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Personal Identity

Quasi-Memory

(Work In Progress: output at 28/08/2025 01:30:43)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. One problem with Locke’s memory theory of Personal Identity² is that it is prima facie circular. A memory can properly only be had by the person who had the experience, so cannot be used to analyse “Person³”.
  2. However, “Quasi-” prefixes do not presuppose ownership.
  3. Snowdon puts it this way₄:-
     1. There is a causal linkage L linking a person’s memory to that person’s history.
     2. There is – we may suppose – a neural trace laid down at the time, and re-activated during an act of remembering.
     3. This trace might be transferred – again we may suppose – to some other subject by micro-surgery.
     4. This new subject thereby Q-remembers an event that he did not experience.
     5. So, since Q-remembering does not presuppose the identity of the person doing the Q-remembering with the person involved in the event Q-remembered, Q-predicates can without circularity be used to analyse personal identity in terms of psychological continuity and connectedness.
     6. Or so it is said.
  4. In "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity" (reviewed here⁵), Paul Snowdon attributes the establishment of the terminology to "Parfit (Derek) - How We Are Not What We Believe", pp. 219-23, and a major critique to "Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity".

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  Further Remarks:
  1. None, currently.

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Parfit (Derek) - How We Are Not What We Believe", 1986, Read
  2. "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity", 2009, Write-Up Note⁶, Read
  3. "Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity", 2001, Read = 48%
• For a Page of Links⁷ to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read⁸, include the following:-
  • General:
    1. "Coliva (Annalisa) - Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?", 2013, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Liao (S. Matthew) - The Organism View Defended", 2006, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Noonan (Harold) - Quasi-Memory", 2003, Annotations
    4. "Olson (Eric) - Immanent Causation and Life After Death", 2010, Write-Up Note⁹, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity", 1999
    6. "Parfit (Derek) - How We Are Not What We Believe", 1986
    7. "Roache (Rebecca) - A Defence of Quasi-Memory", 2006, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality", 2009
    9. "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity", 2009, Write-Up Note¹⁰
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Baillie (James) - Aspects of Non-Reductionism", 1993
    2. "Berglund (Stefan) - Problems of Reductive Personalism", 1995
    3. "Bernecker (Sven) - Personal Identity and Memory", 2010
    4. "Collins (Arthur) - Personal Identity And Coherence Of Q-Memory", 1997, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Shoemaker, 'Persons and their Pasts'", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
    6. "Noonan (Harold) - Memory and Quasi-Memory", 1980, Internal PDF Link
    7. "Northoff (G.) - Are 'Q-Memories' Empirically Realistic? A Neurophilosophical Approach", 2000, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Puccetti (Roland) - Remembering the Past of Another", 1973, Internal PDF Link
    9. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Reply To Wiggins", 2004
    10. "Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity", 2001, Read = 48%
    11. "Wiggins (David) - Reply To Shoemaker", 2004, Internal PDF Link
    12. "Wiggins (David) - Reply To Shoemaker's Reply", 2004, Internal PDF Link

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder¹¹.

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 4:

1. In "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity".

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Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
06/07/2023 00:43:12	3158	Quasi-Memory
20/09/2022 11:24:00	2862	Quasi-Memory
11/04/2022 00:01:26	2481	Quasi-Memory
17/02/2021 01:17:46	2325	Quasi-Memory
30/09/2020 01:16:19	1937	Quasi-Memory
27/10/2018 19:52:19	4071	Quasi-Memory
13/08/2015 23:55:41	1974	Quasi-Memory
18/12/2010 19:58:05	213	Quasi-Memory
06/04/2010 14:55:41	189	Quasi-Memory

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
03/05/2026 07:39:46	Quasi-Memory	Memory

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Locke on Personal Identity	Note Links Explanation	Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Person
Plug Note Apologia	Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Baker - Personal Identity Over Time	Johnston - Human Beings	Memory	Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3, 4
Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Baillie (James)	Aspects of Non-Reductionism	Paper
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Personal Identity Over Time	Paper		Yes
Berglund (Stefan)	Problems of Reductive Personalism	Paper	2
Bernecker (Sven)	Personal Identity and Memory	Paper
Coliva (Annalisa)	Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?	Paper	2	Yes
Collins (Arthur)	Personal Identity And Coherence Of Q-Memory	Paper	2, 3, 4
Funkhouser (Eric)	Notes on Shoemaker, 'Persons and their Pasts'	Paper	2
Hershenov (David)	Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'	Paper		Yes
Johnston (Mark)	Human Beings	Paper		Yes
Liao (S. Matthew)	The Organism View Defended	Paper	2	Yes
Matthews (Steve)	Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, And Moral Personhood	Paper
Noonan (Harold)	Objects and Identity: Introduction	Paper
Noonan (Harold)	Quasi-Memory	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Northoff (G.)	Are 'Q-Memories' Empirically Realistic? A Neurophilosophical Approach	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Olson (Eric)	Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Psychology and Personal Identity	Paper	2	Yes
Roache (Rebecca)	A Defence of Quasi-Memory	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper	2	Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Reply To Wiggins	Paper	2
Slors (Marc)	A Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity: The Five Problems Revisited (The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 5)	Paper
Slors (Marc)	Parfit's Reductio of a Substratum-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity	Paper
Slors (Marc)	Parfit's Reductio of a Substratum-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity	Paper	2
Slors (Marc)	Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory	Paper
Snowdon (Paul)	The Self and Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Memory	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Wiggins (David)	Personal Identity	Paper
Wiggins (David)	Reply To Shoemaker's Reply	Paper
Wiggins (David)	Sameness and Substance Renewed	Book

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Baillie (James)	Aspects of Non-Reductionism	Paper - Cited	Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 3	No
Baillie (James)	Problems in Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	45%
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Personal Identity Over Time	Paper - Referencing	Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 5, pp. 118-146	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Berglund (Stefan)	Human and Personal Identity	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Berglund (Stefan) - Human and Personal Identity	1%
Berglund (Stefan)	Problems of Reductive Personalism	Paper - By Subtopic	Berglund - Human and Personal Identity (PhD Dissertation, Lund University), Chapter 6, 1995, pp. 128-158	No
Coliva (Annalisa)	Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?	Paper - Cited	Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews	Yes
Coliva (Annalisa)	Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?	Paper - Referencing	Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews	Yes
Collins (Arthur)	Personal Identity And Coherence Of Q-Memory	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Quarterly, 1997, Vol. 47 Issue 186, p73, 8p;	No
Gasser (Georg), Ed.	Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	96%
Hershenov (David)	Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'	Paper - Referencing	Religious Studies, 43:2, June 2007, 237-242	Yes
Johnston (Mark)	Human Beings	Paper - Referencing	Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83	Yes
Liao (S. Matthew)	The Organism View Defended	Paper - Cited	The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 334-350	Yes
Liao (S. Matthew)	The Organism View Defended	Paper - Referencing	The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 334-350	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Memory and Quasi-Memory	Paper - By Subtopic	Noonan - Objects and Identity, 1980, Chapter 14	No
Noonan (Harold)	Objects and Identity: An Examination of Relative Identity and its Consequences	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Noonan (Harold) - Objects and Identity: An Examination of Relative Identity and its Consequences	10%
Noonan (Harold)	Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Quasi-Memory	Paper - Cited	Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 8	Yes
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed.	Philosophy - 81/316 (April 2006)	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. - Philosophy - 81/316 (April 2006)	18%
Olson (Eric)	Immanent Causation and Life After Death	Paper - Referencing	Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Psychology and Personal Identity	Paper - Referencing	The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 1, pp. 7-21	Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	How We Are Not What We Believe	Paper - Cited	Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 219-245(27).	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	Reasons and Persons	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Roache (Rebecca)	A Defence of Quasi-Memory	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophy - 81/316 (April 2006), pp. 323-356	Yes
Shand (John)	Central Issues of Philosophy	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	35%
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction	Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper - By Subtopic	Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 1	Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Reply To Wiggins	Paper - By Subtopic	Monist, Oct2004, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p610-613, 4p;	No
Slors (Marc)	Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory	Paper - By Subtopic	The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Apr., 2001) (pp. 186-214)	No
Snowdon (Paul)	The Self and Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Shand (John) - Central Issues of Philosophy, Chapter 9	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Quasi-Memory	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Wiggins (David)	Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed, 2001, Chapter 7	48%
Wiggins (David)	Reply To Shoemaker's Reply	Paper - By Subtopic	Monist, Oct2004, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p614-615, 2p;	No
Wiggins (David)	Sameness and Substance Renewed	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	16%
Zimmerman (Dean) & Gendler (Tamar Szabo), Eds.	Monist Special Issue: Personal Identity	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Zimmerman (Dean) & Gendler (Tamar Szabo), Eds. - Monist Special Issue: Personal Identity	2%

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Text Colour Conventions

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026

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