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Baker - Personal Identity Over Time

(Text as at 14/03/2015 11:36:58)

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This note controls my detailed review of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Personal Identity Over Time", Chapter 5 of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View". I’ve pirated the Oxford Scholarship Online summary as a temporary expedient.

Oxford Scholarship Online Abstract

  1. Discusses the vexing problem of personal identity over time. In virtue of what is a person P1 at t1 the same person as a person P2 at t2? I canvass candidate answers to this question, and show that each fails:
    1. Sameness of person consists in sameness of body,
    2. Sameness of person consists in sameness of living organism (Animalism),
    3. Sameness of person consists in sameness of brain,
    4. Sameness of person consists in psychological continuity,
    5. Sameness of person consists in sameness of immaterial soul.
  2. Then, I discuss my own view: sameness of person consists in sameness of first-person perspective. Alas, my own view does not provide an informative criterion either. Although I can characterize noncircularly what it is to have a first-person perspective at a time, I know of no noncircular characterization of sameness of first-person perspective over time. Since nobody has an adequate and informative criterion of personal identity over time, I conclude that there is no adequate and informative criterion of personal identity over time: Sameness of person is not reducible to sameness of anything nonpersonal.
  3. Nevertheless, construing personal identity in terms of sameness of first-person perspective has its advantages.
    1. First, it avoids problems besetting the other views (e.g., species chauvinism, the duplication problem).
    2. Second, it accords well with our self-understanding: there is a fact of the matter whether some future individual is I, and that fact of the matter does not depend on the nonexistence of someone else.
    3. Finally, the idea of sameness of first-person perspective ties what it is to be a person over time with what it is to be a person in the first place.

Sections
  1. Other Views of Personal Identity over Time
  2. The Constitution View of Personal Identity over Time
  3. Is Bodily Transfer Possible?
  4. Conclusion


… Further details to be supplied1



Printable Versions:



Previous Version of this Note:

Date Length Title
12/02/2009 21:30:14 2262 Baker - Personal Identity Over Time



Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
14/03/2015 11:36:58 None available Baker - Persons and Bodies

Summary of Note Links from this Page

Awaiting Attention (Write-ups)        

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Summary of Note Links to this Page

Baker - Persons and Bodies, 2        

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References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Personal Identity Over Time Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 5 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View Yes



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