Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Thinking Animal Argument
(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- This argument is otherwise known as the “too many minds” argument, the “too many thinkers” argument, or Olson2’s “master argument”. For many years, Olson has trotted out this argument at every opportunity.
- The basic idea is that a human animal3 thinks, and if it is not identical to the person4, then we have too many thinkers – the animal5 and the person6, unless we deny that one or other of them thinks, which is at the least very counter-intuitive.
- Additional to this metaphysical problem, we have – Olson says – an epistemological question. Which one are we? The animal or the person?
- While I’m inclined to accept animalism7, I think this argument fails, and it does the cause for animalism no good by having it as the main argument in its favour.
- This form of argument has been used by nihilists8 to argue that there are no ordinary things, usually invoking vagueness9 and fuzzy boundary considerations. Which of the many cats (give or take a few atoms) is the “real cat”? There’s no principled reason and I can’t know which. So there are no cats, or if there are, I can’t know which of the many cat-a-likes is the real cat. Since there are ordinary things, there must be something wrong with this argument form (though I don’t yet have a strong opinion as to just what it is). I accept Moore’s “two hands” argument – nothing is plainer than that I have two hands, so any metaphysical or epistemological theory that says I haven’t, or can’t know that I have, must have something wrong with it. I do know that there are arguments against the existence of hands and other “arbitrary undetached parts”, so maybe it’s safer to stick to cats. Olson (see "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands"), as well as Peter Van Inwagen (eg. in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts"), argue against the existence of hands, though van Inwagen is happy with the existence of cats and other organisms, so I need to address their arguments head-on to determine the subtleties thereof.
- Baker10 and other supporters of the Constitution View11 have answers to the argument used as an argument against their view (along the lines of “thinking derivatively”).
- There are also resources like “Lewis counting”, as in perdurantism12 where a “soon to fission13” entity is really two entities sharing stages. Our language is fit for purpose.
Further Remarks:
- I intend to cover this argument in Chapter 614 (pro) and Chapter 715 (con16) of my Thesis. It also features in Chapter 917 as an argument against18 the Constitution View19.
References
- Relevant Works cited above:
- "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands", 2014, External Link, Read
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts", 1981, Internal PDF Link
- For a Page of Links20 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read21, include the following:-
- General:
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?", 2005, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism (SEP)", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Blatti (Stephan) - We Are Animals", 2018, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Coliva (Annalisa) - Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?", 2013, Internal PDF Link
- "Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'", 2007, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands", 2014, External Link
- "Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings", 2003, Annotations
- "Olson (Eric) - An Argument for Animalism", 2003, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem", 2004, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity", 2003, Annotations
- "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2002)", 2002, Annotations, External Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Review of P. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves", 2015, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction", 1999
- "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Constitution View", 2001, Write-Up Note22, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'", 2002, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Warum wir Tiere sind (Why we are animals)", 2003, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology", 2007, Book
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals", 2007, Write-Up Note23, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains", 2007, Write-Up Note24, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Bundles", 2007, Write-Up Note25, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Constitution", 2007, Write-Up Note26, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Souls", 2007, Write-Up Note27, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? What Now?", 2007, Write-Up Note28, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'", 2008, Book
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009
- "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity", 2009, Write-Up Note29
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism", 2008, Write-Up Note30, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Footnote31
- A further reading list might start with:-
- General:
- "Arnadottir (Steinvor Tholl) - Functionalism and Thinking Animals", 2010, Internal PDF Link, Read = 22%
- "Blatti (Stephan) - A New Argument for Animalism", 2012, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 67%
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Headhunters", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 40%
- "Burke (Michael) - Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem", 2004, Internal PDF Link
- "Hershenov (David) - Animals, Persons and Bioethics", 2008, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 4%
- "Hershenov (David) - Are There Too Many Hylomorphic Individuals Thinking about this Life and the Next?", 2017, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
- "Hershenov (David) - Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers", Undated, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
- "Hershenov (David) - Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms", 2005, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
- "Hershenov (David) - Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers", 2007, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Hershenov (David) - Who Doesn't Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?", 2013, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Johansson (Jens) - Animal Ethics", 2016, Read = 28%
- "Madden (Rory) - Intention and the Self", 2011, Internal PDF Link, Read = 4%
- "Miller (Kristie) - 'Personal identity' minus the persons", 2013, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
- "Noonan (Harold) - Personal pronoun revisionism - asking the right question", 2012, Internal PDF Link, Read = 67%
- "Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010)", 2002, Read = 10%
- "Noonan (Harold) - The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism", 2010, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2015)", 2017, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 15%
- "Olson (Eric) - Self: Personal Identity", 2009, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Olson (Eric) - The Nature of People", 2014, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 25%
- "Parfit (Derek) - We Are Not Human Beings", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 38%
- "Ray (Greg) - Williamson's Master Argument on Vagueness", 2004, Internal PDF Link, Note: Is it relevant?
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons, Animals, and Identity", 2008, Internal PDF Link, Read = 8%
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Thinking Animals Without Animalism", 2016, Read = 33%
- "Steward (Helen) - Free Will", 2009, No Abstract
- "Sutton (Catherine S.) - The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem", 2014, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts", 1981, Internal PDF Link
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder32.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 31:
Table of the Previous 7 Versions of this Note:
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
Abbreviations |
Animalism |
Animalism - Arguments For, 2 |
Baker - Materialism with a Human Face, 2 |
Baker - Review - Olson - What Are We? |
Baker - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution |
Coincidence |
Constitution View - Objections, 2 |
Corpses |
Counting Persons |
Mereology |
Nihilism |
Olson |
Olson - Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2 |
Olson - What Are We? Animals, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Olson - What Are We? The Question, 2, 3 |
Olson - What Are We? What Now? |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3, 4 |
Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity |
Supervenience |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It), 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View), 2, 3, 4 |
Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) |
Thesis - Current Stance |
Thought |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
|
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Materialism with a Human Face |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
When Do Persons Begin and End? |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Blatti (Stephan) |
A New Argument for Animalism |
Paper |
2 |
|
Blatti (Stephan) |
Animalism (SEP) |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Blatti (Stephan) |
Headhunters |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
|
Blatti (Stephan) |
We Are Animals |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Coliva (Annalisa) |
Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Hershenov (David) |
Animals, Persons and Bioethics |
Paper |
|
|
Hershenov (David) |
Are There Too Many Hylomorphic Individuals Thinking about this Life and the Next? |
Paper |
2, 3, 4 |
|
Hershenov (David) |
Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers |
Paper |
|
|
Hershenov (David) |
Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms |
Paper |
|
|
Hershenov (David) |
Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Hershenov (David) |
Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers |
Paper |
2 |
|
Hershenov (David) |
Who Doesn't Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers? |
Paper |
2, 3 |
|
Johansson (Jens) |
Animal Ethics |
Paper |
|
|
Johnston (Mark) |
Remnant Persons: Animalism's Undoing |
Paper |
2 |
|
Madden (Rory) |
Intention and the Self |
Paper |
|
|
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) |
Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Yes |
Miller (Kristie) |
'Personal identity' minus the persons |
Paper |
|
|
Noonan (Harold) |
Personal pronoun revisionism - asking the right question |
Paper |
|
|
Noonan (Harold) |
Persons, Animals and Human Beings |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Noonan (Harold) |
Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010) |
Paper |
2, 3 |
|
Noonan (Harold) |
The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
|
Olson (Eric) |
Animalism and the Corpse Problem |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Persistence |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Personal Identity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Personal Identity (Stanford, 2002) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Personal Identity (Stanford, 2008) |
Paper |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Personal Identity (Stanford, 2010) |
Paper |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Personal Identity (Stanford, 2015) |
Paper |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
Review of P. Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Self: Personal Identity |
Paper |
|
|
Olson (Eric) |
The Human Animal: Introduction |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
The Nature of People |
Paper |
2 |
|
Olson (Eric) |
Warum wir Tiere sind (Why we are animals) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? Animals |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? Constitution |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper |
2, 3 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? What Now? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
O'Shaughnessy (Brian) |
Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge |
Paper |
2 |
|
Parfit (Derek) |
We Are Not Human Beings |
Paper |
|
|
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Shoemaker (Sydney) |
Persons, Animals, and Identity |
Paper |
|
|
Shoemaker (Sydney) |
Thinking Animals Without Animalism |
Paper |
|
|
Snowdon (Paul) |
Conclusions and Consequences |
Paper |
|
|
Snowdon (Paul) |
The Self and Personal Identity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Sutton (Catherine S.) |
The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem |
Paper |
|
|
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Abbreviations |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Animalism |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Animalism - Arguments For |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View) |
Paper |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Coincidence |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Constitution View - Objections |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Corpses |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Counting Persons |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Current Position |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Mereology |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Nihilism |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Olson |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Supervenience |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Thought |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
Précis of Material Beings |
Paper |
|
Yes |
Zimmerman (Dean) |
The Constitution of Persons by Bodies: A Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker’s Theory of Material Constitution |
Paper |
|
|
References & Reading List
Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
Arnadottir (Steinvor Tholl) |
Functionalism and Thinking Animals |
Paper - Cited |
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 147, No. 3 (February 2010), pp. 347-354 |
22% |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Materialism with a Human Face |
Paper - Referencing |
Corcoran - Soul, Body and Survival, Chapter 10 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson |
Paper - Referencing |
Mind, 117:1120-1122, 2008 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
When Do Persons Begin and End? |
Paper - Cited |
Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
When Do Persons Begin and End? |
Paper - Referencing |
Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005 |
Yes |
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. |
E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' |
Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) |
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' |
Yes |
Blatti (Stephan) |
A New Argument for Animalism |
Paper - Referencing |
Analysis Vol 72, Number 4, October 2012, pp. 685–690 |
33% |
Blatti (Stephan) |
Animalism (SEP) |
Paper - Cited |
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2014 |
Yes |
Blatti (Stephan) |
We Are Animals |
Paper - Cited |
Philosophy for Us, ed. Lenny Clapp (Cognella, 2018), 73-82 |
Yes |
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds. |
Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity |
Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) |
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds. - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity |
22% |
Coliva (Annalisa) |
Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? |
Paper - Cited |
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |
Yes |
Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. |
Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
99% |
Hershenov (David) |
Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers |
Paper - Referencing |
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine. Forthcoming. |
33% |
Hershenov (David) |
Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 80, 2007, 225-36 |
No |
Hershenov (David) |
Who Doesn't Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers? |
Paper - By Subtopic |
American Philosophical Quarterly, 50:2, April 2013, 203-208 |
17% |
Johnston (Mark) |
Remnant Persons: Animalism's Undoing |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part I, Chapter 5, pp. 89-127 |
15% |
Madden (Rory) |
Thinking Parts |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part II, Chapter 9, pp. 180-207 |
18% |
Marshall (Richard) |
Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
37% |
Marshall (Richard) |
Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
37% |
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) |
Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands |
Paper - Cited |
Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers |
Yes |
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) |
Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands |
Paper - Referencing |
Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers |
Yes |
Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. |
Personal Identity |
Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) |
Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. - Personal Identity |
13% |
Moran (Alexander P.) |
Animalism and the Thinking Parts Problem |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Personal website. |
17% |
Noonan (Harold) |
The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Analysis, Vol. 70, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 93-98 |
No |
Olson (Eric) |
An Argument for Animalism |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Martin & Barresi - Personal Identity, Chapter 12 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson) |
Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic) |
Olson (Eric) - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson) |
16% |
Olson (Eric) |
Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson) |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
16% |
Olson (Eric) |
Persistence |
Paper - Referencing |
The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 2, pp. 22-41 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Personal Identity - Oxford Bibliographies Online |
Paper - Referencing |
Oxford Bibliographies Online / Sheffield University website |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
The Human Animal: Introduction |
Paper - Referencing |
The Human Animal, September 1999, Introduction, pp. 3-7 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Thinking Animals and the Constitution View |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I' |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Philosophical Topics 30: 189-208. 2002 |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology |
Book - Cited |
Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? Animals |
Paper - Referencing |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 2 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper - Referencing |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? What Now? |
Paper - Referencing |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 9 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
Shand (John) |
Central Issues of Philosophy |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
35% |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
Shoemaker (David) |
Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern |
Paper - Referencing |
Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 2 |
Yes |
Shoemaker (Sydney) |
Thinking Animals Without Animalism |
Paper - By Subtopic |
Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part I, Chapter 6, pp. 128-141 |
33% |
Snowdon (Paul) |
The Self and Personal Identity |
Paper - Referencing |
Shand (John) - Central Issues of Philosophy, Chapter 9 |
Yes |
Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Thinking Animal Argument |
Paper - By Subtopic |
|
Yes |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity |
Paper - Referencing |
Van Inwagen - Ontology, Identity and Modality, Part II: Identity, Chapter 9, 1997 |
Yes |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
Ontology, Identity and Modality: Essays in metaphysics |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
17% |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
Ontology, Identity and Modality: Essays in metaphysics |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
17% |
Van Inwagen (Peter) |
The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts |
Paper - Cited |
Van Inwagen - Ontology, Identity and Modality, Part II: Identity, Chapter 5, 1981 |
No |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2024