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Personal Identity
Biological Criterion
(Text as at 27/06/2011 18:57:36)
*** THIS IS NOT THE LATEST VERSION OF THIS NOTE ***
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This is the criterion1 of identity associated with the biological view2 of what we human beings3 are.
Animalism4 takes this biological view, that we are human animals (as distinct from persons5, or immaterial souls6). So, our persistence criteria are those of animals. What will fall under this Note is just what these criteria are.
Biological identity criteria in general are slightly wider than those of animals in particular, as they include those for plants and other biological organisms7.
Locke8 made the first stab at what this criterion might be. His view was that it was the participation in a single life9 that made an organism the same organism over time. The concept of a life is itself in need of explanation, and may not (in the absence of vitalism) be logically prior to the concept of an organism.
It seems to me that the biological criterion could (theoretically, at least) allow for metamorphosis10 (provided that the metamorphosis is into another organism). There are, however, sortal11 objections to metamorphosis.
This is a place-holder12. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list below. This list is in need of pruning and further research. It is somewhat arbitrary as to which books / papers fall under this topic, and which under Biological View13 or Animalism14.
The primary text addressing this topic is"Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities".
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