insufficiently philosophical for its arguments – such as they are – to be worth considering as a priority.

Footnote 31: Cover in the next Chapter.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 11: (Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection))

Abstract

  • If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection.
  • Since the body is destroyed at death, it would seem that any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong.
  • Consideration of arguments by Peter Van Inwagen in this respect.
  • This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued, and factually correct concerning what is actually believed by intellectually-aware Christians and Muslims (unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion).
  • Maybe I should also cover reincarnation.



Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
  • Follow this Link for my progress dashboard on these tasks.



Links to Notes
  • A lot of my notes seem to mention resurrection and the Notes fall into at least two categories3:-
    1. Thesis:-
      1. Life,
      2. Death,
        Near Death Experiences,
        Corpses,
      3. Life after Death.
        Resurrection,
        Immortality,
        Reincarnation,
      4. Makropulos Case,
    2. Philosophy of religion13:-
      1. Resurrection,
      2. Resurrection (Metaphysics),
      3. 1 Corinthians 15,
      4. Heythrop.



Chapter Introduction
  1. While I wish in this chapter to consider seriously the religious hope of resurrection, I do not want to get side-tracked onto matters of Scriptural exegesis, or into evidential matters of whether particular resurrections – specifically of Jesus – happened or not. In this regard, I’m interested only in what they take resurrection to be, and whether they provide any detailed metaphysical account of how it is supposed to work.
  2. As in the chapter on Thought Experiments, this chapter is partly aimed at checking how (my version of) animalism copes with projected situations. As such, I may extend this to other posited versions of post-mortem survival, though most are ruled out by the essentially physical nature of the human person as proposed by animalism.
  3. While not wanting to get too far off topic, especially at the end of the thesis, I want to consider some of the ethical consequences of adopting Animalism with – I presume – the lack of hope of post-mortem existence. Hence the reading material on death itself and on “matters of life and death”.
  4. Further text to be supplied.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed everything on our Agenda, we now in our next Chapter make our conclusions.
  2. This is work in progress.



Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed22
  1. In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
  2. I have divided those on the core topic of resurrection into those that are from a religio-philosophical perspective, rather than pure philosophy. In general, those written by professional philosophers are in the latter section, even if addressed to a religious audience.
  3. As the topic of death in itself – and the ethical consequences of death without post-mortem survival - are important issues, I have reading lists for these as well.
  4. Finally, in order to diagnose death, we need to know what life is! I’ve not really investigated a reading-list for this.
  5. Life:
  6. Death:
  7. Death and Ethics:
  8. Resurrection - Purely Philosophical:
  9. Resurrection - Religio-Philosophical:
  10. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.
  11. The motivation for these works is as follows:-
    • Gasser is the most important work I need to address.
    • Wright’s big book (hopefully) supplies all there is from the Christian side – even though the focus is on a specific – and theologically and metaphysically special – resurrection.
    • Bynum and Gillman provide background information from the Christian and Jewish perspectives, respectively.
    • Badham is a rather elementary Christian discussion, and may be rejected.
    • Corcoran is an important survey, already included in the reading for a couple of other Chapters.
    • Edwards, Flew and Penelhum are useful surveys of older material, which is useful just to read for the appropriate background. There is some considerable overlap in the selections.
    • I suppose I need to discuss death itself, hence Kagan, McMahan, Regan & Wyatt – though skipping the ethical bits.
    • Perrett and Tippler may be a little off-centre, and I may reject them on closer inspection.
    • The other individual papers – especially those by van Inwagen and Shoemaker – are probably important, but justification is to be supplied.
  12. Books / Papers Rejected: There are a number of works that I have in my possession that I considered investigating, but in the end decided not to. They are listed here, with reasons for rejection. Of course, there are very many others less tempting that appear in the topical reading lists but are not specifically mentioned here.
    • To be supplied.



The Cut
  1. There had already been a lot of cutting in the various selections of the original reading list – the reading lists attached to the Notes run on and on – and these items just represent the works in my possession (though I have sought out all that I’ve heard of that look relevant).
  2. However, the items in the lists following were given some attention, and have been culled – at least temporarily – from the lists above, where they originally appeared. I’ve not always given a reason as I’ve not studied them sufficiently closely. But, you have to draw a line somewhere.
  3. I’m well aware that the cut has not been sufficiently rigorous. Further items beyond the items below are likely to be culled when I come to process them.
  4. The topic of “Death and Ethics” is already a bit tangential to my thesis, but there’s a set of questions – of which two are the most important, namely:-
    • Why is death bad (for the deceased)?, and
    • Can the dead be harmed (assuming they no longer exist)?
    – in which I have an interest, and on which I wonder whether my views on Personal Identity have anything to say.
  5. Therefore, I park here a bunch of papers on these topics (more on the second than the first) that may or may not get “processed”:-





In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3:
  • Write-up notes are accessible via the papers or books they are write-ups of.
Footnote 13:
  • These are much less significant than my philosophical Notes, but are mentioned for the sake of completion and reference will probably be removed in due course.
Footnote 22:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
  • The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 24:
  • Unlikely to have anything to do with resurrection, but I want an excuse for reading the book!
  • Maybe belongs to Chapter 8.
Footnote 25: Hardly philosophy, but important to have read!

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43


Footnote 12: (Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion))

Abstract

  • This Chapter will summarise the claims and arguments of the Thesis, namely that:-
  • We are human animals,
  • Human persons fall under phase sortals of the concept HUMAN ANIMAL,
  • The person is inseparable from the animal,
  • The animal is utterly destroyed at death,
  • Substance dualism is false, and
  • Consequently (given the sort of thing we are) resurrection or any other post-mortem survival is impossible for us.



Chapter Introduction
  1. To be supplied.



Main Text
  1. To be supplied.



Concluding Remarks
  1. This is work in progress.

Note last updated: 18/04/2019 18:18:43





References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Alexander (Ronald) The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Alexander (Ronald) - The Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity 8%
Andrewes (David) Neuropsychology: From Theory to Practice Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Andrewes (David) - Neuropsychology: From Theory to Practice 1%
Anstotz (Christoph) Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great Apes: A Comparison Paper - Cited Cavalieri & Singer - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity No
Armstrong (David) Identity Through Time Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Van Inwagen - Time and Cause, 1980, pp. 67-78 Yes
Arnold (Keith) The Subject of Radical Change Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (May, 1978), pp. 395-401 Yes
Ayer (A.J.) The Concept of a Person Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ayer - The Concept of a Person & Other Essays 8%
Ayer (A.J.) The Concept of a Person & Other Essays Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 1%
Ayers (Michael R.) Individuals Without Sortals Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4.1, Sept. 1974, 113-148 14%
Ayers (Michael R.) Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology) Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology) 25%
Ayers (Michael R.) Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 25, pp. 278-292 Yes
Baars (Bernard), Banks (William) & Newman (James) Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 1%
Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) Immortality or Extinction Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction 8%
Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) The Meaning of Resurrection, Immortality and Eternal Life Paper - Cited Badham (Paul) & Badham (Linda) - Immortality or Extinction, Chapter 2 No
Baillie (James) Commissurotomy and the Unity of Mind Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 7 No
Baillie (James) Identity and Survival Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 2 No
Baillie (James) Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Philosophical Quarterly, 1990, Vol. 40 Issue 159, p183-194, 12p Yes
Baillie (James) Methodology Matters Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 5 No
Baillie (James) Problems in Personal Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity 66%
Baillie (James) What Am I? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 4 Yes
Baker (Deane-Peter) Alvin Plantinga Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 9%
Baker (Deane-Peter) Taylor and Parfit on Personal Identity: a Response to Lotter Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Abstract Written)
South African Journal of Philosophy, Aug99, Vol. 18 Issue 3, p331, 16p Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Big-Tent Metaphysics Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil) Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on my 'The Ontological Status of Persons' Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, September 2002, pp. 394-395 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Constitution Revisited Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, Chapter 8 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Death and the Afterlife Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract The Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Religion, William Wainwright, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 366-391 71%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001): 151-167 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Materialism with a Human Face Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Corcoran - Soul, Body and Survival, Chapter 10 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Mereology and Constitution Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, Chapter 9 7%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) On Being One’s Own Person Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Reasons of One’s Own, Maureen Sie, Bert van Den Brink, Marc Slors, eds. (Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limitied, 2004): 129-149 8%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) On Making Things Up: Constitution and Its Critics Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Topics 30 (2002) - Identity and Individuation : 31-52 8%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Personal Identity Over Time Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 5 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010 27%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons in Metaphysical Perspective Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Hahn, Lewis E. 7%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons in the Material World Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 1 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Reply to Zimmerman’s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism' Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Review of 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person' by Hud Hudson Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Mind, 112 (2003): 148-151 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism 1%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 8 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Difference that Self-Consciousness Makes Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The First-Person Perspective Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 3 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The First-Person Perspective: A Test For Naturalism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, 35.4, Oct. 1998 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Importance Of Being a Person Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 6 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism 2%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) The Ontological Status of Persons Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, September 2002, pp. 370-388 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Three-dimensionalism defended Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, Chapter 10 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Time Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, Chapter 7 No
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 1999, Vol. XXIII Issue 1, p144, 22p Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) What Am I? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p151, 9p; Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) When Do Persons Begin and End? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Abstract Written)
Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) When Does a Person Begin? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Paul, Miller & Paul - Personal Identity, 2005 7%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Why Constitution is Not Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Journal of Philosophy 94, No. 12 (Dec., 1997), 599-621 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' Yes
Bambrough (Renford), Ed. Philosophy - 66/255 (January 1991) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 1%
Bambrough (Renford), Ed. Philosophy - 67/262 (October 1992) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil) Endurance is paradoxical Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis 65.1, Jan 2005, p69-74, 6p No
Baur (Michael) Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Sep., 1992), pp. 166-168 Yes
Baylis (Charles A.) Review Article: The Identity of Indiscernibles Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Journal of Symbolic Logic 21.1 (Mar. 1956), pp. 85-86 Yes
Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) Neuroscience Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) - Neuroscience Yes
Beck (Simon) Back To The Self And The Future Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
South African Journal of Philosophy, Aug98, Vol. 17 Issue 3, p211, 15p; Yes
Becker (Lawrence) Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4.4 (Summer 1975), 334-359 Yes
Bekoff (Marc) The Emotional Lives of Animals: A Leading Scientist Explores Animal Joy, Sorrow, and Empathy and Why They Matter Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bekoff (Marc) - The Emotional Lives of Animals: A Leading Scientist Explores Animal Joy, Sorrow, and Empathy and Why They Matter Yes
Belshaw (Christopher) My Beginnings Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 371-389 Yes
Belzer (Marvin) Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Paul, Miller & Paul - Personal Identity, 2005 No
Bennett (Karen) Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Chalmers (David), Manley (David) & Wasserman (Ryan) - Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology 9%
Bennett (Karen) Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies, Vol. 118.3: April 2004, pp. 339-371 22%
Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience 2%
Berglund (Stefan) Animalism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Berglund - Human and Personal Identity (PhD Dissertation, Lund University), Chapter 3, 1995, pp. 44-60 No
Berglund (Stefan) Human and Personal Identity Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Berglund (Stefan) - Human and Personal Identity No
Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds. The Body and the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds. - The Body and the Self 6%
Blackmore (Susan) Beyond the Body Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blackmore (Susan) - Beyond the Body No
Blackmore (Susan) Dying to Live: Near-Death Experiences Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blackmore (Susan) - Dying to Live: Near-Death Experiences 3%
Blakemore (Colin) & Greenfield (Susan), Eds. Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Blatti (Stephan) A New Argument for Animalism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis Vol 72, Number 4, October 2012, pp. 685–690 No
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism (Continuum) Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, ed. A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle, N. Goulder (Continuum, 2006), vol. 1: 108–09 Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism and its Implications Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Mostly Author's Text)
OU Website (now deleted) Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism and Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships, ed. M. Bekoff (Greenwood Press, 2007), 430-33 Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism Unburdened Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
OU Website (now deleted) Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 595–608 Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Material Constitution Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Bob Barnard and Neil Manson (Continuum, 2012), 149-69 42%
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 21%
Blatti (Stephan), Ed. The Lives of Human Animals Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Abstract Written)
The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 52, Spindel Supplement, 2014 Yes
Block (Ned), Flanagan (Owen) & Guzeldere (Guven) The Nature of Consciousness Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 48%
Bloom (Paul) Descartes' Baby: How Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bloom (Paul) - Descartes' Baby: How Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human No
Borowski (E.J.) Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 100, Jul., 1975, pp. 271-276 No
Bostrom (Nick) Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, 2003, Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255 Yes
Bostrom (Nick) How Long Before Superintelligence? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Personal Website. Yes
Bostrom (Nick) The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 55, No. 218, pp. 90-97 No
Bourgeois (Warren) Persons: What Philosophers Say about You Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bourgeois (Warren) - Persons: What Philosophers Say about You 22%
Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Philosophical Studies: Vol. 170, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 465-500 Yes
Braddon-Mitchell (David) & West (Caroline) Temporal Phase Pluralism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Jan2001, Vol. 62 Issue 1, p59, 25p No
Bradley (Ben), Feldman (Fred) & Johansson (Jens) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 7%
Braine (David) The Human Person: Animal and Spirit Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit 2%
Brandom (Robert) Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 3%
Brandom (Robert) Toward a Normative Pragmatics Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Brandom (Robert) - Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment, 1994, Chapter 1 50%
Braude (Stephen) First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Braude (Stephen) - First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind 2%
Braude (Stephen) Multiple Personality and the Structure of the Self Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Kolak & Martin - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues No
Braude (Stephen) Personal Identity and Post-Mortem Survival Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Paul, Miller & Paul - Personal Identity, 2005 No
Brennan (Andrew) Concepts of a Person Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Brennan - Conditions of Identity, 1988, Chapter 10 No
Brennan (Andrew) Conditions of Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Brennan (Andrew) - Conditions of Identity 1%
Brennan (Andrew) Fragmented Selves and the Problem of Ownership Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 90 (1989 - 1990), pp. 143-158 No
Brennan (Andrew) Personal Identity and Personal Survival Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis, vol. 42, 1982, pp. 44-50 No
Brennan (Andrew) Persons and their Brains Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis 30.1, 1969, pp. 27-30 No
Brennan (Andrew) Stages, Sortals, and Possible Worlds Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Brennan - Conditions of Identity, 1988, Chapter 5 No
Brennan (Andrew) Survival Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Synthese June 1984; 59: 339-362 No
Broackes (Justin) Substance Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 131-166(36) No
Broackes (Justin) & Hacker (P.M.S.) Substance: Things and Stuffs Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 2004, Vol. 78 Issue 1, p41-63, 23p No
Brody (Baruch) Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life : a Philosophical View Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Brody (Baruch) - Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life : a Philosophical View 5%
Brody (Baruch) Identity and Essence Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Brody (Baruch) - Identity and Essence No
Brook (J.A.) Imagination, Possibility, and Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, 12.3, July 1975, pp. 185-198 No
Brown (James Robert) & Fehige (Yiftach) Thought Experiments Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 1996-2014 6%
Brown (Warren), Murphy (Nancey) & Malony (H. Newton), Eds. Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Brown (Warren), Murphy (Nancey) & Malony (H. Newton), Eds. - Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature 11%
Brueckner (Anthony) Parfit On What Matters In Survival Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 70, 1993, pp. 1-22 No
Brueckner (Anthony) & Fischer (John Martin) Why Is Death Bad? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Fischer - The Metaphysics of Death 12%
Bruntrup (Godehard) 3.5-Dimensionalism and Survival: A Process Ontological Approach Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010 22%
Bullinger (E.W.) The Resurrection of the Body Book - Cited Bullinger (E.W.) - The Resurrection of the Body Yes
Burge (Tyler) Memory and Persons Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 289-337 No
Burke (Michael) Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind, 89, No. 355, Jul., 1980, pp. 391-405 No
Burke (Michael) Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis 57.1, Jan 1997, p11, 8p No
Burke (Michael) Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis 52, 1992, pp. 12-17 No
Burke (Michael) Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Journal of Philosophy 91, No. 3 (March 1994), 129-139 Yes
Burke (Michael) Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis 64, July 2004, Vol. Issue 3, p242-250, 9p No
Burke (Michael) Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 (4), 1997: 457-467 No
Burke (Michael) Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Amongst Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Rea - Material Constitution - A Reader No
Burke (Michael) Tibbles the Cat: A Modern Sophisma Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 84:63-74, 1996 No
Butchvarov (Panayot) Being Qua Being Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Butchvarov (Panayot) - Being Qua Being 5%
Butchvarov (Panayot) Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1977; 2: 70-89 No
Butterfield (Jeremy) On the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Website No
Butterfield (Jeremy) On the Persistence of Particles Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Website No
Butterfield (Jeremy) Spatial and Temporal Parts Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly Jan 1985; 35.138, pp. 32-44 No
Bynum (Caroline) Metamorphosis and Identity Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Bynum (Caroline) - Metamorphosis and Identity 0%
Bynum (Caroline) Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336 Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336 6%
Callahan (Joan C.) On Harming the Dead Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Jan., 1987), pp. 341-352 8%
Campbell (Courtney S.) A No-Brainer: Criticisms of Brain-Based Standards of Death Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Oct. 2001 26.5, pp. 539-551 No
Campbell (John) Past, Space and Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Campbell (John) - Past, Space and Self 11%
Campbell (John) Sortals and the Binding Problem Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract MacBride - Identity and Modality, 2006, Chapter 9 No
Campbell (John) The Reductionist View of the Self Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Campbell - Past, Space and Self, Chapter 5 Yes
Campbell (Joseph Keim), O'Rourke (Michael) & Silverstein (Harry S.) Time and Identity Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Campbell (Joseph Keim), O'Rourke (Michael) & Silverstein (Harry S.) - Time and Identity 10%
Campbell (Scott) Animals, Babies, and Subjects Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Southern Journal of Philosophy, Summer 2001; 39(2): 157-167 No
Campbell (Scott) Can You Survive a Brain-Zap Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Abstract Written)
Theoria, 2004; 70(1): 22-27 Yes
Campbell (Scott) Persons and Substances Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 104, Number 3, June 2001, pp. 253-267(15). No
Candlish (Stewart) Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Mind, Vol. 85, No. 337 (Jan., 1976), pp. 145-149 Yes
Carrithers (Michael), Collins (Steven) & Lukes (Steven) The Category of the Person: Anthropology, philosophy, history Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carrithers (Michael), Collins (Steven) & Lukes (Steven) - The Category of the Person: Anthropology, philosophy, history No
Carruthers (Peter) After-Life for Physicalists Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carruthers - The Nature of the Mind, 2004, Chapter 6 Yes
Carruthers (Peter) The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Carruthers (Peter) The Nature of the Mind: Identity and the Soul Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carruthers - The Nature of the Mind, 2004, Chapter 3 Yes
Carter (William) Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61.3 (September 1983) Yes
Carter (William) Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind, 96, No. 382, Apr., 1987, pp. 250-255 No
Carter (William) Death and Bodily Transfiguration Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Mind, 1984, 412-418 Yes
Carter (William) Dion's Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy) Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75, No. 2 (Jun. 1997), 371-379 Yes
Carter (William) Do Zygotes Become People? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Mind, 91.361 (Jan. 1982), pp. 77-95 Yes
Carter (William) How to Change Your Mind Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 1989, pp. 1-14 Yes
Carter (William) In Defense of Undetached Parts Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 1983, 126-143 Yes
Carter (William) On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 41: 213-230, 1982 No
Carter (William) Once and Future Persons Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, 17, Jan. 1980, pp. 61-66 No
Carter (William) Our Bodies, Our Selves Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66 No. 3,1988, 308-319 Yes
Carter (William) Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Carter - The Elements of Metaphysics, 1990, Chapter 7 No
Carter (William) The Elements of Metaphysics Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) High Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Carter (William) Will I Be a Dead Person? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p167, 5p; Yes
Cartwright (Helen Morris) On Two Arguments for the Indeterminacy of Personal Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Synthese 95, 1993, 241-273 No
Cartwright (Richard) Scattered Objects Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Lehrer - Analysis and Metaphysics, 1975 Yes
Cassam (Quassim) Kant and Reductionism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Review of Metaphysics 43 (Sept. 1989), pp. 72-106 Yes
Cassam (Quassim) Parfit on Persons Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 17-37, 1992 Yes
Cassam (Quassim) Reductionism and First-Person Thinking Paper - Cited Reduction, Explanation, and Realism , ed. David Charles and Kathleen Lennon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 362-380. Yes
Cassam (Quassim) Self and World Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Cassam (Quassim) - Self and World No
Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Cerullo (Michael A.) Uploading and Branching Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Minds & Machines (2015) 25:17–36 78%
Chalmers (David) The Matrix as Metaphysics Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Mostly Author's Text)
Grau - Philosophers Explore "The Matrix", 2005 Yes
Chalmers (David), Manley (David) & Wasserman (Ryan) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
Chappell (Vere), Ed. Locke: Oxford Readings in Philosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 8%
Chisholm (Roderick) Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Chisholm - On Metaphysics, Chapter 3 Yes
Chisholm (Roderick) On Metaphysics Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 10%
Chisholm (Roderick) On the Simplicity of the Soul Paper - Cited Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 167-181 No
Chisholm (Roderick) Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Van Inwagen & Zimmerman - Metaphysics: The Big Questions Yes
Chitty (Andrew) First Person Plural Ontology and Praxis Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 97 (1997), pp. 81-96 20%
Chopra (Deepak) & Hameroff (Stuart) Can science explain the soul? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract San Francisco Chronicle, Website - 9th August 2010 No
Churchland (Patricia) Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy Yes
Churchland (Patricia) Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Churchland (Patricia) - Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain Yes
Churchland (Patricia) Self and Self-Knowledge Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy, Chapter 3 Yes
Cockburn (David) The Mind, the Brain and the Face Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 234 (Oct., 1985), pp. 477-493 No
Cockburn (David), Ed. Human Beings Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Cockburn (David), Ed. - Human Beings 11%
Cohnitz (Daniel) Personal Identity and the Methodology of Imaginary Cases Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003 Yes
Coope (Ursula) Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14 Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Coope (Ursula) - Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14 2%
Cooper (John) Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate 62%
Corcoran (Kevin) Persons, Bodies and the Constitution Relation Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Southern Journal of Philosophy 37:1, 1999, pp. 1-20 No
Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons 18%
Crabbe (James), Ed. From Soul to Self Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Crabbe (James), Ed. - From Soul to Self 2%
Crane (Tim) Substance (4-Lecture BA Course) Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Tim Crane's Home Page, 2005 Yes
Crane (Tim) & Farkas (Katalin) Identity: Introduction Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Crane and Farkas - Metaphysics - a guide and anthology, 2004, pp. 527-536 Yes
Cushing (Simon) Fred Feldman: Confrontations with the Reaper Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Personal Web-page, University of Michigan Yes
Dainton (Barry) Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind 107/427 (July 1998), pp. 679-682 Yes
Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. Reading Parfit Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. - Reading Parfit 23%
Day (Allan) & Martin (L. Michael) Debate: Is It Rational for Christians to Believe in the Resurrection? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 Yes
De Waal (Frans) The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist Book - Cited High Quality Abstract De Waal (Frans) - The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural Reflections of a Primatologist 21%
DeGrazia (David) Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Forum; Winter2002, Vol. 33 Issue 1, p101, 20p Yes
DeGrazia (David) Great Apes, Dolphins, and the Concept of Personhood Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Southern Journal of Philosophy Fall 97; 35(3): 301-320 Yes
DeGrazia (David) Human Identity and Bioethics Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics 10%
DeGrazia (David) Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract DeGrazia (David) - Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status No
DeMyer (William) Neuroanatomy Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract DeMyer (William) - Neuroanatomy 1%
Denkel (Arda) Theon’s Tale: Does a Cambridge Change Result in a Substantial Change? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis 55.3, July 1995, pp. 166–170 No
Dennett (Daniel) Brainchildren - Essays on Designing Minds Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 1%
Dennett (Daniel) Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 43%
Dennett (Daniel) Conditions of Personhood Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Dennett - Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Chapter 14 Yes
Dennett (Daniel) Consciousness Explained Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 3%
Dennett (Daniel) The Reality of Selves Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991, Chapter 13 No
Dennett (Daniel) The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity Paper - Cited F. Kessel, P. Cole and D. Johnson, eds, Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992. Yes
Dennett (Daniel) Where Am I? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Dennett - Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Chapter 17 Yes
Deutsch (Harry) Relative Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2002-7 7%
Doepke (Frederick) Introduction: What Are We? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Started)
Doepke - The Kinds of Things, Chapter 1 14%
Doepke (Frederick) The Constitution Relation Paper - Cited Doepke - The Kinds of Things, Chapter 7 No
Doepke (Frederick) The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Doepke (Frederick) - The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument 4%
Doepke (Frederick) What We Are Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Started)
Doepke - The Kinds of Things, Chapter 9 No
Donnelly (John) Death and Ivan Ilych Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Donnelly (John) - Language, Metaphysics and Death: A Metaphysical Reader (First Edition) 67%
Dorr (Cian) Merricks on the Existence of Human Organisms Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(3): 711-718 17%
Dowe (Phil) The Case for Time Travel Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 293 (Jul., 2000), pp. 441-451 22%
Dummett (Michael) Frege, Philosophy of Language Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Dummett (Michael) Identity Paper - Cited Dummett - Frege, Philosophy of Language, Chapter 16 No
Dunne (John S.) City of the Gods: A Study in Myth and Mortality Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Dunne (John S.) - City of the Gods: A Study in Myth and Mortality 20%
Edwards (Paul) Reincarnation: A Critical Examination Book - Cited Edwards (Paul) - Reincarnation: A Critical Examination Yes
Edwards (Paul), Ed. Immortality Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Edwards (Paul), Ed. - Immortality 6%
Ehring (Douglas) Personal Identity and Time Travel Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Abstract Written)
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433 Yes
Ehring (Douglas) Survival and Trivial Facts Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis, vol. 47, 1987, pp. 50-54 No
Elder (Crawford) Real Natures and Familiar Objects Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Elder (Crawford) - Real Natures and Familiar Objects No
Elder (Crawford) Real Natures and Familiar Objects: Synopsis Paper - Cited Website 12%
Elliot (Robert) How to Travel Faster than Light Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis 41.1,January 1981, pp. 4-6 No
Ellis (Brian) Australasian Journal of Philosophy - 61.3 (September 1983) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 83%
Ereshefsky (Marc) Bridging the Gap between Human Kinds and Biological Kinds Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophy of Science 71 Dec2004, Issue 5, p912-921, 10p No
Feinberg (Joel) Harm to Others Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Fischer - The Metaphysics of Death 8%
Feinberg (Todd) Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Feinberg (Todd) - Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self No
Feldman (Fred) Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Feldman (Fred) - Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death Yes
Feldman (Fred) Sortal Predicates Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Nous, 7.3, Sept. 1973, pp. 268-282 38%
Fenwick (Peter) & Fenwick (Elizabeth) The Truth in the Light: An Investigation of Over 300 Near-Death Experiences Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Fenwick (Peter) & Fenwick (Elizabeth) - The Truth in the Light: An Investigation of Over 300 Near-Death Experiences Yes
Fetzer (James) The Evolution of Intelligence: Are Humans the Only Animals with Minds? Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fetzer (James) - The Evolution of Intelligence: Are Humans the Only Animals with Minds? 3%
Fine (Kit) A Counter-Example To Locke's Thesis Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Monist, Jul2000, Vol. 83 Issue 3, p357, 5p Yes
Fine (Kit) The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Mind - 112/446 (April 2003) Yes
Fischer (John Martin) & Speak (Daniel) Death and the Psychological Conception of Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 2000, Vol. XXIV Issue 1, p84, 10p; Yes
Fischer (John Martin), Ed. The Metaphysics of Death Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Fischer (John Martin), Ed. - The Metaphysics of Death 6%
Flew (Anthony) Merely Mortal? Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Flew (Anthony) - Merely Mortal? 3%
Flew (Anthony) Three Ways to Survival Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Flew - Merely Mortal? 2000, Chapter 1 No
Flew (Anthony), Ed. Body, Mind and Death Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Flew (Anthony), Ed. - Body, Mind and Death No
Flint (Thomas P.) & Rea (Michael) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 3%
Ford (Norman) When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ford (Norman) - When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science 4%
Forrest (Peter) Endurance and Fatalism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Metaphysica 7.2 (2006), pp. 73-82 No
Forrester (Mary) Persons, Animals, and Fetuses: An Essay in Practical Ethics Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Forrester (Mary) - Persons, Animals, and Fetuses: An Essay in Practical Ethics 7%
Francescotti (Robert) Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Explorations, Mar2005, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p69-81, 13p Yes
Frankfurt (Harry) Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind Yes
French (Peter) & Wettstein (Howard), Eds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XXIII) - New Directions in Philosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 9%
French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard) Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol IV, 1979) - Metaphysics Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 1%
Fricker (Miranda) & Hornsby (Jennifer), Eds. The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
Funkhouser (Eric) Metaphysics, Spring 2014 Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014 64%
Gale (Richard) On Some Pernicious Thought-Experiments Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Ed. Tamara Horowitz & Gerald J. Massey, 1991 Yes
Gallagher (Shaun) & Shear (Jonathan), Eds. Models of the Self Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Gallagher (Shaun) & Shear (Jonathan), Eds. - Models of the Self 3%
Gallois (Andre) Occasions of Identity : a Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Gallois (Andre) - Occasions of Identity : a Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness No
Gallup (Gordon G.) Animal Minds: Review Paper - Cited The Quarterly Review of Biology, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), p. 462 Yes
Gallup (Gordon G.) Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Science, New Series, Vol. 167, No. 3914 (Jan. 2, 1970), pp. 86-87 Yes
Gallup (Gordon G.) Levels, Limits, and Precursors to Self-Recognition: Does Ontogeny Recapitulate Phylogeny? Paper - Cited Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1992) (pp. 117-118) Yes
Gallup (Gordon G.) Self-Awareness in Primates: The sense of identity distinguishes man from most but perhaps not all other forms of life Paper - Cited American Scientist, Vol. 67, No. 4 (July-August 1979), pp. 417-421 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Animalism and Reductionism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 2 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Fission Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 4 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Identity and Vagueness Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 5 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Parfit and 'What Matters' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 6 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Garrett, Brian (1998, 2004). Personal identity. Retrieved December 22, 2005 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Personal Identity and Reductionism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51, No. 2, Jun., 1991, pp. 361-373 Yes
Garrett (Brian) Personal Identity and Self-consciousness Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness Yes
Garrett (Brian) Persons Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Garrett, Brian (1998). Persons. Yes
Garrett (Brian) Some Thoughts on Animalism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003 Yes
Garrett (Brian) The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" Yes
Garrett (Brian) Vagueness and Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jun., 1988), pp. 130-134 No
Gasser (Georg), Ed. Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 95%
Geach (Peter) God and the Soul (Analytical ToC) Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Geach (Peter) - God and the Soul, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, pp. vii - xx Yes
Geach (Peter) Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Munitz - Logic and Ontology, 1973, pp. 287-302 No
Gendler (Tamar Szabo) Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology' Paper - Cited Philosophical Review 108, No. 1 (Jan 1999, 112-115). Yes
Ghiselin (Michael) Metaphysics and the Origin of Species Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ghiselin (Michael) - Metaphysics and the Origin of Species 2%
Gibbard (Allan) Contingent Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Rea - Material Constitution - A Reader Yes
Gilbert (Scott) Developmental Biology Book - Cited Gilbert (Scott) - Developmental Biology No
Gill (Christopher) The Person and the Human Mind: issues in ancient and modern philosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 5%
Gillman (Neil) The Death Of Death: Resurrection and Immortality in Jewish Thought Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Gillman (Neil) - The Death Of Death: Resurrection and Immortality in Jewish Thought 3%
Gilmore (Cody) Time Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3 No
Godelek (Kamuran) Review of Thomas Metzinger's 'The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Metapsychology Online Reviews, Oct 6th 2009 (Volume 13, Issue 41) Yes
Goodenough (Jerry) The Achievement of Personhood Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Ratio 10.2, Sep1997, p141, 16p No
Graham (George) & Stephens (G. Lynn) Philosophical Psychopathology Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Graham (George) & Stephens (G. Lynn) - Philosophical Psychopathology 1%
Graham (Gordon) Review of David Cockburn's 'Human Beings' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy - 67/262 (October 1992) No
Grau (Christopher) Philosophers Explore 'The Matrix' Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 12%
Grayling (Anthony), Ed. Philosophy 1 - A Guide Through the Subject Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 27%
Green (James W.) Beyond the Good Death: The Anthropology of Modern Dying Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Green (James W.) - Beyond the Good Death: The Anthropology of Modern Dying 6%
Green (Michael) & Wikler (Daniel) Brain Death and Personal Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1980, 105-133 Yes
Grey (William) Troubles with Time Travel Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy, Jan 1999; 74(287): 55-70 Yes
Griffin (Donald) Animal Minds Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Griffin (Donald) - Animal Minds 2%
Griffin (Nicholas) Criteria Of Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Griffin - Relative Identity, 1977, Chapter 4 No
Griffin (Nicholas) Relative Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Griffin (Nicholas) - Relative Identity No
Griffin (Nicholas) Sortals Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Griffin - Relative Identity, 1977, Chapter 3 No
Grossman (Lev), Kurzweil (Ray) 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal Paper - Cited Time Magazine, February 21, 2011 Yes
Grover (Dorothy) Posthumous Harm Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 156 (Jul., 1989), pp. 334-353 11%
Hale (Bob) & Wright (Crispin), Eds. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 4%
Harre (Rom) Persons and Selves Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Peacocke & Gillett - Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry, 1987, Chapter 6 40%
Harris (Henry) An Experimentalist Looks at Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Harris - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford No
Harris (Henry) Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Harris (Henry) - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford No
Harris (John) The Survival Lottery Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy, Vol. 50, No. 191 (Jan., 1975), pp. 81-87 No
Hartl (Daniel L.) Our Uncertain Heritage: Genetics & Human Diversity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hartl (Daniel L.) - Our Uncertain Heritage: Genetics & Human Diversity 4%
Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. Persistence : Contemporary Readings Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings 45%
Hawley (Katherine) David Lewis on Persistence Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract St. Andrews' Website; forthcoming for Blackwell Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer 44%
Hawley (Katherine) Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming, issue dated November 2005) Yes
Hawley (Katherine) How Things Persist Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist 8%
Hawley (Katherine) Parts and Stages Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hawley - How Things Persist, Chapter 2 No
Hawley (Katherine) Persistence and Time Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Luper - The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, 2014, Chapter 3 13%
Hawley (Katherine) Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84.4 (December 2006), 481-93 Yes
Hawley (Katherine) & Bird (Alexander) What are Natural Kinds? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract St. Andrews' Website; Philosophical Perspectives 25.1 (2011), 205-221. 17%
Hawthorne (John) Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract M. J. Loux and D.W. Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (OUP, 2003) 11%
Hawthorne (John) Three-Dimensionalism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hawthorne - Metaphysical Essays, 2006, Chapter 5, pp. 85-109 No
Hazlett (Allan) Disassembly and Destruction Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 418-433 Yes
Heck (Richard) Is Indeterminate Identity Coherent Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Website No
Heller (Mark) The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Heller (Mark) - The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter 6%
Hershenov (David) Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy - 79, Jul2004, Issue 309, p447-474, 28p; Yes
Hershenov (David) Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind, 114, Number 453, 1 January 2005, pp. 31-59(29). Yes
Hershenov (David) Olson's Embryo Problem Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80, Number 4, December 01, 2002, pp. 502-511(10) No
Hershenov (David) The Death of a Person Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Apr. 2006, 31.2, pp. 107-120 No
Hershenov (David) The Problematic Role of ‘Irreversibility’ in the Definition of Death Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bioethics, 17.1, Feb2003, pp. 89-100, 12p No
Hershenov (David) Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Religious Studies, 38 pp. 1-19 (December 2002) 17%
Hetherington (Stephen) Deathly Harm Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 349-362 8%
Heyd (David) Human Nature: An Oxymoron? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Apr. 2003, 28.2, pp. 151-169 No
Hick (John) Death and Eternal Life Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hick (John) - Death and Eternal Life 1%
Hilgard (Ernest R.) Dissociative Phenomena and the Hidden Observer Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Kolak & Martin - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues No
Hill (Claire Ortiz) Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics: On the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics: On the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy No
Hinton (J.M.) Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy, Vol. 50, No. 192 (Apr., 1975), pp. 246-248 Yes
Hirsch (Eli) Divided Minds Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Review 100, 1991 No
Hirsch (Eli) Natural Kinds and Natural Units Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hirsch - The Concept of Identity, 1982, Chapter 9 Yes
Hirsch (Eli) The Concept of Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity Yes
Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) Are Souls Unintelligible? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 183-212 No
Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) On the Unity of the Parts of Organisms Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hoffman & Rosenkrantz - Substance: Its Nature and Existence, Chapter 4 No
Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) Substance: Its Nature and Existence Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Substance: Its Nature and Existence No
Hoose (Bernard), Ed. Christian Ethics: An Introduction Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
Hornsby (Jennifer) Mind, Causation and Explanation - Introduction: Personal and Subpersonal Levels Paper - Cited Hornsby - Simple Mindedness Yes
Hornsby (Jennifer) Ontological Questions - Introduction: Persons and Their States, and Events Paper - Cited Hornsby - Simple Mindedness Yes
Hornsby (Jennifer) Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Horowitz (Tamara) & Massey (Gerald J.) Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 4%
Horwich (Paul) On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 14, Time, Cause, and Evidence (Aug. 14, 1975), pp. 432-444 No
Hossack (Keith) Vagueness and Personal Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract MacBride - Identity and Modality, 2006, Chapter 10 Yes
Hudson (Hud) A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person 3%
Hudson (Hud) I am Not an Animal! Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons: Human and Divine 17%
Hudson (Hud) Multiple Location and Single Location Resurrection Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010 Yes
Hudson (Hud) Nothing But Dust and Ashes Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, 2001, Chapter 7 No
Hudson (Hud) Temporal Parts and Moral Personhood Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 93, 1999, pp. 299-316 No
Hudson (Hud) The Criterion of Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, 2001, Chapter 4 No
Hudson (Hud) The Metaphysics of Hyperspace Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hudson (Hud) - The Metaphysics of Hyperspace 10%
Hughes (Christopher) Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hughes (Christopher) - Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity No
Humphrey (Nicholas) & Dennett (Daniel) Speaking for Our Selves: An Assessment of Multiple Personality Paper - Cited Dennett - Brainchildren - Essays on Designing Minds No
Hurley (Susan) & Nudds (Matthew) Rational Animals? Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Hurley (Susan) & Nudds (Matthew) - Rational Animals? 6%
Ishiguro (Hide) The Primitiveness of the Concept of a Person Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophical Subjects, Van Straaten, Zak (ed), pp. 62-75 25%
James (Susan) Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Fricker & Hornsby - The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy Yes
JCS Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Issue 05-06 (2007) Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract JCS - Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Issue 05-06 (2007) No
Jenkins (Phil) Review of Galen Strawson's 'Selves' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Metapsychology Online Reviews - Volume 14, Number 09, 2010 Yes
Johansson (Jens) What is Animalism? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ratio, Volume 20, Issue 2, June 2007, pp. 194–205 Yes
Johnston (Mark) Human Beings Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83 Yes
Johnston (Mark) 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Mostly Author's Text)
Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3 75%
Johnston (Mark) Surviving Death Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death 20%
Johnstone (Henry) Persons and Selves Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28.2 (Dec 1967), 205-212 No
Jolley (Nicholas) Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Jolley - Locke: His Philosophical Thought, OUP, 1999 Yes
Jones (Nicholas K.) Too Many Cats: The Problem of the Many and the Metaphysics of Vagueness Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ph.D. Dissertation, Birkbeck College, University of London, 2010 No
Jubien (Michael) Contemporary Metaphysics Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 37%
Jubien (Michael) Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Mostly Author's Text)
Jubien - Contemporary Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 4 Yes
Jubien (Michael) Things and Their Parts Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Jubien - Contemporary Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 9 Yes
Kagan (Shelly) Death Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Kagan (Shelly) - Death Yes
Kaku (Michio) The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest To Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Kaku (Michio) - The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest To Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind Yes
Kamm (F.M.) Morality, Mortality (Vol. 1) - Death and Whom to Save from It Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Kamm (F.M.) - Morality, Mortality (Vol. 1) - Death and Whom to Save from It 0%
Kamm (F.M.) Why Is Death Bad? Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Kamm - Morality, Mortality (Vol. 1) - Death and Whom to Save from It, Chapter 1 17%
Keefe (Rosanna) Contingent Identity and Vague Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis 55.3, 1995, 183-190 No
Kerr (Fergus) Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Kerr (Fergus) - Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity 1%
Kitcher (Patricia) Natural Kinds and Unnatural Persons Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy - 54:541-547 (1979) No
Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 351-370 11%
Kolak (Daniel) & Martin (Raymond), Eds. Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Kolak (Daniel) & Martin (Raymond), Eds. - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues No
Korsgaard (Christine) Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Korsgaard (Christine) - Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity 5%
Kripke (Saul) Naming and Necessity Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity Yes
Lakoff (George) & Johnson (Mark) Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Lakoff (George) & Johnson (Mark) - Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought No
Lamb (David) Diagnosing Death Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1978, 144-153 Yes
LaPorte (Joseph) Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
LaPorte (Joseph) Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change: Introduction Paper - Cited LaPorte - Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change, Introduction No
Larkin (William S.) Persons, Animals, and Bodies Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Southwest Philosophy Review Vol. 20, No. 2, July 2004 25%
Le Fanu (James) Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Le Fanu (James) - Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves Yes
Leiber (Justin) Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : A Dialogue Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Leiber (Justin) - Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? : A Dialogue No
LePoidevin (Robin) Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract LePoidevin (Robin) - Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time 38%
LePoidevin (Robin) & MacBeath (Murray), Eds. The Philosophy of Time: Oxford Readings in Philosophy Book - Cited LePoidevin (Robin) & MacBeath (Murray), Eds. - The Philosophy of Time: Oxford Readings in Philosophy 9%
Lerner (Berel Dov) Review of 'Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction' by David Shoemaker Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Metapsychology On-Line, Jun 16th 2009 (Volume 13, Issue 25 Yes
Levenbook (Barbara Baum) Harming Someone after His Death Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 3 (Apr., 1984), pp. 407-419 8%
Levenbook (Barbara Baum) Harming the Dead, Once Again Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Ethics, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 162-1643 No
Levenbook (Barbara Baum) The Retroactivity Problem Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Campbell, O'Rourke & Silverstein - Time and Identity, IV - Death, Chapter 15 25%
Lewis (David) Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 1: Ontology, Chapter 4 Yes
Lewis (David) On the Plurality of Worlds Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds 4%
Lewis (David) On the Plurality of Worlds (Selections) Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings Yes
Lewis (David) Philosophical Papers Volume I Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Lewis (David) Philosophical Papers Volume II Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 22%
Lewis (David) Survival and Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 1: Ontology, Chapter 5 Yes
Lewis (David) The Paradoxes of Time Travel Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume II, Part 4: Counterfactuals and Time, Chapter 18 25%
Liao (S. Matthew) The Organism View Defended Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 334-350 Yes
Lizza (John) Multiple Personality and Personal Identity Revisited Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 2, Jun., 1993, pp. 263-274 No
Lizza (John) Persons, Humanity, & the Definition of Death Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lizza (John) - Persons, Humanity, & the Definition of Death 4%
Locke (John) Of Identity and Diversity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Locke - Essay, Book 2, Chapter 27 Yes
Locke (John), A.M. Locke on the Human Understanding Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 5%
Lockwood (Michael) When Does a Life Begin? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Mostly Author's Text)
Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 Yes
Lockwood (Michael), Ed. Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 43%
Long (Douglas) The Bodies of Persons Paper - Cited Journal of Philosophy 71, No. 10 (May 30, 1974), 291-301 Yes
Longuenesse (Beatrice) Kant on the identity of persons Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 22 January 2007, draft Yes
Loux (Michael) Endurantism and Perdurantism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Loux - Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings No
Loux (Michael), Ed. Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) High Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 16%
Lowe (E.J.) A Survey of Metaphysics Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Lowe (E.J.) Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the ‘Standard Account’ Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis 55.3, July 1995, pp. 171-178 17%
Lowe (E.J.) Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Corcoran - Soul, Body and Survival, Chapter 9 No
Lowe (E.J.) Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms No
Lowe (E.J.) Locke on Human Understanding Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 30%
Lowe (E.J.) Locke: Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Lowe - Locke on Human Understandingn Chapter 5 Yes
Lowe (E.J.) Necessity and Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics, Chapter 5 No
Lowe (E.J.) Objects and Criteria of Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Hale & Wright - A Companion to the Philosophy of Language 67%
Lowe (E.J.) Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Cockburn - Human Beings No
Lowe (E.J.) Sortal Terms and Criteria of Identity Paper - Cited Lowe - Kinds of Being, 1989, Chapter 2 No
Lowe (E.J.) Subjects of Experience Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 5%
Lowe (E.J.) Substance and Selfhood Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Lowe - Subjects of Experience, Chapter 2 9%
Lowe (E.J.) Substance, Identity and Time Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 62, 1988, pp. 61-78 No
Lowe (E.J.) The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Lowe (E.J.) - The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time No
Lowe (E.J.) Vagueness and Endurance Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis 65.2, April 2005, pp. 104-112(9) No
Lowe (E.J.) What Is a Criterion Of Identity? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly 39.154, Jan. 1989, pp. 1-21 17%
Ludwig (Arnold) How do we Know who we are? A Biography of the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ludwig (Arnold) - How do we Know who we are? A Biography of the Self 5%
Luper (Steven) Annihilation Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1985) 233-252 17%
Luper (Steven) Death Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2002-09 3%
Luper (Steven) Mortal Harm Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 227 (Apr., 2007), pp. 239-251 25%
Luper (Steven) Past Desires and the Dead Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies; Dec. 2005, Vol. 126 Issue 3, p331-345, 15p 25%
Luper (Steven) Posthumous Harm Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan., 2004), pp. 63-72 11%
Luper (Steven), Ed. The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 5%
Luper-Foy (Steven) Annihilation Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Fischer - The Metaphysics of Death 14%
Lurz (Robert) Animal Minds Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, April 2009 Yes
MacBride (Fraser), Ed. Identity and Modality Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract MacBride (Fraser), Ed. - Identity and Modality 7%
MacDonald (Graham) Perception & Identity - Essays Presented to A J Ayer with His Replies Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
Mackie (David) Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 49, Number 196, July 1999, pp. 369-376(8). Yes
Mackie (David) Going Topless Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Ratio 11.2, Sep1998, p125, 16p Yes
Mackie (David) Personal Identity and Dead People Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 95, Number 3, September 1999, pp. 219-242(24). Yes
Mackie (J.L.) Identity and Diversity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 5 No
Mackie (J.L.) Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 6 No
Mackie (J.L.) Problems from Locke Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
Mackie (Penelope) Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly 44.176, July 1994, pp. 311-333 7%
Madell (Geoffrey) The Identity of the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Madell (Geoffrey) - The Identity of the Self No
Manninen (Tuomas) Review of Alva Noe's 'Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Metapsychology Online Reviews, Sep 15th 2009 (Volume 13, Issue 38) Yes
Margolis (Joseph) Persons and Minds: Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Margolis (Joseph) - Persons and Minds: Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism No
Margolis (Joseph) Persons: Notes on Their Nature, Identity and Rationality Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1980, 463-472 No
Markosian (Ned) Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil) Yes
Markosian (Ned) Time Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2002-14 Yes
Marks (Charles) Commissurotomy, Consciousness and Unity of Mind Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Marks (Charles) - Commissurotomy, Consciousness and Unity of Mind Yes
Marquis (Don) Harming the Dead Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Ethics, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 159-161 No
Marshall (Richard) Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 97%
Marshall (Richard) & Callender (Craig) Craig Callender: Time Lord Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers Yes
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers Yes
Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death 15%
Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed. Mind - 112/446 (April 2003) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 50%
Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed. Mind - 114/453 (January 2005) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 11%
Martin (Raymond) Fission Rejuvenated Paper - Cited Martin & Barresi - Personal Identity, Chapter 8 No
Martin (Raymond) Identity, Transformation, and What Matters in Survival Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Kolak & Martin - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues No
Martin (Raymond) Memory, Connecting and What Matters In Survival Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65.1, March 1987, pp. 82-97 No
Martin (Raymond) Review of Paul Edwards. Reincarnation: A Critical Examination Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Religious Studies, 33, Issue 03, September 1997, pp 349-352 No
Martin (Raymond) Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Martin (Raymond) - Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival Yes
Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. Personal Identity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. - Personal Identity 20%
Matthews (Gareth B.) Surviving As Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Analysis 38, 1977, pp. 53-58 No
McCall (Catherine) Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self and Human Being Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract McCall (Catherine) - Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self and Human Being 2%
McDaniel (Kris) Composition as Identity Does Not Entail Universalism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 73, No. 1 (July 2010), pp. 97-100 17%
McGill (V.J.) Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Jun., 1975), pp. 577-578 Yes
McGinn (Colin) Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract McGinn - Logical Properties, 2000, Chapter 1 Yes
McGinn (Colin) Logical Properties Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 11%
McGinn (Colin) The Character of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
McGinn (Colin) The Self Paper - Cited McGinn - The Character of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 21%
McGrath (Matthew) Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3 No
McInerney (Peter K.) Conceptions of Persons and Persons through Time Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 121-133 No
McMahan (Jeff) The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract McMahan (Jeff) - The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life No
Melia (Joseph) Introduction to Modality Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Melia - Modality, 2003, Chapter 1 Yes
Melia (Joseph) Modality Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
Mellor (D.H.) Natural Kinds Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 28, No. 4, Dec., 1977, pp. 299-312 No
Mellor (D.H.) Real Time Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time 16%
Mellor (D.H.) Real Time II Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II 33%
Merricks (Trenton) Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Mind - 107/425 (January 1998) Yes
Merricks (Trenton) Considerations in Favour of Eliminating Us? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Merricks - Objects and Persons, 2001, Chapter 5 8%
Merricks (Trenton) Considerations in Favour of Eliminativism Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Merricks - Objects and Persons, 2001, Chapter 2 7%
Merricks (Trenton) Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Dec99, Vol. 59 Issue 4, p983, 15p; No
Merricks (Trenton) Fission and Personal Identity Over Time Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 88, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 163-186(24). No
Merricks (Trenton) Objects & Persons: Preface Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Merricks - Objects and Persons, 2001, Preface Yes
Merricks (Trenton) Objects and Persons Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons 10%
Merricks (Trenton) The Resurrection of the Body Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Flint (Thomas P.) & Rea (Michael) - The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology 25%
Metzinger (Thomas) Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Metzinger (Thomas) - Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity 1%
Metzinger (Thomas) The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Metzinger (Thomas) - The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self 2%
Midgley (Mary) Persons and Non-Persons Paper - Cited Singer - In Defence of Animals (1st Edition), 1985 Yes
Miller (Kristie) Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 2006), pp. 309-334 29%
Mitchell (Robert) Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood Paper - Cited Cavalieri & Singer - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity No
Moran (Alexander P.) Animalism and the Thinking Parts Problem Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Personal website. 17%
Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) Body & Soul - Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) - Body & Soul - Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics 16%
Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) Human Persons as Substances or Property-Things Paper - Cited Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul - Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics, Chapter 2 Yes
Morison (Frank) Who Moved the Stone? Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Morison (Frank) - Who Moved the Stone? 12%
Morris (Thomas) Understanding Identity Statements Book - Cited Morris (Thomas) - Understanding Identity Statements No
Mulgan (Tim) Critical Notice of Jeff McMahan's The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sep2004, Vol. 34 Issue 3, p443-459, 17p Yes
Munitz (Milton) Identity and Individuation Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Munitz (Milton) - Identity and Individuation No
Murphy (Nancey) Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Murphy (Nancey) - Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? 18%
Murphy (Nancey) I Cerebrate Myself: Is there a little man inside your brain? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Books and Culture 5/1 (Jan-Feb 1999), p. 24 Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Birth, Death, and the Meaning of Life Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Nagel (Thomas) - A View from Nowhere, Chapter 11 Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Nagel (Thomas) - Mortal Questions Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Death Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Nagel (Thomas) - Mortal Questions Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Mind and Body Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Nagel (Thomas) - A View from Nowhere, Chapter 3 Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Mortal Questions Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Nagel (Thomas) Subjective and Objective Paper - Cited Nagel (Thomas) - Mortal Questions Yes
Nagel (Thomas) The Objective Self Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Nagel (Thomas) - A View from Nowhere, Chapter 4 Yes
Nagel (Thomas) The View from Nowhere Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Noe (Alva) Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Noe (Alva) - Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness 23%
Noonan (Harold) Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, 1998, Vol. 48 Issue 192, p302, 17p; Yes
Noonan (Harold) Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, 2001, Vol. 51 Issue 202, p83, 8p Yes
Noonan (Harold) Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies' Paper - Cited Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" Yes
Noonan (Harold) Constitution Is Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Mind, 102.405 (Jan. 1993), 133-146 Yes
Noonan (Harold) Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 271-288, 1999 Yes
Noonan (Harold) Locke Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 2 Yes
Noonan (Harold) Objects and Identity: An Examination of Relative Identity and its Consequences Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Noonan (Harold) - Objects and Identity: An Examination of Relative Identity and its Consequences 9%
Noonan (Harold) Parfit and What Matters in Survival Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 9 Yes
Noonan (Harold) Personal Identity Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity Yes
Noonan (Harold) Persons, Animals and Human Beings Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 11 Yes
Noonan (Harold) Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010) Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Campbell, O'Rourke & Silverstein - Time and Identity, III - The Self, Chapter 9 10%
Noonan (Harold) Relative Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Hale & Wright - A Companion to the Philosophy of Language 67%
Noonan (Harold) Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 256 (Apr., 1991), pp. 248-249 Yes
Noonan (Harold) Substance, Identity and Time Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society Vol. 62, 1988, 79-100 No
Noonan (Harold) The Reduplication Problem Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 7 Yes
Noonan (Harold) The Self and the Future Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 10 Yes
Noonan (Harold), Ed. Identity Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Identity 2%
Noonan (Harold), Ed. Personal Identity (Readings) Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Personal Identity (Readings) No
Northoff (G.) Do Brain Tissue Transplants Alter Personal Identity? Inadequacies of Some 'Standard' Arguments Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 1996) (pp. 174-180) No
Nussbaum (Martha) & Sunstein (Cass), Eds. Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Nussbaum (Martha) & Sunstein (Cass), Eds. - Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning 1%
Odegard (Douglas) Personal and Bodily Identity Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, 1969, 69-71 Yes
Oderberg (David) Johnston on Human Beings Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy, 86.3, Mar., 1989, pp. 137-141 Yes
Oderberg (David) The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time 4%
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. Philosophy - 74/287 (January 1999) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 9%
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. Philosophy - 75/293 (July 2000) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 2%
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. Philosophy - 79/309 (July 2004) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 24%
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. Philosophy - 81/316 (April 2006) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 18%
Olding (A.) Resurrection Bodies and Resurrection Worlds Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind, Vol. 79, No. 316 (Oct., 1970), pp. 581-585 No
Olson (Eric) An Argument for Animalism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Martin & Barresi - Personal Identity, Chapter 12 Yes
Olson (Eric) Animalism and the Corpse Problem Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82, No. 2, pp. 265-274; June 2004 Yes
Olson (Eric) Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
J. Fonseca and J. Gonçalves, eds., Philosophical Perspectives on the Self, Peter Lang 2015: 21-40 Yes
Olson (Eric) Dion's Foot Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy 94, No. 5 (May, 1997), 260-265 Yes
Olson (Eric) Human Atoms Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, No 3, pp. 396--406; September 1998 33%
Olson (Eric) Human People Or Human Animals Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 80:159-181, 1995 Yes
Olson (Eric) Immanent Causation and Life After Death Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Abstract Written)
Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010 Yes
Olson (Eric) Imperfect Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106, Number 2, March 2006, pp. 247-264(18) Yes
Olson (Eric) Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, Number 2, June 1994, pp. 173-186(14). Yes
Olson (Eric) Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 19, 2015: 409-423 Yes
Olson (Eric) Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Number 210, January 2003, pp. 92-95(4) No
Olson (Eric) Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly 51, No. 204, July 2001 Yes
Olson (Eric) Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 17%
Olson (Eric) Persistence Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 2, pp. 22-41 Yes
Olson (Eric) Personal Identity Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Stich & Warfield - Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2003 Yes
Olson (Eric) Personal Identity (Stanford, 2010) Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2002-10 10%
Olson (Eric) Personal Identity and the Radiation Argument Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Analysis 61, January 2001, pp. 38-44(7). Yes
Olson (Eric) Precis of 'The Human Animal' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract
(Write-Up Complete)
Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil) Yes
Olson (Eric) Relativism and Persistence Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 88, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 141-162(22) Yes
Olson (Eric) Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p161, 6p; Yes
Olson (Eric) Review of Hud Hudson's 'A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person' Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Yes
Olson (Eric) Review of Jack Wilson's 'Biological Individuality: The Identity and Persistence of Living Entities' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, 2001, Vol. 51 Issue 203, p264-6 No
Olson (Eric) Review of Lowe's 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind, 109, Number 436, October 2000, pp. 967-9 No
Olson (Eric) Review of Lynne Baker's 'Persons And Bodies' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Mind, 110, Number 438, April 2001, pp. 427-430(4) No
Olson (Eric) Review of Perry's 'Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract European Journal of Philosophy (To appear in …) No
Olson (Eric) Review of 'Persons: Human and Divine' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Mind, 2008 Yes
Olson (Eric) Review of Tye's 'Consciousness and Persons - Unity and Identity' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73, 2006: 500-503 No
Olson (Eric) The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology Yes
Olson (Eric) The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twining Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Southern Journal of Philosophy 52, Spindel Supplement, 2014: 24-40 17%
Olson (Eric) The Nature of People Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Luper - The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, 2014, Chapter 2 25%
Olson (Eric) The Paradox of Increase Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 390-417 4%
Olson (Eric) The Passage of Time Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract R. LePoidevin, et al., eds., Routledge Companion to Metaphysics No
Olson (Eric) The Person and the Corpse Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death; ed. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (OUP, 2015), pp. 80-96 Yes
Olson (Eric) There Is No Problem of the Self Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 5, Numbers 5-6, 1998, pp. 645-657(13) Yes
Olson (Eric) Thinking Animals and the Constitution View Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract
(Copy Annotated)
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" Yes
Olson (Eric) Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I' Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Topics 30: 189-208. 2002 Yes
Olson (Eric) Warum wir Tiere sind (Why we are animals) Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003 Yes
Olson (Eric) Was I Ever a Fetus? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar97, Vol. 57 Issue 1, p95, 18p; Yes
Olson (Eric) Was I Ever a Fetus? ('New Version')