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Personal Identity

Dion and Theon

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. ‘Dion and Theon’ is an ancient conundrum that has been revived by Peter Geach, Michael Burke and others – in the form of “Tib and Tibbles²” – and is put to a variety of uses.
  2. It is so closely associated with one version of Tibles the Cat³ that I’ll describe them together, though a variant form of Tibbles the Cat will be discussed under its own Note.
     1. The conceit is that there is a whole man (Dion; or cat, Tibbles) and a partially overlapping thing (Theon or Tib) that is identical to Dion (or Tibbles) apart from its right foot (or tail). It is, of course, moot whether this “thing” is a man (or cat) – or even whether it exists at all.
     2. Subsequently Dion (or Tibbles) suffers the misfortune of losing the relevant member.
     3. Post-ectomy, it appears that Dion is identical to Theon (and Tibbles to Tib).
     4. What are we to make of this apparent contradiction, as it would seem that beforehand the respective pairs were non-identical?
        
  3. The solutions to this puzzle, taken from "Burke (Michael) - Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle", include:-
     1. Restrict the principle that different objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Some philosophers, following Locke⁴ and David Wiggins⁵, modify the principle so that it applies only to objects of the same sort.
     2. Embrace mereological essentialism⁶, the doctrine that each of the parts of an object is essential to its identity. Popular in antiquity, but not supported these days.
     3. Deny that the concept⁷ of a torso is a proper one, or deny that there ever was such a thing as Theon.
     4. Invoke the doctrine of temporal parts.
     5. Relativizing identity⁸, whether to time or to sort⁹. George Myro and Peter Geach both would say that the amputation has left just one (man-sized) object, an object that is both a man and a torso. Is that object Dion? Or is it Theon? Myro's answer would be "both."
     6. Michael Burke’s solution: Post amputation there is just one object; it is (predicatively) both a man and a torso; this one object is Dion, who once was two-footed and now is one-footed; Theon has ceased to exist.
        

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  Further Remarks:
  1. This Note is associated with a number of other Notes on the same general theme, namely:-
     • Coincident Objects¹⁰,
     • The Problem of the Many¹¹
     • The Ship of Theseus¹²,
     • The Statue and the Clay¹³,
     • Tibbles the Cat¹⁴,

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Burke (Michael) - Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle", 1994, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read
• For a Page of Links¹⁵ to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read¹⁶, include the following:-
  • General:
    1. "Burke (Michael) - Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle", 1994, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Carter (William) - Dion's Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy)", 1997, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands", 2014, External Link
    4. "Olson (Eric) - Dion's Foot", 1997, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Parsons (Josh) - Dion, Theon, and DAUP", 2004, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time", 1968, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Bowin (John) - Chrysippus' Puzzle About Identity", 2003, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
    2. "Burke (Michael) - Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem", 2004, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Denkel (Arda) - Theon’s Tale: Does a Cambridge Change Result in a Substantial Change?", 1995, Internal PDF Link
    4. "Doyle (Robert O.) - Dion and Theon", 2021, No Abstract, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Moran (Alexander P.) - The Paradox of Decrease and Dependent Parts", 2018, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 13%
    6. "Sedley (David) - The Stoic criterion of identity", 1982, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
    7. "Stone (Jim) - Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus's Puzzle", 2002, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Ujvari (Marta) - Cambridge Change and Sortal Essentialism", 2004, Internal PDF Link

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder¹⁷.

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Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
20/09/2022 11:24:00	4057	Dion and Theon
10/05/2022 17:45:36	3694	Dion and Theon
01/10/2021 13:17:46	3062	Dion and Theon
11/02/2021 11:29:46	3502	Dion and Theon
19/09/2020 20:29:46	3104	Dion and Theon
24/04/2018 22:19:12	4380	Dion and Theon
14/01/2017 20:18:14	3386	Dion and Theon
26/03/2014 19:09:07	820	Dion and Theon
25/08/2009 14:34:05	84	Dion and Theon

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
06/07/2023 00:43:12	Dion and Theon	Constitution

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Coincidence	Concepts	Essentialism	Locke
Note Links Explanation	Plug Note Apologia	Problem of the Many	Relative Identity	Ship of Theseus
Sortals	Statue and the Clay	Tibbles the Cat	Wiggins	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Coincidence	Constitution	Constitution View - Objections	Mereology	Olson - What Are We? The Question
Personite	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3	Problem of the Many	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View)	Thesis - Current Stance	Tibbles the Cat, 2	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Bowin (John)	Chrysippus' Puzzle About Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Burke (Michael)	Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Burke (Michael)	Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem	Paper	2, 3
Denkel (Arda)	Theon’s Tale: Does a Cambridge Change Result in a Substantial Change?	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5
Doyle (Robert O.)	N/A	Author
Kingma (Elselijn)	Were You Part of Your Mother?	Paper		Yes
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric)	Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands	Paper	2	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Tibbles the Cat - A Reply to Burke	Paper
Olson (Eric)	Dion's Foot	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? The Question	Paper		Yes
Parsons (Josh)	Dion, Theon, and DAUP	Paper	2	Yes
Stone (Jim)	Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus's Puzzle	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Coincidence	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Constitution	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Constitution View - Objections	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Mereology	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personite	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Problem of the Many	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Tibbles the Cat	Paper	2	Yes
Ujvari (Marta)	Cambridge Change and Sortal Essentialism	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Wiggins (David)	On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time	Paper	2	Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Bowin (John)	Chrysippus' Puzzle About Identity	Paper - Cited	Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24: 239-251 (2003)	33%
Burke (Michael)	Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy 91, No. 3 (March 1994), 129-139	Yes
Burke (Michael)	Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem	Paper - Cited	Analysis 64, July 2004, Vol. Issue 3, p242-250, 9p	No
Burke (Michael)	Tibbles the Cat: A Modern Sophisma	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Studies 84:63-74, 1996	No
Carter (William)	Dion's Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy)	Paper - Cited	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75, No. 2 (Jun. 1997), 371-379	Yes
Denkel (Arda)	Theon’s Tale: Does a Cambridge Change Result in a Substantial Change?	Paper - Cited	Analysis 55.3, July 1995, pp. 166–170	No
Doyle (Robert O.)	Dion and Theon	Paper - Cited	Personal Website	No
Kingma (Elselijn)	Were You Part of Your Mother?	Paper - Referencing	Mind, Volume 128, Issue 511, July 2019, Pages 609–646	Yes
Marshall (Richard)	Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	37%
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric)	Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands	Paper - Cited	Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers	Yes
Moran (Alexander P.)	The Paradox of Decrease and Dependent Parts	Paper - Cited	Penultimate draft. Final draft published in Ratio, 31 (3): 273-284 (2018)	13%
Noonan (Harold)	Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 256 (Apr., 1991), pp. 248-249	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Tibbles the Cat - A Reply to Burke	Paper - Referencing	Philosophical Studies 95:215-218, 1999	No
Olson (Eric)	Dion's Foot	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy 94, No. 5 (May, 1997), 260-265	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	16%
Olson (Eric)	What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	99%
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? The Question	Paper - Referencing	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Parsons (Josh)	Dion, Theon, and DAUP	Paper - Cited	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85 (2004)	Yes
Parsons (Josh)	Dion, Theon, and DAUP	Paper - Referencing	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85 (2004)	Yes
Rea (Michael), Ed.	Material Constitution - A Reader	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	35%
Rea (Michael), Ed.	Material Constitution - A Reader	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	35%
Sedley (David)	The Stoic criterion of identity	Paper - Cited	Phronesis, 27 (1982), 255–75	11%
Stone (Jim)	Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus's Puzzle	Paper - Cited	Analysis, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 216-223	No
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Dion and Theon	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Ujvari (Marta)	Cambridge Change and Sortal Essentialism	Paper - Cited	Metaphysica 5.2 (2004), pp. 25-34	No
Wiggins (David)	On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time	Paper - Cited	Rea - Material Constitution - A Reader	Yes
Wiggins (David)	On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time	Paper - Referencing	Rea - Material Constitution - A Reader	Yes

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Text Colour Conventions

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2023

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